No. 13440
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
GLORIA RAY EAGAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Patrick J. Kelly argued, Miles City, Montana
David J. Patterson, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hom. P l k Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
iie
Allen B. Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Denzil Young argued, County Attorney, Baker, Montana
Submitted: June 5, 1978
Decided: q&G 2 !9]@
-
Filed: qul;z i9lkjl
M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
T h i s i s an a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t G l o r i a Ray Eagan from
h e r c o n v i c t i o n of t h e o f f e n s e of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homi-
c i d e , e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i -
c i a l D i s t r i c t , F a l l o n County, Montana.
The s i n g l e i s s u e t o be d e c i d e d on t h i s a p p e a l i s whether
t h e r e was i m p r o p r i e t y i n t h e h a n d l i n g of a problem t h a t
a r o s e d u r i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l when o n e of t h e empaneled
j u r o r s made s t a t e m e n t s i n a p u b l i c p l a c e , o u t s i d e t h e p l a c e
of t r i a l , i n d i c a t i n g h i s p r e j u d i c e , and implying t h a t o t h e r s
on t h e j u r y p a n e l m i g h t a l s o be p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t .
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e f a c t s can be b r i e f l y s t a t e d a s f a r as
t h e a l l e g e d crime i s concerned. Defendant was c h a r g e d by
i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide a r i s i n g
o u t of t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h of one R u s s e l l Hanson on J u l y 1 3 ,
1975. Defendant claimed t h a t R u s s e l l Hanson, w h i l e a g u e s t
a t h e r home i n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of t h a t d a t e , had
a t t a c k e d h e r and a t t e m p t e d t o r a p e h e r , and t h a t s h e was
r e q u i r e d t o r e p e l h i s a g g r e s s i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e a
30.30 r i f l e a g a i n s t him. Defendant s t a t e d s h e had o r d e r e d
t h e d e c e d e n t t o g e t o u t of h e r m o b i l e home and t h a t t h e
d e c e d e n t , i n s t e a d of l e a v i n g , had t a k e n a s i t t i n g p o s i t i o n
on a couch i n t h e home. A t a t i m e when he was a p p a r e n t l y
s t a r t i n g t o g e t up from t h e couch, d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h e
r i f l e a c c i d e n t a l l y d i s c h a r g e d w h i l e s h e was h o l d i n g it a t
w a i s t l e v e l , and t h e b u l l e t t h e r e f r o m s t r u c k Hanson and
caused h i s death.
The c a s e was t r i e d b e g i n n i n g F e b r u a r y 2 , 1976, i n
D i s t r i c t Court. The j u r y was empaneled on t h e f i r s t day and
opening s t a t e m e n t s w e r e made. T r i a l continued through
February 3 , 1976, w i t h t h e c a l l i n g of w i t n e s s e s . On F e b r u a r y
4 , 1976, when t h e d e f e n s e was p r e s e n t i n g i t s c a s e and
d e f e n d a n t h e r s e l f had been examined and cross-examined,
c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t informed t h e c o u r t t h a t he had j u s t
l e a r n e d t h a t one o f t h e j u r o r s , Roland Kruger, had made
s t a t e m e n t s i n a b a r i n t h e downtown a r e a t h e evening b e f o r e .
The p e r s o n t o whom h e made t h e s t a t e m e n t s w a s e v e n t u a l l y
c a l l e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o r e p o r t what was s a i d . Here i s
what t h e r e c o r d shows w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o u t - o f - c o u r t
statements:
"THE COURT: L e t t h e r e c o r d show t h a t t h e Court
i s i n chambers w i t h Counsel and t h e C l e r k and
t h a t i t i s 1:00 o ' c l o c k . Immediately p r i o r t o
t h e noon b r e a k , Counsel appeared i n chambers
and a d v i s e d t h e C o u r t t h a t o n e of t h e j u r o r s
on t h e p a n e l s i t t i n g i n t h e Cause now b e i n g
t r i e d had been downtown l a s t e v e n i n g i n t h e b a r
d i s c u s s i n g t h i s c a s e i n p u b l i c and t h e C o u r t
t h e n o r d e r e d t h a t t h i s meeting b e h e l d a t 1:00
and t h a t t h e p e r s o n who o v e r h e a r d t h e j u r o r b e
b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t - Camera and h i s
In
t e s t i m o n y be t a k e n .
"JOHN MEYERS, h a v i n g been f i r s t d u l y sworn by
t h e C l e r k , t e s t i f i e d upon h i s o a t h as f o l l o w s :
"BY THE COURT:
"Q. For t h e r e c o r d , w i l l you s t a t e your name.
"A. John Meyers.
"Q. Where do you l i v e ?
"A. Phebus T r a i l e r C o u r t .
"Q. I t i s m u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t you w e r e down-
y
town l a s t e v e n i n g , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Where were you a t ?
"A. Corner Bar.
"Q. A t what t i m e was t h i s ?
"A. About 9:30.
"Q. What happened i n t h e Corner Bar a t a b o u t 9:30?
"A. W e l l , Roland Kruger was t e l l i n g m e t h a t , you
know, t h a t h e w a s on j u r y d u t y and as f a r a s he
was concerned, t h a t s h e was g u i l t y and h e a l s o t o l d
me t h a t h a l f of t h e j u r y i s Hanson's f r i e n d s .
"Q. Who e l s e was p r e s e n t when h e was t a l k i n g t o you?
"A. H e was j u s t by m e a t t h e end of t h e Bar.
"Q. There w a s n ' t anyone e l s e t h a t o v e r h e a r d
t h a t conversation?
"A. No.
"THE COURT: Do Counsel have any o t h e r q u e s t i o n s ?
"BY MR. YOUNG:
"Q. Have you s e e n him o t h e r n i g h t s down t h e r e ?
Has h e been down Monday n i g h t ?
"A. W e l l , l e t me s e e . I d i d n ' t go uptown Mon-
day n i g h t .
"MR. KELLY: I have no q u e s t i o n s .
"Q. (By M r . Young) W s h e drunk?
a
"A. Yes.
"Q. Which i s f r e q u e n t t o him?
"A. Yes.
"THE COURT: Do you have any o t h e r q u e s t i o n s ,
Denzil?
"MR. YOUNG: No, I d o n ' t t h i n k s o .
"MR. KELLY: I have one.
"Q. He communicated d i r e c t l y w i t h you?
"A. Yes.
"MR. KELLY: T h a t i s a l l I have. Thank you.
"THE COURT: Okay. That i s a l l , Thank you.
" (Witness excused. )
"THE COURT: Now, I t h i n k t h a t w e s h o u l d c a l l
him i n a n d a s k him, g i v e him a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
e x p l a i n i t o r deny i t o r a d m i t i t .
"MR. YOUNG: I s u g g e s t e d t o P a t t h a t i f , you know,
i f t h i s were s u p p o r t e d , r a t h e r t h a n c r e a t e a f u r o r
on t h e j u r y , w e c o u l d w a i t u n t i l t h e c a s e i s i n
and excuse him and u s e t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t e . I f h e
were c a l l e d i n h e r e and examined, h e would be ex-
cused and t h e r e - - I w a s t h i n k i n g , i t m i g h t c a u s e a
l i t t l e d i s t r a c t i o n f o r t h e jury i f he disappeared
suddenly.
"THE COURT: W e l l , t h i s i s f i n e . I t h i n k t h a t w e
o u g h t t o have him i n and have him t e s t i f y .
"MR. KELLY: I agree.
"THE COURT: Whether w e do i t now o r do i t f o l l o w i n g
r e c e s s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s t r i a l i s i m -
m a t e r i a l t o me.
"MR. YOUNG: It doesn't matter t o me.
"THE COURT: Then i n t h e e v e n t t h a t h e s a y s , 'Yeah,
I d i d i t , ' what a r e C o u n s e l ' s s u g g e s t i o n s ?
"MR. KELLY: M s u g g e s t i o n - - w e l l , f i r s t of a l l ,
y
a s t o him, I t h i n k t h a t h e s h o u l d be excused a t
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e c a s e p r i o r t o t h e j u r y
going t o t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s . I t h i n k t h e proper
a l t e r n a t e should be p u t i n h i s stead. I have a
second q u e s t i o n . Does t h i s i n d i c a t e a problem
o t h e r t h a n w i t h him on t h i s j u r y ? And I am
wondering i f w e have any i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e
B a i l i f f regarding conversations. Have t h e y been
d i s c u s s i n g t h i s c a s e p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of b e i n g
charged? I j u s t d o n ' t know. T h a t i s a q u e s t i o n
I d o n ' t have any answer. With him, I have no
d o u b t s he s h o u l d be excused.
"MR. YOUNG: I w i l l a s k him i f h e h a s d i s c u s s e d
i t w i t h any of t h e o t h e r j u r o r s .
"THE COURT: Well, I t h i n k t h i s i s a p r o p e r i n -
q u i r y t o a s k him. I f h e h a s been d i s c u s s i n g t h e
c a s e w i t h t h e o t h e r j u r o r s , t h a t is--and whether
t h e r e s t o f t h e j u r y have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y have
made t h e i r minds up and i f t h e o t h e r members of
t h e j u r y have, t h e n I suppose we have a m i s t r i a l .
And i f we have a m i s t r i a l , I suppose t h a t w e b e t -
t e r f i n d o u t a b o u t it today.
"MR. YOUNG: W e d o n ' t have any r e a s o n t o t h i n k
t h a t t h e r e s t of t h e jury i s contaminated.
"THE COURT: No, b u t i f h e s a y s t h i s i s what h a s
happened and t h e whole j u r y i s c o n t a m i n a t e d , t h e n
I t h i n k we may a s w e l l d e c l a r e a m i s t r i a l and s t a r t
o v e r a g a i n . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, h e s a y s , no, h e
h a s n ' t t a l k e d w i t h t h e r e s t of t h e j u r y , o r h e
h a s n ' t h e a r d any of them t a l k , t h e n I t h i n k what we
o u g h t t o do i s g e t r i d of him and p u t an a l t e r n a t e
i n and go ahead and complete t h e t r i a l . I am n o t
g o i n g t o presume t h a t a l l of t h e s e p e o p l e b r e a k
t h e i r oath.
"ROLAND KRUGER, b e i n g f i r s t d u l y sworn by t h e
C l e r k , t e s t i f i e d upon h i s o a t h as f o l l o w s :
"BY THE COURT:
"Q. Roland, i t h a s been b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n
of t h e C o u r t t h a t l a s t n i g h t you w e r e downtown i n
t h e Corner Bar a t a b o u t 9:30 and w h i l e you were
there, you advised a person that you had made up
your mind that the defendant was guilty. You fur-
ther advised this individual that about half of the
jury were personal friends of the Hanson family.
Is this charge true?
"A. Pardon?
"Q. Is this charge true?
"A. Not to my knowledge, nope.
"Q. Were you downtown last night?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Were you in the Corner Bar?
"A. Yes, I was.
"Q. Were you there about 9 : 3 0 ?
"A. I would assume so.
"Q. And while you were there, you were down
at the end of the bar talking to John Meyers?
"A. John Meyers? I don't even know the guy
personally. What does he do?
"Q. He is a very dark complected person. Black
hair.
"A. Oh, did he used to work for Signal? Yes, I
was uptown, but any statement I made, I made a
joke of it. There was no --
"Q. Well, have you discussed this case with any
of the other jurors?
"A. No, I haven't.
"Q. Have any of the jurors discussed it with you?
"A. No, they sure haven't. No, I am positive. I
am not that type of guy.
"THE COURT: Do Counsel have any questions?
"MR. YOUNG: No.
"MR. KELLY: No.
"A. No, i f I said anything, it was in the line
of bull. There was no business talk.
"THE COURT: Okay, you may leave. Tell the
Bailiff that I will advise him when we are ready
to proceed.
" (Witness excused. )
"THE COURT: Okay, what i s t h e s u g g e s t i o n ?
"MR. KELLY: H i s answer was t h a t a n y t h i n g he s a i d
was made i n a -- s a i d i n a humorous f a s h i o n . So
I t a k e i t a s some of t h e a d m i s s i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n
with h i s conversation of t h i s case. I would t h i n k ,
a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , h e s h o u l d be excused.
"THE COURT: I think so.
"MR. KELLY: I would a l s o s u g g e s t t h a t h e m i g h t --
H e a p p e a r s t o b e e i t h e r e x t r e m e l y hung o v e r o r
p e r h a p s he i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e r i g h t now.
"THE CLERK: Hard of h e a r i n g , I t h i n k .
"MR. YOUNG: He worked f o r many y e a r s , r i g work,
has probably a f f e c t e d h i s hearing. I haven't
t a l k e d t o him f o r a c o u p l e of y e a r s and I am n o t
aware of t h a t problem.
"THE COURT: A l l right. Now, d i d you want me t o
e x c u s e him now o r a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s
case?
"MR. KELLY: I d o n ' t t h i n k he s h o u l d be excused
now. I t h i n k a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t o d a y ' s c a s e .
"MR. YOUNG: Fine.
"THE COURT: A l l right. L e t ' s go."
T h e r e a f t e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court resumed t h e t r i a l , w i t h
M. Kruger s t i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e j u r y f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e
r
a f t e r n o o n , d u r i n g which t i m e t h e r e m a i n i n g t e s t i m o n y i n t h e
c a s e was completed. T h a t e v e n i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s were
s e t t l e d , whereupon c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t moved t h e c o u r t f o r
a m i s t r i a l of t h e c a u s e upon t h e ground t h a t t h e r e had been
improper c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of t h e j u r y a s evidenced by t h e
h e a r i n g e a r l i e r had t h a t day. The motion was d e n i e d by t h e
District Court.
On t h e f o l l o w i n g morning, F e b r u a r y 5 , 1976, t r i a l was
resumed a t 9:30 a.m. a t which t i m e t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s
t o o k p l a c e i n chambers:
" I N CHAMBERS :
" ( M r . Xruger c a l l e d i n . )
"THE COURT: A f t e r t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h i s m a t t e r
we d i s c u s s e d y e s t e r d a y , t h e consequences a r e
t h a t i f i t w e r e p r o v a b l e , i f you made t h e s e
s t a t e m e n t s , we would have a m i s t r i a l and we
would have t o go t h r o u g h t h e whole t h i n g one
more t i m e a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e expense t o t h e
county.
"A. Yes.
"THE COURT: Not o n l y t h a t , b u t i f i t were
p r o v a b l e , you would have v i o l a t e d a t l e a s t
two l a w s , t h o s e b e i n g contempt of c o u r t and
f a i l u r e t o perform your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . And
I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n s e e i n g you c h a r g e d w i t h
a crime. I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n a n y t h i n g o t h e r
than seeing t h a t t h i s t r i a l i s properly, f a i r l y
conducted and t h a t t h e county i s n ' t p u t t o t h e
expense of r e t r y i n g i t . And s o , f o r t h a t r e a -
s o n , I t h i n k i t would b e b e s t of a l l i f I re-
move you a s a j u r o r and p u t one of t h e a l t e r n a t e s
i n your s p o t . And t h a t i s what I am g o i n g t o do.
"A. Yes.
"THE COURT: And I t h i n k t h a t , f i r s t of a l l , a s
f a r a s you a r e concerned, I am g o i n g t o i n s t r u c t
you n o t t o d i s c u s s t h i s t r i a l o r n o t t o d i s c u s s
t h e r e a s o n t h a t you were removed w i t h anybody,
and i f you d o , I w i l l c h a r g e you w i t h contempt
of c o u r t b e c a u s e I d o n ' t want a b u i l t - i n e r r o r
i n t h i s case. I t i s t o o i m p o r t a n t of a c a s e .
"A. Yes, I r e a l i z e t h a t .
"THE COURT: So i t m i g h t be b e t t e r f o r you and
f o r everybody i f you j u s t s a y you g o t s i c k t o d a y
and you c o u l d n ' t s i t .
"A. Well, I have a q u e s t i o n i f I may a s k i t .
Who c a l l e d t h i s i n ?
"THE COURT: Well, t h e r e p o r t came t o t h e C o u r t
t h r o u g h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . Somebody a d v i s e d him.
I d o n ' t know, I d i d n ' t a s k .
"A. Who would it come t o ?
"THE COURT: W e l l , defense counsel i s t h e person
t h a t t o l d me. Now, I d o n ' t know where h e h e a r d
it.
"A. Yes, b e c a u s e i f I remember r i g h t , i t was--
W s i t Meyers?
a
"THE COURT: Yes. I t i s an u n f o r t u n a t e t h i n g
and what you c a n do i s s t a y h e r e and I w i l l c a l l
t h e j u r y i n and t h e n --
"(Whereupon M r . Kruger was r e p l a c e d by A l t e r n a t e
J u r o r NO. 1.) "
T h e r e a f t e r , w i t h Kruger excused, and t h e a l t e r n a t e
juror s i t t i n g i n h i s place, t h e jury r e t i r e d t o consider i t s
v e r d i c t , and r e t u r n e d i t s f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y
of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. On F e b r u a r y 2 6 , 1976,
d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o a term of f i v e y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e
prison. She moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e ground s h e had
been d e n i e d h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l
jury. The motion f o r new t r i a l was d e n i e d on March 11,
1976, and t h e r e a f t e r t h i s a p p e a l ensued.
Defendant s t a t e s two i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w on a p p e a l :
1. Was t h e s t a t e m e n t made by J u r o r Kruger such t h a t i t
c o n s t i t u t e d s u f f i c i e n t misconduct and p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t
of t h e j u r y s o a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l ?
2. Did t h e a l t e r n a t i v e remedy chosen by t h e c o u r t ,
t h a t i s , replacing t h e jury with an a l t e r n a t e , cure t h e
t r i a l defect?
W e w i l l consider t h e i s s u e s together.
The r i g h t of a d e f e n d a n t t o speedy p u b l i c t r i a l by a n
i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s s o s a c r e d t o o u r system of j u r i s p r u d e n c e
t h a t i t i s p r e s e r v e d b o t h i n o u r s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u -
t i o n s . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 2 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ;
S i x t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The v e r b a t i m e x c e r p t from t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a s w e l l a s c o u n s e l , were f u l l y aware of t h e
s a n c t i t y of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y . We are
c a l l e d upon h e r e t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e c o u r s e of a c t i o n
t a k e n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t upon t h e d i s c o v e r y of a d i s q u a l i -
f i e d j u r o r d i d i n f a c t remove any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t occa-
s i o n e d t h e r e b y s o t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c c o r d e d h e r r i g h t of
fair trial.
For t h e most p a r t , i t seems t h a t w e would r e g a r d a s
p e r s u a s i v e t h e f i n d i n g o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t t h a t any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t o f misconduct by a j u r o r
had i n f a c t been removed. C e r t a i n l y i n such m a t t e r s a s
w h e t h e r , f o r example, t h e r e s p o n s e s of a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r
on v o i r d i r e i n d i c a t e h i s s t a t e of mind, o r whether a j u r o r
had i n f a c t d i s q u a l i f i e d h i m s e l f by p r e j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s ,
t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would be g i v e n
c o n s i d e r a b l e w e i g h t by t h i s Court. I n t h e s i t u a t i o n p r e -
s e n t e d h e r e , however, i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s C o u r t i s i n a s
good a p o s i t i o n a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make t h i s judgment
where t h e r e a r e no f a c t u a l c o n f l i c t s a p p a r e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e
conduct i t s e l f . A s was s t a t e d i n P e o p l e v . Brown, (1976),
"Some c a s e s have t r e a t e d t h e i s s u e of t h e
p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of j u r y misconduct a s b e i n g
a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t and
have h e l d t h a t a f i n d i n g of no p r e j u d i c e i m -
p l i e d i n t h e d e n i a l of a new t r i a l s h o u l d n o t
be s e t a s i d e u n l e s s t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t o
s u s t a i n i t . * * * W a r e of t h e view however
e
t h a t t h e more e n l i g h t e n e d and a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e
i s t h a t s i n c e j u r y misconduct c h a l l e n g e s t h e
fundamental r i g h t t o a n u n p r e j u d i c e d j u r y and
t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e t r i a l proceedings, t h i s
i s s u e i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t a p p e l l a t e i s s u e t o be
a d j u d i c a t e d by t h i s c o u r t based upon t h e whole
r e c o r d . * * *"
From t h e r e c o r d i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r
d i d i n f a c t make t h e s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d t o him i n a
p u b l i c p l a c e t o a t h i r d p e r s o n , w h i l e t h e t r i a l was i n
progress. When t h e j u r o r was b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i n
chambers, h e f i r s t d e n i e d t h a t h e knew t h e t h i r d p e r s o n .
Then t h e j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was merely j o k i n g a s t o any
s t a t e m e n t s h e had made. Following t h a t h e s t a t e d he had n o t
d i s c u s s e d t h e c a s e w i t h any of t h e o t h e r j u r o r s .
When t h e j u r o r was excused a f t e r h i s e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e r e
was a d i s c u s s i o n by c o u r t and c o u n s e l a s t o whether h e was
"under t h e i n f l u e n c e " o r hung o v e r , o r whether he was i n
f a c t h a r d of h e a r i n g . A t any r a t e , t h e j u r o r was p e r m i t t e d
t o s i t w i t h t h e remainder of t h e j u r y f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e
t i m e t h a t t e s t i m o n y was t a k e n t h a t day.
F u r t h e r , t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d when
t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r was s i t t i n g w i t h t h e j u r y , f o l l o w i n g
h i s e x a m i n a t i o n i n chambers, f o u r r e c e s s e s w e r e t a k e n by t h e
c o u r t d u r i n g t h e remainder of t h e a f t e r n o o n . There w a s a
r e c e s s t a k e n w h i l e c o u r t and c o u n s e l r e t i r e d t o chambers t o
d i s c u s s a l e g a l p o i n t , and a f u r t h e r r e c e s s f o r t h e same
purpose. A rest-period r e c e s s was t a k e n m i d a f t e r n o o n , and
a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y , a n e v e n i n g r e c e s s was
d e c l a r e d u n t i l 9:30 a.m. t h e f o l l o w i n g morning. On e a c h of
t h e s e occasions i t appears t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n s t r u c t e d t h e
j u r y w i t h t h e u s u a l admonition t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t d i s c u s s
t h i s c a s e w i t h e a c h o t h e r o r among t h e m s e l v e s o r w i t h o t h e r s ;
b u t , it i s a l s o t o b e n o t e d t h a t t h e same admonition had
been g i v e n p r i o r t o t h e d i s c o v e r y of t h e p r e j u d i c i a l s t a t e -
ments, which admonition t h e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r a p p a r e n t l y
ignored. Allowing t h i s j u r o r t o s i t w i t h t h e remainder of
t h e jury, including t h e a l t e r n a t e , a f t e r t h e discovery t h a t
h e was a d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r i s t h e f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y we f i n d
i n t h e p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
The second d i f f i c u l t y r e l a t e s t o t h e b a l a n c e of t h e
s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e same j u r o r - - t h a t i s , "he a l s o
t o l d me t h a t h a l f of t h e j u r y i s Hanson's f r i e n d s " . The
q u e s t i o n s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h i s p o i n t t o Kruger d i d
n o t q u i t e r e a c h t h e s o u r c e of t h i s j u r o r ' s i n f o r m a t i o n as t o
t h i s s t a t e m e n t , n o r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h e r e i n t h a t h a l f of t h e
j u r y was a l s o p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t .
The third difficulty relates to whether the disquali-
fied juror may have made known his prejudice to the other
members of the jury. The District Court relied completely
upon the responses of the challenged juror that he had not
discussed the case with the other jurors. At no stage of
the trial were the other jurors interrogated by the District
Court as to what contact or expression of opinion the chal-
lenged juror may have made to them while he was sitting with
them on the jury panel. This is important because as pointed
out in People v. Brown, supra:
"In approaching the issue of prejudice, it first
must be noted that a unanimous verdict is re-
quired in a criminal case. Thus, the disquali-
fication of a single juror could have resulted
in a different verdict on any of the counts."
132 Cal.Rptr. at 221.
The duty to preserve a fair trial for the defendant
rests in the first instance upon the trial judge. People v.
Shaw, (Mich. 1969), 164 N.W.2d 7, 12, 13. When a juror is
found to have been guilty of improper conduct, such improper
conduct is charged to the entire panel, Kinkaid v. Wade,
(Kan. 1966), 410 P.2d 333, 337, since the jurors operate as
a unit, and since public policy demands that misconduct be
discouraged and insofar as possible prohibited. Kinkaid, at
337. We cannot assume therefore that the remainder of the
jury panel had been safeguarded from contamination in the
absence of some interrogation addressed to those jurors to
dispel the possibility that prejudice existed, either from
friendship, or from prejudicial comments by Kruger.
It is this factor that distinguishes this case from
State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont . , 571 P. 2d 779, 34
St.Rep. 1315. Baugh was a case where the District Court
learned during the course of the trial that one of the
jurors had, before the trial, viewed a videotape of the
exhumation of t h e d e c e a s e d . The c o u r t l e a r n e d of t h i s f a c t
f i v e d a y s a f t e r t h e t r i a l had commenced. The c o u r t c a l l e d
t h e j u r o r i n t o chambers and determined t h e r e t h a t t h e j u r o r
had i n f a c t previewed t h e v i d e o t a p e . The j u r o r , upon t h e
c o u r t ' s q u e s t i o n , i n d i c a t e d t h a t no o t h e r j u r o r knew t h a t
s h e had viewed t h e v i d e o t a p e . The c o u r t immediately excused
t h e j u r o r from f u r t h e r s e r v i c e and a l l o w e d t h e t r i a l t o
proceed by s e a t i n g one of t h e a l t e r n a t e j u r o r s . However,
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n Baugh took one more i m p o r t a n t s t e p .
A f t e r t h e j u r y had r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t , b u t b e f o r e t h e
v e r d i c t was announced, t h e c o u r t q u e s t i o n e d t h e j u r y and
asked them i f a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e t r i a l t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d
j u r o r had d i s c u s s e d w i t h any of them any of t h e e v i d e n c e on
the trial. A l l of t h e j u r y responded "No". In t h i s case we
have no s u c h r e a s s u r i n g i n t e r r o g a t i o n . There i s l e f t hanging
i n t h e a i r h e r e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t one h a l f of t h e j u r y i n
t h i s c a s e were f r i e n d s of t h e d e c e d e n t o v e r whose d e a t h
d e f e n d a n t was b e i n g t r i e d ; moreover, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d j u r o r may have communicated h i s p r e j u d i c e
t o o t h e r members of t h e j u r y was n o t f u l l y s e a r c h e d o u t . In
t h a t s i t u a t i o n i t c a n n o t be s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t no
p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t had o c c u r r e d .
I t i s t h e r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t i f j u r y misconduct i s
shown t e n d i n g t o i n j u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t , p r e j u d i c e t o t h e
d e f e n d a n t i s presumed; however, t h e presumption i s n o t
a b s o l u t e and may be r e b u t t e d by t h e u s e of t e s t i m o n y of t h e
j u r o r s t o show f a c t s which p r o v e t h a t p r e j u d i c e o r i n j u r y
d i d n o t o r could n o t occur. S t a t e v. Jackson, (1890), 9
Mont. 508, 522, 24 P . 213, 216. P u t r o v . ~ a l c e rand Mannix
~ l e c t r i c ,I n c . , ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 1 3 9 , 1 4 7 , 410 ~ . 2 d
717,
722.
The p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d by t h e ~ i s t r i c t
Court i n Baugh
had t h e e f f e c t of overcoming t h e presumption of p r e j u d i c e
c a u s e d by j u r y misconduct. The r e s p o n s e of t h e j u r o r s ,
b e f o r e t h e i r v e r d i c t was announced, overcame t h e presump-
tion. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e members of t h e j u r y were n o t s o
i n t e r r o g a t e d , and t h e r e f o r e t h e presumption of p r e j u d i c e
remains.
What t h i s C o u r t s a i d i n P u t r o , s u p r a , b e a r s r e p e a t i n g :
"The g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e of o u r l e g a l system i s
f a i r n e s s . W e must t e n a c i o u s l y a d h e r e t o t h e
i d e a l t h a t b o t h s i d e s of a l a w s u i t be g u a r a n t e e d
a fair trial. Sec. 27, A r t . 111, Montana Con-
s t i t u t i o n . The f u n c t i o n of t h e j u r y i s t o de-
c i d e t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e o n l y on e v i d e n c e
introduced a t t r i a l . I t h a s been n o t e d t h a t
' T h e r e i s no p r a c t i c a b l e method t o s o a n a l y z e
t h e m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n of t h e j u r o r s a s t o d e t e r -
mine w h e t h e r , i n p o i n t of f a c t , t h e v e r d i c t would
have been t h e same i f t h e t r i a l had been c o n d u c t e d ,
a s b o t h p a r t i e s had a r i g h t t o e x p e c t , a c c o r d i n g
t o law and upon t h e e v i d e n c e i n c o u r t . ' McDaniels
v . McDaniels, 40 V t . 3 6 3 . The t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d
have d e c l a r e d a m i s t r i a l i n j u s t i c e t o i t s e l f a s
w e l l a s t o p a r t i e s , s o t h a t a f a i r t r i a l may re-
s u l t and t h e v e r d i c t when r e n d e r e d may b e e n t i t l e d
t o t h e r e s p e c t of b o t h p a r t i e s and t h e c o n f i d e n c e
of t h e c o u r t . W c a n n o t be t o o s t r i c t i n g u a r d i n g
e
t r i a l s by j u r i e s from improper i n f l u e n c e s . T h i s
s t r i c t n e s s i s n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e due c o n f i d e n c e t o
p a r t i e s i n t h e r e s u l t s of t h e i r c a u s e s , and t o
e n l i g h t e n t h e p u b l i c who have r e c o u r s e t o o u r
c o u r t s t h a t any improper i n f l u e n c e which h a s t h e
n a t u r a l tendency t o p r e j u d i c e t h e v e r d i c t i s
grounds f o r a m i s t r i a l . * * * " 147 Mont. 147,
148, 4 1 0 P.2d 722.
W e r e v e r s e t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t
and remand f o r a new t r i a l .
We concur:
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting:
I dissent. By sheer speculation the majority finds,
without a scintilla of proof, that the jury might have been
influenced by something Juror Kruger said or did before
being removed at the conclusion of the case.
Our recent case of State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont.
, 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315, is in my view con-
trolling. In that case we held:
"Defendant was not prejudiced by the
occurrence involving juror Kolar.
While serious prejudice may have arisen
if juror Kolar had participated in the
verdict, those problems were thus arrested
by replacing her with an alternate juror
and the further safeguards taken by the
trial judge." 571 P.2d 784.
The same can be said here. The trial court questioned
the offending juror to insure he had not discussed the case
with the other jurors. The defense counsel agreed that the
court should wait until the conclusion of the evidence to
dismiss the juror so as not to disrupt the jury. The court
went further by instructing the juror not to discuss his
removal with anyone and to say he was sick, if asked.
In addition, there is nothing in the record to show
prejudice to the appellant. The fact the juror said the
victim's family "enjoyed the friendship of most people in
the area" falls far short of the prejudice that would pre-
vent a fair trial. This fact came out during voir dire
examination. The juror himself contradicted any factual
basis for the statement when he denied talking to any of the
jurors or that any had talked to him.
Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a k e what
c u r a t i v e measures w e r e necessary b e f o r e t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a -
t i o n s began and I c a n f i n d no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g any p r e -
j u d i c e a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a r r a n t i n g a new t r i a l .
ra
Mr.
f 1
C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. Has e l 1 c o n c u r s w i t h t h e d i s s e n t .
w
Chief J u s t i c e