Madison v. Yunker

No. 13741

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN

1978

A. P . MADISON,

P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,

CAREY MATOVICH YUNKER, I n d i v i d u a l l y
a n d a s E d i t o r o f t h e Montana Kaimin,
t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana S t u d e n t
Newspaper; The Montana Kaimin; e t a l . ,

D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District,
H o n o r a b l e Edward T. D u s s a u l t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

Boone, K a r l b e r g and Haddon, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Sam E. Haddon a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

For Respondents:

C a l t o n & S t e p h e n s , B i l l i n g s , Montans
H e r r o n and Meloy, H e l e n a , Montana
P e t e r M. Meloy a r g u d , H e l e n a , Montana
Bruce B. B a r r e t t a r g u e d , Missoula, Montana
R i c h a r d V o l i n k a t y a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn a n d R o b i n s o n , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Gary Graham a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

F o r Amicus C u r i a e :

B r i n t o n M a r k l e , H e l e n a , Montana

Submitted: May 5 , 1978

Decided: fiul.2 - - r7
3g
e
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

Missoula County, g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' motion t o d i s m i s s

p l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r l i b e l and from t h e e n t r y o f

judgment f o r d e f e n d a n t s .

The p r e s e n t c a u s e of a c t i o n a r o s e o u t of a p u r p o r t e d

l i b e l o u s p u b l i c a t i o n w r i t t e n by d e f e n d a n t Carey Matovich

Yunker (Yunker) and p u b l i s h e d i n t h e October 8 , 1974 e d i t i o n

of t h e Montana Kaimin, t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana s t u d e n t

newspaper. In pertinent part the editorial states:

" * * * One of t h e memos i s from A 1 Madison.
H i s p o s i t i o n , d i r e c t o r of t h e U n i v e r s i t y
p r i n t shop, a l o n e makes a n y t h i n g h e would
s a y on t h e m a t t e r s u s p e c t . A s w e l l , he i s
a c o n g e n i t a l l i a r , a n i n c o m p e t e n t whose own
o p e r a t i o n h a s l o s t $103,914.89 i n t h e l a s t
four years. * * *"

On December 9, 1974, Madison f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t

d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l l e g i n g d e f e n d a n t Yunker,

a c t i n g i n h e r c a p a c i t y a s e d i t o r of t h e Montana Kaimin,

d e l i b e r a t e l y and m a l i c i o u s l y l i b e l e d p l a i n t i f f by p u b l i s h i n g

f a l s e defamatory statements. P l a i n t i f f p l e a d e d noncompliance

w i t h s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, (Montana's r e t r a c t i o n

s t a t u t e ) on t h e grounds t h a t s e c t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and

t h e p u r p o r t e d l i b e l was n o t w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of s e c t i o n 64-

207.1.

Madison prayed f o r judgment i n h i s f a v o r and a n award

of s p e c i a l , g e n e r a l , and p u n i t i v e o r exemplary damages i n

t h e a g g r e g a t e amount of $102,000.

On December 30 and 31, 1974, d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d m o t i o n s

t o d i s m i s s Madison's c o m p l a i n t , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 1 2 ( b ) ,

M.R.Civ.P., on t h e grounds t h e c o m p l a i n t f a i l e d t o s t a t e a

c l a i m upon which r e l i e f c o u l d b e g r a n t e d and t h e D i s t r i c t
 Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n over p a r t i e s i n a l i b e l a c t i o n

until ad is on complied w i t h s e c t i o n 64-207.1. The Univer-
s i t y of ~ o n t a n a ' smotion t o d i s m i s s w a s based upon t h e

a d d i t i o n a l ground t h a t no c l a i m had been f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e

U n i v e r s i t y of Montana p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 82-4312, R.C.M.

1947.

On J a n u a r y 31, 1975, Madison f i l e d a motion t o d e f e r

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m a t t e r s r a i s e d i n t h e c o n s o l i d a t e d motion

of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana pending f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of

t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1. Madison and t h e

U n i v e r s i t y of Montana s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 was a c o n d i t i o n p r e -

c e d e n t t o t h e maintenance of any a c t i o n f o r l i b e l .

On May 2 9 , 1975, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r d o r a l argument

on d e f e n d a n t s ' s e p a r a t e motions t o d i s m i s s . B r i e f s i n sup-

p o r t of and i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e motions t o d i s m i s s were

f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s . On December 2 2 , 1976, t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' motions t o d i s m i s s

on t h e grounds s e c t i o n 64-207.1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e

1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and Madison f a i l e d t o demand a

r e t r a c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 64-207.1, defendants being

entitled to "* * * an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u b l i s h a r e t r a c t i o n t o

m i t i g a t e a c t u a l o r compensatory damages, i f any." ~udgment

was a c c o r d i n g l y e n t e r e d f o r d e f e n d a n t s .

The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w , a s s t a t e d by a p p e l l a n t

Madison, are:

1. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r i n g a

demand f o r r e t r a c t i o n a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o a n a c t i o n f o r

l i b e l , impose u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s upon p e r s o n a l

l i b e r t i e s and r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by A r t i c l e 11, 1972 Montana

c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e due p r o c e s s p r o v i s i o n of t h e our tee nth

Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n ?
 2. Does s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, have any ap-

p l i c a t i o n i n a l i b e l a c t i o n founded upon p u b l i c a t i o n of a n

obvious i n t e n t i o n a l falsehood?

W e a r e handed f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n a c l a s s i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n

between b a s i c and t r e a s u r e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h e

freedom of s p e e c h and p r e s s g u a r a n t e e d under t h e F i r s t Amend-

ment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , on t h e one hand, and

t h e r i g h t s of a n i n d i v i d u a l t o b e s e c u r e from d e f a m a t i o n on

the other. The p i v o t a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n we must make i s t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y o f s e c t i o n 64-207.1. For on t h a t

d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a l l e l s e i n t h i s c a s e depends. It requires,

a s we s a i d i n Granger v . T i m e , I n c . (1977) , - Mont. ,
568 P.2d 535, 541, 34 St.Rep. 983, a "* * * c a r e f u l balanc-

i n g of t h e F i r s t Amendment freedoms of s p e e c h and p r e s s , and

t h e p e r s o n a l d i g n i t y i n t e r e s t s u n d e r l y i n g t h e law of defama-

tion" .
A t t h e o u t s e t , w e s e t o u t i n f u l l t h e s t a t u t e which i s

under a t t a c k :

"64-207.1. Notice i n w r i t i n g t o publisher
of l i b e l o u s o r defamatory m a t t e r - - o p p o r t u n i t y
t o c o r r e c t - - d e f e n s e and m i t i g a t i o n of damages.
-- - -
B e f o r e g c i v i l a c t i o n s h a l i b e commenced on
-
a c c o u n t of 3 libelous o r f a m a t o r y publics-
t i o -i n
- n newspaper, magazine, p e r i o d i c a l ,
radio o r television station, or cable television
s y s t e m , t h e l i b e l--- s h a l l --
e d person f i r s t give
those a l l e g e d - be responsible - l i a b l e f o r
to - or
t h e publication a reasonable opport-to
c o r r e c t t h e l i b e i o u s o r defamatory m a t t e r - Such
o p p o r t u n i t y s h a l l b e z v e n by n o t i c e i n w r i t i n g
s p e c i f y i n g t h e a r t i c l e and t h e s t a t e m e n t s t h e r e i n
which a r e c l a i m e d t o b e f a l s e and d e f a m a t o r y
and a s t a t e m e n t of what a r e c l a i m e d t o b e t h e
true facts. The n o t i c e may a l s o s t a t e t h e
s o u r c e s , i f any, from which t h e t r u e f a c t s may
b e a s c e r t a i n e d w i t h d e f i n i t e n e s s and c e r t a i n t y .
The f i r s t i s s u e of a newspaper, magazine o r
p e r i o d i c a l p u b l i s h e d a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of
o n e week from t h e r e c e i p t o f s u c h n o t i c e s h a l l
be w i t h i n a reasonable t i m e f o r c o r r e c t i o n .
I n t h e c a s e of r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s
and c a b l e t e l e v i s i o n systems a b r o a d c a s t made
a t t h e same t i m e of day as t h e b r o a d c a s t com-
 plained of and of at least equal duration,
which is made within seven (7) days following
receipt of such notice shall be within a rea-
sonable time for correction. To the extent
that the true facts are, with reasonable dili-
gence, ascertainable with definiteness and
certainty, only a retraction shall constitute
a correction; otherwise the publication of the
libeled person's statement of the true facts,
of so much thereof as shall not be libelous
or another, scurrilous, or otherwise improper
for publication, published as his statement,
shall constitute a correction within the
meaning of this section. If it shall appear
upon trial -- publication w a s a m e r
that the --
honest mistake or misapprehension, - - a
then
correction, timay published, without comment,
- -a position and type as prominent - -
in as the
alleged libel, or in a broadcast made at the
same time of day as the broadcast complained
of and of at least equal duration, shall con-
stitute a defense against the recovery of any
as
damages except actual damages, - - - - being
as well
competent and material in mitigation of actual
damases - - extent the correction Kblished
to the
does2so mitigate them. " (Emphasis added. )
--
The pertinent part of the Fourteen Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads:
" * * * No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
Article 11, 1972 Montana Constitution, has several sec-
tions which are pertinent to or have some significance in
this case:
"Section 3. Inalienable rights. All persons
are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and seeking their safety,
health and happiness in all lawful ways. In
enjoying these rights, all persons recognize
corresponding responsibilities.
"Section 4. Individual dignity. The dignity
of the human being is inviolable. No person
shall denied the equal protectionof -
- the
laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm,
-

corporation, or institution shall discriminate
against any person in the exercise of his civil
 o r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on a c c o u n t of r a c e ,
c o l o r , s e x , c u l t u r e , s o c i a l o r i g i n o r con-
dition, or p o l i t i c a l o r religious ideas.

" S e c t i o n 7. Freedom of s p e e c h , e x p r e s s i o n ,
and p r e s s . No law s h a l l be p a s s e d i m p a i r i n g
t h e freedom of s p e e c h o r e x p r e s s i o n . Every
person s h a l l - -e-t o speak o r p u b l i s h
be f r e
whatever - - l-on any s u b j e c t , b e i n g r e s p o n s i -
he w i l
- - - a b u s e - -a t l i b e r t y . I n a l l s u i t s
ble for a l l of t h 7 -

and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r l i b e l o r s l a n d e r -- h
the trut
t h e r e o f m a y b e y i v e n i n e v i d e n c e ; and - j u r y ,
-the
under t h e --- n o f t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e
directio
-----t s .
t h e law and t h e f a c

" S e c t i o n 1 6 . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e .
C o u r t s of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o e v e r y p e r s o n ,
and speedy remedy a f f o r d e d f o r every i n j u r y of
person, property, or c h a r a c t e r . No p e r s o n s h a l l
be d e p r i v e d of t h i s f u l l l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r i n -
j u r y i n c u r r e d i n employment f o r which a n o t h e r
p e r s o n may b e l i a b l e e x c e p t as t o f e l l o w employees
and h i s immediate employer who h i r e d him i f s u c h
immediate employer p r o v i d e s c o v e r a g e under t h e
Workmen's Compensation Laws of t h i s s t a t e . R i g h t
and j u s t i c e s h a l l b e a d m i n i s t e r e d w i t h o u t s a l e ,
denial, o r delay.

" S e c t i o n 1 7 . Due p r o c e s s of l a w . N person
-o
s h a l l b e d e p r i v e d - -f e , l i b e r t y , o r p r o p e r t
of l i
withouFdue process - - of law." ( ~ m ~ h a s usp p l i z d . )
z

I t w i l l be n o t e d t h a t s e v e r a l of t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n s

of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n r e p e a t o r r e s t a t e l i k e p r o v i s i o n s

i n t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . For example, A r t i c l e 11,
S e c t i o n 4 , p r o v i d e s t h a t no p e r s o n s h a l l b e d e n i e d t h e e q u a l

p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e laws. A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 1 7 , p r o v i d e s

t h a t no p e r s o n s h a l l be d e p r i v e d of l i f e , l i b e r t y o r p r o p e r t y

w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law. Freedom o f s p e e c h , of e x p r e s s i o n
and of p r e s s i s g u a r a n t e e d i n Article 11, S e c t i o n 7 . These

state constitutional provisions, i d e n t i c a l o r nearly i d e n t i c a l

w i t h l i k e language i n t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and
c e r t a i n l y i d e n t i c a l i n concept, each c o n s t i t u t e s e p a r a t e

and e n f o r c e a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n s o f a r a s t h e j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of t h e S t a t e of Montana e x t e n d s . Where s t a t e and
 f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions a r e i d e n t i c a l , each i s
e n f o r c e a b l e i n i t s own r e s p e c t i v e s p h e r e where t h o s e p r i n -

ciples attach. S e e , Department of Mental Hygiene v . K i r c h n e r

( 1 9 6 5 ) , 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 C a l . R p t r . 329, 4 0 0 P.2d 321; Emery

v . S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. , 580 P.2d 445, 35
St.Rep. 709.

The competing freedoms which s e c t i o n 64-207.1 affect are

found i n t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . F i r s t and

f o r e m o s t o f t h e a f f e c t e d p r o v i s i o n s i s A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7.

Freedom o f t h e p r e s s f l o w e r s i n t h e l a n g u a g e " e v e r y p e r s o n

s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r p u b l i s h whatever h e w i l l on any

s u b j e c t " , b u t t h e r e i s a n accompanying t h o r n , " b e i n g r e s p o n s i -

b l e f o r a l l a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y . "

I t i s noteworthy t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t d e f i n e

t h e c l a u s e " a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y " . However, on t h e books

a t t h e t i m e of t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n was s e c t i o n

64-203, R.C.M. 1947, a d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l . That s t a t u t e

follows :

" L i b e l i s a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a -
t i o n by w r i t i n g , p r i n t i n g * * * which exposes
any p e r s o n s t o h a t r e d , contempt, r i d i c u l e , o r
obloquy, o r which c a u s e s him t o b e shunned o r
a v o i d e d , o r which h a s a tendency t o i n j u r e him
i n h i s occupation."

W e may assume t h e r e f o r e t h a t a n " a b u s e of t h a t l i b e r t y "

would b e any p u b l i c a t i o n t h a t would f i t t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i -

t i o n of l i b e l . W e a r e f o r t i f i e d i n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n by t h e

f a c t t h a t i n A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ,

t h e s e c t i o n g o e s on t o s a y , " i n a l l s u i t s and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r

l i b e l o r s l a n d e r , t h e t r u t h t h e r e o f may b e g i v e n i n e v i d e n c e ,
and t h e j u r y , under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r -

mine t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s . "

W d e t e r m i n e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t s u i t s f o r l i b e l a r e recog-
e

n i z e d and p r e s e r v e d i n t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . It is

p r o p e r t o t u r n now t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g i n

t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , re-
garding freedom of the press, or the case law applying thereto,
that allows the press a greater degree of freedom than the
Montana Constitution, or prevents suits for libel such as
contemplated by the Montana Constitution.
We find from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418
U.S. 323 347, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L Ed 2d 789, that states may
provide for libel actions, at least where the publication is
libelous on its face:
"We hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual. This approach provides a more
equitable boundary between the competing con-
cerns involved here. It recognizes the strength
of the legitimate state interest in compensating
private individuals for wrongful injury to repu-
tation, yet shields the press and broadcast
media from the rigors of strict liability for
defamation. At least this inclusion obtains
where, as here, the substance of the defamatory
statement 'makes substantial danger to reputa-
tion apparent'. This phrase places in perspec-
tive the conclusion we announce today. Our
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat
different from those discussed above if a State
purported to condition civil liability on a
factual mis-statement whose content did not
warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster
of a defamatory potential * * *." 418 U.S. at
347, 348.
We next turn to consider how section 64-207.1 comports
with Article 11, Section 7, respecting the freedom of the
press which we have already set out in full, and the provi-
sions of Article 11, Section 16, which provides that "courts
of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy
afforded for every injury of person, property, or character

It is plaintiff's contention that the provisions of
section 64-207.1 absolutely preclude a suit by a defamed
individual and that the statutory requirement therein for
written notice demanding a retraction is outside the
provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution and an impermis-
sible limitation or restriction on the constitutional right
of action for libel. Defendants on the other hand contend

that the statute does not bar suits for libel, but only
sets forth a condition precedent to maintaining a suit;
that the effect of section 64-207.1, once followed, is to
mitigate damages; and further, that the provision for retrac-
tion is in itself a remedy afforded by the statute to a
libeled person.
This Court has said that:
"The underlying purpose of libel laws is to
furnish a means of redress for defamation.
Every person is entitled to enjoy his repu-
tation unimpaired by false and defamatory
remarks. An action for libel or slander is
based upon a violation of this right which
exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
to injure him in his occupation. (Citations
omitted.) " Lewis v. Reader's Digest (1973),
162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702.
The legislature has defined what constitutes libel. Sec-
tion 64-203. It has also determined who can be held liable
for libel. Section 64-201, et seq., R.C.M. 1947. These
statutes implement the constitutional mandate of Article 11,
Section 7, 1972 Montana Constitution and also of Article 11,
Section 16, of that Constitution, which provides that a
remedy shall be available for injury to character.
The District Court in this case dismissed Madison's com-
plaint because Madison failed to give the required notice for
retraction. It must be said that the District Court was
simply following the statute, which allows no other interpre-
tation. The statute begins with the words: "Before any
civil action shall be commenced * * * the libeled person
shall first give * * * notice to the libelor * * *." This
requirement is in direct derogation of the clear and unam-
biguous language of Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana
Constitution, which mandates that the courts of this state
are open to every person, and a remedy afforded for every
injury to character.
" * * * With reference to the subjects upon
which the Constitution speaks, its declara-
tions are binding upon the legislature
(citing case). Constitutional provisions
are conclusive upon the legislature and
prevent the enactment of any law which
extinguishes or limits the powers conferred
by the Constitution (citing cases)." No11
and Kenneady v. Bozeman (1975), 166 Mont.
504, 507, 534 P.2d 880.
We do not find that the "right" of a libeled individual
to obtain a retraction under section 64-207.1 is in itself
a remedy. Remedies for "injury of * * * character" are
found in "courts of justice" which "shall be open to every
person". In all suits for libel, "the truth thereof may be
given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the
court, shall determine the law and the facts". Article 11,
Sections 7 and 16, 1972 Montana Constitution. Thus, the
state constitution fixes the right to a remedy and where it
may be sought. The legislature is without power to provide
otherwise.
We therefore hold section 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947, uncon-
stitutional in that it is in violation of the provisions
which we have noted of Article 11, Sections 7 and 16, 1972
Montana Constitution.
Having so held, there is no need for us to reach a deci-
sion as to the additional objections made by Madison to sec-
tion 64-207.1 that it violates the due process clauses of
the Montana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
i s enough t o s a y t h a t w e have s u b s t a n t i a l d o u b t s a b o u t t h e

v a l i d i t y of s e c t i o n 64-207.1 under t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s a l s o ,

and t h a t w e r e s e r v e t o some f u t u r e t i m e as it may become

necessary t o discuss those contentions. Nor a r e we r e q u i r e d

t o d i s c u s s t h e second i s s u e above s t a t e d , t h a t t h e s t a t u t e

cannot apply t o an obvious falsehood.

Having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e which b r o u g h t a b o u t

t h e d i s m i s s a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s s u i t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e

must send t h i s c a u s e back f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . I n doing

s o , however, we a r e o b l i g e d t o s t a t e , f o r g u i d a n c e of t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t , c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s on l i b e l s u i t s and t h e

damages o b t a i n a b l e t h e r e i n which now a p p l y . I n doing s o ,

we c a n p e r h a p s o b v i a t e , o r a t l e a s t e a s e , t h e f e a r s which

w i l l r i s e i n t h e b r e a s t s of p u b l i s h e r s , e d i t o r s , and broad-

c a s t e r s upon p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s o p i n i o n .

Although t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d

t h a t a s t a t e may p r o v i d e f o r l i b e l s u i t s ( G e r t z v . R o b e r t

Welch I n c . , s u p r a ) , t h e r e h a s been a s u b s t a n t i a l development

i n c a s e s from t h a t c o u r t which i s i n i t s e l f a p r o t e c t i o n t o

p u b l i s h e r s b e c a u s e i t l i m i t s t h e r i g h t t o damages. These

r e s t r i c t i o n s on damages a r e i n t h e m s e l v e s a d e t e r r e n t t o t h e

b a r r a g e of l i b e l s u i t s t h a t p u b l i s h e r s m i g h t o t h e r w i s e f e a r .

The development b e g i n s w i t h N e w York Times Co. v.

S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 1 L Ed 2d 686,
1

95 A R 1912.
L T h e r e , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t found

t h a t t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n of news was s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t news

media s h o u l d b e p r o t e c t e d from l i b e l judgments, and s h o u l d
a l s o be s h i e l d e d from t h e i r own " s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p " b r o u g h t

a b o u t by f e a r of l i b e l s u i t s . The Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t

a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l c o u l d n o t r e c o v e r on a c l a i m f o r d e f a m a t i o n

u n l e s s " a c t u a l m a l i c e " had been p r e s e n t . I m p l i e d o r presumed
malice was out. "Malice" meant publication of the defaming

material with a "knowledge that it was false, or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not". The burden
of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that kind of malice
with convincing clarity. The court found that the First
Amendment permitted, on public issues, vehement, caustic
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public officials.
In Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct.
209, 13 L Ed 2d 125, the New York Times rule was extended
to a public official's private reputation, as well as his
public reputation.
In Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, and Associated
Press v. Walker (1967), reported together in 388 U.S. 130,
87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L Ed 2d 1094, reh.den. 389 U.S. 889 (1967),
the court extended the New York Times rule to public figures.
"Public figures" are defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
supra:
" * * * For the most part those who attain this
status have assumed roles of a special prominence
in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions
of such persuasive power and influence that they
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment." 418
U.S. at 345.
Finally, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, the
Supreme Court, while allowing states to provide for libel
suits, erected a fence around the amount of damages recover-
able:
"We would not, of course, invalidate state law
simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we
are attempting to reconcile state law with a
competing interest grounded in the constitu-
tional command of the First Amendment. It is
therefore appropriate to require that state
remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no
 f a r t h e r than i s necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e
l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t involved. It i s necessary
t o r e s t r i c t d e f a m a t i o n p l a i n t i f f s who do n o t
p r o v e knowledge of f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s r e -
g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h t o compensation f o r a c t u a l
i n j u r y . W e need n o t d e f i n e ' a c t u a l i n j u r y , ' a s
t r i a l c o u r t s have wide e x p e r i e n c e i n framing
appropriate jury i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t o r t actions.
S u f f i c e it t o s a y t h a t a c t u a l i n j u r y i s n o t
l i m i t e d t o out-of-pocket l o s s . Indeed, t h e
more customary t y p e s of a c t u a l harm i n f l i c t e d
by defamatory f a l s e h o o d i n c l u d e impairment of
r e p u t a t i o n and s t a n d i n g i n t h e community, p e r -
s o n a l h u m i l i a t i o n , and m e n t a l a n g u i s h and s u f -
f e r i n g . Of c o u r s e , j u r i e s must b e l i m i t e d by
a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , and a l l awards must
b e s u p p o r t e d by competent e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g
t h e i n j u r y , a l t h o u g h t h e r e need be no e v i d e n c e
which a s s i g n s a n a c t u a l d o l l a r v a l u e t o t h e
injury.

"We a l s o f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a l l o w i n g
awards of p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t p u b l i s h e r s
and b r o a d c a s t e r s h e l d l i a b l e under s t a t e -
d e f i n e d s t a n d a r d s of l i a b i l i t y f o r d e f a m a t i o n .
I n most j u r i s d i c t i o n s j u r y d i s c r e t i o n o v e r t h e
amounts awarded i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e g e n t l e
r u l e t h a t they n o t be excessive. Consequently,
j u r i e s a s s e s s p u n i t i v e damages i n wholly unpre-
d i c t a b l e amounts b e a r i n g no n e c e s s a r y r e l a t i o n
t o t h e a c t u a l harm c a u s e d . And t h e y remain
f r e e t o use t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n s e l e c t i v e l y t o
p u n i s h e x p r e s s i o n s o f unpopular views. Like
t h e d o c t r i n e of presumed damages, j u r y d i s c r e -
t i o n t o award p u n i t i v e damages u n n e c e s s a r i l y
e x a c e r b a t e s t h e d a n g e r of media s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p ,
b u t , u n l i k e t h e former r u l e , p u n i t i v e damages
a r e wholly i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e s t a t e i n t e r e s t
t h a t j u s t i f i e s a negligence standard f o r p r i -
v a t e d e f a m a t i o n a c t i o n s . They a r e n o t compen-
sation for injury. Instead, they a r e p r i v a t e
f i n e s l e v i e d by c i v i l j u r i e s t o p u n i s h r e p r e -
h e n s i b l e c o n d u c t and t o d e t e r i t s f u t u r e oc-
currence. I n s h o r t , t h e p r i v a t e defamation
p l a i n t i f f who e s t a b l i s h e s l i a b i l i t y under a
l e s s demanding s t a n d a r d t h a n t h a t s t a t e d by
N e w York T i m e s may r e c o v e r o n l y s u c h damages
a s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate him f o r a c t u a l
injury." 418 U.S. a t 349, 350.
I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t s have c o n s t a n t l y r e f e r r e d t o

Madison a s a " p u b l i c o f f i c i a l " , a p p a r e n t l y t o b r i n g t h i s
c a s e under t h e u m b r e l l a of N e w York T i m e s Co. v . S u l l i v a n ,
supra. W e a r e s k e p t i c a l t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e p r i n t

shop a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana, M i s s o u l a , Montana, i s

indeed a "public o f f i c i a l " . I n G e r t z v . R o b e r t Welch, I n c . ,
s u p r a , i t was h e l d t h a t a lawyer was n o t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l ,
a l t h o u g h h e had t a k e n on a prominent c a s e and was by v i r t u e

of h i s p r o f e s s i o n a n o f f i c e r o f t h e c o u r t . L i k e w i s e , i t may
b e contended i n t h e r e t r i a l t h a t Madison i s a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " .

Whatever h i s s t a t u s , i t i s a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r -

mine, b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h a t t h e j u r y

under t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e c o u r t i s t h e judge of b o t h law

and f a c t . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

With a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r y c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e s e

m a t t e r s and t h e i r s t a t u s i n any t r i a l , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e

stipulated.

I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , a p p l y i n g t h e r a t i o n a l e of t h e

c a s e s of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on damages f o r l i b e l ,

i f Madison i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be a p r i v a t e p e r s o n , h e must p r o v e :

(1) t h a t t h e p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l was f a l s e ; (2) t h a t defendants

a r e c h a r g e a b l e w i t h f a u l t i n t h e p u b l i c a t i o n ; and ( 3 ) t h a t

a c t u a l i n j u r y t o him e n s u e d , f o r which h e may r e c o v e r h i s

a c t u a l damages. Moreover, ( 4 ) i f he proves t h a t t h e publica-

t i o n was made by d e f e n d a n t s w i t h knowledge of i t s f a l s i t y o r

i n r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t i e s t h e r e o f , he

may r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages f o r s u c h m a l i c e , b u t s u c h m a l i c e

does n o t include h a t r e d , personal s p i t e , i l l - w i l l , o r a de-

sire t o injure. N e w York Times Co. v . ~ u l l i v a n ,s u p r a ;

L e t t e r Carriers v . A u s t i n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct.

2770, 4 1 L Ed 2d 745.

I f Madison i s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r p u b l i c f i g u r e , he may
recover only i f he proves t h e threshhold f a c t t h a t t h e publica-

t i o n was made w i t h knowledge of i t s f a l s i t y o r r e c k l e s s d i s -
regard f o r i t s t r u t h o r f a l s i t y . He c o u l d t h e n r e c o v e r h i s

a c t u a l and p u n i t i v e damages.
 We now, therefore, reverse the judgment and order of
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint by the District Court and
remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings,
consonant with this opinion. Costs to the plaintiff.

We Concur:

,
Chief Justice

\\ .
'
Justice

-
Hon. Leonard H Langen, District
.
Judge, sitting for Mr. Justice Harrison