State v. Finley

No. 13358
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977

THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
JOHN LeROY FINLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District,
Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

Small, Cummins and Hatch, Helena, Montana
Gregory A. Jackson argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Charles Graveley, County Attorney, argued, Helena,
Montana

Submitted: May 11, 1977
Decided: JUL f 2 1 n
!3

Clerk
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e P a u l G. H a t f i e l d d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.

Defendant John Leroy F i n l e y a p p e a l s from a judgment o f

t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and C l a r k County, o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r

d r i v i n g a motor v e h i c l e upon t h e highways w h i l e under t h e

i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r .

On t h e n i g h t of J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1976, d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e l e f t

t h e i r f a m i l y home a f t e r a n argument w i t h d e f e n d a n t . Defendant
d r o v e h i s a u t o m o b i l e on t h e c i t y s t r e e t s of Helena, Montana, i n

an attempt t o l o c a t e h i s wife. When d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e d i s c o v e r e d
d e f e n d a n t w a s d r i v i n g t h e f a m i l y c a r , s h e t e l e p h o n e d t h e Helena

c i t y p o l i c e and r e p o r t e d d e f e n d a n t was d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d .

The p o l i c e responded t o t h e c a l l , s t o p p e d d e f e n d a n t a s h e w a s
r e t u r n i n g t o h i s house, concluded he w a s i n d e e d d r i v i n g w h i l e

i n t o x i c a t e d , and p l a c e d him under a r r e s t f o r t h e o f f e n s e o f d r i v -

i n g a motor v e h i c l e , w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g

liquor. The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s , a c c o r d i n g t o u n c o n t r o v e r t e d

t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l , t h e n a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t o f h i s Miranda r i g h t s ,

t o o k him i n t o c u s t o d y , and t r a n s p o r t e d him t o t h e Helena c i t y

jail. From t h e t i m e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o t h e
t i m e h e w a s p l a c e d i n a j a i l c e l l , h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e
r e c o r d e d on a n a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g . Defendant d i d n o t

g i v e h i s c o n s e n t t o t h e r e c o r d i n g ; n o r d i d t h e p o l i c e i n f o r m him

t h e y were a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g h i s a c t i o n s and speech.

Defendant, who had two p r e v i o u s d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u -

e n c e c o n v i c t i o n s , w a s c h a r g e d under s e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 1 4 2 ( d ) , R.C.M.
1947, and a r r a i g n e d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and C l a r k County.
Defendant, i n a p r e t r i a l motion, moved t o e x c l u d e t h e a u d i o - v i d e o

t a p e r e c o r d i n g from a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l . The d i s -
t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion and a t t r i a l a d m i t t e d t h e

t a p e i n t o evidence, over defendant's o b j e c t i o n s , t o a i d t h e jury

i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y of e y e w i t n e s s e s . A t least s i x
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees o b s e r v e d d e f e n d a n t w h i l e he w a s

a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e d , and t h r e e of t h o s e w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d

a t trial. A s i x p e r s o n j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y a s c h a r g e d .

Defendant w a s t h e r e a f t e r s e n t e n c e d t o one y e a r i n Montana S t a t e

Prison.

Defendant a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t p o l i c e

u s e o f a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t , and ad-

m i s s i o n o f t h e t a p e i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l , v i o l a t e s t h e s e con-

s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s :

1. The p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , protected

by t h e F i f t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and by A r t .

11, S e c t i o n 25, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

2. The r i g h t t o n o t b e d e p r i v e d o f l i b e r t y w i t h o u t due

p r o c e s s o f law, r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, United

S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and i n A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 1 7 , 1972 Montana

Constitution.

3. The r i g h t t o be s e c u r e from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and

s e i z u r e s , g u a r a n t e e d by t h e F o u r t h Amendment, U n i t e d S t a t e s Con-

s t i t u t i o n , and A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

Defendant's primary c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

p r o t e c t e d p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n was a b r i d g e d when

h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e r e c o r d e d on a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e w i t h o u t

h i s c o n s e n t o r knowledge, and t h e n s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y a s e v i -

dence a t t r i a l . Defendant c l a i m s t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e was i n -

c r i m i n a t i n g e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d from him by compulsion, and must

be s u p r e s s e d under t h e r u l e o f Miranda v . A r i z o n a , 384 U.S. 436,

86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L ed 2d 694.

Under t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i -

t u t i o n , and under t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l l y worded A r t . 11,

S e c t i o n 25, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , no p e r s o n may be compelled

t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t himself i n a c r i m i n a l proceeding. This Court
has held the Montana constitutional guarantee of the privilege
against self-incrimination affords no broader protection to an
accused than does the Fifth Amendment. State v. Armstrong,
Mont . , 552 P.2d 616, 33 St.Rep. 688. The opinions of
the United States Supreme Court, therefore, delineate the maximum
breadth of the privilege against self-incrimination in Montana.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between testimonial
compulsion and compulsion which does not force the accused to be
a witness against himself, but merely requires him to be the source
of real or physical evidence. Testimonial compulsion is proscribed
by the Fifth Amendment and by Art. 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana
constitution. The Court in Miranda stated that, to safeguard the
privilege against self-incrimination, police must, prior to in-
terrogation of a suspect in custody, inform the accused he has the
right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used as
evidence against him in court; that he has the right to consult
a lawyer and have the lawyer present with him during the interro-
gation; and, if he is indigent, he may obtain court appointed
counsel. Without the Miranda warning or other equally effective
measures, the person in custody would not be deemed to have in-
telligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and
any evidence of a testimonial nature obtained from the accused
would be inadmissible at trial. The privilege against testimonial
compulsion extends to the defendant's written and oral statements
as well as to communicative gestures, such as a nod of the head
in response to a question. "It is clear that the protection of
the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form
they might take * * *." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L ed 2d 908, 916.
Real or objective evidence taken from the accused, how-
ever, is not protected by Art. 11, Section 25, or by the Fifth
Amendment. In Schmerber, results of a test for alcohol in blood
taken from defendant despite his refusal to consent to the test,
were admissible at trial and did not violate defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court in Schmerber followed
a long line of Supreme Court decisions when it held:
" * * * The distinction which has emerged, often
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege
is a bar against compelling 'cornrnunications' or
'testimony', but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate it." 16 L ed 2d 916.
This Court, too, has long and consistently recognized
that, while testimonial compulsion is constitutionally prohibited,
the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to real
or objective evidence. State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 P. 369;
State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 975; State ex rel.
Sikora v. Dist. Ct., 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897. The crucial
inquiry, therefore, is whether the audio-video taping of the speech
and actions of defendant in the police station constituted con-
stitutionally prohibited testimonial compulsion or whether his
words and actions recorded on the tape were merely real, physical,
or objective evidence.
We hold that the audio-video taping in this case was ob-
jective evidence and, therefore, outside the scope of Art. 11,
Section 25 and Fifth Amendment protection. There is no evidence
in the record which indicates the recording contained any speech
or gesture of defendant which was testimonial in nature. The
tape did not contain defendant's responses to interrogation by
police. The audio-video tape was introduced into evidence not
for the incriminating content of the words uttered by defendant,
but as evidence helpful to the jury in understanding the testimony
of the police officers and employees who observed defendant's
unsteady walk and slurred speech in the police station. While
t h i s Court h a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y

o f v i d e o t a p e s we now j o i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have h e l d ,

p r o v i d e d t h e p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n i s l a i d , t h a t b o t h motion p i c -

t u r e s and v i d e o t a p e s r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l t o c o n t e s t e d i s s u e s

may be a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e

t r i a l judge. See Annot., 62 ALR2d 686, 701-703 87. This i s a

l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g s t h a t sound r e c o r d i n g s ,

S t a t e v . Warwick, 158 Mont. 531, 494 P.2d 627, and p h o t o g r a p h s ,

S t a t e v. Harney, 160 Mont. 55, 499 P.2d 802, may be a d m i s s i b l e

i n evidence.

The d e c i s i o n s o f c o u r t s i n s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s

support t h e holding t h a t t h e audio-video t a p e involved i n t h i s

c a s e w a s o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e , and as

such, d i d n o t i n f r i n g e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n -

crimination. I n Hendricks v . Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506, 507,
wherein t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a n a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s

murder c o n f e s s i o n was i n i s s u e , t h e E i g h t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f Appeals

stated:

" A s t o whether t h e u s e of such t a p e comes d a n g e r -
o u s l y c l o s e t o r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o incrim-
i n a t e h i m s e l f , w e t h i n k t h i s no more i n c r i m i n a t e s
him t h a t t h e t a k i n g of s t i l l p i c t u r e s o r blood o r
u r i n e samples. Such p r o c e d u r e d o e s n o t v i o l a t e
t h e F i f t h Amendment. [ C i t i n g c a s e s . ] W e conclude
t h a t a video tape incriminates t h e defendant only
i f t h e statement i t s e l f i s incriminating. If the
p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a s been l a i d , t h e r e c e p t i o n i n
evidence o f a video t a p e should a i d t h e trier of
f a c t . " 456 F.2d 506.

The c o u r t s of s e v e r a l s t a t e s have r u l e d on t h e p r e c i s e

q u e s t i o n o f t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f motion p i c t u r e s , v i d e o t a p e s ,

and a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e s o f d e f e n d a n t s who have been a r r e s t e d f o r

d r i v i n g motor v e h i c l e s w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g

liquor. The c o u r t s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c a s e s h e l d t h a t such t a p e s

o r motion p i c t u r e s a r e o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e ,

and a r e a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' p r i v i l e g e
against self-incrimination. S t a t e v . F e l l o w s , 4 7 Ohio App.2d

154, 352 N.E.2d 631, 635 ( v i d e o t a p e ) ; C i t y o f P i q u a v . H i n g e r ,

1 5 Ohio S t . 2 d 1 1 0 , 238 N.E.2d 766, c e r t . d e n . , 393 U.S. 1001,

89 S.Ct. 484, 21 L ed 2d 466 (motion p i c t u r e s ) ; Thompson v .

P e o p l e , 1 8 1 Col. 1 9 4 , 510 P.2d 311, ( v i d e o t a p e ) ; Lanford v.

P e o p l e , 159 Col. 36, 409 P.2d 829, (sound motion p i c t u r e s ) ;

P e o p l e v. F e n e l o n , 1 4 I l l . A p p . 3 d 622, 303 N.E.2d 38, (video

tape); S t a t e v. S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N . C . 253, 1 7 3 S.E.2d 1 2 9 , (sound

m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) ; C a r p e n t e r v . S t a t e , 169 Tex. C r i m . App. 283,

333 S.W.2d 391, ( m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) ; Housewright v. S t a t e , 154

Tex. C r i m . App. 1 0 1 , 225 S.W.2d 417 ( m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) .

Only o n e s t a t e h a s r u l e d t h a t m o t i o n p i c t u r e s o f a d e -

f e n d a n t who w a s a r r e s t e d on a d r i v i n g w h i l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e

of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r charge c o n s t i t u t e d t e s t i m o n i a l evidence.

The Oklahoma C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals i n S p e n c e r v . S t a t e , Okla.
4 0 4 P.2d 46,
C r i m . App. 1 9 6 5 , / r u l e d t h a t Oklahoma's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e

a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n was broad enough t o p r o h i b i t

u s e , a s e v i d e n c e , o f motion p i c t u r e s t a k e n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h -

o u t h i s knowledge. The c o u r t r e l i e d on S p e n c e r a s a u t h o r i t y f o r

i t s h o l d i n g s i n two s u b s e q u e n t c a s e s . R i t c h i e v. S t a t e , Okla.

Crim. App. 1966, 415 P.2d 1 7 6 ; S t e w a r t v. S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App.

1967, 435 P.2d 191. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , however, have e x p r e s s l y

d e c l i n e d t o f o l l o w t h e r e a s o n i n g o f t h e Oklahoma c o u r t i n S p e n c e r .

S t a t e v . S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129; S t a t e v . F a i d l e y ,

202 Kan. 517, 450 P.2d 2 0 . I n a r e c e n t o p i n i o n , t h e Oklahoma

C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals e x p r e s s l y o v e r r u l e d S p e n c e r . Ross v .

S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. 1976, 556 P.2d 638, 640, c i t i n g S t a t e v .

Thomason, Okla. C r i m . App. 1975, 538 P.2d 1080.

Because w e h o l d t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e of defendant i n t h e

p o l i c e s t a t i o n was o b j e c t i v e e v i d e n c e , u n p r o t e c t e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s

constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, t h e holding
i n Miranda i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . W need
e

n o t i n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , d i s c u s s whether t h e Miranda warning

g i v e n by t h e p o l i c e t o d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f h i s a r r e s t would

have s u f f i c e d t o s u s t a i n d e f e n d a n t ' s i n c r i m i n a t i n g t e s t i m o n i a l

s t a t e m e n t s made a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n and r e c o r d e d w i t h o u t h i s

knowledge.

Defendant r a i s e d two o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s which he

a p p a r e n t l y abandoned, s i n c e he f a i l e d t o d i s c u s s them i n h i s

brief. W e s h a l l , however, d e a l w i t h t h o s e i s s u e s i n t h i s o p i n i o n

t o provide guidance i n f u t u r e appeals. Defendant s t a t e d t h e i n -

t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e i n t o e v i d e n c e v i o l a t e d t h e due

p r o c e s s and s e a r c h and s e i z u r e c l a u s e s o f t h e Montana and U n i t e d

States Constitutions. The p r o t e c t i o n s of A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 17 and

Art. 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e i d e n t i c a l t o

t h o s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment due p r o c e s s c l a u s e and t h e F o u r t h

Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s ,

respectively. For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d h e r e a f t e r , d e f e n d a n t ' s d u e

p r o c e s s and s e a r c h and s e i z u r e c l a i m s a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t .

T h i s C o u r t h a s n o t e d t h a t even where e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d

from a d e f e n d a n t i s " r e a l " o r " o b j e c t i v e " e v i d e n c e , and t h u s o u t -

s i d e t h e c o v e r a g e o f t h e F i f t h Amendment, " t h e manner i n which

s u c h e v i d e n c e i s o b t a i n e d must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e q u i r e -

ments o f d u e p r o c e s s . " S t a t e v . Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 259, 405

P.2d 978, 983. Here, t h e p r o c e d u r e o f a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g defend-

a n t w a s n o t " b r u t a l " o r "offensive" conduct s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r c i b l e

o p e n i n g o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s mouth and t h e f o r c i b l e pumping o f h i s

stomach which "shocked t h e c o n s c i e n c e " and v i o l a t e d t h e defend-

a n t ' s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s i n Rochin v . C a l i f o r n i a , 342 U.S. 165,

72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183. The a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g of d e f e n d a n t

was a l e s s e r p e r s o n a l i n v a s i o n t h a n t h e f o r c e d blood t e s t s u p h e l d

by t h e C o u r t i n Schmerber and i n B r e i t h a u p t v . Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L ed 2d 448, 452-53, where t h e C o u r t s t a t e d :

" * * * Modern community l i v i n g r e q u i r e s modern
s c i e n t i f i c methods of c r i m e d e t e c t i o n l e s t t h e
p u b l i c go u n p r o t e c t e d * * *

"As a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t o f a n i n d i v i d u a l t h a t h i s
p e r s o n be h e l d i n v i o l a b l e * * * must be s e t t h e
i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of i n t o x i c a t i o n * * *. And t h e more s o s i n c e t h e
t e s t l i k e w i s e may e s t a b l i s h i n n o c e n c e , t h u s a f f o r d -
i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t r e a c h e r y o f judgment
based on one o r more o f t h e s e n s e s . "

N e i t h e r d o e s d e f e n d a n t ' s F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t t o be

s e c u r e from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s p r o t e c t him from

h a v i n g h i s words and a c t i o n s a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e d i n a p o l i c e sta-

t i o n , a f t e r he had been a r r e s t e d .

Although t h e F o u r t h Amendment may p r o t e c t what a n i n d i -

v i d u a l s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e a s p r i v a t e , even when he i s i n a p u b l i c
what
p l a c e , / a p e r s o n " * * * knowingly e x p o s e s t o t h e p u b l i c , even

i n h i s own home o r o f f i c e , i s n o t a s u b j e c t o f F o u r t h Amendment

protection." Katz v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S . C t . 507,

1 9 L ed 2d 576, 582. Defendant i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d n o t

j u s t i f i a b l y r e l y on h i s p r i v a c y a s d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t i n Katz, whose

c o n v e r s a t i o n s were r e c o r d e d when he p l a c e d phone c a l l s i n a g l a s s -

e n c l o s e d t e l e p h o n e booth. Here d e f e n d a n t was i n a p o l i c e s t a t i o n

where h e knew p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees were o b s e r v i n g h i s

words and a c t i o n s .

The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y upheld

t h e u s e i n e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d e d c o n v e r s a t i o n s between d e f e n d a n t s

and t h e p o l i c e i n f o r m a n t s whom t h e y m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t o be

compatriots. I n such c a s e s , d e f e n d a n t s ' m i s p l a c e d c o n f i d e n c e s

i n p o l i c e i n f o r m a n t s a r e n o t p r o t e c t e d by t h e F o u r t h Amendment.

United S t a t e s v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L ed 2d

453; Hoffa v. United S t a t e s , 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17

L ed 2d 374; Lopez v . United S t a t e s , 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381,

10 L ed 2d 462. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t t a l k and
walk in the presence of police informants, but in the presence
of police officers, while in the police station. Defendant
had no legitimate expectation of privacy to be protected by
Art. 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution or by the Fourth
Amendment.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
4 i

We concur:
Chief Justice
3

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Justices