In Re Declaring Alisa

No. 13472 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN I N THE MATTER O DECLARING F DAWN ALISA, SANDRA LEA and LILLIAN MARIE SWAN, YOUTHS I N N E O CARE ED F Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e R. J. N e l s o n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: E. F. G i a n o t t i a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : J . F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Randy Gray a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Thomas Mahan a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: A p r i l 27, 1977 Decided : Filed: 18 1977 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, awarding permanent custody of a p p e l l a n t ' s t h r e e minor c h i l d r e n t o t h e Montana Department of S o c i a l and Rehabili- t a t i o n Services (SRS) a s youths i n need of c a r e . Appellant, H e n r i e t t a Swan, i s t h e n a t u r a l mother of Dawn A l i s a , Sandra Lea, and L i l l i a n Marie Swan. H e n r i e t t a Swan has a long h i s t o r y of i n a b i l i t y t o c a r e f o r h e r c h i l d r e n , p a r t i a l l y caused by emotional problems and severe alcoholism. On February 26, 1976, SRS f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r permanent custody and a u t h o r i t y t o a s s e n t t o t h e adoption of t h e c h i l d r e n . A hearing on t h i s p e t i t i o n was held on May 10. Testimony was heard from two SRS employees, Mary Morris and Mildred Lucero, who were acquainted with H e n r i e t t a Swan and h e r c h i l d r e n . Much of t h i s testimony was hearsay evidence which was admitted i n t o evidence over defense c o u n s e l ' s objection. H e n r i e t t a Swan was n o t c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y a t t h i s hearing. The record i r i d i c a e s c e r t a i n w r i t t e n r e p o r t s prepared by SRS and o t h e r s t a t e agencies were considered by t h e c o u r t i n i t s decision. These r e p o r t s concerned H e n r i e t t a Swan's a b i l i t y t o c a r e f o r h e r c h i l d r e n , an a n a l y s i s of t h e c h i l d r e n ' s adjustment t o t h e i r f o s t e r home, and p o l i c e r e p o r t s . filthough t h e s e r e p o r t s were a v a i l a b l e a t t h e time of t h e hearing, they were n o t o f f e r e d a s evidence by SRS. Subsequent t o t h e hearing, a medical r e p o r t prepared by D r . Hamilton P i e r c e was f i l e d with t h e c o u r t . It appears t h i s r e p o r t was a l s o considered by t h e c o u r t . The district court entered an order on June 1, awarding permanent custody of the children to SRS as .youths in need of care. The sole issue presented upon appeal is whether hearsay evidence is admissible in a custody hearing. The petition for permanent custody was brought by SRS pursuant to sections 10-1300 through 1322, R.C.M. 1947. Section 10-1310(3) states: "A petition alleging abuse, neglect or dependency, is a civil action brought in the name of the state of Montana. The Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply except as herein modified, Proceedings under a petition shall not be a bar to criminal prosecution." The instant case is a civil action and therefore all Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable, including the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule appears in section 93-401-2, R.C.M. 1947, and states: "Testimony confined to personal knowledge. A witness can testify to those facts only which he knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions, except in those few express cases in which his opinions or inferences, or the declarations of others, are admissible." This Court recently defined hearsay in State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 457, 513 P.2d 258: "'Hearsay' is testimony or 'ievidence of someone's words or conduct outside the court, when offered in court to prove the truth of the thing being asserted, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." Appellant is correct in her contention the record is replete with oral and written hearsay evidence, admitted over proper objection. Blatant examples of hearsay, such as the following exchange, are found throughout the testimony of Mary Morris and Mildred Lucero: "Q. Do you recall any time when the visitation was arranged and Mrs. Swan did not spend that visitation time with the children? A. Not by my direct observation. The children would say, you know, 1 we went with so and so,' but not from my direct observation. "Q. Did you talk to the children, then, following these visitations? A. Yes. "Q. And what did they tell you? "MR. GIANOTTI : Objection, hearsay. ''THE COURT: Overruled. "THE WITNESS: The children would say they were with Tiny, meaning an aunt, or :they were with Ronnie, or they were with Mrs. Lahr and her children, you know, Situations vary .I1 In addition, the reports which were submitted to the court by SRS and Dr. Pierce contained written hearsay that did not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule; The underlying purpose of sections 10-1300 et?seq., is to ascertain the best interests of the children subject to the proceedings and act in accordance with those findings. Bonser v. County of Cascade, 162 Mont. 1, 507 P,2d 1064; In re Bad Yellow Hair, 162 Mont. 107, 509 P.2d 9; In re Olson, 164 Mont. 431, 524 P.2d 779. In keeping with that purpose however, the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the hearsay rule, must be strictly followed. See Sanchez v. Sanchez, 55 C.2d 118, 358 P.2d 533. Any relaxing of these procedural rules could create a custody \ procedure ripe for abuse. As to written hearsay contained in the reports submitted to the court, this jurisdiction has long followed the rule that unsworn statements made out of court with no opportunity afforded to confront the writer and question him as to their veracity are hearsay. State v. Nelson, Mont . , 560 P.2d 897, 34 St. Rep. 80; Pessl v, Bridger Bowl, 164 Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101. SKS argues t h e r e p o r t s in question a r e admissible under a s t a t u t o r y exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e , s e c t i o n 93-901-1, R.C.M. 1947. That s t a t u t e provides: " w r i t t e n r e p o r t s o r - f i n d i n g s of f a c t made by o f f i c e r s of t h i s s t a t e , on a matter w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e i r duty a s defined by s t a t u t e , s h a l l , i n so f a r a s r e l e v a n t , be admitted a s evidence of t h e matter s t a t e d therein." W f i n d no merit i n t h i s contention. e The r e p o r t s submitted t o t h e c o u r t by M r s . Morris, t h e SRS s o c i a l worker, contain a conglomeration of m a t e r i a l prepared by h e r , a food stamp e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n , a Great F a l l s p o l i c e o f f i c e r , and t h e f o s t e r mother of t h e Swan c h i l d r e n . The r e p o r t s a r e inadmissible a s they contain m a t e r i a l t h a t i s hearsay upon hearsay. S t a t e v. Nelson, supra. Many of the r e p o r t s submitted were n o t business records a s contemplated by s e c t i o n 93-801-2, R.C.M. 1947. Neither were they admissible under s e c t i o n 93-901-1, t h e Uniform O f f i c i a l Reports a s Evidence Act. Richardson v. Farmers Union O i l Co., 131 Mont. 535, 312 P.2d 134. Unsworn r e p o r t s where t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o cross-examine come w i t h i n t h e hearsay r u l e and a r e inadmissible. S h i l l i n g s t a d v. Nelson, 141Mont. 412, 378 P.2d 393. The admis- s i o n of t h e r e p o r t s over o b j e c t i o n was e r r o r . The decision of t h e d i s t r i c t court i s reversed. This cause i s remanded t o t h a t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n conformity with t h i s opinion. a We Concur: 6 & Chief Justice -