I am of the opinion that the bill should be dismissed without costs, in accordance with the rule stated in Daniell’s Chancery Practice (1st Ed.) p. 1540:
“Where the conduct of both parties has been equally reprehensible, the court will also abstain from giving costs in favor of either party.”
The following authorities, cited by counsel for the complainant, seem to show a settled practice to deny costs in cases like the present case: Fetridge v. Wells, 13 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 385; Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 33 L. J. Ch. 199; Nixey v. Roffey, W. N. 1870, p. 227; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 31 L. T. N. S. 285; Ripley v. Bandey, 14 R. P. C. 591; Newman v. Pinto, 57 L. T. N. S. 31; Estcourt v. Estcourt, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 276; Warsop v. Warsop, 21 R. P. C. 481; Tallcot v. Moore, 6 Hun, 106; Lever Bros. v. Bedingfield, 16 R. P. C. 3; Borthwick v. Evening Post, 37 Ch. D. 449; Ainsworth v. Walmsley, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; Thornloe v. Hill (1894), 1 Ch. 569; Hostetter v. Van Vorst (C. C.) 62 Fed. 600; Edgington v. Edgington, 11 L. T. N. S. 299; Bass v. Dawber, 19 L. T. N. S. 626. See, also, 2 Daniell’s Chancery (6th Am. Ed.) *p. 1397; Kerly on TradeMarks (2d Ed.) p. 433; Hopkins on Trade-Marks, § 173; Paul on Trade-Marks, § 327; Sebastian on Trade-Marks (4th Ed.) p. 236.
A. decree may be entered accordingly.