No. 13298
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
OSCAR W. CRADDOCK,
Deceased.
Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
Honorable Arnold Olsen, Jud.qe presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Burgess, Joyce, Prothero, Whelan & O'Leary,
Butte, Montana
Robert O'Leary argued, Butte, P4ontana
For Respondent :
Edward Yelsa argued, Anaconda, Montana
Submitted: March 16, 1977
Decided : -1
j~fl 1917
JUIJ 1- j n
3
Filed:
Mr. Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the
Court .
This is an appeal from an order of the district court
admitting to probate a purported holographic will of Oscar W.
Craddock, who died on November 22, 1969, survived by one brother
and five sisters.
Oscar W. Craddock had resided on his ranch near Ramsey,
Montana, located in Silver Bow County, along with his brother,
Ralph Craddock and two sisters, Ruby and Myrtle Craddock. Ralph
Craddock resided with his brother from 1953 until 1969, perform-
ing most of the physical labor on the ranch. Ruby and Myrtle
Craddock resided with Oscar from 1960 until 1969, taking care
of the household duties.
In February 1972, approximately two and one half years
after Oscar W. Craddock's death, Ruby found the holographic will
in question in a cupboard above the kitchen sink at the ranch
house. The will was taken to the Silver Bow County attorney's
office by Ralph shortly thereafter. A few days later Ralph
retrieved the will and returned it to the cupboard where it remained
until September, 1972.
Ruby and Myrtle Craddock were hospitalized in July or
August, 1972, Ruby for illness and Myrtle for a nervous break-
down. Ruby Craddock died in September, 1972, and Myrtle Craddock
was subsequently declared incompetent.
Following Ruby's death and the hospitalization in Warm
Springs of Myrtle, Ralph Craddock offered the holographic will
for probate in September, 1972, an enlarged copy appearing as
follows: (The actual dimensions of the will are 4-1/8" x 5 - 5 / 8 " . )
This w i l l
color.
' h e r e a f t e r P e a r l Trevenna, a n o t h e r s i s t e r o f Oscar W.
Craddock, f i l e d a n o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p r o b a t e o f t h e w i l l a l l e g -
i n g t h a t t h e w i l l had been m u t i l a t e d and m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r e d by
someone ol t h e r t h a n Oscar W. Craddock. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d
p r o b a t e oif t h e w i l l and Ralph Craddock a p p e a l e d t o t h i s C o u r t
o b j e c t i n g t o t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o l l o w e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
T h i s C o u r t remanded t h e c a s e t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a h e a r -
i n g a t which t h e proponent was t o make a prima f a c i e showing
o f p r o p e r e x e c u t i o n i n compliance w i t h s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s .
E s t a t e of O s c a r W. Craddock, 166 Mont. 6 8 , 72, 530 P.2d 483.
A t t h a t t i m e t h i s Court s t a t e d :
"Accordingly, w e remand t h i s c a s e t o t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t f o r a h e a r i n g a t which p r o p o n e n t i s t o make
h i s prima f a c i e showing o f t h e p r o p e r e x e c u t i o n
of t h e w i l l . By s o h o l d i n g , w e make no d i s p o s i t i o n
a s t o t h e m e r i t s o f t h e i s s u e . The a l t e r a t i o n s
a p p e a r i n g on t h e f a c e o f t h i s h o l o g r a p h i c w i l l ,
i f unexplained, could i n v a l i d a t e t h e w i l l . The
d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e s t s w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t upon
proper hearing." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h i s h e a r i n g wherein Ralph Craddock
and h i s d a u g h t e r , C h a r l e n e Berryman, t e s t i f i e d i n t h e p r o p o n e n t ' s
case i n chief. The c o n t e s t a n t , who i s now George Trevenna, t h e
p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e s t a t e of P e a r l Trevenna, d e c e a s e d ,
p r e s e n t e d no c a s e i n c h i e f . Thereafter, t h e d i s t r i c t court entered
a n o r d e r a d m i t t i n g t h i s w i l l t o p r o b a t e and t h e c o n t e s t a n t a p p e a l e d .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , however, f a i l e d t o make f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and
c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, s t a t i n g i t s b a s i s f o r t h e o r d e r . Now w e a r e
asked t o a d d r e s s t h e m e r i t s of t h i s c a s e .
Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., makes it mandatory t h a t t h e d i s -
t r i c t c o u r t make f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w i n a l l
a c t i o n s t r i e d upon t h e f a c t s w i t h o u t a j u r y . Absent f i n d i n g s of
f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , t h i s C o u r t i s f o r c e d t o s p e c u l a t e
a s t o t h e reasons f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s decision. Such a s i t u -
a t i o n i s n o t a healthy b a s i s f o r a p p e l l a t e review. For t h i s reason
we r e v e r s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r and a g a i n remand t h i s c a s e
t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o make f i n d i n g s o f f a c t
and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, based upon t h e h e a r i n g p r e v i o u s l y h e l d
b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , and e n t e r a n o r d e r a c c o r d i n g l y .
For purposes of p o s s i b l y expediting t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of
this matter, we will address one principle of law relied upon
by the proponent at the district court and before this Court.
The proponent asserts that he is entitled to a presump-
tion that the testator made any alterations or modifications
found to appear upon the holographic will. The proponent cites
two California cases as authority for this principle, Estate
of Stickney, 101 C.A.2d 572, 225 P.2d 649, and Estate of Cuneo,
60 C.2d 196, 384 P.2d 1. However, a better understanding of
this rule of law is found in Estate of Hewitt, 63 C.A. 440, 218
P. 778, in which California first discussed this principle.
Hewitt involved a will found in an open closet four to
five weeks after the testatrix's death with the signatures cut
away. The district court instructed the jury that where a will
remains in the testator's possession until his death, and is
then found among his papers with alterations, cancellations or
tearings, the presumption is that such alterations, cancellations,
or tearings were done by the testator with the intention to re-
voke. This instruction was first of all held to be in error for
the use of the word "presumption" instead of "inference". Second-
ly, the court pointed out that the will was found four to five
weeks after the testatrix's death in an open hall closet; that
the testatrix's son, the contestant, also had a key to a safety
deposit box, in which the will had been previously kept; that the
contestant had access to some of the testatrix's papers shortly
before her death and had secretly destroyed them. The court then
held:
"On the facts, therefore, the case is not
similar to those upon which the rule of law,
however correct it may be, has been laid down,
that, when a will is found immediately upon the
death of the testator among his private papers,
or in his depository, and in a mutilated condi-
tion, having been continuously in the testator's
possession until his death, the presumption is
that it was mutilated by the testator himself
animo r e v o c a n d i . I t i s hardly necessary t o point
o u t t h e e r r o r i n t h e u s e of t h e word " p r e s u m p t i o n " .
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
A s r e c e n t l y s t a t e d i n I n r e E s t a t e of Hartman, Mont .
"Legal p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e founded upon t h e e x p e r -
i e n c e and o b s e r v a t i o n of d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u r i s t s
a s t o what i s u s u a l l y found t o be t h e f a c t r e s u l t -
i n g from any g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; a n d , t h e r e s u l t
b e i n g t h u s a s c e r t a i n e d , whenever such c i r c u m s t a n c e s
o c c u r , t h e y a r e prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e o f t h e f a c t
presumed. "
I t i s n o t a l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e from t h e f a c t s of t h e
p r e s e n t c a s e t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r made t h e c r o s s - o u t s i n q u e s t i o n .
T h i s h o l o g r a p h i c w i l l , which l e a v e s t h e e n t i r e e s t a t e t o t h e
p r o p o n e n t , w a s found two and one h a l f y e a r s a f t e r t h e t e s t a t o r ' s
death. The proponent t h e n r e t a i n e d p o s s e s s i o n of t h e w i l l f o r
seven months and p r e s e n t e d it f o r p r o b a t e f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h
o f o n e s i s t e r and t h e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r s i s t e r ,
b o t h o f whom had r e s i d e d w i t h t h e t e s t a t o r and performed h i s
household d u t i e s . Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h i s p r o p o n e n t i s
n o t e n t i t l e d t o t h e e v i d e n t i a r y b e n e f i t of a presumption, i f
any d o e s e x i s t , t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r a u t h o r e d t h e c r o s s - o u t s i n
question.
T h i s c a u s e i s r e v e r s e d and remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r an o r d e r i n accordance with t h i s
decision.
Chief J u s t i c e
4