No. 13394
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F OTN
1977
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
/' D N L E.
O AD BRINER,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e R . D. M c P h i l l i p s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Kampfe a n d P e r h a c s , Red Lodge, Montana
D. F r a n k Kampfe a r g u e d , Red Lodge, Montana
F o r Respondent:
Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Dennis Moreen a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
R a e V. K a l b f l e i s c h , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , S h e l b y ,
Montana
Submitted: J u n e 9, 1977
M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G . H a t f i e l d d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
Defendant Donald E. B r i n e r was charged and convicted of
b u r g l a r y i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Toole County. From t h e j u r y
v e r d i c t and subsequent sentence of 8 y e a r s , w i t h 6 y e a r s sus-
pended, defendant seeks t h i s C o u r t ' s review of f o u r i s s u e s :
I) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s
v a r i o u s motions t o suppress and d i s m i s s .
2) Whether t h e testimony of t h e accomplice had t h e s u f f i c i e n t
independent c o r r o b o r a t i o n r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-3012, R.C.M.
1947.
3) Whether t h e Information f i l e d a g a i n s t defendant was
s u f f i c i e n t t o inform defendant of t h e n a t u r e of t h e charges
a g a i n s t him.
4) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o g r a n t
d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l based upon newly discovered
evidence.
The charges a g a i n s t defendant B r i n e r a r o s e i n Sunburst,
Montana from t h e b u r g l a r y of t h e Farmers Co-op O i l Co. between
t h e hours of 6:15 p.m., J u l y 11, 1975 and 6:45 a.m., J u l y 12, 1975.
Three i n d i v i d u a l s were charged w i t h t h e b u r g l a r y - - Donald E.
B r i n e r , George Cain, and 'William F e l t o n .
B r i n e r and co-defendants were stopped on J u l y 1 3 , 1975 out-
s i d e Shelby, Montana by d e p u t i e s possessing t h i s information:
[ I ) Three hours p r i o r t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t , s h e r i f f d e p u t i e s
responded t o a b u r g l a r y i n p r o g r e s s a t t h e Co-op i n Devon, Montana;
(2) on reaching Devon a highway patrolman observed t h e pickup
defendant was l a t e r d r i v i n g when a r r e s t e d ; (3) t h i s pickup had l e f t
t h e v i c i n i t y by t h e time t h e d e p u t i e s reached t h e Devon Co-op;
(4) a t t h e Co-op t h e phone l f n e s were c u t , a window broken, and a
door l e f t open; (5) t h e dEputies observed f o o t p r i n t s l e a d i n g from
t h e Co-op t o and a c r o s s a c r e e k i n t h e d i r e c t i o n where t h e pickup
had been parked. The f o o t p r i n t s were s i m i l a r t o t h o s e found
a t t h e Sunburst Co-op t h e previous evening. The t i r e t r a c k s
observed a t both Co-ops were s i m i l a r ; and (6) t h e d e p u t i e s had
information t h e pickup defendant was d r i v i n g was equipped w i t h a
r a d i o scanner tuned t o p o l i c e f r e q u e n c i e s .
On J u l y 1 3 , 1975 upon stopping t h e B r i n e r v e h i c l e , t h e
d e p u t i e s examined t h e pickup t i r e s and determined t h e y were s i m i l a r
i n d e s i g n t o t h e t r a c k s found a t t h e Devon and Sunburst Co-ops.
Deputies a l s o observed d e f e n d a n t ' s and C a i n ' s p a n t l e g s were wet;
t h a t a p a i r o f wet w a f f l e stomper b o o t s was on t h e pickup's f l o o r -
board; and t h a t a r a d i o scanner was p r e s e n t . A r r e s t was made
w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , t h e pickup was s e i z e d .
On t h e same day a s e a r c h warrant was i s s u e d t o s e a r c h t h e
v e h i c l e defendant was d r i v i n g . This warrant was r'eturned on t h e
same day, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e w a f f l e stompers and gloves. Later,
on J u l y 25, 1975, d e p u t i e s removed t h e v e h i c l e ' s r a d i o scanner
and on J u l y 26, 1975, t h e vehicle's t i r e s .
The defendant was charged by Information on September 4 , 1975
w i t h t h e b u r g l a r y of t h e Farmers Co-op O i l Company o f Sunburst,
Montana, !'on o r about J u l y 12, 1975".
Evidence presented t o t h e j u r y showed:
1). F o o t p r i n t s from w a f f l e stompers were found i n s i d e and
o u t s i d e t h e Co-op a f t e r t h e b u r g l a r y ; defendant owned a p a i r of
w a f f l e stompers which was i n h i s pickup a t t h e time o f h i s a r r e s t ;
e x p e r t opinion found t h e p r i n t s t o be made by boots w i t h a s i m i l a r
t r e a d d e s i g n and wear p a t t e r n a s t h o s e o f defendant.
2). The v e h i c l e defendant was d r i v i n g was seen parked on
t h e I n t e r s t a t e highway ramp overlooking t h e Co-op d u r i n g t h e
e a r l y morning hours a f t e r t h e n i g h t of t h e b u r g l a r y ; f r e s h t i r e
t r a c k s were found a t t h e Co-op; e x p e r t opinion found t h e t i r e
t r a c k s and t h e t i r e s from t h e pickup defendant was d r i v i n g t o be
o f s i m i l a r t i r e d e s i g n and t r e a d wear.
3). Defendant's v e h i c l e was equipped w i t h a r a d i o scanner
tuned t o t h e major law enforcement f r e q u e n c i e s .
4). An accomplice of defendant t e s t i f i e d t o t h e p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n of defendant i n t h e b u r g l a r y .
From t h i s evidence t h e j u r y convicted defendant of b u r g l a r y .
On t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l , a f t e r t h e j u r y had been v o i r
d i r e d and passed f o r cause by t h e county a t t o r n e y , t h e a t t o r n e y
f o r defendant attempted t o f i l e v a r i o u s motions t o suppress
evidence and t o dismiss. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e c e s s e d and took
testimony and argument on t h e motions; l a t e r i t denied a l l motions.
From t h a t d e n i a l defendant r a i s e s h i s f i r s t i s s u e on a p p e a l .
Counsel f o r defendant argues it i s h i s c l i e n t ' s c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l r i g h t t o use t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e a t any time. In
S t a t e v. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 235, 462 P.2d 186, t h i s Court
reviewed t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e :
"The e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e fashioned i n Weeks v. United
S t a t e s , 232 U.S.383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed 652 (1914),
and Mapp v , Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 8 1 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.
2d 1081 (1961) excludes from a c r i m i n a l t r i a l any e v i -
dence s e i z e d from t h e defendant i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s 4 t h
Amendment r i g h t s . I n Mapp and Weeks t h e defendant a g a i n s t
whom t h e evidence was h e l d t o be i n a d m i s s i b l e was t h e
v i c t i m of t h e s e a r c h . I n t h e r e c e n t c a s e of Alderman v.
United S t a t e s , 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d
176 (1969) t h e Supreme Court r e j e c t e d any expansion of
t h e 4 t h Amendment and t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e t o i n c l u d e
t h o s e who a r e aggrieved s o l e l y by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of
damaging evidence, o r t h o s e whose r i g h t s were n o t v i o l a t e d
by t h e s e a r c h i t s e l f . ** *I1
L a r e c e n t c a s e the United S t a t e s Supreme Court r e i t e r a t e d
n
t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e was n o t a p e r s o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t of t h e aggrieved p a r t y and a g a i n r e j e c t e d t h e f o u r t h and most
c r i t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e exclusionary r u l e enunciated i n
Mapp. I n United S t a t e s v. J a n i s , 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021,
49 L ed 2d 1046, 1056, t h e Court s a i d :
"The d e b a t e w i t h i n t h e c o u r t on t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e
has always been a warm one. *** The C o u r t , however,
h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e 'prime purpose' of t h e r u l e ,
i f n o t t h e s o l e one, ' i s t o d e t e r f u t u r e unlawful p o l i c e
conduct! [ C i t e d c a s e s o m i t t e d ]
"Thus
" ' [1]n sum, t h e r u l e i s a j u d i c i a l l y c r e a t e d
remedy designed t o safeguard F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t s
g e n e r a l l y through i t s d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t , r a t h e r t h a n
a p e r s o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of t h e p a r t y a g g r i e v e d . I
United S t a t e s v . Calandra, 414 U.S. a t 348, 38 L Ed 2d
561, 94 S.Ct. 613, 66 Ohio Ops.2d 320.'' 49 L ed 2d 1056.
The q u e s t i o n of " t i m e l i n e s s " i s w e l l d e f i n e d i n Montana.
S e c t i o n 95-1806, R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h t h e procedure f o r f i l i n g
motions t o suppress evidence i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d and p r o v i d e s i n
part :
" ( a ) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful s e a r c h
and s e i z u r e may move t h e c o u r t t o s u p p r e s s a s evidence
a n y t h i n g so o b t a i n e d .
" ( b ) The motion s h a l l be made b e f o r e t r i a l u n l e s s
f o r good cause shown t h e c o u r t s h a l l o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t .
" ( c ) The defendant s h a l l g i v e a t l e a s t t e n (10)
d a y s i n o t i c e of such motion t o t h e a t t o r n e y p r o s e c u t i n g
o r such o t h e r time a s t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t . The de-
f e n d a n t s h a l l s e r v e a copy of t h e n o t i c e and motion upon
the attorney prosecuting.
I n S t a t e v . G o t t a , 71 Mont. 288, 290, 229 P. 405, t h i s C o u r t ,
speaking t o t h e i s s u e of " t i m e l i n e s s " stated:
":k ** One wishing t o p r e c l u d e t h e u s e of evidence
o b t a i n e d through a v i o l a t i o n of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s must p r o t e c t himself by t i m e l y a c t i o n , I f he
has had opportunity t o suppress t h e evidence
before t r i a l and has f a i l e d t o take advantage of
h i s remedy, o b j e c t i o n t o t h e evidence upon t r i a l
w i l l n o t a v a i l him.* * *" 7 1 Mont. 290.
See a l s o : S t a t e v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509 P.2d 852.
I n t h e i n s t a n t case defendant was aware of the f a c t s and
circumstances surrounding t h e a r r e s t and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of c e r t a i n evidence, long before t h e f i r s t day of
trial. Upon f i l i n g of defendant's various motions t o suppress,
no o f f e r of evidence nor showing of good cause was given which
prevented defendant from f i l i n g h i s motions before t r i a l . If
under s e c t i o n 95-1806, we assume t h e evidence was obtained by an
unlawful search and s e i z u r e , i t ?was necessary f o r t h e accused,
who d e s i r e d t o exclude such evidence from h i s t r i a l , t o make a
timely o b j e c t i o n t o i t s introduction. Such was not t h e f a c t
i n t h i s c a s e , a s t h e t r i a l judge found. Also a review of t h e
record would allow t h e evidence i n any event.
Defendant's second i s s u e concerns whether t h e testimony of
William J . F e l t o n , an accomplice, was s u f f i c i e n t l y corroborated
by independent evidence. Defendant and p l a i n t i f f agree s e c t i o n
95-3012, i s t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e and t h e numerous p r i o r opinions
of t h i s Court concerning requirements f o r corroboration of an
accomplice's testimony have continued v a l i d i t y . Section 95-
3012 r e p l a c e s s e c t i o n 94-7220, R.C.M. 1947. The only d i f f e r e n c e
between t h e present provision and i t s predecessor i s t h e s u b s t i t u -
t i o n of t h e words "one responsible o r l e g a l l y accountable f o r
t h e same o f f e n s e , a s defined by s e c t i o n 94-2-106'1 f o r t h e term
"an a c c ~ m p l i c e ' ~ .
The -question whether t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t , independent
corroboration of an accomplice's testimony, tending t o connect
a defendant with t h e commission of a crime i s one of law and
must be decided by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . S t a t e v. Spielmann, 163 Mont.
199, 207, 516 P.2d 617. See a l s o : S t a t e v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423,
452, 384 P.2d 777; S t a t e v. Dess, supra.
The requirements of s e c t i o n 94-7220 t h e predecessor of sec-
t i o n 95-3012, a r e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana. This Court i n
Spielmann r e p e a t s t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 94-7220 a s ex-
plained i n Dess:
" ' * * * Appellant suggests t h a t t h e evidence, independent
of t h e testimony of an accomplice, must prove him g u i l t y
beyond a reasonable doubt. This i s n o t t h e law i n Montana,
however. Though t h e r e must be some independent evidence
connecting t h e defendant t o t h e crime, i t .need n o t be
s u f f i c i e n t alone t o s u s t a i n a conviction. The j u r y can
consider t h e testimony of t h e accomplice and give t h e t e s t i -
mony whatever weight they d e s i r e . I n S t a t e v. Donges, 126
Mont. 341, 251 P.2d 254,(1952), t h e Court s t a t e d a t page
347, 251 P.2d a t page 257:
" "'The evidence which corroborated Bungard could
be furnished by t h e defendants. I t could be circumstan-
t i a l , I t need not extend t o every f a c t t o which Bungard
t e s t i f i e d and need not be s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a con-
v i c t i o n o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case of g u i l t ; i t
being s u f f i c i e n t i f it tends t o connect defendants with
t h e commission of t h e crime. Whether i t tends t o do so
i s a question of law, while i t s w e i g h t - i t s e f f i c a c y t o
f o r t i f y t h e testimony of Eungard and render h i s s t o r y
trustworthy - i s a matter f o r t h e consideration of t h e
jury. S t a t e v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265."'"
163 Mont. 207,208.
I n t h i s case t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t corroborating evidence i n
t h e record f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, a s a matter of law, t o
warrant t h e submission of t h e case t o t h e j u r y : (a) w a f f l e
stomper f o o t p r i n t s were discovered i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e Co-op
a f t e r t h e burglary; (b) defendant owned a p a i r of w a f f l e stomper
boots s e i z e d on t h e same day a s h i s a r r e s t ; ( c ) expert comparison
of defendant's boots t o f o o t p r i n t s found a t t h e Co-op demonstrated
t h e p r i n t s were made by boots s i m i l a r t o defendantis; (d) t h e
pickup defendant was d r i v i n g was seen parked on t h e Sunburst
I n t e r s t a t e 15 e x i t ramp overlooking t h e Co-op i n t h e e a r l y
morning hours following t h e n i g h t of t h e burglary; ( e ) f r e s h
t i r e t r a c k s were found a t t h e Co-op a f t e r t h e burglary; ( f ) expert
comparison of t h e t i r e t r a c k s found a t t h e Co-op and t h e t i r e s on
t h e pickup defendant was d r i v i n g determined t h e t r a c k s were made
by t i r e s with s i m i l a r t r e a d design and wear a s those of t h e pickup;
(g) eyewitnesses who saw t h e pickup defendant was d r i v i n g on t h e
Sunburst e x i t ramp, observed t h e pickup proceed down t h e ramp and
repark a t t h e Texaco s t a t i o n across t h e s t r e e t from t h e Co-op;
(h) w a f f l e stomper f o o t p r i n t s l e d from t h e ramp towards t h e
Co-op; and ( i ) t h e pickup defendant was d r i v i n g was equipped with
a r a d i o scanner tuned t o Montana law enforcement channels.
Defendant's t h i r d i s s u e claims t h e time a l l e g e d i n t h e
Information was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e t o inform defendant
of t h e n a t u r e of t h e charge a g a i n s t him. This Court f i n d s t h i s
i s s u e without merit. Defendant's motion t o dismiss, which
challenged t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of ' t h e Information, was properly
denied a s untimely f i l e d .
Defendant's f o u r t h i s s u e contends t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying
h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l , based on newly discovered evidence.
This Court i n S t a t e v. Gallagher, supra, s e t f o r t h requirements
f o r t h i s motion:
"* **(1) That t h e evidence must have come t o t h e
knowledge of t h e a p p l i c a n t s i n c e t h e t r i a l ; (2) t h a t
it was n o t through want of d i l i g e n c e t h a t i t was n o t
discovered e a r l i e r J; * *."
162 Mont. 161.
By r a i s i n g t h i s i s s u e , defendant r e q u i r e s t h i s Court t o
review t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Section 95-2101, R.C.M.
1947, s t a t e s i n p a r t :
"(b) Motion f o r a N w T r i a l
e
"(1) Following a v e r d i c t o r f i n d i n g of g u i l t y
t h e c o u r t may g r a n t t h e defendant a new t r i a l i f
required i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e . "
The t r i a l c o u r t using sound d i s c r e t i o n must decide i f a new
t r i a l i s required " i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e " . Where t h e t r i a l
c o u r t a c t s w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s Court has no r i g h t of
review. S t a t e v. Laughlin, 105 Mont. 490, 497, 73 P.2d 718;
S t a t e v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 147, 467 P.2d 692.
Here defendant supported h i s motion f o r new t r i a l with
four a f f i d a v i t s . Three were from a l i b i witnesses who purportedly
saw defendant on t h e n i g h t i n q u e s t i o n , and one was from John
S. Lindsey J r . , an i n v e s t i g a t o r , who knew of and t r i e d t o l o c a t e
one a l i b i witness before t r i a l . This a f f i d a v i t from Lindsey
shows the a l i b i witness was known before t r i a l . S t a t e v.
Gallagher, supra. The t r i a l judge was i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n
t o weigh t h e m e r i t s of t h e o t h e r t h r e e a f f i d a v i t s . S t a t e v.
Quigg, supra.
W f i n d t h e r e was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t
e
i n denying t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l .
The judgment i s affirmed.
Chief J u s t i c e A
W Concur:
e
Justices.
-. g -
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea s p e c i a l l y concurring:
I a g r e e w i t h t h e r e s u l t of t h i s c a s e b u t I do n o t a g r e e
w i t h a l l t h a t i s s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e
question.
The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d t h e motion t o suppress was
untimely. A f t e r t h e motion t o suppress was f i l e d t h e t r i a l
judge heard t h e evidence and denied t h e motion without s t a t i n g
h i s reasons. He l e f t i t f o r t h i s Court t o s p e c u l a t e a s t o t h e
reasons he denied t h e motion. I do a g r e e however, t h a t t h e
evidence was n o t i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d .
With regard t o t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n
t o s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , I f e e l t h i s Court i s paying t o o much
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n i n t e r p r e t i n g
t h e 4 t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and n o t
paying enough a t t e n t i o n t o A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 11, of Montana's
1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n which p r o v i d e s :
"The people s h a l l be s e c u r e i n t h e i r persons,
p a p e r s , homes and e f f e c t s from unreasonable s e a r c h e s
and s e i z u r e s . N warrant t o s e a r c h any p l a c e , o r
o
s e i z e any person o r t h i n g s h a l l i s s u e without d e s c r i b i n g
t h e p l a c e t o be searched o r t h e person o r t h i n g t o be
s e i z e d , o r without probable c a u s e , supported by o a t h
o r a f f i r m a t i o n reduced t o w r i t i n g ."
Undoubtedly we a r e bound by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court
i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n b u t we
a r e n o t bound by i t when we implement and g i v e meaning t o
Montana's C o n s t i t u t i o n . W c e r t a i n l y can reach a c o n t r a r y r e s u l t
e
by i n t e r p r e t i n g s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s of ~ o n t a n a ' sC o n s t i t u t i o n .
Without s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n
t h i s Court seems t o be holding t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i s n o t
a p e r s o n a l r i g h t of t h e accused, although t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e
from unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s i s h i s personal r i g h t .
Without t h e exclusionary r u l e the r i g h t t o be f r e e from un-
reasonable searches and s e i z u r e s would be meaningless. I would
hold the exclusionary r u l e i s p a r t and p a r c e l of A r t . 11, Section
1 of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and accordingly i s a personal
1
r i g h t of t h e defendant. This does n o t mean t h a t a defendant
can f e e l f r e e t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e a t any time during t h e proceedings.
But i t does mean t h a t a defendant must be informed, i n s u f f i c i e n t
time ahead of t r i a l , t h a t he has a r i g h t t o make a motion t o
suppress, I f a defendant f i l e s no motion t o suppress, t h e c o u r t
should o b t a i n an informed, i n t e l l i g e n t waiver.
Here, t h e defendant has shown no p r e j u d i c e however, because
t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d hear t h e motion t o suppress and a review of
t h e evidence c l e a r l y shows t h e motion was properly denied.