No. 13320
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
CAMDEN J. HENDRICKS, Deceased,
Claimant and Respondent,
-vs-
THE ANACONDA COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Joseph J. Picarelli argued, Butte, Montana
For Respondent :
Jack M. Scanlon argued, Anaconda, Montana
Submitted: May 11, 1977
Decided : J N 2 2 1977
U
Filed: J N 22 1
U m
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
In October 1971 claimant Camden Hendricks was injured in
an industrial accident while employed in a mine of defendant
The Anaconda Company (Anaconda). He submitted a claim for
compensation. Anaconda accepted it and began paying temporary
total disability benefits, and continued until claimant's death
in November 1973. The parties here stipulated the cause of
death was unrelated to the industrial injury.
Claimant's widow requested a lump sum disability payment
that was denied by Anaconda and subsequently, on appeal, by
the Worker's Compensation Division. Claimant's widow appealed
the decision to the district court, Silver Bow County. That
court reversed the Division and awarded claimant's widow a lump
sum of $6,000.
Prior to his demise claimant had seen two physicians and
each made an estimate of the percentage of disability. The first
physician estimated disability at 20%, the second, some months
later, set the figure at 30%. The district court's award repre-
sents an amount based on the 30% figure. Neither physician's
report stated the period of healing had ended.
The only additional testimony taken by the district court
was that of Albert Pillen, an administrator of the Division's
State Campensation Fund. No transcript of his testimony was
filed as a part of this appeal record, but the briefs indicate
the testimony explained how the state fund handles such claims.
The question here is whether the widow has a right to a lump
sum payment.
I n 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, $58.40, t h e r e i s
a general d i s c u s s i o n , p e r t i n e n t a s background f o r our d i s c u s s i o n
of t h e i s s u e involved h e r e , i t s t a t e s :
"558.40 H e r i t a b i l i t y and a s s i g n a b i l i t y of b e n e f i t s ,
"In t h e opening p o r t i o n of t h e book i t was pointed
o u t t h a t one of t h e f e a t u r e s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a compensa-
t i o n award from a t o r t recovery i s t h e absence of any
property r i g h t i n an award which can survive i n favor
of h e i r s . The problem most frequently a r i s e s i n connec-
t i o n with schedule o r o t h e r permanent p a r t i a l awards, when
an employee who has been awarded, say, 312 weeks' bene-
f i t s f o r l o s s of an arm d i e s a t t h e end of 1 2 weeks. The
question i s whether h i s h e i r s have a claim upon t h e unaccrued
300 weeks' payments.
"Accrued b u t unpaid i n s t a l l m e n t s a r e , of course,
an a s s e t of t h e e s t a t e , l i k e any o t h e r debt. This i s
e q u a l l y t r u e of t h e widow's death b e n e f i t s , accrued
but unpaid i n s t a l l m e n t s of which go on h e r death t o h e r
h e i r s . When t h e award takes t h e form of a lump sum,
t h e amount due a s accrued payments i s t h e e n t i r e amount
of t h e lump sum.
"When, however, t h e award, although f o r a f i x e d
number of weeks, i s paid weekly o r . p e r i o d i c a l l y , most
j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n t h e absence of a s p e c i a l s t a t u t e t o
t h e contrary have held t h a t t h e h e i r s have no claim
upon t h e unaccrued payments, s i n c e t h e award i s a personal
one, based upon t h e employee's need f o r a s u b s t i t u t e f o r
h i s l o s t wages and earning capacity. There i s , however, some
contra a u t h o r i t y .
"This r u l e has been modified by s t a t u t e i n some
s t a t e s , b u t it i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e modification
o f t e n t a k e s t h e form, n o t of giving t h e unaccrued balance
t o h e i r s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , but of giving i t i n f i x e d
proportions t o dependent h e i r s , ** *I1
The s t a t u t e p e r t i n e n t here i s s e c t i o n 92-608, R.C.M. 1947:
"(1) I f an i n j u r e d employee d i e s and t h e i n j u r y
was t h e proximate cause of such death, then t h e bene-
f i c i a r y of t h e deceased, a s t h e case may be, s h a l l
receive t h e same compensation a s though t h e death
occurred immediately following t h e i n j u r y , but t h e
period during which t h e death b e n e f i t s h a l l be paid
s h a l l be reduced by t h e period during o r f o r which
compensation was paid f o r t h e i n j u r y .
" ( 2 ) I f t h e employee s h a l l d i e from some cause ,
o t h e r than t h e i n j u r y , t h e r e s h a l l be no l i a b i l i t y
f o r compensation a f t e r h i s death.
"(3) The question a s t o who c o n s t i t u t e s a
b e n e f i c i a r y s h a l l be determined a s of t h e d a t e of
t h e happening of t h e accident t o t h e employee,
whether death s h a l l immediately r e s u l t therefrom
o r n o t .I1
Subsection 2 of s e c t i o n 92-608 was discussed i n Breen v.
Ind. Ace. Board, 150 Mont. 463, 475, 436 P.2d 701, where t h e
Court s a i d :
" A s we construe t h i s provision i t simply
means t h a t i f an employee i s receiving compen-
s a t i o n a s t h e r e s u l t of an i n d i s t r i a l i n j u r y and
subsequently d i e s from causes o t h e r than t h i s
i n j u r y , l i a b i l i t y f o r f u r t h e r compensation by
way of death b e n e f i t s o r continuing d i s a b i l i t y
b e n e f i t s i s c u t o f f . But we do n o t construe t h i s
s t a t u t e a s terminating l i a b i l i t y f o r compensation
accrued p r i o r t o death but unpaid a t t h e time of
death.'' 150 Mont. 475.
Claimant's widow argues claimant had an accrued r i g h t t o
a lump sum idemnity payment and t h a t such r i g h t accrued when
t h e physicians made t h e i r e s t i m a t e s of t h e percentage dfi impair-
ment. The major d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s argument i s t h a t a lump
sum indemnity payment was not t h e only option a v a i l a b l e t o
claimant a t t h e time of h i s death. A s noted i n McAlear v. McKee
& Co., Mont . , 558 P.2d 1134,1136,1137, 33 St.Rep.
'I* ** t h e r e a r e two d i s t i n c t types of p a r t i a l
d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s which a claimant may seek 9~ * *.
A claimant may e l e c t a d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t under s e c t i o n
92-703.1, R,C.M. 1947, o r an indemnity b e n e f i t under
s e c t i o n 92-709, R.C.M. 1947.
"The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s e two b e n e f i t s i s t h a t
s e c t i o n 92-703.1 bases t h e b e n e f i t upon a c t u a l l o s s of
earning c a p a c i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n j u r y , whereas
s e c t i o n 92-709 awards compensation r e g a r d l e s s of earnings
t o compensate f o r p o s s i b l e l o s s of earning capacity i n
t h e f u t u r e . Jones v. Glac. General Assurance Co., 145
Mont, 326, 400 P.2d 888." 33 St.Rep. 1341; 558 P.2d 1137.
Here claimant made no e l e c t i o n p r i o r t o h i s death. If
claimant had e l e c t e d t o receive d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s Breen s t a t e s
t h e s e would have ceased a t death. To say claimant had accrued
r i g h t s i n a lump sum indemnity b e n e f i t r e q u i r e s t h a t options
which t h e deceased claimant could have exercised be made f o r
him and given r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t .
1A second d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t p r i o r t o c l a i m a n t ' s death
t h e r e was never a determination made t h a t t h e h e a l i n g period
had ended. McAlear p o i n t s out:
"* * * The s t a t u t e s which govern a r e s e c t i o n 92-
701.1, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s :
"I* * * Totaltemporary d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s s h a l l
be paid f o r t h e duration of t h e worker's temporary
disability. '
and s e c t i o n 92-439, R.C.M. 1947, which d e f i n e s temporary
t o t a l disability as:
I"* ** a condition r e s u l t i n g from an i n j u r y a s
defined i n t h i s a c t t h a t r e s u l t s i n t o t a l l o s s of wages
and e x i s t s u n t i l t h e i n j u r e d workman i s a s f a r r e s t o r e d
a s t h e permanent c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l permit. I
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y ceases when t h e
workman's physical condition i s a s f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e
permanent c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l permit. When
t h e claimant has reached t h i s s t a g e i n h i s h e a l i n g
process temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y c e a s e s , and p a r t i a l
d i s a b i l i t y begins i f t h e r e i s permanent p a r t i a l impair-
ment." 33 S t . Rep. 1340; 558 P.2d 1136.
N indemnity payment may accrue u n t i l t h e healing period i s
o
completed. Blessed with h i n d s i g h t , i t i s easy t o s e e t h e b e n e f i t
t o c l a i m a n t ' s e s t a t e t h a t would r e s u l t from having claimant f u l l y
healed and having made an e l e c t i o n t o go under t h e indemnity
provisions. The l e g i s l a t u r e could g r a n t death b e n e f i t s t o depen-
dents of claimants who d i e from causes u n r e l a t e d t o t h e i r indus-
t r i a l i n j u r y , a s y e t i t has not done so. I n s t e a d i t has p r o h i b i t e d
payment of compensation a f t e r death from unrelated causes. Although
i t i s unfortunate claimant had no accrued lump sum indemnity pay-
ment due him p r i o r t o h i s death, t h e f a c t remains he d i d n o t .
Since no compensation accrued to the claimant remains
unpaid, the district court erred in granting a lump sum award
to claimant's widow. The cause is reversed with direction
to dismiss.
We Concur:
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