No. 13507
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978
JOHN BOYER and LAURA LU BOYER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
ANTHONY L. KARAGACIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Robb and Botsford, Missoula, Montana
Archie J. Robb argued, Missoula, Montana
McCaffery and Peterson, Butte, Montana
For Respondents:
Knight, Dahood, MacKay and McLean, Anaconda, Montana
Conde MacKay argued and Bernard J. Everett argued,
Anaconda, Montana
Submitted: June 15, 1978
Decided :
Filed: JUL 1 0 1976
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion
of the Court.
This appeal is from the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order and the denial of a motion to quash by the
Honorable Arnold Olsen, District Court, Silver Bow County.
Courts become involved in all types of fights--dog
fights, fence fights, church fights, school fights and
street fights. This case arose because defendant parked
his car in such a manner as to cut off traffic going into
a drive-in. It can be classed as a street fight.
By the time it reached this Court nearly four years
had passed since the plaintiffs filed this cause seeking a
permanent injunction preventing defendant from parking his
car in such manner as to block proper ingress to plaintiffs'
place of business; for damages for loss of business; and,
for exemplary damages for the alleged malicious character
of defendant's actions. The action was filed September 14,
1974. A temporary restraining order was issued by the
Honorable Robert J. Boyd. Thereafter, Judge Boyd disquali-
fied himself and between September 25, 1974 and October 1975,
four additional judges were disqualified. Also, new counsel
for defendant came into the case. Hearings were set on mo-
tions but it was not until May 3, 1976 that Judge Olsen
heard defendant's motion to quash.
Plaintiffs operate a drive-in restaurant in the 1100
block of East Park Avenue in Anaconda, Montana. Defendant
owns a triangular shaped piece of property on the Northeast
corner of the 1000 block of East Park Avenue. East Park is
a one-way street, running in an easterly direction, and is
classified and regulated as a state highway. Lying between
the properties of the respective parties and intersecting
East Park is a short, oil covered gravel drive, known as
Jefferson Street.
P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e t h a t b e g i n n i n g i n 1974 d e f e n d a n t parked
h i s v e h i c l e a t t h e Southwest c o r n e r of P a r k and J e f f e r s o n (see
diagram) i n s u c h a manner a s t o p r e v e n t t o u r i s t s and o t h e r s n o t
f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e l o c a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f s ' b u s i n e s s from s e e i n g
p l a i n t i f f s ' b u s i n e s s , and from making p r o p e r e n t r y i n t o t h e
business. I t i s a l l e g e d t h a t such p a r k i n g w a s done m a l i c i o u s l y ,
t o vex and h a r a s s p l a i n t i f f s .
Defendant c o n t e n d s h e was l e g a l l y parked i n f r o n t of h i s
own p r o p e r t y , w i t h i n t h e p a r k i n g b o u n d a r i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e
Montana Department of Highways and, a s s u c h , c a n n o t b e con-
sidered a "nuisance". Defendant t e s t i f i e d h e parked h i s
v e h i c l e i n t h a t l o c a t i o n f o r y e a r s w i t h o u t c o m p l a i n t from
p l a i n t i f f s ' predecessor i n t i t l e . Defendant f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d
t h a t o t h e r s parked i n t h e l o c a t i o n a s w e l l .
I n J u l y 1974 d e f e n d a n t w a s i s s u e d a t i c k e d f o r i l l e g a l
p a r k i n g by t h e Anaconda C i t y P o l i c e b e c a u s e h e parked i n t h e
disputed area. The t i c k e t was s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d by t h e
c i t y judge. A t t h e May 3 , 1976, h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o
quash, defendant attempted t o introduce evidence concerning
t h e i s s u a n c e and d i s m i s s a l of t h e t i c k e t . However, t h e t e s t i -
mony was excluded upon p l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n .
Defendant raises three issues:
1. Is the July 26, 1976 order of the District Court,
continuing in effect its temporary restraining order, an
appealable order under Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P.?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in
initially issuing and subsequently refusing to quash the
temporary restraining order?
3. Did the District Court err in excluding evidence
offered by defendant at the hearing on the motion to quash
concerning the issuance and dismissal of the parking ticket?
Defendant first argues that the order of the District
Court continuing in effect the temporary restraining order
and denying the motion to quash is an appealable order.
Under Rule l(b), M.R.App.Civ.P., an aggrieved party
may appeal from an order granting or refusing an injunction.
Generally, this Court has determined the appealability of
injunctive orders by distinguishing between those which are
temporary or permanent in substance, without regard to form.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, (1959),
134 Mont. 526, 335 P.2d 310; State ex rel. Public Service
Commission v. District Court, (1936), 103 Mont. 563, 63 P.2d
1032. In Labbitt v. Bunston, (1927), 80 Mont. 293, 260 P.
727, it was stated:
"Where the matter is heard upon an order
to show cause, the right to a temporary
injunction is 'adjudicated' by the decision
rendered after the hearing * * * so here as
the motion to dissolve presented the ques-
tion of plaintiff's right to the restraining
order, and the decision on the motion was
equivalent to a decision on the hearing on
the order to show cause and rendered such a
hearing needless, the order of September 24,
was an 'adjudication' of the plaintiff's
right to an injunction pendente lite and an
order refusing to dissolve an injunction,
from which an appeal lies * * *." 80 Mont. 302.
S e e , S t a t e ex r e l . K e a s t v. K r i e g , ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. 521,
432 P.2d 405.
Here, t h e o r d e r c o n t i n u i n g t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g
o r d e r a p p e a r s a p p e a l a b l e b e c a u s e i t h a s t h e e f f e c t of a p e r -
manent i n j u n c t i o n . The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t Judge Olsen
r e g a r d e d t h e i s s u e as whether o r n o t a permanent i n j u n c t i o n
s h o u l d be g r a n t e d :
"THE COURT: Very w e l l , when t h i s m a t t e r i s
submitted t o t h e Court then it i s submitted
on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e Motion t o Quash - and
- th i n t h c - as
o r -e f i n a l q u e s t i o n - -e-a s e - t o
whether - -t t h e r e -e-a permanent i n j u n c t i o n .
or no b
"MR. MACKAY: Yes, i f it p l e a s e t h e Court.
"THE COURT: I f t h e r e i s no o t h e r e v i d e n c e t o
be o f f e r e d - - q u e s t i o n - - permanent
on t h e of t h e
i n j u n c t i o n , t h i s c a s e w i l l be concluded."
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
I n s u b s t a n c e , by c o n t i n u i n g i n e f f e c t t h e temporary
r e s t r a i . n i n g o r d e r , Judge Olsen g r a n t e d a n i n j u n c t i o n of a
permanent n a t u r e , a p p e a l a b l e a s such.
I n h i s second i s s u e , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n i n i t i a l l y i s s u i n g and subse-
q u e n t l y r e f u s i n g t o q u a s h t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r .
Under Montana s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 9 3 - 4 2 0 4 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) , R.C.M.
1947, an i n j u n c t i v e o r d e r may be g r a n t e d :
"1. When i t s h a l l a p p e a r by t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t
t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e l i e f de-
manded, and such r e l i e f , o r any p a r t t h e r e o f ,
c o n s i s t s i n r e s t r a i n i n g t h e commission o r con-
t i n u a n c e of t h e a c t complained o f , e i t h e r f o r
a limited period o r perpetually;
" 2 . When i t s h a l l a p p e a r by t h e c o m p l a i n t of
a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e commission o r c o n t i n u a n c e
of some a c t d u r i n g t h e l i t i g a t i o n would pro-
duce a g r e a t o r i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y t o t h e
plaintiff."
T h i s Court h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t o o b t a i n a temporary
r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r t h e c o m p l a i n t must c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t of
material facts establishing irreparable injury o r p l a i n t i f f ' s
r i g h t t o t h e r e l i e f sought t h e r e i n . Emery v. Emery, (1949),
122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251.
However, equity will not interfere by way of injunc-
tion where the law can furnish all the relief to which the
complaining party is entitled, as by monetary damages.
State ex rel. Keast v. Krieg, supra.
Defendant contends plaintiffs' complaint failed to
establish the irreparable nature of the injury caused by
defendant's parking, as the complaint specifies monetary
damages compensable as such under the law without resort
to equity.
Plaintiffs, however, appear to be correct in responding
that a plaintiff in a nuisance action can seek judgment
that the nuisance be enjoined, as well as damages recovered.
Section 93-6101, R.C.M. 1947; Thrasher v. Hodge, (1929), 86
Mont. 218, 283 P. 219. Further, plaintiffs contend precise
monetary damages for loss of business due to defendant's
actions are not precisely ascertainable because of the
peculiar nature of the allegedly harmful activity, in rela-
tion to the asserted harm.
Defendant further argues the impropriety of the initial
grant of injunctive relief on the ground that the effect of
the temporary restraining order is a change in the status
quo, contrary to Montana case authority. Plaintiffs do
not respond to this argument.
It is well settled that the purpose of a temporary
restraining order is to preserve the status quo until a
hearing can be held to determine whether an injunction
pendente lite should be granted. State ex rel. ~ c ~ e n z i e
v. District Court, (1941), 111 Mont. 241, 107 ~ . 2 d
885;
State ex rel. Cook v. District Court, (1937), 105 Mont.
72, 69 P.2d 746.
The Washington Supreme Court i n S t a t e v. S u t t o n , (1940),
2 Wash.2d 523, 98 P.2d 680, s t a t e d t h a t t h e " s t a t u s quo"
which t h e i n j u n c t i o n i s t o p r e s e r v e , c o n s i s t s o f :
I! I * * * t h e l a s t a c t u a l p e a c e a b l e , noncon-
t e s t e d s t a t u s which preceded t h e pending
controversy. O r d i n a r i l y where t h e i s s u a n c e
of a p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n would have t h e
e f f e c t of g r a n t i n g a l l t h e r e l i e f t h a t c o u l d
be o b t a i n e d by a f i n a l d e c r e e and would
p r a c t i c a l l y d i s p o s e of t h e whole c a s e , it
w i l l n o t be g r a n t e d . ' " 98 P.2d 684.
However, t h i s argument a p p e a r s w i t h o u t m e r i t a s Montana
c o u r t s s i t t i n g i n e q u i t y have t h e power t o r e s t r a i n o r e n j o i n
t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of a n e x i s t i n g n u i s a n c e a s w e l l as a contem-
p l a t e d o r threatened nuisance. S t a t e ex rel. Dussault v.
Fox Missoula T h e a t r e Corp., ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 110 Mont. 4 4 1 , 1 0 1 P.2d
1065; P u r c e l l v. Davis, ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 480, 50 ~ . 2 d255.
Defendant a l s o a r g u e s t h a t b e c a u s e h i s a c t of p a r k i n g
was n o t shown t o be o t h e r t h a n l e g a l , i t c o u l d n o t be
enjoined, temporarily o r otherwise. However, i t i s c l e a r
t h a t a n a c t , w h i l e t e c h n i c a l l y l e g a l , may be e n j o i n e d a s a
nuisance. 6 6 C. J. S. NUISANCES, ~ l l l . ( c ) .- , 874,875.
A s a g e n e r a l r u l e , t h e g r a n t i n g of a temporary re-
s t r a i n i n g o r d e r r e s t s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e
t r i a l court. Atkinson v. R o o s e v e l t County, ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont.
4 1 1 , 214 P. 74; Rea Bros. Sheep Co. v . Rudi, ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 46 Mont.
149, 127 P. 85. U n l e s s i t a p p e a r s on a p p e a l t h a t such d i s -
c r e t i o n was abused, t h e o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l be
affirmed. P o s t a l Telegraph-Cable Co. of America v . Nolan,
( 1 9 1 6 ) , 53 Mont. 1 2 9 , 162 P . 169.
The same a n a l y s i s i s a p p l i c a b l e t o a c o n t i n u a n c e of an
i n j u n c t i o n , upon h e a r i n g , pending f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
c a u s e on t h e m e r i t s . Atkinson v. R o o s e v e l t County, s u p r a ;
Lowery v. Cole, ( 1 9 1 3 ) , 47 Mont. 64, 130 P. 140. This Court
i n Atkinson s t a t e d :
" I * * * And t h e c o u r t s h o u l d be i n c l i n e d t o
i s s u e a temporary i n j u n c t i o n a p p l i e d f o r where
t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s made o u t a prima f a c i e c a s e ,
o r i f , upon t h e showing made, i t i s l e f t doubt-
f u l whether o r n o t t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l s u f f e r
i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y b e f o r e h i s r i g h t s c a n be
f u l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d and d e t e r m i n e d ; it i s n o t
n e c e s s a r y t h a t a c a s e be made which would
e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f a t a l l e v e n t s on f i n a l
hearing. * * *
" I * * * I t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e c o u r t be
satisfied that the plaintiff w i l l certainly
p r e v a i l on t h e f i n a l h e a r i n g ; " a p r o b a b l e
r i g h t , and a p r o b a b l e danger t h a t s u c h r i g h t
w i l l be d e f e a t e d , w i t h o u t t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r -
p o s i t i o n of t h e c o u r t , " i s a l l t h a t need be
shown.' (Sec, 1685, Pomeroy's E q u i t y J u r i s -
prudence, 4 t h e d . ) . " 6 6 Mont. 4 2 2 .
Here, p l a i n t i f f s o f f e r e d proof t h a t t h e y had s u f f e r e d
and would c o n t i n u e t o s u f f e r a l o s s of b u s i n e s s u n l e s s
d e f e n d a n t was r e s t r a i n e d from p a r k i n g i n s u c h mannger a s
t o p r e v e n t v i s i b i l i t y of and p r o p e r i n g r e s s t o p l a i n t i f f s '
business. P l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d , and it a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l e t o
c o n c l u d e , t h a t t h i s showing a l o n e i s s u f f i c i e n t a s t h e r e i s
no means of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p r e c i s e number of p o t e n t i a l
p a t r o n s who p a s s e d by t h e d r i v e - i n due t o d e f e n d a n t ' s
v e h i c l e , n o r how much e a c h would have s p e n t upon e n t e r i n g .
Defendant's f i n a l i s s u e argues t h e order continuing
t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r was v o i d f o r l a p s e of t i m e .
I n o t h e r words, d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g
o r d e r e x p i r e d a f t e r a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e w i t h o u t n o t i c e and
h e a r i n g , such t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c -
t i o n t o o r d e r t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of it.
I n S t a t e e x r e l . Cook v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a , i t i s
stated:
" * * * I t i s t h e d u t y of t h e c o u r t upon
g r a n t i n g a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r w i t h -
o u t notice, t o s e t t h e matter f o r hearing
f o r an i n j u n c t i o n pendente l i t e a t a very
e a r l y d a t e , t o t h e end t h a t a ' t e m p o r a r y
e x p e d i e n t may n o t , i n f a c t , become a n i n j u n c -
t i o n . ' * * * And s i x weeks h a s been h e l d an
unreasonable time t o r e s t r a i n without n o t i c e
and a h e a r i n g . " 105 Mont. 75, 76.
Here, while the temporary restraining order was ini-
tially granted on September 11, 1974, it had gone without a
hearing until May 1976, a period of over one and one-half
years. A temporary injunction is a procedural device,
interlocutory or provisional in nature granted at the com-
mencement of an action before there can be a determination
of the rights of the parties to preserve the subject in
controversy in its existing condition pending a determina-
tion. It does not determine the merits of a case or decide
controverted facts. It preserves the status quo pending
an adjudication on the merits. It seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm
until the rights of the parties are adjusted. 43 C.J.S.
INJUNCTIONS, 55; Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, (1977), 429 F.Supp. 683; Sheridan County Elec-
tric Co-op v. Ferguson, (1951), 124 Mont. 543, 222 P.2d
597; Kansen v. Galiger, (1949), 123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049.
Recognizing that this was raised by defendant in his
motion to quash, we find no merit due to the delays of
defendant in changing counsel and disqualifying the judges
called in.
Defendant contends the District Court erred in ex-
cluding upon objection on the grounds that it was irrelevant
and hearsay, the evidence offered concerning the issuance
and dismissal of the parking ticket.
It is maintained that evidence is not hearsay when
offered, as here, in proof of the fact that a statement was
made, and not the truth thereof and that, in any event, the
evidence was admissible under the "transaction rule". Sec-
tion 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947; Stayg v. Stagg, (1934), 96 Mont.
573, 32 P.2d 856; Sullivan v. ~etropolitan~ i f e
Ins. Co.,
( 1 9 3 4 ) , 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046; Welch v . A l l P e r s o n s ,
( 1 9 2 9 ) , 85 Mont. 1 1 4 , 278 P. 110; Burns v . S m i t h , (1898),
21 Mont. 251, 53 P . 742.
Finallydefendant urges the t i c k e t is relevant a s
t e n d i n g t o e s t a b l i s h o r make p r o b a b l e a d i s p u t e d f a c t ( i . e . ,
t h e l e g a l i t y o f d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r k i n g and h i s i n t e n t i n s o
doing).
A s d e f e n d a n t , on t h i s a p p e a l , r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e o r d e r
c o n t i n u i n g i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f be quashed, t h i s i s s u e appears
t o h a v e l i t t l e b e a r i n g on t h i s C o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n .
The o r d e r o f t h e c o u r t c o n t i n u i n g t h e t e m p o r a r y re-
s t r a i n i n g o r d e r i s upheld. The c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e
D i s t r i c t Court w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o e x p e d i t e t h e t r i a l of
t h e c a u s e f o r damages.
J u s ticeL---
W e Concur:
u
- )&Justices
:JdLcL/~;j
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O F MONTANA
F
No. 13507
J O H N BOYER and L U A L BOYER,
A R U
P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,
F
A T O Y L. KARAGACIN,
NH N
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . CLm?s&c:? SUPi'iE@iECOURT
."TEOF MBN'iANA
O R D E R
PER CURIAM:
An e r r o r h a v i n g been d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e Opinion i s s u e d i n
t h e above e n t i t l e d c a u s e where t h e diagram on Page 3 of t h a t
Opinion i s i n c o r r e c t ,
I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e Page 3 a t t a c h e d h e r e t o b e s u b s t i t u t e d
f o r Page 3 o f t h e o r i g i n a l O p i n i o n . .
DATED t h i s day of September, 1978.
ief Justic
.
?