No. 13378
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
EDWARD Re SIKORSKI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
RAY OLIN and ROLIN
MFG., INC.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Denzil R. Young argued, Baker, Montana
For Respondent:
Gene Huntley argued, Baker, Montana
Submitted: May 6, 1977
Decided: !$.[
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Filed:
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Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
Defendants Ray Olin and Rolin Mfg.,Inc. appeal from a
Fallon County jury v e r d i c t and judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f
Edward R. S i k o r s k i , i n t h e amount of $10,000 f o r breach of a
sales representative .contract.
Edward S i k o r s k i f i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t Ray Olin a s t h e
manager of Rolin Mfg.,Inc. a l l e g i n g a breach of c o n t r a c t .
Defendants answered by admitting t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t u a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p b u t denying any l i a b i l i t y f o r a breach. Discovery
c o n s i s t e d of S i k o r s k i ' s deposition of Olin and i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s
answered by S i k o r s k i . O t h e day of t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
n
allowed S i k o r s k i t o amend one answer t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o
r e f l e c t t h e f u l l e x t e n t of t h e a s s e r t e d agreement. Following
t r i a l , t h e j u r y returned a v e r d i c t f o r $10,000 i n favor of
S i k o r s k i and a g a i n s t Olin and Rolin Mfg., I n c . ( h e r e i n a f t e r
r e f e r r e d t o a s Olin and Rolin o r Olin). Olin and Rolin appeal.
This Court on appeal i s asked t o consider numerous ques-
t i o n s regarding t h e t r i a l of t h i s matter. I n substance, these
questions c o n s t i t u t e but two arguable i s s u e s :
(1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n permitting S i k o r s k i
t o amend t h e previously answered i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and
(2) Whether t h e evidence offered by S i k o r s k i w a s s u f f i c i e n t
t o support t h e j u r y ' s award of $10,000 damages.
The f a c t s a r e : S i k o r s k i a l l e g e d i n h i s complaint and
provided evidence a t t r i a l t h a t i n January 1971, Olin and Rolin
agreed S i k o r s k i would become a s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r Rolin i n
the s a l e of machinery and equipment produced by Rolin. Sikorski
maintained t h e c o n t r a c t was t o extend f o r one year and he was t o
r e c e i v e a s compensation t h e r e f o r 7% of d e a l e r c o s t s f o r
a l l s a l e s up t o $60,000 and 8% f o r a l l s a l e s exceeding t h a t
amount. A t t r i a l , S i k o r s k i t e s t i f i e d he was t o r e c e i v e a 5%
commission on improvements he might make, based on wholesale
p r i c e s of t h e improved equipment.
S i k o r s k i a l l e g e d f u l l performance on h i s p a r t , c o n s i s t i n g
of numerous demonstrations of t h e machinery and arrangements
for dealer distribution. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t over a p e r i o d of
f o u r months, h e s p e n t approximately 75% of h i s time i n performing
under t h e agreement. S i k o r s k i ' s testimony a t t r i a l t h a t he
should have received $3,750 f o r h i s e f f o r t s i n t h i s r e g a r d was
received w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n . Also, r e c e i v e d without o b j e c t i o n ,
was proof t h a t S i k o r s k i had devised improvements f o r c e r t a i n
f u n c t i o n s of t h e machinery and he should have r e a l i z e d therefrom
a $2,000 commission. He t e s t i f i e d had he been allowed t o per-
form, he would have r e a l i z e d a n e s t i m a t e d $4,800 i n commissions
by t h e end of t h e f i r s t y e a r . T h i s , t o o , was r e c e i v e d without
objection.
I n s u p p o r t of t h e e s t i m a t e , S i k o r s k i o f f e r e d uncontroverted
testimony he arranged f o r t h e s a l e of a l a r g e amount of equipment,
which Rolin r e f u s e d t o d e l i v e r . S i k o r s k i argued he was never
i n f a c t " t e r m i n a k d " a s s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by R o l i n b u t r a t h e r
t h a t he himself ceased performance i n June 1971, when Rolin refused
t o d e l i v e r r e q u e s t e d machinery and d e l e g a t e d h i s s a l e s t e r r i t o r y
t o another agent.
R o l i n , on t h e o t h e r hand, contended t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t
were t h o s e embodied i n a l e t t e r s e n t by O l i n t o S i k o r s k i , r e c e i v e d
by S i k o r s k i i n March 1971. The l e t t e r purported t o l i m i t t h e
l e n g t h of t h e c o n t r a c t t o t h r e e months, s u b j e c t t o e x t e n s i o n t o
one year. Under i t s terms, S i k o r s k i was t o receive a 7% com-
mission on s a l e s up t o $60,000 and 8% f o r amounts i n excess of
$60,000.
I t was O l i n ' and4 Rolihl s p o s i t i o n i n t h e i r answer t o s i k o r s k i t s
complaint t h a t S i k o r s k i had made no s a l e s and earned no commis-
s i o n s and t h e r e f o r e was n o t damaged because he f a i l e d t o perform.
However, O l i n , i n h i s testimony i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n and a s an
a d v e r s e , w t t n e s s a t t r i a l , recanted and admitted a s a l e .
Olin and R o l i n ' s f i r s t contention i s t h a t they were
s u r p r i s e d and prejudiced when t h e t r i a l c o u r t permitted S i k o r s k i
t o amend an answer t o h i s o w n - i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s on t h e day of
trial. They claim S i k o r s k i was allowed t o i n t e r j e c t what, i n
e f f e c t , c o n s t i t u t e d a "new contract" by comparison t o t h e con-
t r a c t a s pled and a s d i s c l o s e d by p r i o r discovery. It i s main-
t a i n e d t h e "new contract" c r e a t e d new i s s u e s , and t h e r e f o r e
S i k o r s k i ' s proof a t t r i a l should have been l i m i t e d t o those
damages, i f any, occasioned by breach of t h e o r i g i n a l l y d i s c l o s e d
contract.
However, t h e record c o n s i s t i n g of t h e pleadings, answers
t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and O l i n ' s testimony through deposition and
a t t r i a l , e s t a b l i s h t h a t Olin and Rolin were w e l l aware of t h e
broader c o n t r a c t u a l terms upon which S i k o r s k i intended t o r e l y
a t trial. Moreover, i t i s noteworthy Rolin d i d not request a
continuance, on t h e ground of such a l l e g e d s u r p r i s e o r undue
advantage,
Rule 33, M.R.Civ.P. a u t h o r i z e s use of i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s f o r
the purpose of p r e t r i a l discovery from an adverse p a r t y . This
r u l e i s l i b e r a l l y construed t o make a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s a v a i l -
a b l e t o p a r t i e s i n advance of t r i a l , and t o reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i -
t i e s of s u r p r i s e and u n f a i r advantage. Wolfe v. Northern P a c i f i c
Ry. Co., 147 Mont, 29, 409 P.2d 528 (1966).
However, f a i l u r e t o properly answer c e r t a i n i n t e r r o g a -
t o r i e s w i l l n o t be deemed i n every case t o e f f e c t censure of
m a t e r i a l which should r i g h t f u l l y be developed i n a t r i a l on
the merits. A d e t a i l e d statement of t h e a p p l i c a b l e r u l e and
corresponding reasoning appears i n Wolfe v. Northern P a c i f i c
Ry. C o . , supra:
"* ** Even though under Rule 37 sanctions may
be imposed upon a p a r t y who f a i l s t o comply
with t h e discovery requirements of t h e r u l e s ,
and s p e c i f i c a l l y upon a p a r t y who f a i l s t o
properly answer h i s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , n e c e s s a r i l y
i t must l i e w i t h i n t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e t r i a l
judge t o determine from the circumstances of
each c a s e what c o n s t i t u t e s compliance and non-
compliance and t o determine what s a n c t i o n s , i f
any, a r e t o be imposed. A s t r i c t r u l e of exclusion
could i n many instances d e f e a t t h e d e s i r e d g o a l
of a decision on t h e m e r i t s , Such a misfortune,
we f e e l , may be avoided i f we heavily r e l y upon
t h e watchful eye of t h e t r i a l judge whose v i s i o n
normally i s focused upon t h e d e l i c a t e balance
which weighs t h e s e r v e r ' s r i g h t t o demand answers
t o h i s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and t h e e x t e n t of t h e adverse
p a r t y ' s compliance. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e r u l e s
we w i l l reverse t h e t r i a l judge only when h i s
judgment may m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l
r i g h t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t and allow a p o s s i b l e
miscarriage of j u s t i c e . " 147 Mont. 29, 40-41.
W n o t e , i n reviewing t h e claims of s u r p r i s e and u n f a i r
e
advantage, t h a t S i k o r s k i ' s complaint s e t s f o r t h t h e same p r e c i s e
c o n t r a c t u a l terms a s t o d u r a t i o n and remuneration f o r s a l e s
a s were subjected t o proof a t t r i a l . Moreover, testimony
of Olin e s t a b l i s h e d he had made c e r t a i n c o n t r a c t u a l promises
t o S i k o r s k i , s p e c i f i c a l l y regarding compensation f o r improve-
ments. I t i s c l e a r t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e s of t h e case were formulated
w e l l i n advance of t r i a l , and Olin and Rolin had knowledge of a l l
f a c t s responsive t o ~ i k o r s k i ' sclaims a t t r i a l . Hence, any
s u r p r i s e o r prejudice t o O l i n and Rolin i n t h i s regard was minimal,
a t most. Moreover, by n o t requesting a continuance a f t e r t h e
t r i a l judge g r a n t e d t h e r i g h t t o amend t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r y ,
O l i n and Rolin waived any r f g h t t o c l a i m e r r o r on appeal.
Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48 (1968);
17 C . J . S . Continuances 5 13.
The a c t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge, i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e amend-
ment t o t h e s i n g l e i n t e r r o g a t o r y answer, was proper and
should be s u s t a i n e d . Olin a n d t R o l i n were a f f o r d e d every
o p p o r t u n i t y , through cross-examination, t o t e s t the c r e d i b i l i t y
of S i k o r s k i ' s v e r s i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t . W f i n d no m i s c a r r i a g e of
e
j u s t i c e by p e r m i t t i n g t h e amendment.
Since O l i n and Rolin a l s o f a i l e d t o obj'ect t o almost
a l l of t h e evidence introduced by S i k o r s k i , t h i s C o u r t ' s
f u n c t i o n on review, except where t h e r e w i l l be a m a n i f e s t
m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e , i s extremely l i m i t e d .
Here, t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a g e n e r a l v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of
S i k o r s k i i n t h e amount of $20,000. Items o f damage s p e c i f i c a l l y
o f f e r e d by S i k o r s k i , by h i s testimony, included t h e s e amounts:
1.$3,750 f o r t h e v a l u e o f time expended i n performance
of t h e c o n t r a c t ;
2. $4,800 f o r l o s s of s a l e s commissions which would
have been received b u t f o r t h e breach; and
3. $2,000 f o r l o s s of commissions on i n v e n t i o n s .
The law c o n t r o l l i n g t h e award of damages i n such c a s e s
was placed b e f o r e t h e j u r y i n t h e form of i n s t r u c t i o n s from
the court. The i n s t r u c t i o n s , takenfrom s e c t i o n s 17-301 and
17-302, R.C.M. 1947, were:
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12. "For t h e breach of an o b l i g a t i o n
a r i s i n g from c o n t r a c t , t h e measure o f damages, i s t h e
amount which w i l l compensate t h e p a r t y aggrieved f o r
a l l t h e detriment proximately caused thereby, o r which,
i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of t h i n g s , would be l i k e l y t o
r e s u l t therefrom."
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. "No damages can be recovered
f o r a breach of c o n t r a c t which a r e not c l e a r l y
a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n t h e i r nature and origin."
See Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557
(1974) .
P l a i n l y , t h e damages a l l e g e d by S i k o r s k i r e l a t e t o t h e
f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of Olin and Rolin t o supply equipment and
machinery f o r r e s a l e , and premature termination of t h e con-
t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with S i k o r s k i . There i s no r e a l question
a s t o proximate causation of damages. Rather,it i s stressed
the o f f e r e d proof of damages was overly s p e c u l a t i v e and
t h e r e f o r e an improper b a s i s f o r t h e present damage award.
Olin and Rolin concede damages t o t h e e x t e n t of t h e value
of time invested by S i k o r s k i i n performance of t h e c o n t r a c t
i n t h e amount of $3,750. However, t h e s t r i k i n g f a c t t h a t
emerges from a review of t h e record i s t h a t counsel f o r Olin
and Rolin wholly f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o S i k o r s k i ' s evidence on
t h e o t h e r items of damage and t h e method of computing those
damages.
I t i s elementary t h a t unless a p a r t y urging e r r o r has
made timely o b j e c t i o n t o evidence o r testimony a t t h e t r i a l
l e v e l , i t w i l l hot be considered by t h i s Court on appeal.
I n r e Stevenson, 167 Mont. 220, 538 P.2d 5 (1975); Berdine
v. Sanders County, 164 Mont. 206, 520 P.2d 650 (1974);
~oehler
v. Sanders, 146 Mont. 158, 404 P.2d 885 (1965). While
t h e computations o f f e r e d may have been s u b j e c t t o t h e o b j e c t i o n
t h a t they were s p e c u l a t i v e i n n a t u r e , w e r e f u s e t o consider
t h e matter f o r t h e f i r s t time on appeal.
W e have s a i d , i n p r i o r c a s e s , t h a t any award of damages i s
n e c e s s a r i l y grounded, t o some degree, upon conjecture and surmise.
However, t h e q u e s t i o n . o f damages i s c l e a r l y one t o be determined
by t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e and common sense of t h e j u r y . Waltee v.
Petrolane, Inc., 162 Mont. 317, 511 P.2d 975 (1973).
W f i n d t h e evidence, admitted w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n , i s
e
s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e j u r y v e r d i c t .
W a f f i r m t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
e
Justices.