No. 13504
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
ARTHUR GRINDE , ARTHUR F . WIEDEMAN,
LEON JACOBS, JOE C. WICKS, ROBERT L.
DISSLY, of the CITY-COUNTY AIRPORT
COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF LEWISTOWN
and COUNTY OF FERGUS, STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
FRANCIS M. TINDALL and MARIAN B. TINDALL,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana
Torger S. Oaas argued, Lewistown, Montana
For Respondents :
Bradley B. Parrish argued, Lewistown, Montana
Submitted: January 26, 1977
Decided: 'APR - 6 19n
Filed: 1YFi j 3jT
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
I n a c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n t r i e d b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , Fergus County, without a j u r y , t h e c o u r t found p l a i n t i f f s
a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e possession of c e r t a i n property c o n s t i t u t i n g
a f u e l tank i n s t a l l a t i o n . Defendants a p p e a l .
During World War I1 t h e United S t a t e s government c o n s t r u c t e d
and placed a f u e l i n g system on l a n d belonging t o Frank and Mary
Hruska. The s i t e was a d j a c e n t t o t h e Lewistown A i r Force Base
and t h e government e n t e r e d i n t o a l e a s e w i t h Hruskas f o r t h e 7
a c r e s of land upon which t h e f u e l i n g system was l o c a t e d . The
l e a s e provided t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e s placed on t h e land would remain
p r o p e r t y of t h e government and could b e removed o r o t h e r w i s e disposed
of by t h e government.
I n 1947, t h e l e a s e was renewed f o r a 10 year p e r i o d . In
June 1948, t h e government t r a n s f e r r e d and q u i t c l a i m e d t h e f u e l i n g
system and t h e f e n c e surrounding i t t o t h e c i t y - c o u n t y a i r p o r t
commission of t h e c i t y of Lewistown and county of Fergus, which
p l a i n t i f f s herein represent. I n J u l y 1957, t h e commission
e n t e r e d i n t o a n o t h e r l e a s e w i t h Hruskas. Again i n May 1969, an-
o t h e r l e a s e was e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h Hruskas s i m i l a r t o t h e l e a s e s
of 1947 and 1957. The 1969 l e a s e was f o r a p e r i o d of 3 y e a r s w i t h
an o p t i o n f o r a n a d d i t i o n a l 3 y e a r s . The r e n t a l was $40 p e r y e a r
and Hruskas were p a i d $75 a t t h e time of t h e execution of t h e 1969
lease.
I n June 1970, Hruskas s o l d c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y t o de-
f e n d a n t s h e r e i n F r a n c i s and Marian T i n d a l l . This s a l e included
t h e 7 a c r e s l e a s e d by p l a i n t i f f commission. I n Y3 of t h e c o n t r a c t
f o r deed appears t h i s statement:
"The Airport Commission l e a s e s about 7 Acres i n
t h e South p a r t of SE 114 S 114 and/or S 114
W W
SE 114 of s a i d Section 1 7 , and Buyer w i l l take s a i d
land s u b j e c t t h e r e t o and he s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o a l l
r e n t s h e r e a f t e r paid thereon. The s i x f u e l s t o r a g e
tanks and stands thereon a r e owned by s a i d Commission
and they do n o t go with t h e land."
When t h e 1969 l e a s e expired t h e commission attempted t o g a i n
possession of t h e f u e l i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n but were refused posses-
s i o n by defendants who contend t h e f u e l tanks a r e f i x t u r e s t o
t h e land. Defendants argue t h a t while t h e United S t a t e s govern-
ment r e t a i n e d r i g h t of removal, t h e r i g h t d i d not pass t o t h e
commission and even i f i t d i d pass those r i g h t s terminated i n
1972 when t h e 1969 l e a s e expired, o r i n 1970 when t h e commission
stopped paying r e n t .
While t h e p a r t i e s argue t h e c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i s whether
t h e f u e l i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n i s r e a l o r personal property, we f i n d
t h e above quoted statement from 1 3 of t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed
controls. However, we w i l l consider t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d .
Defendants argue s e c t i o n 67-209, R.C.M. 1947, i s c o n t r o l l i n g .
However, i n P r i t c h a r d Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-op, 1 1 7 Mont.
467, 161 P.2d 526, t h i s Court i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h a t s t a t u t e held
i t t o be merely a r u l e f o r general guidance concerning i t s e l f more
with u l t i m a t e than with probative f a c t s . This C o u r t ' s cases
hold t h e proper t e s t f o r determining whether a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t
has become a f i x t u r e o r n o t , i s s a i d t o comprise (1) annexation
t o t h e r e a l t y , (2) an adaption t o t h e use t o which t h e r e a l t y
i s devoted and ( 3 ) i n t e n t t h a t t h e o b j e c t become a permanent
accession t o t h e land. Of these t h r e e , t h e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s
has t h e most weight and i s t h e c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r . Montana
E l e c t r i c Co. v. Northern Valley Mining Co., 5 1 Mont. 266, 153
P. 1017; Sanders v. B u t t e Motor Co., 142 Mont. 524, 385 P.2d
263; S h i p l e r v . Potomac Copper Co., 69 Mont. 86, 220 P. 1097;
B u t t e E l e c t r i c Ry. Co. v . B r e t t , 80 Mont. 12, 257 P. 478.
Considering t h e evidence b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t c l e a r l y
t h e i n t e n t of a l l p a r t i e s , p r i o r t o defendants a r r i v a l , was t h a t
t h e f u e l i n g system i n s t a l l a t i o n was t o be considered p e r s o n a l
p r o p e r t y a f t e r i t was placed on t h e Hruska property.
Defendants a r g u e t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n t h a t it went
beyond t h e agreed statement of f a c t s and included f a c t s i n
i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t s and conclusions of law t h a t came from a
d e p o s i t i o n taken from Frank Hruska. W f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s
e
allegation. True, a d e p o s i t i o n was taken from Hruska and included
i n t h e c o u r t f i l e , b u t we n o t e t h e d e p o s i t i o n was p r o p e r l y n o t i c e d
and when taken no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of defendants appeared. That
f a c t i s not controlling here f o r the general r u l e i s , i n considering
a n agreed statement of f a c t s , t h a t a c o u r t may make any l e g i t i -
mate o r reasonable i n f e r e n c e o r i n f e r e n c e s of which t h e f a c t s
may r i g h t l y be s u s c e p t i b l e . The c o u r t may d r a w - t h e r e a s o n a b l e
and l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e s i n t h e same way and t o t h e same e x t e n t
had t h e f a c t s agreed upon been adduced by t h e t a k i n g of testimony
i n open c o u r t . 83 C.J.S. S t i p u l a t i o n s 3 25, p. 73. When a
c o u r t f e e l s i t needs evidence o t h e r than t h a t p r e s e n t e d i n t h e
agreed statement o f f a c t s t o make a d e c i s i o n , i t may r e f e r t o
o t h e r evidence than t h e agreed statement i n a r r i v i n g a t i t s
decision. S t a t e ex r e l . Nelson v. D i s t r i c t Court, 107 Mont. 167,
8 1 P.2d 699; 83 C.J.S. S t i p u l a t i o n s 1 25, p. 70.
Defendants f u r t h e r argue t h a t even though t h e f a c i l i t y i s
h e l d t o be p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , t h e commission i s f o r e c l o s e d from
removing t h e p r o p e r t y by t h e running of t h e 2 y e a r s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s a s a p p l i e d t o recovery of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . Not
so! Whether o r n o t t h e commission ceased t o pay r e n t , and
t h i s i s a q u e s t i o n , t h i s of i t s e l f does n o t mean t h e l e a s e was
a u t o m a t i c a l l y terminated. The 1969 l e a s e contained no d e f a u l t
c l a u s e and t h e r e was no evidence b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t h a t defendants
terminated o r attempted t o t e r m i n a t e t h e l e a s e b e f o r e i t e x p i r e d
on A p r i l 30, 1972.
under
W f i n d l t h e f a c t s t h a t t h e l e a s e was v o i d a b l e and n o t void
e
and t h e s t a t u t e d i d n o t begin t o run u n t i l t h e r e was a demand
by t h e commission and a r e f u s a l by defendants. Gates v. Powell,
77 Mont. 554, 252 P. 377; I n t e r s t a t e Mfg. Co. v . I n t e r s t a t e
Products Co., 146 Mont. 449, 408 P.2d 478; 5 1 Am J u r 2d, Limita-
t i o n s of A c t i o n s , $107, p. 680, 4484, p. 959.
Judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
p r
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Chief J u s t i c e