No. 13452
IN THE SUPREIgE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
BABY GIRL HALL, a Minor Child
DONNA HALL NAGY,
Appellant,
GLEN E. WILLIAMS and DOLORES
LORRAINE WILLIAMS,
Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls,
Montana
Robert J. Emmons argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondents:
James W. Zion argued, Helena, Montana
Thomas E. Boland argued for Baby Girl Hall, Helena,
Montana
Submitted: January 13, 1977
Decided: JUL_, l l(.~n
Filed: ,gUe - 1 19?t;i'
7 i u 8. i G
aw. yQ w
Y clerk
Hon. Gordon Bennett, District Judge, sitting for Chief Justice
Paul G. Hatfield, delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court,
Cascade County, denying a petition for annulment of an adoption
decree and, in the alternative, for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner was born January 21, 1954, and gave birth to the
child involved in this litigation on June 18, 1970. On July 17,
1970, the district court decreed the adoption of the child by
respondents, having found the child was abandoned by its natural
parents. In June 1975, petitioner discovered her child had
purportedly been adopted by respondents and was living in their
home. She filed her petition November 4, 1975. Respondents moved
to quash.
Pursuant to a written stipulation filed by the parties, the
district court on November 14, 1975, issued its order determining,
inter alia, that the adoption decree was invalid. It found a lack
of due process because no notice was given the natural parents, and
that consent had not been waived by abandonment for the required
period of one year, in view of the fact the child was only 24 days
old at the time of the adoption,
In the same order, and again by stipulation of the parties, the
court directed the local welfare office to investigate the living
circumstances and parental qualifications of petitioner and respon-
dents and make its recommendation as to where the child should best
be placed. The report was to be made to the court with counsel for
both parties present and allowed to cross-examine as to its contents.
After the filing of the report and an adversary hearing on
the question of the best interests of the child, the court on March
29, 1976, issued its findings of fact, conclusion of law and order,
wherein it confirmed its previous conclusion that the adoption
decree was invalid for lack of notice and the absence of consent
by abandonment. The court then concluded petitioner was guilty of
laches and was estopped from maintaining her petition because she
could have commenced her action upon reaching majority on July 1,
1973, under the provisions of Art. 11, Section 14, 1972 Montana
Constitution. It also concluded it was in the best interests
of the child to remain in respondents' home. The court denied the
petition and granted the motion to quash.
We would not disturb the stipulation of the parties and the
conclusion of the district court pursuant thereto that the adoption
decree is invalid, as there is no request or basis presented for
doing so. The decree is, however, not only invalid, it is void
for all purposes. It is conceded no notice was given the natural
parents. More than fifty years ago, this Court recited with
approval the universally accepted general rule that notice to
natural parents in these cases is indispensable to jurisdiction;
if jurisdiction is not thus obtained there can be no judicial
determination, and any such purported determination is void. State
ex rel. Thompson v. District Court, 75 Mont. 147, 151, 242 P. 959.
This Court has not deviated from this rule. See: Bascom v. Car-
penter, 126 Mont. 129, 136, 246 P.2d 223, recently reinforced by
the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
85 Sect. 1187, 14 L ed 2d 62. Nothing appears in this case that
would remove it from the application of the rule. In 1921 this
Court in Lamont v. Vinger, 61 Mont. 530, 546, 202 P. 769, adopted
from the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728,
24 L Ed 565, the fundamental principle that:
II
A judgment void when rendered w i l l always remain void.
The v a l i d i t y of every judgment depends upon t h e j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t before i t i s rendered, n o t upon what
may occur subsequently ."
This p r i n c i p l e remains undisturbed, here and elsewhere. It r e -
q u i r e s t h a t we give a void decree no e f f e c t whatever a t any time
and view i t a s a n u l l i t y f o r a l l purposes. Thus it i s t h e l i m i t e d
function of t h i s Court t o d e c l a r e t h e r e never was a l e g a l l y
cognizable adoption decree i n t h i s case. That being so, t h e
e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e s of laches and e s t o p p e l cannot be a p p l i e d t o
save t h e non-existent decree o r . t o implement it i n any way.
It i s a l s o conceded t h a t no consent was given by t h e n a t u r a l
p a r e n t s , nor was t h e r e a v a l i d exception t o t h e consent requirement
of ~ o n t a n a ' ss t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 61-205, R.C.M. 1947. W have required
e
s t r i c t compliance with t h a t s t a t u t e (Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont.
353, 522 P.2d 1377), but have not y e t found f a i l u r e t o comply with
i t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l , a s have c o u r t s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . See
f o r example: Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or.App.450, 513 P.2d 1216,1217;
2 C.J.S. Adoption of P e r s o m , 551, p. 470, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n .
W see no reason f o r r e l a x a t i o n of t h e standard i n t h i s c a s e and
e
would s e t a s i d e t h e decree, a s we d i d i n Biery, i f i t had any
v a l i d i t y i n t h e f i r s t place.
P e t i t i o n e r sought not only annulment of t h e adoption decree
but t h e r e t u r n of h e r c h i l d upon a w r i t of habeas corpus. Appar-
e n t l y pursuant t o t h e l a t t e r p e t i t i o n , and upon s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e
p a r t i e s , a f u l l hearing was provided i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on t h e
question of t h e "best i n t e r e s t s of t h e child". This being t h e b a s i c
c r i t e r i o n by which custody i s determined t h e hearing may be considered
a cugtody hearing, held with t h e consent of both p a r t i e s . O the
n
b a s i s of t h i s hearing, t h e c o u r t concluded a s a matter of law t h a t
i t was i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t o leave i t with respon-
dents. Having so concluded, t h e c o u r t granted responsents' motion
t o quash and, i n e f f e c t , granted custody t o them.
W cannot q u a r r e l with t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion a s t o t h e b e s t
e
i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d . The t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h e c a s e was
thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t e d by t h e county welfare department and i t s
r e p o r t was a i r e d with equal thoroughness a t t h e hearing. There
i s an abundance of s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e
c o u r t ' s conclusion. Thus we f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t and must a f f i r m i t s conclusion. Adoption of
Biery, supra, and cases cPted t h e r e i n .
For t h e above reasons, t h e adoption decree involved h e r e i n
should be annulled and permanent custody of t h e c h i l d decreed i n
respondents. The cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r
e n t r y of i t s decrees i n accordance with t h i s opinion.
Judge.
W Concu
e /-
Justices.
M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n
part:
I concur with t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n voiding
t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e , b u t I d i s s e n t on i t s d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g
permanent c u s t o d y t o t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s . For a l l p r a c t i c a l
p u r p o s e s t h i s d e c i s i o n f o r e c l o s e s t h e n a t u r a l mother from e v e r
s u c c e s s f u l l y p e t i t i o n i n g t o o b t a i n custody of h e r daughter. She
can have n o c o n s o l a t i o n i n w i n n i n g h e r c a s e b u t l o s i n g h e r c h i l d .
I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e s u l t would have been t h e same
i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t if t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had voided t h e
a d o p t i o n d e c r e e , f o r i n t h a t c a s e t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s would n o t
have had a n y l e g a l c l a i m t o t h e c h i l d . While t h e c o u r t would
n o t have been bound t o i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e c u s t o d y t o t h e n a t u r a l
mother, t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s would have had no l e g a l b a s i s f o r
t h e n o b t a i n i n g permanent c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d . It i s c l e a r
however, t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h i s problem f o r i t
h e l d t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e was v o i d , i t r e a l l y was
not void. The r e a s o n was t h a t t h e n a t u r a l mother was g u i l t y o f
l a c h e s and t h e r e f o r e had no l e g a l b a s i s t o s e t t h e a d o p t i o n a s i d e .
However, by u p h o l d i n g t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s 1 c l a i m o f l a c h e s t h e
c o u r t d i d n o t have t o r e a c h a d e c i s i o n on t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s " o f
t h e c h i l d , f o r a t t h a t p o i n t t h e n a t u r a l mother had n o l e g a l
r i g h t t o be h e a r d . She was s t a n d i n g b e f o r e t h e c o u r t a s a
s t r a n g e r t r y i n g t o o b t a i n c u s t o d y of a c h i l d t h a t was no l o n g e r
hers. C e r t a i n l y t h e c o u r t was n o t g o i n g t o award permanent
custody t o a s t r a n g e r . But t h i s C o u r t by o v e r r u l i n g t h e c l a i m
of l a c h e s a s a p p l i e d t o a void adoption decree, held t h e ; n a t u r a l
mother was n o t a s t r a n g e r , and s h e was wronged b y t h e a d o p t i v e
p a r e n t s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e f i l i n g of a f a l s e adoption p e t i t k o n .
But i n t h e same b r e a t h t h e C o u r t h a s d e p r i v e d t h e n a t u r a l mother
from e v e r o b t a i n i n g l e g a l c u s t o d y o f h e r d a u g h t e r . The p r o v i s i o n s
o f t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e a n d D i v o r c e Act, a p p l i c a b l e t o f u r t h e r
d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h i s case<, p l a c e a n i m p o s s i b l e
b u r d e n on t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r .
The Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e Act went i n t o e f f e c t
on J a n u a r y 1, 1976 a n d p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 48-341(4) R.C.M. 1947,
a n y f u r t h e r d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h i s c a s e must b e u n d e r
t h i s Act. S e c t i o n 48-341(4) provides:
" I n a n y a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g i n which a n
a p p e a l was p e n d i n g o r a new t r i a l was o r d e r e d
p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h i s a c t , t h e
law i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h e o r d e r s u s t a i n i n g
t h e a p p e a l o r t h e new t r i a l g o v e r n s t h e a p p e a l , t h e
new t r i a l , and a n y s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l o r a p p e a l . "
Here, t h e t r i a l t o o k p l a c e i n March, 1976 a n d a n a p p e a l was f i l e d
on A p r i l 27, 1976. Therefore, f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h i s case
must be u n d e r t h i s Act.
Under S e c t i o n 4 8 - 3 3 9 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947, a p e t i t i o n t o o b t a i n
c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d ( a b s e n t e x t e n u a t i n g a n d emergency s i t u a t i o n s )
c a n b e f i l e d o n l y once i n a two y e a r p e r i o d . Th,is means t h e
m o t h e r must e n d u r e a s u b s t a n t i a l w a i t i n g p e r i o d b e f o r e s h e c a n
f i l e a custody p e t i t i o n . But even i f s h e l a t e r f i l e d a p e t i t k o n ,
h e r e f f o r t s would most l i k e l y b e doomed t o f a i l u r e b e c a u s e s h e
must overcome t h e h e a v y b u r d e n of proof p l a c e d on h e r by t h e A c t .
To be e n t i t l e d t o a h e a r i n g u n d e r s e c t i o n 48-339, R.C.M.
1947, t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r must f i l e a n a f f i d a v i t o r sworn p e t i t i o n
a l l e g i n g e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s ( s e c t i o n 48-340, R.C.M. 1947) t h a t t h e
c h i l d ' s " p h y s i c a l , mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h " i s b e i n g
harmed i n h e r p r e s e n t home. Because a l l a g r e e t h a t t h e a d o p t i v e
p a r e n t s have been good p a r e n t s , i t would i n d e e d t a k e a c r e a t i v e
mind t o a l l e g e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s t h a t would e n t i t l e
t h e n a t u r a l mother t o a h e a r i n g . Moreover, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t
has a l r e a d y determined t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s ' ' of t h e c h i l d a r e w i t h
t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s , upon a n o t h e r h e a r i n g t h e c o u r t would b e
r e q u i r e d t o r e t a i n them a s c u s t o d i a n s u n l e s s " t h e c h i l d ' s
p r e s e n t environment e n d a n g e r s s e r i o u s l y h i s p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l ,
moral, o r e m o t i o n a l h e a l t h , and t h e harm l i k e l y t o b e c a u s e d b y
a change o f environment i s outweighed by i t s a d v a n t a g e s t o him."
Section 48-339{2)(c). Thus we have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e s t a t e d
purpose o f t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e Act o f k e e p i n g t h e
c h i l d i n a s t a b l e , permanent environment i s d e p r i v i n g t h e n a t u r a l
mother from e v e r o b t a i n i n g c u s t o d y of h e r c h i l d . his is not a
just r e s u l t , nor is it necessarily, t h e long run, t h e r i g h t
decision f o r the child.
The n a t u r a l mother l i v e s o n l y a few b l o c k s from h e r c h i l d ,
b u t o n l y knew o f h e r whereabouts j u s t a s h o r t p e r i o d b e f o r e
f i l i n g t h e p e t i t i o n i n d i s t r i c t court t o annul t h e adoption
decree. The c h i l d d o e s n o t know s h e h a s been a d o p t e d . However,
even assuming t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s have been g r a n t e d permanent
c u s t o d y i t would a p p e a r t h e n a t u r a l mother now h a s a r i g h t t o
p e t i t i o n f o r r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 48-
3 3 7 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s :
"A p a r e n t n o t g r a n t e d c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i
is e n t i t l e d t o reasonable v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s
unless the court finds, a f t e r a hearing, t h a t
v i s i t a t i o n would e n d a n g e r s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d
physical, mental, moral, o r emotional h e a l t h .
It would seem most l i k e l y t h e c h i l d w i l l now f i n d o u t s h e h a s
, --
,
been a d o p t e d and t h e i d e n t i t y o f h e r n a t u r a l m o t h e r . Yet t h e
mother w i l l n e v e r have a m e a n i n g f u l o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b t a i n t h e
custody of h e r daughter.
In s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e adoption decree but s t i l l leaving
permanent c u s t o d y i n t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s , t h e C o u r t r e l i e s on
Adoption O f B i e r y , 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377, b u t I f e e l
t h a t r e l i a n c e i s misplaced. I n B i e r y t h e n a t u r a l mother was
s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s b e f o r e t h e a d o p t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t e d
f u l l hearing t o determine t h e "best i n t e r e s t s " of the c h i l d . Also,
t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s i n B i e r y had a c t u a l custody of t h e c h i l d
before t h e adoption. The r e a s o n f o r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e a d o p t i o n
i n B i e r y was b e c a u s e t h e r e was n o f i n d i n g b y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
t h a t t h e m o t h e r had abandoned t h e c h i l d f o r a p e r i o d o f one y e a r .
A s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d t h e a d o p t i v e p a r e n t s t o prove t h e mother d i d
n o t s u p p o r t t h e c h i l d f o r a one y e a r p e r i o d a n d s h e had t h e
a b i l i t y t o support the child during t h a t period. S e c t i o n 61-205,
R.C.M. 1947. The a d o p t i o n was s e t a s i d e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e . The
f a c t s a r e very d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t case.
The n a t u r a l mother was a minor when s h e s i g n e d a c o n s e n t
form t o have h e r c h i l d a d o p t e d . No g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m was a p p o i n t e d
t o represent her interests. She was n o t s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s i n
the guardianship proceedings. The p e t i t i o n t o a d o p t was f a l s e on
its face. It a l l e g e d abandonment, i n which c a s e t h e abandonment
must have e x i s t e d f o r a p e r i o d o f a t l e a s t one y e a r . S e c t i o n 61-
205,R.C.M. 1947. However, t h e p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h e c h i l d was
b o r n on June 18, 1970, a n d t h e p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on J u l y 17, 1970,
j u s t 24 d a y s a f t e r t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h . S t i l l t h e c o u r t approved
the adoption. The e n t i r e p r o c e e d i n g s were d e v o i d o f even t h e
r u d i m e n t s o f due p r o c e s s .
The e f f e c t o f t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s t h a t due p r o c e s s when
a p p l i e d t o c h i l d custody c a s e s i s meaningless, f o r it is custody
of t h e c h i l d t h a t i s important. I f a c o u p l e , however w e l l
i n t e n t i o n e d , c a n a c q u i r e permanent c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d i n t h e
manner done i n t h i s c a s e , t h e n p a r e n t a l r i g h t s a r e m e a n i n g l e s s .
I n e f f e c t , t h i s C o u r t i s h o l d i n g t h a t permanent c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d
can be a c q u i r e d by a h y b r i d form o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n a n d i t d o e s
n o t m a t t e r t h a t t h e i n i t i a l p o s s e s s i o n was a c q u i r e d by i l l e g a l
means.
I ~ ~ o u l c lo
v ~ uthe entire p r ? o c e z d i n & s drld a l l o w t h e a d o p t i v e
uaren t s t e m p o r a r y c u s t o d y u n t i l s u c h t i m e as s a t i s f a c t o r y a r r a n g e -
ments c o u l d be worked o u t f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f permanent c u s t o d y
so t h e n a t u r a l mother.