State v. Lahr

                                 No.    13131a

         IN THE SUPREI.tE CGURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA

                                     1977



THE STATE OF MONTANA,

                          P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

          -vs-

H R L CHESTER LABR,
 A OD

                         D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .




A p p e a l from:    D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                     H o n o r a b l e LeRoy L . McKinnon, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

    For Appellant:

          Bradley B.        P a r r i s h a r g u e d , Lewistown, Montana

    For Respondent :

          Hon. M i c h a e l G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
            Montana
          J . Mayo A s h l e y , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
            H e l e n a , Montana
          W i l l i a m S p o j a , Jr., County A t t o r n e y , Lewistown,
            Montana
          R o b e r t L. Knopp, Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a p p e a r e d ,
            Lewistown, Montana



                                               Submitted:             January 2 1 ,     1977

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                                                   Decided:
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.


        This appeal concerns probable cause for an arrest for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.    The district court,Fergus

County, after hearing on a motion to suppress held sufficient

probable cause existed for the arrest. Thereafter defendant Harold

Lahr was tried and convicted of the charge.

        On the evening of September 7, 1974, defendant Harold C.

Lahr and Richard Biehl drove from Moore, Montana to Denton, Montana

in Lahr's automobile.    Sheriff's Lleputy David Sirucek was on duty

in Denton that evening and noticed Lahr and Biehl as they entered

town.   Sirucek, who had positioned himself nearby, observed Lahr
and Biehl conversing with one John Linse.    Deputy Sirucek was aware
of Linse's previous drug related arrests, Using binoculars, Deputy

Sirucek observed what he believed to be a transaction take place

between the parties.    Sirucek testified that a package appeared

to change hands, however, he had no idea what kind of package, only

that the circumstances were somewhat suspicious.

        Lahr and Biehl left Denton soon after their conversation
with Linse and proceeded toward Lewistown, Montana.    Deputy Sirucek

then radioed Deputy Randle Cordle in Lewistown and informed him of

the suspicious transaction.   He asked Cordle to "pick them up when

they came into Lewistown to see what they were up to."
        Deputy Cordle positioned his unmarked patrol car approx-
imately four to five miles outside Lewistown and waited for the
Lahr vehicle.   As the Lahr vehicle approached Lewistown, Deputy
Cordle followed the car for approximately three miles at a dis-

tance of one to four car lengths. Lahr testified he considered the
v e h i c l e following him so c l o s e l y a dangerous s i t u a t i o n and

attempted t o have t h a t v e h i c l e pass him.              He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d

he slowed and waved f o r t h e following v e h i c l e t o p a s s .

            Deputy Cordle t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e following t h e Lahr

v e h i c l e he observed i t swerve over t h e c e n t e r l i n e of t h e highway

twice and go onto t h e shoulder t h r e e times.                    Cordle s t a t e d he con-

s i d e r e d L a h r ' s manner of d r i v i n g r e c k l e s s i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h e

c a r s were only t r a v e l i n g from 35 t o 40 m i l e s p e r hour, so he d i s -

played h i s f l a s h i n g r e d l i g h t and Lahr p u l l e d t o t h e s i d e of t h e

road.     Both Deputy Cordle and Lahr a l i g h t e d from t h e i r v e h i c l e s

and Deputy Cordle asked t o s e e L a h r ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .            Lahr

returned t o h i s car t o g e t h i s license.               As he was r e t r i e v i n g i t

from h i s c o a t pocket, Deputy Cordle observed a q u a n t i t y of what he

b e l i e v e d t o be marijuana i n t h e console between t h e f r o n t s e a t s o f

Lahr's car.        A t t h a t time Cordle placed Lahr and B i e h l under a r r e s t

f o r i l l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous drugs.        A t no time was Lahr

charged w i t h any d r i v i n g v i o l a t i o n .   Lahr was found g u i l t y of

i l l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n o f dangerous drugs; B i e h l was found n o t g u i l t y

of t h a t charge.

            Whether t h e r e was probable cause f o r t h e a r r e s t i s t h e

i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court on appeal.

            S e c t i o n 95-608(d), R.C.M.         1947, provides t h e circumstances

under which peace o f f i c e r s may make a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t , i t s t a t e s :

            "A peace o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a person when:

                  "* * *
                   " ( d ) He b e l i e v e s . on r e a s o n a b l e grounds, t h a t
            t h e person i s committing a n o f f e n s e , o r t h a t t h e person
            h a s committed a n o f f e n s e and t h e e x i s t i n g circumstances
            r e q u i r e h i s immediate a r r e s t . II
              See: S t a t e ex r e l . Glantz v. D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont. 132,

461 P.2d 193; S t a t e v. F e t t e r s and Lean, 165 Mont. 1 1 7 , 123, 526

P.2d 122; S t a t e v. Bennett, 158 Mont. 496, 493 P.2d 1077.

              However, t h e v a l i d i t y of an a r r e s t under s e c t i o n 95-608(d),

i s determined by t h e presence of probable cause.                       I n F e t t e r s and Lean

t h e Court s t a t e d t h e well-established r u l e i n Montana:

             "Whether t h e a r r e s t s a r e v a l i d depends, i n t u r n , upon
             whether a t t h e moment t h e a r r e s t s were made t h e o f f i c e r s
             had probable cause- i . e . whether a t t h a t moment t h e f a c t s
             and circumstances w i t h i n t h e i r knowledge and of which
             they had reasonable trustworthy information were s u f f i c i e n t
             t o warrant a prudent man i n b e l i e v i n g defendants had
             committed o r were committing an o f f e n s e and t h e circum-
             stances required t h e i r immediate a r r e s t s . Section 95-
             608(d), R,C.M. 1947; S t a t e v. Bennett, supra; Brinegar
             v. United S t a t e s , 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
             1879    ."
              I t i s c l e a r t h a t n e i t h e r Deputy Sirucek nor Deputy Cordle

had probable cause t o a r r e s t Lahr.             Deputy Sirucek had a suspicion

t h a t an i l l e g a l t r a n s a c t i o n had taken p l a c e i n Denton, but nothing

more.       O cross-examination a t a hearing on a motion t o suppress
             n

he t e s t i f i e d :

             "Q. You saw what you thought was a suspicious t r a n s -
             a c t i o n and you--why d i d n ' t you a r r e s t them i f you thought
             something was going on? A. I had no grounds f o r an
             arrest.

             "Q.         You had no grounds f o r an a r r e s t ?   A.     N sir.
                                                                             o

             "Q.  And y e t you c a l l e d O f f i c e r Cordle and s a i d t h e r e
             was something suspicious? A . Yes, s i r . I t

             Deputy Cordle t e s t i f i e d he i n i t i a l l y stopped Lahr f o r a

d r i v i n g v i o l a t i o n , however a t r a f f i c c i t a t i o n was never issued.

C l e a r l y , t h e t r a f f i c s t o p was merely a p r e t e x t used by Deputy

Cordle t o follow up on t h e c a l l received from Deputy Sirucek. Eence,

Deputy Cordle was a l s o a c t i n g on a mere suspicion.

             The evidence required t o e s t a b l i s h g u i l t i s not necessary

t o prove probable cause f o r an a r r e s t , however good f a i t h o r mere
suspicion on t h e p a r t of a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s i s n o t enough.      State

v. F e t t e r s and Lean, supra; S t a t e ex r e l . Wong You v. D i s t r i c t

Court, 106 Mont. 347, 78 P.2d 353.                Furthermore, an a r r e s t i s not

j u s t i f i e d by what t h e subsequent search d i s c l o s e s .     S t a t e v. F e t t e r s

and Lean, supra; Henry v. United S t a t e s , 361 U.S.                 98, 80 S.Ct.        168,

4 L A ed 2d 134; C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct.

280, 69 L ed 543.

           W reverse on t h e grounds of l a c k of probable cause
            e

for the a r r e s t .




  Justices.
J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :

              I n m view t h e c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d .
                   y                                                                           The

a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e d a n g e r o u s d r u g s and smoking p a r a p h e r n a l i a

depends on whose v e r s i o n o f t h e f a c t s i s a c c e p t e d , Deputy C o r d l e ' s

o r defendant's.             The d i s t r i c t c o u r t must have a c c e p t e d Deputy

C o r d l e ' s v e r s i o n o r t h e c o u r t would n o t have d e n i e d t h e defend-

a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s .        This Court should not r e v e r s e t h i s

i m p l i e d f a c t u a l f i n d i n g based on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , though c o n f l i c t -

ing,evidence.             I f t h e r e i s no c l e a r preponderance o f e v i d e n c e

a g a i n s t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n , it s h o u l d

n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l .       Crncevich v . Georgetown R e c r e a t i o n

Corporation,                 Mont.           ,   541 P.2d 56, 32 St.Rep.                  963, and

cases cited therein.

             A s I s e e i t , t h e e v e n t s i n Denton a r e i r r e l e v a n t and

f u r n i s h no b a s i s f o r s t o p p i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r .     But a c c o r d i n g t o

Deputy C o r d l e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e t w i c e swerved o v e r t h e

c e n t e r l i n e and t h r e e t i m e s went o n t o t h e s h o u l d e r o f t h e r o a d

i n Deputy C o r d l e ' s p r e s e n c e .        T h i s gave Deputy C o r d l e a r i g h t

t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e and a s k t o see t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d r i v e r ' s

license.         I n t h i s p r o c e s s Deputy C o r d l e o b s e r v e d i n p l a i n view

t h e two r o a c h e s o f m a r i j u a n a c i g a r e t t e s , a f i l m c a n n i s t e r used

t o c o n t a i n m a r i j u a n a , and a hash p i p e .           T h e r e a f t e r he p l a c e d

t h e d e f e n d a n t under a r r e s t .

             The m a j o r i t y c i t e s e c t i o n 9 5 - 6 0 5 ( d ) , R.C.M.         1947, a s

amended, a s d e t a i l i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which a n o f f i c e r

may make a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t .         One o f t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s

where, a s h e r e , a n o f f e n s e i s committed i n t h e o f f i c e r ' s p r e s e n c e .

Normal p o l i c e p r o c e d u r e i n c i d e n t t o a t r a f f i c s t o p i s a r e q u e s t

t o see t h e p e r s o n ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .    During t h i s p r o c e s s

Deputy C o r d l e observed t h e d a n g e r o u s d r u g s i n p l a i n view.                     At

t h i s p o i n t he had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t t h e d e f e n d a n t .          This

i s i n a c c o r d w i t h o u r h o l d i n g i n S t a t e v. F e t t e r s and Lean and

                                                 - 6 -
the other cases cited by the majority.
        The majority point out that the defendant was never
arrested on the traffic charge and therefore conclude that the
traffic offense either did not occur or that it was a mere
subterfuge to get a look in defendant's car.   This is pure
supposition, in my view, as common experience demonstrates that
in many cases where a second more serious crime is discovered
while investigating a lesser offense, the person is frequently
not charged with the lesser offense.
       What the majority have done here is accept the version
of defendant that his erratic driving was the result of tail-
gating by Deputy Cordle in preference to Deputy Cordle's version
to the contrary.   In so doing they have made an independent
factual determination contrary to that made by the district
court in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
       For these reasons I respectively dissent.



                                          Justice