STATE v. McKENZIE

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No. 13011 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1978 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J . Nelson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Barney Reagan a r g u e d , Cut Bank, Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Michael McCarter, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Douglas Anderson, County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , Conrad, Montana Submitted: March 1 3 , 1978 Decided : jUN 1 !$re Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . Defendant Duncan Peder McKenzie, J r . , was c o n v i c t e d of t h e c r i m e s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g by j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of Cascade County and t h e r e a f t e r was s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h . The c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e were a f f i r m e d on a p p e a l by t h i s C o u r t . S t a t e v. McKenzie, (1976), Mont. , 557 P.2d 1023, 33 St.Rep. 1043. Thereafter , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t g r a n t e d c e r t i o r a r i , v a c a t e d t h i s C o u r t ' s judgment and remanded t h e c a u s e t o u s f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v . New York, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U . S . 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. T h i s o p i n i o n c o n s t i t u t e s t h e judgment of t h i s C o u r t f o l l o w i n g remand. The v i c t i m i n t h i s c a s e was Lana Harding, a 23 y e a r o l d r u r a l s c h o o l t e a c h e r i n Pondera County, Montana. On Tuesday morning, J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1974, s h e f a i l e d t o a p p e a r a t s c h o o l . A t t h e P i o n e e r School t e a c h e r a g e where s h e l i v e d , t h e bed was found i n a d i s h e v e l l e d c o n d i t i o n . The s h e r i f f of Pondera County was c a l l e d and o f f i c e r s w e r e d i s p a t c h e d t o t h e s c h o o l , a r r i v i n g t h e r e mid-morning. I n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t day r e v e a l e d : (1) A r e d t e n n i s s h o e b e l o n g i n g t o Lana Barding j u s t o u t s i d e t h e s c h o o l ; (2) a d r a g t r a i l from the t e a c h e r a g e t o a nearby r o a d ; ( 3 ) blood n e a r t h e end of t h e d r a g t r a i l ( l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s L a n a ' s t y p e and Rh f a c t o r ) ; and ( 4 ) a w r i s t w a t c h b e l o n g i n g t o Lana i n t h e same a r e a a s t h e b l o o d . Lana Harding was l a s t s e e n i n Conrad, Montana, some 1 3 m i l e s from t h e t e a c h e r a g e , on Monday, J a n u a r y 21, a t a b o u t 5:00 p.m. D e f e n d a n t had r e c e n t l y moved i n t o t h e community and was working f o r t h e K & K W h o l e s a l e Seed Co. l o c a t e d a p p r o x i - m a t e l y t h r e e m i l e s from t h e P i o n e e r S c h o o l t e a c h e r a g e . A day o r s o b e f o r e J a n u a r y 21, h e made a r r a n g e m e n t s t o buy a 1948 b l a c k Dodge p i c k u p , r e c o g n i z a b l e t o most i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e a r e a b e c a u s e i t had b e l o n g e d t o o n e l o c a l owner f o r a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e . On J a n u a r y 21, d e f e n d a n t had worked on t h e p i c k u p a f t e r work. H e was s e e n l e a v i n g K & K Wholesale Seed Co. a t a p 2 r o x i m a t e l y 6:45 p.m., h e a d i n g toward h i s p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e ( n o t f a r from t h e t e a c h e r a g e ) i n t h e black pickup. The p i c k u p was s e e n a b o u t 7:00 p.m. about a m i l e from t h e t e a c h e r a g e . A p p r o x i m a t e l y a n hour l a t e r , a r o u n d 8:00 p.m., defendant knocked o n t h e d o o r o f t h e P e a r s o n f a r m r e s i d e n c e , l o c a t e d a c r o s s t h e r o a d from t h e t e a c h e r a g e . H e asked f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n s t a r t i n g h i s pickup. I t was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t h e p i c k u p was p a r k e d i n t h e r o a d a t a p o i n t where t h e d r a g t r a i l ended and where t h e b l o o d and w a t c h w e r e found t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y . A t t h e Pearson r e s i d e n c e defendant asked d i r e c t i o n s t o h i s own r e s i d e n c e and c a l l e d h i s w i f e t o s a y h e was coming home. Don P e a r s o n p u l l e d t h e p i c k u p , g o t i t s t a r t e d , and n o t e d d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t d r i v e on toward h i s p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h e p i c k u p was s e e n b e i n g d r i v e n toward t h e d r i l l s i t e where L a n a ' s body was f o u n d t h e f o l l o w i n g day. H e r body was f o u n d c l o t h e d o n l y i n a s h i r t , s w e a t e r and b r a . I t was d r a p e d o v e r t h e t o n g u e o f a g r a i n d r i l l . She had b e e n s e v e r e l y b e a t e n a b o u t t h e head and body. The f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t who examined t h e body t e s t i f i e d t h e d e a t h blow had been d e l i v e r e d t o t h e head and l a i d open t h e right side. A r o p e was t i e d a r o u n d h e r neck; t h e r e was e v i d e n c e s h e had been s t r a n g l e d ; however, p r e s s u r e had been r e l e a s e d s o s h e d i d n o t d i e of s t r a n g u l a t i o n . A c o i l of w i r e was e n t a n g l e d i n h e r h a i r , l a t e r shown t o have come from a r o l l of w i r e found i n t h e back of d e f e n d a n t ' s p i c k u p . During t h e s e a r c h f o r t h e body and t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e homicide, t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l i t e m s were found: (1) A p a i r of g l o v e s , worn by d e f e n d a n t a t work, were found i n a f i e l d n o t f a r from where t h e body was d i s c o v e r e d w i t h human blood on them; (2) o v e r s h o e s w i t h L a n a ' s t y p e blood and b r a i n t i s s u e on them were found a b o u t a q u a r t e r o f a m i l e away, and i m p r e s s i o n s from t h e s o l e s matched t h e h e e l s of b o o t s l a t e r t a k e n from d e f e n d a n t ' s home; and ( 3 ) L a n a ' s p u r s e was found n e a r t h e p l a c e where t h e o v e r s h o e s were r e c o v e r e d . A s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e s h e r i f f and h i s d e p u t i e s , t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y , on Tuesday a f t e r n o o n , J a n u a r y 22, f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h a s s a u l t b e f o r e t h e j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e . The c o u n t y a t t o r n e y a l s o o b t a i n e d a w a r r a n t f o r t h e a r r e s t of d e f e n d a n t and a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . Defendant was t h e r e a f t e r a r r e s t e d a t h i s home. The b l a c k Dodge p i c k u p was s e i z e d and impounded. Human b l o o d was found i n t h e bed of t h e pickup and on t h e s p r i n g s ; t h e back end of t h e p i c k u p had been r e c e n t l y s p r a y e d w i t h b l a c k p a i n t ; t h e s p r a y p a i n t was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d by F B I e x p e r t s a s i d e n t i c a l t o a p a i n t brand named "Weekend" which was n o t a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Conrad, Pondera County, a r e a . A c a n of t h e b l a c k s p r a y p a i n t w a s found i n t h e c a b of t h e p i c k u p , and a n o t h e r was l a t e r found a t d e f e n d a n t ' s home. The f o l l o w i n g i t e m s w e r e found i n t h e back of t h e pickup: (1) A c o i l of w i r e , l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s having been t h e s o u r c e of t h e w i r e found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s h a i r ; ( 2 ) an e x h a u s t m a n i f o l d t h a t had been p a i n t e d b l a c k ; and ( 3 ) human blood of t h e same t y p e and Rh f a c t o r a s L a n a ' s and b r a i n and c o r t i c a l t i s s u e were found on t h e m a n i f o l d . Dr. John P f a f f , who examined t h e v i c t i m ' s body and t h e m a n i f o l d , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a n i f o l d c o u l d have i n f l i c t e d t h e f a t a l blow. A t t h e d r i l l s i t e where t h e body was l o c a t e d , a p i e c e of b r a s s from a w a t e r pump was found. The p r i o r owner of t h e Dodge pickup t e s t i f i e d t h i s p i e c e of b r a s s w a s i n t h e back of t h e p i c k u p when d e f e n d a n t t o o k p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p i c k u p on J a n u a r y 19. S e v e r a l co-workers a t t h e K & K Wholesale Seed Co. t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s a i d on J a n u a r y 21 t h a t he b r o k e i n e v e r y new v e h i c l e by engaging i n s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e i n e a c h newly a c q u i r e d v e h i c l e . Several days b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t had remarked t h a t he had had i n t e r c o u r s e with country school t e a c h e r s ; t h a t they w e r e naive, he could t e a c h them, and t h e y were e a s y t o g e t . Defendant a p p e a l e d from t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e imposed. W e affirmed. S t a t e v . McKenzie, s u p r a . The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , on c e r t i o r a r i , v a c a t e d t h i s C o u r t ' s judgment and remanded t h e c a u s e t o u s f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f P a t t e r s o n v . N e w York, s u p r a . W have r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t i r e c a s e , n o t o n l y i n t h e e l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n , b u t a l s o on a l l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l appeal t o t h i s Court. This opinion c o n s t i t u t e s t h i s C o u r t ' s judgment i n t h e e n t i r e c a s e f o l l o w i n g remand. I n t h e i n t e r e s t of a n o r d e r l y p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e s p e c i - f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t , w e r e o r g a n i z e and p r e s e n t them i n s o f a r a s p o s s i b l e i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequence. ~ l t h o u g ht h e r e i s some o v e r l a p , t h e i s s u e s on a p p e a l g e n e r a l l y f a l l i n t o four categories: (1) Those r e l a t i n g t o p r e t r i a l proceedings; ( 2 ) those involving t h e t r i a l i t s e l f ; (3) i s s u e s involving p o s t - t r i a l proceedings, including b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e ; and ( 4 ) i s s u e s f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s remanded from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . D e f e n d a n t ' s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on a p p e a l a r e : 1. The i s s u a n c e and e x e c u t i o n of t h e a r r e s t and s e a r c h w a r r a n t s w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , i n c l u d i n g a l l c l a i m s of e r r o r flowing therefrom. 2. Errors relating t o the D i s t r i c t Court's refusal t o p e r ~ n i td e f e n d a n t t o change h i s p l e a and e n f o r c e a p l e a bargain. 3. D e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n s f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. 4. P e r m i t t i n g t h e f i l i n g of amended I n f o r m a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t and m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o . 5. D e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l t o d e f e n d a n t . 6. D e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motions f o r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r and t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Montana s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g thereto. 7. Denying d e f e n d a n t t h e r i g h t t o v o i r d i r e t h e j u r y on l e g a l c o n c e p t s r e l a t i n g t o d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l s t a t e . 8. P e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o e n d o r s e 58 a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s on t h e amended I n f o r m a t i o n on t h e f i r s t day of trial. 9. F a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o t i m e l y f u r n i s h d e f e n d a n t w i t h s t a t e m e n t s of i t s w i t n e s s e s . 10. Improperly a d m i t t i n g i n e v i d e n c e numerous S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s and denying a d m i s s i o n i n e v i d e n c e c e r t a i n proposed e x h i b i t s of d e f e n d a n t ' s . 11. Improperly i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y . 12. Improper j u r y v e r d i c t forms. 13. P e r m i t t i n g a u d i e n c e r e c o r d i n g of t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e j u r y . 14. Undue i n t e r f e r e n c e and p a r t i s a n a t t i t u d e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r e v e n t i n g a n o r d e r l y and p r o p e r p r e s e n t a t i o n of the case. 15. I n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e verdict. 16. D e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . 17. Errors i n t h e c o u r t ' s "findings, conclusions, s e n t e n c e and o r d e r " r e s u l t i n g i n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h sentence. 18. On remand from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , t h e i s s u e i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s i m p r o p e r l y s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof of d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e of mind, a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e s c h a r g e d , t o d e f e n d a n t i n v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s under t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i - tutions. I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e f i r s t i s s u e above, d e f e n d a n t contends: The a r r e s t and s e a r c h w a r r a n t s were n o t i s s u e d upon p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n v i o l a t i o n of U n i t e d S t a t e s and Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements; t h e f a c t s supporting probable c a u s e were n o t made under o a t h o r a f f i r m a t i o n and reduced t o w r i t i n g i n v i o l a t i o n of Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s ; t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t was e i t h e r i s s u e d a s o r c o n v e r t e d i n t o a prohibited general search warrant; s e c t i o n 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s ; by r e a s o n t h e r e o f S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s 1 7 , 1 8 , 20, 2 1 , 22, 2 6 , 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39 t h r o u g h 52, 83 t h r o u g h 1 0 0 , and s u b l e t t e r e d e x h i b i t s b e a r i n g any of t h e s e numbers a r e i n a d m i s s i b l e a s t h e p r o d u c t s of a n u n l a w f u l s e a r c h and s e i z u r e ; and d e f e n d a n t ' s motions t o s u p p r e s s and o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e s e e x h i b i t s s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d . W e d i s a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h e r e was no probable cause f o r t h e a r r e s t o r search warrant. This Court i n S t a t e e x r e l . G a r r i s v . Wilson, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 1 5 , c o n s i d e r e d f e d e r a l c a s e law and t h e l o n g s t a n d i n g r u l e i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n on p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r a r r e s t and search warrants noting: "'We r e a c h t h i s d e c i s i o n by a - -p l i c a t i o n of t h e - p following standards: only a p r o b a b i l i t y - of c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t - - e shown.'" need b F a r more was shown h e r e . See: S t a t e v. Troglia, (1971), 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143; S p i n e l l i v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 393 U.S. 410, 89 S . C t . 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Defendant a r g u e s t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t s must f a l l on t h e b a s i s o f f a i l u r e o n t h e p a r t of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y t o swear o r a f f i r m and r e d u c e t h e t e s t i m o n y t o w r i t i n g . H e r e l i e s on S t a t e e x r e l . Townsend v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; and P e t i t i o n o f Gray, (19701, 1 5 5 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. W e f i n d n e i t h e r c a s e f a c t u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e here. A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , provides : " * * * No w a r r a n t t o s e a r c h any p l a c e , o r s e i z e any p e r s o n o r t h i n g s h a l l i s s u e * * * w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , s u p p o r t e d by o a t h o r a f f i r m a - t i o n reduced t o w r i t i n g . " I n Townsend n o t h i n g was r e d u c e d t o w r i t i n g . Here, t h e r e i s a n a f f i d a v i t s i g n e d by t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and made a p a r t of b o t h w a r r a n t s . A t a later d a t e , defendant argues t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e f a i l e d t o f o l l o w t h e r i t u a l s of t h e swearing. County A t t o r n e y Nelson l a t e r t e s t i f i e d h e a s k e d t h e j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e " i f h e was sworn." D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y made t h e a f f i d a v i t o n l y on f a c t s o b t a i n e d from J e r r y Hoover, a d e p u t y s h e r i f f of Pondera County, who had been a t t h e s c e n e of t h e crime a s p a r t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g team. This i s n o t a t r u e p i c t u r e of what t o o k p l a c e b e f o r e J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe a t t h e t i m e t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y g a v e t h e a f f i d a v i t and o b t a i n e d t h e warrants. On September 30, 1974, a h e a r i n g on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s was h e l d b e f o r e Judge R o b e r t J . Nelson. T e s t i f y i n g were S h e r i f f Hamrnermeister, h i s d e p u t y J e r r y Hoover, J u s t i c e o f t h e Peace Robert Wolfe and County A t t o r n e y David H. Nelson. The arguments of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l were d i r e c t e d t o t h e l a c k of p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e warrants. A summary of t h e t e s t i m o n y shows J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe t e s t i f i e d h e c u s t o m a r i l y s w e a r s a l l w i t n e s s e s though he d i d n o t r e c a l l s w e a r i n g i n t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y , h e con- s i d e r e d him sworn. Deputy Hoover t e s t i f i e d h e came i n t o town a b o u t 4:30 p.m. on J a n u a r y 22, 1974, w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o go t o t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e ; t h a t he h e l p e d t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y p r e p a r e t h e a f f i d a v i t and he t h e n went b e f o r e J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe and g a v e sworn t e s t i m o n y i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e w a r r a n t s . County A t t o r n e y Nelson t e s t i f i e d h e had been a t t h e s c e n e w i t h t h e s h e r i f f and h i s d e p u t i e s d u r i n g t h e a f t e r n o o n and j u s t p r i o r t o h i s coming t o town t o g e t t h e w a r r a n t s i s s u e d . A t the hearing, he s a i d i n answer t o a q u e s t i o n a s t o what knowledge h e had of t h e f a c t s : "A. Well, w i t h o u t l o o k i n g a t t h e a f f i d a v i t now--I t h i n k t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h o r two i s m y s t a t e m e n t a s t o what I d e t e r m i n e d , t h a t s h e w a s m i s s i n g and may have been t h e v i c t i m of f o u l p l a y b u t o f what n a t u r e w e d i d n ' t know a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , and t h a t s h e r e s i d e d a t t h e teacherage." I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y examined Deputy Hoover b e f o r e t h e j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e a s t o f a c t s h e l e a r n e d during the investigation. Here, u n l i k e Gray, t h e r e was, i n e f f e c t , sworn t e s t i m o n y by t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and d e p u t y s h e r i f f i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a f f i d a v i t , and t h e combination thereof e s t a b l i s h e d probable cause. The f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had been parked a t t h e r o a d s i d e n e a r t h e s c h o o l t h e n i g h t b e f o r e had been e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e P e a r s o n s , who a s s i s t e d d e f e n d a n t i n g e t t i n g t h e t r u c k moved. I t was t h e r e t h e v i c t i m ' s watch was found i n a p o o l of blood by t h e i n v e s t i - g a t i n g o f f i c e r s b e f o r e g o i n g t o town t o g e t t h e w a r r a n t s . See: Lindley v. S t a t e , ( 1 9 5 6 ) , Okl.Cr., 2 9 4 P.2d 851. T h i s , i n o u r o p i n i o n i s a s u f f i c i e n t showing of p r o b a b l e cause t o i s s u e t h e warrants. Defendant n e x t a t t a c k s t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t , a l l e g i n g t h a t under t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d , a blanket seizure resulted. Examination of t h e w a r r a n t i n d i - c a t e s t h a t b o t h t h e house and t h e v e h i c l e were t o be s e a r c h e d . Though a n e r r o r on t h e v i n t a g e of t h e b l a c k Dodge p i c k u p (1950 i n s t e a d of 1948) a p p e a r e d , t h a t i s of l i t t l e s i g n i - ficance. S t a t e e x r e l . Flournoy v . Wren, ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 108 ~ r i z . 356, 498 P.2d 4 4 4 . A l l p a r t i e s knew t h e p i c k u p i n v o l v e d . A l l t h a t i s needed t o m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s p e c i f i c i t y i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r with reasonable e f f o r t , can a s c e r t a i n t h e a u t o m o b i l e i n t e n d e d t o b e s e a r c h e d , and i t s owner, i f possible. Wangrow v . United S t a t e s , (8th C i r . 1 9 6 8 ) , 399 F.2d 106. Defendant c i t e s c a s e a u t h o r i t y t h a t some s e v e n c r i t e r i a a r e needed f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e - - owner, make, model, y e a r , c o l o r , motor number and l i c e n s e number. Here, t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t answers f i v e of t h e s e v e n l i s t e d c r i t e r i a and i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y specific. Wilkerson v . Commonwealth, ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 2 0 0 Ky. 399, 255 S.W. 76; H a t l e y v . S t a t e , ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 72 0 k l . C r . 69, 113 P.2d 396. D e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t t h e i t e m s s e i z e d were n o t covered by t h e l a n g u a g e "any o t h e r c o n t r a b a n d a r t i c l e s 1 ' i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . The l a n g u a g e used comes w i t h i n t h e r u l e of S t a t e v . Q u i g g , ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 1 1 9 , 467 P.2d 692, where we h e l d t h a t i t e m s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t may be s e i z e d a s l o n g a s a r e a s o n a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d e m o n s t r a t e d between t h e s e a r c h a u t h o r i z e d i n t h e w a r r a n t and s e i z u r e of t h e i t e m s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y described therein. Next we c o n s i d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 95- 1 8 0 6 ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : "The burden of p r o v i n g t h a t t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e were u n l a w f u l s h a l l be on t h e d e f e n d a n t . " W e f i n d no m e r i t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h i s subsec- tion is unconstitutional. W e n o t e d e f e n d a n t c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y f o r h i s p o s i t i o n and t h e r e f o r e f a i l s t o overcome t h e presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . United S t a t e s v . Keleher, ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 55 App.D.C. 1 3 2 , 2 F.2d 934, r e l i e d upon by defendant, i s not applicable t o t h e f a c t s here. W e note t h a t Montana's s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 95-1806 ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, i s p a t t e r n e d a f t e r C h a p t e r 38, 8 1 1 4 - 1 2 ( b ) , I11.Code of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , which s t a t e s i n p a r t : "* * * The judge s h a l l r e c e i v e e v i d e n c e on any i s s u e of f a c t n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e motion and t h e burden of p r o v i n g t h a t t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e were u n l a w f u l s h a l l be on t h e d e f e n d a n t * * *.'I Here, such a h e a r i n g was h e l d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and de- fendant f a i l e d i n h i s e f f o r t . P e o p l e v . Normant, (1975), 25 111.App.3d 536, 323 N.E.2d 553; S t a t e v . T r i t z , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 344, 522 P.2d 603. Defendant n e x t s p e c i f i e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a r i s i n g o u t of a n a l l e g e d " p l e a b a r g a i n " , a n a l l e g e d b r e a c h t h e r e o f by t h e S t a t e , a r e f u s a l by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o s p e c i f i c a l l y e n f o r c e t h e terms t h e r e o f , and a r e f u s a l by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o p e r m i t t h e d e f e n d a n t t o withdraw h i s p r i o r p l e a and s u b s t i t u t e a p l e a of g u i l t y i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e a l l e g e d plea bargain. I n s u b s t a n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t a v a l i d and b i n d i n g agreement was made on December 2 2 , 1974, between t h e p r o s e c u t o r and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , s u b j e c t t o a p p r o v a l by t h e t r i a l judge, t h a t d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d g u i l t y t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and would r e c e i v e s e n t e n c e s of 50 y e a r s and 2 0 y e a r s r e s p e c t i v e l y t o be s e r v e d concur- rently. Defendant c l a i m s t h a t on t h e f o l l o w i n g day c o u n s e l met w i t h t h e t r i a l judge, who w i t h some r e l u c t a n c e , a g r e e d t o a l l aspects thereof (except t h a t he f e l t he could only g i v e o n e 50 y e a r s e n t e n c e f o r b o t h c r i m e s ) and s e t December 30 a s t h e d a t e f o r change of p l e a and e n t r y of judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e agreement. A s a r e s u l t , according t o d e f e n d a n t , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a g r e e d t o e x p l a i n what problems t h e y f o r e s a w i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e and what t h e d e f e n s e p o s i t i o n would have been had t h e c a s e gone t o t r i a l , a l l t o c o u n t e r a c t a n t i c i p a t e d p u b l i c r e a c t i o n by t h e s h e r i f f and t h e f a m i l y of t h e v i c t i m . On December 2 8 t h e p r o s e c u t o r a d v i s e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h e y would n o t perform t h e i r p a r t of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e - ment, a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . On December 30 t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a and r e f u s e d t o e n f o r c e t h e a l l e g e d p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, d e n i e s t h a t any p l e a b a r - g a i n i n g agreement was e n t e r e d i n t o on December 2 2 , o r a t any o t h e r time. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h e i n i t i a t i o n and impetus f o r t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g d i s c u s s i o n s came from t h e d e f e n d a n t ; t h a t throughout t h e d i s c u s s i o n s t h e S t a t e c o n s i s t e n t l y took t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t no p l e a b a r g a i n c o u l d be e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y and t h e s h e r i f f ; and t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n t h e S t a t e a g r e e d t o meet w i t h t h e t r i a l judge and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l on December 2 3 was t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was u n a b l e t o t r a v e l some 4 0 0 m i l e s t o see t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y u n t i l December 2 6 . Because no c o n s e n t c o u l d be o b t a i n e d from t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y , no f u r t h e r p l e a b a r - g a i n i n g d i s c u s s i o n s were h e l d . The S t a t e a s s e r t s any g r a t u i t o u s information t h a t defense counsel believed they had i m p a r t e d t o t h e S t a t e was e i t h e r a l r e a d y known t o t h e S t a t e o r of no s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s case. T h i s i s s u e t u r n s on t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e a l l e g e d p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement. The t r i a l judge a c c e p t e d t h e S t a t e ' s v e r s i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n and r e f u s e d t o e n f o r c e t h e a l l e g e d agreement contended f o r by d e f e n d a n t s . W likewise accept e the S t a t e ' s version. W e h o l d t h a t where, a s h e r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e of any p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement was d i s p u t e d and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t none was made, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o e n f o r c e and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c t i o n s i n t h i s r e g a r d were c o r r e c t . A s w e understand it, t h e r e i s n e i t h e r contention nor proof of bad f a i t h by t h e S t a t e i n i t s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l on a p l e a b a r g a i n o r i n i t s e f f o r t t o s e c u r e t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e s h e r i f f o r t h e v i c t i m ' s p a r e n t s . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s any s t a t e m e n t s of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l con- c e r n i n g weaknesses i n t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e o r d e f e n s e p o s i t i o n s i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h w e r e g r a t u i t o u s and p r e m a t u r e . In any e v e n t , a t r i a l i s n o t a s p o r t i n g c o n t e s t i n which t h e v e r d i c t t u r n s on n o n d i s c l o s u r e of s u c h m a t t e r s . Discovery p r o c e d u r e s a r e d e s i g n e d and o p e r a t e d t o remove t h i s e l e m e n t and had been extensively and exhaustively utilized at the time in question. Santobello v. New York, (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L Ed 2d 427, does not aid the defendant here as that case is clearly distinguishable on the facts and on the law. Defendant's next specification of error concerns the denial of his motions for substitution of the trial judge. He argues that he attempted to disqualify the trial judge for cause by motion and hearing on September 30, 1974, on the basis that the trial judge was a member of the Criminal Law Revision Commission that drafted Montana's present Criminal Code and submitted it to the legislature for enact- ment. He argues that he again attempted to disqualify the trial judge for cause on December 30, 1974, first, because the trial judge had acquired information during the plea bargaining process making it impossible for him to sit in an impartial manner, and second, because he was attempting to force his own "Preliminary Instructions to the Jury" over both prosecution and defense objections which indicated he had assumed an adversary stance and taken over prosecution of the case. We hold that the trial judge's membership on the Criminal Law Revision Commission did not per se constitute grounds for disqualification for cause. Canon 4 of the American Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics specifically permits this: "A Judge may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice." The draft of the revision of the Criminal Code by the commission was presented to the legislature for its consideration, approval, rejection or modification. Nor d o we f i n d any ground f o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge f o r c a u s e i n h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , h i s d r a f t i n g of " P r e - l i m i n a r y I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e J u r y " , o r any f a c t s o r proof t h a t h e had assumed a n a d v e r s a r y p o s i t i o n a t t r i a l i n t a k i n g o v e r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e c a s e . The r u l e of U n i t e d S t a t e s v . G r i n n e l l Corp., (19661, 384 U.S. 563, 86 S . C t . 1698, 16 L Ed 2d 778, i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h b i a s and p r e j u d i c e . Here, whatever knowledge t h e t r i a l judge o b t a i n e d was d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of l e g a l p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e c a s e and n o t from any o u t s i d e source. A s long a s t h e t r i a l judge's "Preliminary I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e J u r y " a r e a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law, i t i s i m m a t e r i a l whether t h e y a r e d r a f t e d by t h e judge o r g i v e n o v e r t h e o b j e c t i o n s of o n e o r b o t h a d v e r s a r y coun- sel. Such i s t h e c a s e h e r e f o r r e a s o n s h e r e a f t e r d i s c u s s e d . F i n a l l y , w e f i n d t h e record does n o t support defendant's c o n t e n t i o n t h e t r i a l judge assumed an a d v e r s a r y r o l e and t o o k o v e r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e c a s e . Defendant a r g u e s a s e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g s p e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o f i l e amended I n f o r m a t i o n s a g a i n s t him. W need o n l y c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e f i l i n g of t h e e t h i r d amended I n f o r m a t i o n a s i t was t h i s I n f o r m a t i o n on which d e f e n d a n t w a s u l t i m a t e l y t r i e d . The t h i r d amended I n f o r m a t i o n conforms t o o u r o p i n i o n and d i r e c t i o n s i n S t a t e e x r e l . McKenzie v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1 2 1 1 . Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n t h e a f f i d a v i t , t h e Information, o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r u l i n g s i n per- mitting its filing. Defendant complains he w a s d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l , emphasizing a l a p s e of 350 d a y s between a r r e s t and t r i a l . T h i s d e l a y c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d p e r s e a v i o l a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . However, t h e l e n g t h of t i m e between d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t and t r i a l d o e s s h i f t t h e burden of e x p l a i n i n g t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y and showing a b s e n c e of p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t upon t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 382, 528 P.2d 1322; S t a t e v. Keller, (1976), Mont. , 553 P. 2d 1013, 33 St.Rep. 795. The S t a t e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e d e l a y was d e f e n d a n t ' s s e v e r a l appearances i n t h i s Court, t h e d i f f i - c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o p l e a d , and t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which a r o s e b e c a u s e t h i s w a s t h e f i r s t homicide p r o s e c u t e d under t h e new Montana C r i m i n a l Code and under t h e new c a p i t a l punishment scheme. Much of t h e t i m e c a n i n f a i r n e s s be c h a r g e d t o n e i t h e r p a r t y , b u t i t i s c l e a r t h a t it aided both p a r t i e s t o b e t t e r prepare f o r t r i a l , t h i s b e i n g a complex c i r c u m s t a n t i a l c a s e . Under t h o s e circum- s t a n c e s , w e c a n n o t see t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The S t a t e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e d e l a y i s s a t i s f a c t o r y and shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d by t h e l e n g t h of t i m e between a r r e s t and t r i a l . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e Montana p r o v i s i o n f o r n o t i c e of m e n t a l d e f e c t o r d i s e a s e and t h e m e n t a l d e f e c t o r d i s e a s e p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e Code of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , s e c t i o n s 95- 501 t h r o u g h 509 and s e c t i o n 9 5 - 1 8 0 3 ( d ) , R.C.M. 1947, a r e unconstitutional. To c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of these s e c t i o n s , defendant sought a p r o t e c t i v e order t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f from any w a i v e r of r i g h t s were h e t o g i v e t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e d by t h e s e s e c t i o n s . The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e r e l i e f s o u g h t and h e l d t h e s e s e c t i o n s t o b e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and n o t v i o l a t i v e of t h e United S t a t e s o r Montana c o n s t i t u - tions. On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t m a i n t a i n s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t holding these provisions unconstitutional. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments were p r e v i o u s l y answered by t h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e ex r e l . S i k o r a v . D i s t r i c t Court, ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 2 4 1 , 4 6 2 P.2d 897. Defendant's a t t a c k on t h e s e s t a t u t e s l o s e s much of i t s f o r c e when i t i s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t promulgated, and Congress, a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , approved Rule 12.2, F e d e r a l Rules of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , N o t i c e of Defense Based upon Mental C o n d i t i o n , which i s n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e procedure attacked here. I t s h o u l d be emphasized t h a t t h e p u r p o s e of t h e s t a t u t e i s f o r n o t i c e , t o p r e v e n t s u r - p r i s e , and t o e l i m i n a t e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e o f a t r i a l when t h e d e f e n s e i s r a i s e d . The f a c t o f n o t i c e d o e s n o t amount t o a p l e a , and i t c o u l d n o t be used i n any way a s e v i d e n c e i n a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . The p r o v i s i o n s m e r e l y p r o v i d e f o r advance n o t i c e of t h e i n t e n t t o r e l y on such d e f e n s e s o t h a t t h e S t a t e may be p r e p a r e d t o meet t h i s defense. Defendant c l a i m s p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e he was n o t a l l o w e d t o v o i r d i r e t h e j u r y on t h e s u b j e c t of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y s a i d t h a t where n o t i c e of a d e f e n s e of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t i s g i v e n , a r e f u s a l t o a l l o w d e f e n d a n t t o v o i r d i r e t h e j u r y on t h i s d e f e n s e con- stitutes prejudicial error. S t a t e v . Olson, ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822. Here, d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t g i v e any notice. W b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t was p r o p e r l y n o t a l l o w e d t o e v o i r d i r e t h e j u r y on m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a s h e d i d n o t g i v e any n o t i c e of t h i s d e f e n s e . Defendant a l s o a l l e g e s t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e names of 58 new w i t n e s s e s t o t h e amended I n f o r m a t i o n on t h e day of t r i a l was e r r o r . The p e r t i n e n t s e c t i o n o f t h e Code of C r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e i s s e c t i o n 95-1803 ( a ) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, which r e a d s : " (a) L i s t of W i t n e s s e s : " (1) F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f n o t i c e o n l y and t o p r e - vent surprise, the prosecution s h a l l furnish t o t h e d e f e n d a n t and f i l e w i t h t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of a r r a i g n m e n t , a l i s t of t h e w i t n e s s e s i n t e n d e d t o be c a l l e d by t h e prosecu- t i o n . The p r o s e c u t i o n may, any t i m e a f t e r a r - r a i g n m e n t , add t o t h e l i s t t h e names of any ad- d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s , upon a showing of good c a u s e . The l i s t s h a l l i n c l u d e t h e names and a d d r e s s e s of t h e w i t n e s s e s . " The Revised Commission Comment on t h i s s e c t i o n p o i n t s o u t : " S s L i o n 95-1503 ( d ) of C h a p t e r 1 5 r e q u i r e s t h e s t a t e t o e n d o r s e t h e names of t h e w i t - n e s s e s f o r t h e s t a t e on t h e i n d i c t m e n t o r information. The motion under t h i s s e c t i o n p e r m i t s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o g e t a l i s t a t any t i m e , p r o b a b l y a f t e r a r r a i g n m e n t and b e f o r e t r i a l . Many t i m e s t h e s t a t e d o e s n o t know b e f o r e i t f i l e s t h e i n d i c t m e n t o r informa- t i o n a l l t h e w i t n e s s e s i t may c a l l . " F u r t h e r , t h i s p r o v i s i o n a l l o w s t h e a d d i t i o n of names n o t o n l y p r i o r t o t r i a l , b u t a f t e r t h e t r i a l h a s commenced. A s t h e t r i a l p r o g r e s s e s , t h e showing which i s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h 'good c a u s e ' s h o u l d be more s t r i n g e n t . A t any t i m e , t h e judge may a l l o w a c o n t i n u a n c e ( s e c - t i o n 95-1708) i f i t s h o u l d a p p e a r n e c e s s a r y i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e . " I n S t a t e v . Campbell, ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 111, 500 P.2d 801, t h e p e r s o n whose name was added was t h e v i c t i m of t h e a s s a u l t and t h e C o u r t t h e r e found no s e r i o u s c l a i m of s u r - p r i s e and p o i n t e d o u t t h a t w h i l e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d , h e made no e f f o r t t o a s k f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e . I n S t a t e v. Rozzell, ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 443, 486 P.2d 877, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t judge r e c o g n i z e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s added would s u r p r i s e t h e d e f e n d a n t and o f f e r e d t o c o n t i n u e t h e t r i a l u n t i l t h e d e f e n d a n t had had a chance t o i n t e r v i e w a l l t h e new w i t n e s s e s , b u t t h i s was r e f u s e d . These c a s e s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e where s u r p r i s e i s c l a i m e d from t h e a d d i t i o n of new w i t n e s s e s i s t o a s k f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e s o t h a t d e f e n d a n t may p r e p a r e . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d t o t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e w i t n e s s e s based on s u r p r i s e and i n a b i l i t y t o p r e p a r e h i s defense, b u t never requested a continuance. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e new w i t n e s s e s c a u t i o n e d : " * * * and i n g r a n t i n g t h i s m o t i o n , it must be u n d e r s t o o d b e f o r e any o f t h e s e w i t n e s s e s i s a l - lowed t o t e s t i f y , t h e d e f e n d a n t must be g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o have h i s c o u n s e l t a l k w i t h them, examine them * * *." The w i t n e s s e s added were n o t p r e j u d i c i a l t o d e f e n d a n t . The a d d i t i o n of t h e names o f t h e F B I a g e n t s d i d n o t s u r p r i s e d e f e n d a n t , a s h e knew t h e c o n t e n t of t h e i r t e s t i m o n y from r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d s e v e r a l months e a r l i e r . The r e s t of t h e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s who were a c t u a l l y c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y were employees of Wright C h e v r o l e t . These p e r s o n s ' t e s t i m o n y was a p a r t of t h e c h a i n of p o s s e s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d from t h e t r u c k . The r e m a i n d e r of t h e w i t n e s s e s whoses names w e r e added, b u t who were n o t c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y , w e r e named b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d , i f need b e , c o r r o b o r a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e already l i s t e d witnesses, l a y f u r t h e r foundation, o r t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e w e a t h e r and t e m p e r a t u r e i n t h e a r e a on t h e dates i n question. I n i t s o r d e r t h e c o u r t was c a r e f u l t o p r o v i d e d e f e n d a n t w i t h p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e and t o e n s u r e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e t e s t i m o n y . Defendant was i n no way p r e j u d i c e d by t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e s e w i t n e s s e s . Before a l l o w i n g t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e new w i t n e s s names, t h e c o u r t examined t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e a d d i t i o n o f e a c h new w i t n e s s and t o f i n d o u t t h e n a t u r e o f e a c h of t h e w i t n e s s ' t e s t i m o n y i n t h e p r e s e n c e of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l , s o t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s a p p r i s e d of t h e b a s i c n a t u r e of t h e t e s t i m o n y . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o t i m e l y f u r n i s h him w i t h s t a t e m e n t s of i t s witnesses. H e argues t h a t t h i s is reversible error. S e c t i o n s 95-1801(d) (1) ( d ) ( 2 ) and 95-1804 ( a ) , R.C.M. , 1947, p r o v i d e t h e b a s i c d i s c o v e r y t o o l s . Section 95-1804(a), R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s : "On motion of a d e f e n d a n t i n any c r i m i n a l c a s e made p r i o r t o t r i a l t h e c o u r t s h a l l o r d e r t h e s t a t e t o f u r n i s h t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h a copy of any w r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n and a l i s t of t h e w i t n e s s e s t o i t s making. I f t h e defendant h a s made a n o r a l c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n a l i s t of t h e w i t n e s s e s t o i t s making s h a l l be f u r n i s h e d . " T h i s s e c t i o n by i t s mandatory l a n g u a g e e n t i t l e s d e f e n d a n t , a s a m a t t e r of r i g h t upon motion, t o s t a t e m e n t s he made. It r e q u i r e s no showing o f good c a u s e . S e c t i o n 95-1801(d) ( l ) ,p r o v i d e s : "Upon motion of e i t h e r p a r t y and upon showing of good c a u s e , t h e c o u r t may i s s u e a subpoena p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l d i r e c t i n g any p e r s o n o t h e r t h a n t h e d e f e n d a n t t o produce books, s t a t e m e n t s , p a p e r s and o b j e c t s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t a t a t i m e p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l o r p r i o r t o t h e t i m e when t h e y a r e t o be o f f e r e d i n e v i d e n c e and t h e c o u r t may, upon t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n , p e r m i t t h e books, s t a t e m e n t s , p a p e r s o r o b j e c t s o r p o r t i o n s t h e r e o f t o be i n - s p e c t e d , c o p i e d , o r photographed by t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r a t t o r n e y s . " The Revised Commission Comment d i s c u s s i n g t h i s s e c t i o n points out: "The d i s c o v e r y a l l o w e d under s u b s e c t i o n ( d ) i s a t w o - p a r t mechanism f o r g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . Under p a r a g r a p h (1) e i t h e r p a r t y may r e q u i r e a t h i r d person, o t h e r than t h e defendant, through t h e u s e of a subpoena ( s e c t i o n 93-1501-3), t o produce c e r t a i n a r t i c l e s . The o n l y r e s t r i c t i o n i s t h a t good c a u s e must be shown. T h i s a l l o w s what i s sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as a ' f i s h i n g e x p e d i t i o n 1 - - b u t o n l y where t h i r d p a r t i e s a r e concerned. " S e c t i o n 95-1801 ( d ) ( 2 ) , provides: "Upon motion of t h e d e f e n d a n t , w i t h i n a r e a - s o n a b l e t i m e b e f o r e t r i a l , t h e c o u r t may, upon a showing of good c a u s e , a t a t i m e and p l a c e d e s i g n a t e d by t h e c o u r t , o r d e r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o produce p r i o r t o t r i a l f o r i n s p e c t i o n , photo- g r a p h i n g o r copying by t h e d e f e n d a n t , d e s i g n a t e d books, s t a t e m e n t s , p a p e r s , o r o b j e c t s o b t a i n e d from t h e d e f e n d a n t o r o t h e r s by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n which a r e m a t e r i a l , r e l e v a n t and n e c e s s a r y t o t h e preparation of t h e defendant's case." The Revised Commission Comment d i s c u s s i n g t h i s p r o v i s i o n states: "The second p a r a g r a p h p e r m i t s d i s c o v e r y by t h e defendant o r t h e prosecution with t h e a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e o b j e c t d e s i r e d must be ' m a t e r i a l , r e l e v a n t and n e c e s s a r y t o t h e pre- p a r a t i o n of t h e c a s e . ' " T h i s comment i n d i c a t e s t h e showing n e c e s s a r y t o g e t a c c e s s t o m a t e r i a l i n t h e hands of t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t r e q u i r e d t o g e t m a t e r i a l i n t h e hands of t h i r d p a r t i e s . A g a i n s t t h i s background, and w i t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i n most c r i m i n a l c a s e s i n Montana d i s c o v e r y i s conducted on a more i n f o r m a l b a s i s w i t h o u t r e s o r t t h e motion and hearing procedures o u t l i n d a b o v e , t h i s Court f i n d s t h e a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r based on a d e l a y of a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e week i n complying w i t h t h e demand made by d e f e n d a n t a f t e r t r i a l had begun, t o b e w i t h o u t m e r i t . Defendant c l a i m s h e had made two p r i o r demands upon t h e county a t t o r n e y f o r t h i s m a t e r i a l . These demands were i n t h e form o f l e t t e r s t o t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y . Defendant made a number o f s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t s and t h e n made a g e n e r a l r e q u e s t for "* * * c o p i e s o f any documentary o r p h y s i c a l i t e m s which you w i l l r e l y o n f o r proof of any f a c t * * *." The second l e t t e r expressed defense counsel's opinion t h a t t h e S t a t e was n o t g o i n g t o p r o v i d e t h e r e q u e s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n . This l e t t e r was d a t e d August 2 0 , 1974. O J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1975, n a f t e r t r i a l began, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a demand and motion r e q u e s t i n g t h a t a l l s t a t e m e n t s t a k e n by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n from a l l w i t n e s s e s b e t u r n e d o v e r t o d e f e n d a n t and demanding immediate compliance. Any d e l a y i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s f u r - nishing defendant with t h e material requested i n h i s e a r l i e r l e t t e r s was waived by d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o f i l e a demand and motion f o r t h i s m a t e r i a l u n t i l a f t e r t r i a l had begun. Even though t h e demand and motion was n o t made " w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e b e f o r e t r i a l " , a s r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 95-1801 ( d ) ( 2 ) , t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion s a y i n g : "Before a witness t a k e s t h e s t a n d , o t h e r than your f o u n d a t i o n w i t n e s s e s , t h a t you [ t h e S t a t e ] a r e p r o c e e d i n g w i t h now, f u r n i s h them [ d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] w i t h s u c h c o p i e s a s you have t h a t a r e n o t your work p r o d u c t a s s u c h , and b e f o r e t h e y [ t h e w i t n e s s ] t a k e t h e s t a n d , he i s g o i n g t o be given an opportunity t o t a l k with each w i t n e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e t h a t have been endorsed j u s t t h e o t h e r day * * *." ( B r a c k e t e d m a t e r i a l added.) The t i m e i t t o o k f o r t h e S t a t e t o g a t h e r , s o r t , and copy t h e r e q u e s t e d m a t e r i a l d u r i n g t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief was r e a s o n a b l e . The c o u r t p r e v e n t e d any p r e j u d i c e by a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t t o i n t e r v i e w t h e w i t - nesses p r i o r t o t h e i r taking the stand. W e note the S t a t e complied w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t s made by d e f e n d a n t i n t h e August l e t t e r s , and t h e r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d from t h e FBI and t h e a u t o p s y r e p o r t w e r e forwarded t o d e f e n d a n t soon a f t e r t h e y w e r e r e c e i v e d and p r i o r t o t h e August r e q u e s t s . Defendant o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n p h o t o g r a p h s which w e r e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a s b e i n g gruesome and inflammatory o r otherwise prejudicial. The b a s i c r u l e on p h o t o g r a p h i c e v i d e n c e i n Montana a s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v . Campbell, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 251, 261, 405 P.2d 978, 984, i s : " * * * Photographs a r e a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e pur- p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n under- standing t h e case. F u l t o n v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. When t h e p u r p o s e of a n e x h i b i t i s t o i n f l a m e t h e minds of t h e j u r y o r e x c i t e t h e f e e l i n g s r a t h e r t h a n t o e n l i g h t e n t h e j u r y a s t o any f a c t , i t s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d . S t a t e v . B i s c h e r t , 1 3 1 Mont. 1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 969 * * *." Here, t h e p h o t o g r a p h s i n q u e s t i o n f a l l i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : (1) Photographs of t h e body t a k e n a t t h e " d r i l l s i t e " ; (2) a u t o p s y p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ; and ( 3 ) a s i n g l e photograph o f a c a n of s p r a y p a i n t i n a s u i t c a s e . I n e a c h i n s t a n c e t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s meet t h e above t e s t . They were r e l e v a n t , u s e f u l , and n e c e s s a r y i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e case. (1) The p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n a t t h e s i t e where t h e body was found w e r e used by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t t o show c r e a s e s i n t h e body which were n o t p r e s e n t a f t e r t h e body had been moved and which tended t o show how l o n g t h e body had been a t the site. ( 2 ) The a u t o p s y p h o t o g r a p h s , t a k e n i n c o l o r and t h e n p r i n t e d i n b l a c k and w h i t e , were used by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t t o show t h e n a t u r e of t h e wounds and e x p l a i n t h e e v i d e n c e which formed t h e b a s i s of h i s o p i n i o n a s t o t h e s i z e and c o n f i g u r a t i o n of t h e weapon which was used t o i n f l i c t t h e wounds. ( 3 ) The photograph of t h e c a n of s p r a y p a i n t i n t h e s u i t c a s e was used t o show t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n a t y p e o f p a i n t which was n o t a v a i l a b l e i n l o c a l s t o r e s . Defendant f i n d s p r e j u d i c e from t h i s p h o t o g r a p h i n t h e i m p l i - c a t i o n o f f l i g h t t h a t c o u l d a r i s e from t h e f a c t t h e p a i n t was i n a suitcase. However, d e f e n d a n t had been i n c u s t o d y f o r some t i m e p r i o r t o t h e t i m e t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s w e r e taken. T h i s a l l e g e d p r e j u d i c e c o u l d have been e a s i l y ex- p l a i n e d away i n c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . There w a s no i n t e n t t o e x c i t e f e e l i n g s w i t h t h i s photograph which w a s i n no way gruesome. I t w a s properly admitted. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t h a t c e r t a i n e x p e r t o p i n i o n was a l l o w e d t o b e g i v e n p r i o r t o t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e c h a i n of p o s s e s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e upon which t h i s o p i n i o n was based. T h i s o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e was g i v e n by F B I a g e n t s who were w i t n e s s e s f o r t h e S t a t e . The judge allowed t h e n t o g i v e t h e i r o p i n i o n a s t o t h e e v i d e n c e t h e y had examined, which had n o t a s y e t been a d m i t t e d i n e v i d e n c e , b e c a u s e t h e r e was a p o r t i o n of t h e c h a i n of p o s s e s s i o n which had n o t been e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o a l l o w o p i n i o n t o be g i v e n , c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e s u b s e q u e n t p r o d u c t i o n and a d m i s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e which forms t h e b a s i s of t h e o p i n i o n . Risken v . N o r t h e r n Pac. Ry., (1960), 137 Mont. 57, 350 P.2d 831; Graham v . Rolandson, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263. The c h a i n of p o s s e s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e was l a t e r s u p p l i e d . Thus no e r r o r was committed. Next d e f e n d a n t complains t h a t a number of h i s proposed e x h i b i t s were r e f u s e d a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e . Our e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e s e e x h i b i t s were r e f u s e d on t h e b a s i s of a l a c k of a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n . The r u l e i s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a s been l a i d f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e x h i b i t s i n t o e v i d e n c e r e s t s w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t be o v e r t u r n e d on a p p e a l u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r a b u s e of discretion. S t a t e v. Olsen, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926. I n t h i s c a s e , w e c a n n o t s a y t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t admitting defendant's e x h i b i t s i n t o evidence. D e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e e x t e n s i v e p r e l i m i n a r y i n s t r u c - t i o n s g i v e n by t h e c o u r t were e r r o n e o u s , t h a t i t was e r r o r t o g i v e them p r i o r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e v i d e n c e , and t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n a f t e r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of e v i d e n c e were wrong. The p r e l i m i n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s were t h e u s u a l i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n on t h e r o l e of t h e j u r y . I n a d d i t i o n , i n c l u d e d were a number of i n s t r u c t i o n s which s e t o u t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e v a r i o u s c r i m e s of which d e f e n d a n t w a s a c c u s e d , and s e t o u t s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of t e r m s used. Montana's c r i m i n a l code i s w r i t t e n i n c l e a r p l a i n language which s e r v e s w e l l a s t h e b a s i s f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury. There was no e r r o r i n i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e e n t i r e Information i n t o t h e preliminary i n s t r u c t i o n s , f o r it t o o i s b a s i c a l l y i n s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e merely i n s e r t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s name and t h e v i c t i m ' s name i n t h e p r o p e r p l a c e s and enumerating t h e weapons used. The language i s n o t inflammatory b u t i s a s n e u t r a l a s language d e t a i l i n g t h e charges involved h e r e c a n be. Examination of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t and t h e burden of proof show p r o p e r s t a t e m e n t s of t h e law. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t language i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n which d e f i n e s t h e d e g r e e of proof n e c e s s a r y a s b e i n g t h a t which c o n v i n c e s t h e mind " t o a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e c h a r g e , no more and no l e s s " f a l l s i n t o t h e t y p e of e r r o r found i n S t a t e v . T a y l o r , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 1 0 6 , 515 P.2d 695. I n T a y l o r , t h e S t a t e ' s burden w a s d e f i n e d u s i n g t h e p h r a s e " o n l y s u c h proof a s may" which i m p l i e d l y l i m i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of some o f t h e e v i d e n c e and which c o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d t o l i m i t t h e burden of p r o o f . Here, t h e n a t u r e of t h e s u b j e c t i v e judgment t o be made by t h e j u r o r s i s s e t f o r t h , and t h e l a n g u a g e "no more and no l e s s " merely empha- s i z e s t h e n a t u r e of t h e judgment and i n no way d i m i n i s h e s it. The C o u r t f i n d s no e r r o r t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of d e f e n d a n t from t h e f a c t t h a t e x t e n s i v e p r e l i m i n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n p r i o r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e . Defendant concedes t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947, g i v e s t h e c o u r t t h e power t o v a r y t h e o r d e r of t r i a l s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 95-1910, R.C.M. 1947, f o r good r e a s o n s . The p r e s e n t case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence. Some of the counts charged were complex and difficult to understand. For example, the second homicide count was a felony homicide which had as alternative felonies, sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. The aggravated assault alternative had alternate aggravating factors, serious bodily injury or bodily injury with a weapon, and a listing of alternative weapons, a rope or a heavy object. It was for good reason that the judge instructed the jury as to the basic elements of all the offenses charged, so the jury could have some understanding of the complex circumstantial evidence to be presented. In a less complex case which was not based only on circumstantial evidence, such preliminary instruc- tions might not be necessary and there would not be the re- quired good reasons for varying the usual order of the trial, but here it was acceptable to do so. One of the preliminary instructions to which defendant objects is the one defining torture. The instruction states: "Whoever purposely assaults another physically for the purpose of inflicting cruel suffering upon the person so assaulted for the particular purpose of enabling the assailant to either: "(a) extort anything from such person; "(b) or to persuade such person against his or her will, or " (c) to satisfy some other untoward pro- pensity of the assailant * * *." The term "untoward propensity" is defined in the same instruc- tion as meaning "any perverse, wrong, bad or corrupt inclina- tion or tendency." Defendant maintains that this instruction incorrectly defined torture. A number of California cases have adopted a similar definition of torture. People v. Daugherty, (1953), 40 Cal.2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, 917 states: "Murder i s p e r p e t r a t e d by t o r t u r e 'when " t h e a s s a i l a n t ' s i n t e n t was t o c a u s e c r u e l s u f - f e r i n g on t h e p a r t of t h e o b j e c t of t h e a t - t a c k , e i t h e r f o r t h e purpose of revenge, e x t o r t i o n , p e r s u a s i o n o r t o s a t i s f y some o t h e r untoward p r o p e n s i t y . " P e o p l e v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51, 54; P e o p l e v . Bender, 27 Cal.2d 1 6 4 , 177, 163 P.2d 8 . ' P e o p l e v . M a r t i n e z , 38 Cal.2d 556, 561, 241 P.2d 224, 227." The l a n g u a g e of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n proposed by d e f e n d a n t i s an e x a c t q u o t a t i o n from t h e o p i n i o n of a n e a r l i e r C a l i - f o r n i a c a s e , People v. Heslen, ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 163 P.2d 2 1 , 27. See: 27 Cal.2d 520, 1 6 5 P.2d 250. That c a s e d e a l t with t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of murder by t o r t u r e and w h i l e t h e r e i s no r e a l c o n f l i c t between t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e o n e g i v e n by t h e c o u r t i s i n t h e g e n e r a l l a n g u a g e which d o e s n o t comment on t h e e v i d e n c e , which b r e a k s t h e e l e m e n t s down, and which s e t s t h e v a r i o u s p u r p o s e s o u t i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i s a c l e a r e r and more under- s t a n d a b l e s t a t e m e n t of t h e law. The i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n i s a p r o p e r o n e and c e r t a i n l y t h e b e t t e r of t h e two proposed instructions. P e o p l e v . Wiley, ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 18 Cal.3d 1 6 2 , 133 The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e a d 28 " P r e l i m i n a r y I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e Jury" p r i o r t o t r i a l . After t r i a l , t h e court read I n s t r u c t i o n s 29 t h r o u g h 53, denominated " A d d i t i o n a l I n s t r u c - tions". These i n s t r u c t i o n s d e t a i l e d t h e m e n t a l e l e m e n t s of e a c h o f f e n s e charged and i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y r e g a r d i n g how t h e s e e l e m e n t s c o u l d b e i n f e r r e d o r presumed from proven facts. The c o u r t a l s o d e f i n e d d i r e c t e v i d e n c e , circum- s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e , i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s and added a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o e v i d e n c e and c r e d i - b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s . I n s t r u c t i o n 30 s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s presumed s a n e , and I n s t r u c t i o n 53 d e t a i l e d t h e a f f i r m a - t i v e d e f e n s e of d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e u s e of s t a t u t o r y i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s was e r r o r and e f f e c t i v e l y s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t t o defendant. I n g e n e r a l , t h r e e s t a t u t o r y i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s used i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e i n d i s p u t e . The p r e s u m p t i o n s t h a t a n u n l a w f u l a c t was done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t , w e r e i n c l u d e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n s 33 ("Method of Proof A p p l i c a b l e t o t h e O f f e n s e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide"), 37 ("Methods of Proof A p p l i c a b l e t o S e x u a l I n t e r c o u r s e Without Consent") and 38 ("Methods of Proof A p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Of- f e n s e of Aggravated A s s a u l t " ) . S e c t i o n 93-1301-7 ( 2 ) , (3), R.C.M. 1947. The i n f e r e n c e i n a d e l i b e r a t e homicide of knowledge o r p u r p o s e from t h e f a c t t h e a c c u s e d committed a homicide i n t h e a b s e n c e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s of e x c u s e , j u s t i - f i c a t i o n o r m i t i g a t i o n a p p e a r e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n 33. S e c t i o n 95-3004 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. A s a n example o f how t h e s e i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s w e r e e x p l a i n e d t o t h e j u r y , I n s t r u c t i o n 33 ( I ) and (11) i s s e t out: "Method of Proof A p p l i c a b l e - -e t o th - O f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide "The m e n t a l s t a t e accompanying t h e v o l u n t a r y a c t r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e b e i n g e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and n o t r e q u i r i n g i n a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t t h e a c t be committed f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , proof of t h e m e n t a l s t a t e may b e made by t h e u s e of e i t h e r i n f e r e n c e s o r p r e s u m p t i o n s , o r by t h e u s e o f b o t h i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s . "I. - Proof o f Mental S t a t e - I n f e r e n c e . by " I f you f i n d from t h e e v i d e n c e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , on o r a b o u t J a n u a r y 21, 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, i n t h e commission of a v o l u n t a r y a c t , c a u s e d t h e d e a t h o f Lana Harding, you a r e p e r m i t t e d from t h a t f a c t a l o n e t o deduce o r r e a s o n t h a t he d i d s o e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y , i f no circum- s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , e x c u s e o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n appear i n t h e evidence. "You w i l l be i n s t r u c t e d on m i t i g a t i o n , e x c u s e and j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e needed. " I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t of d e a t h b e i n g v o l u n t a r i l y c a u s e d by t h e a c c u s e d , you may, and a r e instructed t o a l s o consider a l l t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h s a i d d e a t h , t h a t have been proved i n t h e e v i d e n c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether o r n o t t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d e i t h e r know- ingly o r purposely. "11. Proof - Mental S t a t e of & Presumptions. " ( 1 ) I f you f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , on a b o u t J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, v o l u n t a r i l y committed a n i l l e g a l a c t on Lana Harding, s u c h a s a s s a u l t i n g o r i n j u r i n g h e r , t h e l a w presumes t h a t a n u n l a w f u l a c t w a s done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t ; t h a t i s , t h e law e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o r e a s o n from s u c h u n l a w f u l a c t t h a t t h e defendant acted with an unlawful in- t e n t , o r purpose. " T h i s i s a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n , which means i t may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d and overcome by o t h e r e v i d e n c e , b u t whether o r n o t a presump- t i o n , o n c e it h a s come i n t o e f f e c t i s overcome, i s f o r t h e jury t o determine. " ( 2 ) The law a l s o presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequence of h i s volun- tary act. " T h e r e f o r e , i f you f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , on o r a b o u t J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, v o l u n t a r i l y and u n l a w f u l l y a s s a u l t e d o r i n j u r e d Lana Harding, and i f you f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e a t h would r e s u l t a s t h e o r d i n a r y consequence of such a n a s s a u l t o r i n j u r y , t h e l a w presumes t h a t , and e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o r e a s o n t h e r e - from t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t e n d e d t o c a u s e s a i d d e a t h r e g a r d l e s s of whether o r n o t h e a c t u a l l y had s u c h a n i n t e n t o r purpose. " T h i s a l s o i s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption capa- b l e of b e i n g c o n t r o v e r t e d and overcome, b u t once i t h a s come i n t o e f f e c t i t i s f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e whether o r n o t it h a s been r e b u t t e d . " Defendant i n i t i a l l y a r g u e s t h a t P a t t e r s o n v . New York, s u p r a , and Mullaney v. Wilbur, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 4 2 1 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 4 4 L Ed 2d 508, s t a n d f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i n t e n t , a s a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e , may n e v e r be e s t a b - l i s h e d by t h e u s e of p r e s u m p t i o n s . W e disagree. The Supreme Court noted i n Patterson: "Mullaney s u r e l y h e l d t h a t a S t a t e must p r o v e e v e r y i n g r e d i e n t o f a n o f f e n s e beyond a r e a - s o n a b l e d o u b t , and t h a t i t may n o t s h i f t t h e b u r d e n o f roof t o t h e d e f e n d a n t 1 ments o f t h e o ~ h u s ,a n e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e may n o t be presumed m e r e l y by p r o o f o f t h e r e m a i n i n g e l e m e n t s . Elements o f t h e o f f e n s e may s t i l l b e presumed o r i n f e r r e d , however, from p r o o f o f o t h e r f a c t s , i f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u c h proved f a c t s and t h e f a c t s presumed comports w i t h t h e d u e p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s announced i n B a r n e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L Ed 2d 380. See, S t a t e v . McBenge, (1978), Mont. , 574 P.2d 260, 35 St.Rep. 84, 91. The u s e of p r e s u m p t i o n s and i n f e r e n c e s w a s recognized i n a f o o t n o t e t o t h e m a j o r i t y opinion i n llullaney: " * * * Generally i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e t h e prose- c u t i o n b e a r s b o t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n b u r d e n and t h e p e r s u a s i o n burden. I n some i n s t a n c e s , however, i t i s a i d e d by a p r e s u m p t i o n , see D a v i s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 160 U.S. 469, 40 L Ed 499, 16 S C t 353 (1895) ( p r e s u m p t i o n o f s a n i t y ) , o r a p e r m i s s i b l e i n f e r e n c e , see U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 1 3 L Ed 2d 658, 85 S C t 754 (1965) ( i n f e r e n c e o f knowledge from p r e s e n c e a t a n i l l e g a l s t i l l ) . These p r o c e d u r a l d e v i c e s r e q u i r e ( i n t h e c a s e of a presumption) o r per- m i t ( i n t h e c a s e of a n i n f e r e n c e ) t h e trier of f a c t t o conclude t h a t t h e prosecution has m e t i t s burden of proof w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e pre- sumed o r i n f e r r e d f a c t by h a v i n g s a t i s f a c t o r i l y established other facts. Thus, i n e f f e c t t h e y r e q u i r e t h e d e f e n d a n t t o p r e s e n t some e v i d e n c e c o n t e s t i n g t h e o t h e r w i s e presumed o r i n f e r r e d fact. S e e B a r n e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 412 U S 387, 846 n.11, 37 L Ed 2d 380, 93 S C t 2357 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . S i n c e t h e y s h i f t t h e p r o d u c t i o n bur- d e n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e s e d e v i c e s must s a t i s f y c e r t a i n due process requirements. See e.g., Barnes v . United S t a t e s , s u p r a ; T u r n e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 396 U 398, 2 4 L S Ed 2d 610, 90 S C t 642 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . " I n e a c h of t h e s e c a s e s , however, t h e u l t i - mate burden of p e r s u a s i o n by proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t remained on t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . * * *" 4 2 1 U.S. 703, n. 31. Our i n q u i r y t h e r e f o r e i s t w o f o l d : (1) Whether t h e i n f e r e n c e s and p r e s u m p t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n s a t i s f y t h e due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s announced i n Barnes; and ( 2 ) whether t h e cumulative e f f e c t of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s s h i f t e d t h e u l t i m a t e burden of p e r s u a s i o n on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t t o d e f e n d a n t . The Supreme C o u r t i n Barnes c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e proven f a c t and t h e i n f e r r e d o r presumed f a c t t h a t i s r e q u i r e d by due p r o c e s s and concluded: " * * * What h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c a s e s , however, i s a t l e a s t t h i s : t h a t i f a s t a t u t o r y inference submitted t o t h e jury a s s u f f i c i e n t t o support conviction s a t i s f i e s t h e reasonable doubt standard ( t h a t i s , t h e evidence necessary t o invoke t h e i n f e r e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r a r a t i o n a l j u r o r t o f i n d t h e i n f e r r e d f a c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ) a s w e l l as t h e m o r e - l i k e l y - than-not standard, then it c l e a r l y accords with due p r o c e s s . " B a r n e s , 4 1 2 U.S. 843. The p r e s u m p t i o n s t h a t a n u n l a w f u l a c t was done w i t h u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t , have been a p a r t of Montana law s i n c e 1895. T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y approved t h e u s e of t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t . S t a t e v. Caryl, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 4 1 4 , 426, 543 P.2d 389; S t a t e v . McLeod, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 478, 489, 311 P.2d 400, 407. See a l s o , S t a t e v . J o n e s , ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 143 Mont. 155, 181, 387 P.2d 913. The c o n c l u s i o n s drawn t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e ways t o a s c e r t a i n i n t e n t , which, of c o u r s e , c a n n e v e r be proved d i r e c t l y . The i n s t r u c t i o n s emphasized t h a t t h e " u n l a w f u l a c t " proven must have been v o l u n t a r y . W believe e a r a t i o n a l j u r o r would f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t a v o l u n t a r y , u n l a w f u l a c t was done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and w i t h a n i n t e n t t o c a u s e i t s o r d i n a r y consequences. he i n f e r e n c e of knowledge o r purpose i n a d e l i b e r a t e homicide from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a c c u s e d committed a homicide and t h a t t h e r e a r e no c i r c u m s t a n c e s of e x c u s e , j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r m i t i g a t i o n i s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 9 5 - 3 0 0 4 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. his s t a t u t e was p a s s e d i n 1973, a t t h e same t i m e t h e c r i m i n a l code i n t r o d u c e d t h e m e n t a l e l e m e n t s of knowledge and purpose. I n order t o qualify f o r the instructed inference t h a t d e f e n d a n t a c t e d p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly, t h e S t a t e was s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o prove: (1) A v o l u n t a r y a c t ; (2) causing t h e d e a t h of t h e v i c t i m ; and ( 3 ) a b s e n c e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s of e x c u s e , j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r m i t i g a t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n empha- s i z e d t h e d e a t h must have been " v o l u n t a r i l y c a u s e d by t h e accused". T h i s i n f e r e n c e c l e a r l y comports w i t h t h e " r e a - sonable doubt" standard. Defendant a r g u e s t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f t h e s e p r e - sumptions and i n f e r e n c e s s h i f t s t h e burden of proof on t h e i n t e n t i s s u e t o defendant. It i s well established t h a t c h a l l e n g e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s must b e viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e e n t i r e c h a r g e . Cupp v . Naughten, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 4 U.S. 1 4 1 , 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L Ed 2d 368; S t a t e v . F a r n e s , (1976) I Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270, 1275; S t a t e v . Bosch, ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 125 Mont. 566, 574, 242 P.2d 477. Defendant a r g u e s t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s and i n f e r e n c e s gave t h e j u r y t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t must p r o v e l a c k of i n t e n t . He f a i l s , however, t o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g countervailing i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a l s o given t o t h e jury: (1) T h a t d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d e v e r y m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n i n e v e r y c o u n t by h i s p l e a , and t h e r e f o r e e v e r y m a t e r i a l a l l e g a - t i o n must b e proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; ( 2 ) T h a t d e f e n d a n t i s presumed t o b e i n n o c e n t , and h i s g u i l t must be proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; (3) ÿ hat t h e j u r y may n o t c o n v i c t on p o s s i b i l i t i e s , c o n j e c t u r e o r s u r p r i s e , b u t o n l y on e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; ( 4 ) The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e m e n t a l e l e m e n t s , " p u r p o s e l y " and "knowingly"; ( 5 ) A s t a t e m e n t o f t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d , including t h e mental elements; ( 6 ) A re-emphasis ( i n t h e " A d d i t i o n a l I n s t r u c t i o n s " ) of t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s r e q u i r e d f o r e a c h o f f e n s e , and a r e - emphasis of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a v o l u n t a r y a c t ; and ( 7 ) Warnings t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s n o t e d may n e v e r be used t o p r o v e t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s t h a t a r e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide by means of t o r t u r e and aggravated kidnapping. When r e a d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s c a n o n l y be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t t h e S t a t e had t h e burden of p r o v i n g e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. The u s e of t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s and i n f e r e n c e s m e r e l y s e t f o r t h , i n t e r m s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Montana law, how t h e S t a t e c o u l d meet t h i s burden by proof of o b j e c t i v e facts. W e a r e aware of t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n i n Oregon t h a t t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e presumption of u n l a w f u l i n t e n t a r i s i n g from an u n l a w f u l a c t c o n s t i t u t e d a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s h i f t i n g of t h e burden of proof on t h e e l e m e n t of i n t e n t from t h e s t a t e t o d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v . Anderson, (1978), Or. , 575 P.2d 677. However, w e r e j e c t t h e r e a - s o n i n g of t h a t c a s e . I n t h a t c a s e , u n l i k e t h i s one, "* * * t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t a k e n as a whole, were n o t c l e a r on t h e i s s u e s of i n t e n t o r burden of p r o o f . " Anderson, 575 P.2d 679. Here, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on i n t e n t and burden of proof w e r e c l e a r and t h e j u r y was n o t m i s l e d by them. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s c a s e , even i f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s had e r r o n e o u s l y s h i f t e d t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f on t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t t o d e f e n d a n t , w e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r r e v e r s a l would b e required. Such a n e r r o r c o u l d n o t h a v e a f f e c t e d t h e j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i t w a s d e f e n d a n t who c a u s e d t h e d e a t h o f t h e victim. E v i d e n c e of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r ' s i n t e n t i s overwhelming. The e v i d e n c e w e d e t a i l e d i n t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s o p i n i o n a b o u t t h e cause of d e a t h , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s behavior on t h e d a y s p r i o r t o t h e a t t a c k , and t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o l l o w i n g t h e a t t a c k , a l l show t h a t d e f e n d a n t a c t e d " p u r p o s e l y " o r "knowingly". A psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Wetzler, t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e d e f e n s e t h a t i f d e f e n d a n t d i d t h e a c t s c h a r g e d i n t h e Informa- t i o n , h e s u f f e r e d from s u c h a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t t h a t h e c o u l d n o t h a v e a c t e d " p u r p o s e l y " o r "knowingly". This testimony must be considered i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t D r . W e t z l e r made no i n q u i r y i n t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s o r s t a t e m e n t s o n t h e n i g h t o f t h e a t t a c k o r t h e two d a y s i m m e d i a t e l y preceding it, although he admitted t h a t such f a c t o r s could h a v e some b e a r i n g upon d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l c a p a c i t y when t h e o f f e n s e was committed. Another p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . M. F. G r a c i a , and a p s y c h o l o g i s t , D r . Edmund W. Shubat, both expressed t h e o p i n i o n t h a t defendant d i d have c a p a c i t y t o a c t "purposely" o r "knowingly". Furthermore, t a k i n g i n t o account a l l t h e evidence, w e a r e c o n v i n c e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t a c t e d " p u r p o s e l y " o r "knowingly" and t h e r e f o r e , e v e n i f t h e r e was any e r r o r i n t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f , i t was h a r m l e s s . Chapman v. C a l i f o r n i a , ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 8 , 24, 87 S . C t . 524, 8 2 8 , 1 7 L Ed 2d 705. Defendant g o e s on t o c l a i m e r r o r b e c a u s e h i s i n s t r u c - t i o n s were n o t g i v e n . T h i s argument must f a i l . ~efendant's i n s t r u c t i o n s on m e n t a l s t a t e and m e n t a l d i s e a s e and d e f e c t m i s s t a t e t h e law, and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e crimes c h a r g e d add a n e l e m e n t t h a t i s n o t r e q u i r e d . W have c a r e f u l l y examined t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s and e f i n d them p r o p e r . The c o u r t ' s i n g t r u c t i o n s a s a whole c o r r e c t l y s t a t e t h e law. The n e x t argument d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s i s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t forms p r o v i d e d t o t h e j u r y d i d n o t c o v e r a l l p o s s i b l e v e r - d i c t s and t h a t t h e y amount t o s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . Defendant s u b m i t t e d i n s t r u c t i o n s and v e r d i c t forms which c o v e r e d t h e o f f e n s e s of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and u n l a w f u l r e s t r a i n t . I t i s c l e a r , as s t a t e d i n S t a t e v . Gray, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 145, 153, 447 P.2d 475,479: " * * * 'The s u b m i s s i o n o f a lower o f f e n s e i s j u s t i f i e d o n l y when t h e e v i d e n c e on some b a s i s would s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s i n n o c e n t of t h e h i g h e r o f f e n s e and g u i l t y of t h e lower.' * * *" See a l s o : S t a t e v . McDonald, ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 51 Mont. 1, 149 P. 279; S t a t e v . Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779. 34 St.Rep. 1315. I n t h i s c a s e t h e r e was no such e v i d e n c e and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and v e r d i c t forms on t h e l e s s e r o f f e n s e s w e r e properly not given. Defendant c l a i m s e r r o r i n t h a t t h e v e r d i c t forms sub- to m i t t e d / t h e j u r y were s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . H e argues t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t a l l o w f o r s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s by t h e jury . The j u r y was g i v e n g e n e r a l v e r d i c t s a s k i n g f o r a f i n d i n g of g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y o n each c o u n t . The j u r y w a s t o make t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e element necessary f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was p r e s e n t . Under t h o s e c i r c ~ m s t a n c e s , t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g does n o t f a l l i n t o t h e v i c e of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . I t does n o t r e q u i r e a f a c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n which c o u l d be used t o undermine t h e general verdict. Thus, t h e v e r d i c t forms were p e r m i s s i b l e . Defendant c l a i m s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s permitting t h e audience t o tape record t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e j u r y . He c o n t e n d s t h i s p r e j u d i c e d h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . H i s argument i s t h a t t h e j u r y was i n f l u e n c e d by t h e argument b e i n g r e c o r d e d b e c a u s e t h e j u r y c o u l d b e l i e v e , under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e was something worth p r e s e r v i n g . I n h i s b r i e f , defendant admits t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o h i b i t t h e r e c o r d i n g o f t h e argument v i o l a t e s no s t a t u t e . H e c i t e s no c a s e l a w t h a t i s v i o l a t e d . He a d m i t s t h e Canons of J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , which have been a d o p t e d by t h i s C o u r t , do n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l w i t h t h i s q u e s t i o n . He d o e s s a y t h a t t h e Code of J u d i c i a l Conduct p r o h i b i t s such r e c o r d i n g . However, t h a t Code h a s n o t been a d o p t e d i n Montana. Thus, no l a w o r r u l e of t h i s C o u r t was v i o l a t e d by t h e a u d i e n c e ' s t a p e r e c o r d i n g t h e argument. A s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t i t p r e j u d i c e d h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l , we f i n d no m e r i t i n t h a t c l a i m . The r u l e i s t h a t b e f o r e a judgment i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e w i l l be r e v e r s e d , p r e j u d i c e must be shown. S t a t e v . T o t t e r d e l l , (1959) , 135 Mont. 56, 336 P.2d 696. The d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e from t h e r e c o r d . S t a t e v . S c h l e i n i n g , ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 1, 4 0 3 P.2d 625. Defendant h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d h e was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e r e c o r d i n g s of t h e c l o s i n g argument. His r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l was n e i t h e r d e n i e d nor invaded. Defendant a l l e g e s e r r o r b e c a u s e he had t o make a n o u t - o f - o r d e r p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f during the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief. The u s u a l o r d e r of t r i a l may b e d e p a r t e d from i n t h e proper case. S e c t i o n 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947 s t a t e s : "When t h e s t a t e of t h e p l e a d i n g r e q u i r e s i t , o r i n any o t h e r c a s e , f o r good r e a s o n s , and i n d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t , t h e o r d e r p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n may be d e p a r t e d from." W e n o t e t h a t t h e a r t f u l p h r a s e "good c a u s e " i s n o t u s e d , r a t h e r t h e r e must be "good r e a s o n s " f o r t h e d e p a r t u r e of t h e u s u a l o r d e r of t h e t r i a l . D e f e n d a n t ' s d i f f i c u l t y a r o s e from t h e f a c t t h e F B I a g e n t s who w e r e t o t e s t i f y i n t h i s c a s e w e r e s c h e d u l e d t o t e s t i f y i n s e v e r a l o t h e r c a s e s i n o t h e r s t a t e s and t h e judge would n o t r e q u i r e them t o remain f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e t r i a l , n e a r l y t h r e e weeks, u n l e s s t h e r e was good r e a s o n t o keep them. The c o u r t r e q u e s t e d d e f e n d a n t make a n o f f e r of proof t o show why t h e s e p e r s o n s s h o u l d n o t be r e l e a s e d from t h e i r subpoenas a f t e r d e f e n d a n t opened h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . Defendant argued t h a t no r e a s o n a b l e o f f e r of proof c o u l d b e made u n t i l t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . T h i s may w e l l have been t r u e p r i o r t o enactment of t h e l i b e r a l d i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e s i n t h e Code of C r i m i n a l Pro- cedure. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , however, d e f e n d a n t had examined t h e F B I r e p o r t s ; h e had examined t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e ; and he had a l i s t of t h e proposed e x h i b i t s t h a t were t o be p u t i n t o evidence. I f t h e r e was some r e a s o n t o r e q u i r e t h e F B I a g e n t s t o remain, d e f e n d a n t would know it a t t h e t i m e of trial. No showing of such need was made and t h e judge i n a p r o p e r e x e r c i s e of h i s d i s c r e t i o n and f o r good r e a s o n s a l l o w e d t h e a g e n t s t o l e a v e a f t e r t h e y had t e s t i f i e d a s p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief. Defendant f u r t h e r a l l e g e s e r r o r b e c a u s e h i s e x p e r t on m e n t a l d e f e c t o r d i s e a s e was n o t a l l o w e d t o be p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e S t a t e ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t s on t h i s matter. E a r l i e r i n t h e t r i a l , defendant sought a r u l i n g from t h e c o u r t t h a t a l l w i t n e s s e s b e e x c l u d e d from t h e c o u r t r o o m when o t h e r w i t n e s s e s w e r e t e s t i f y i n g . The c o u r t g r a n t e d t h i s motion except t h e c o u r t s a i d t h a t t h e exclusionary r u l e d i d n o t extend t o r e b u t t a l witnesses. D e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e r t was a w i t n e s s i n h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . A f t e r d e f e n d a n t r e s t e d , h e s o u g h t p e r m i s s i o n from t h e c o u r t t o have t h i s e x p e r t p r e s e n t i n t h e c o u r t r o o m d u r i n g t h e testimony of t h e S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t s . The c o u r t r e f u s e d t o g r a n t such permission. D e f e n d a n t a l l e g e s t h i s was a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n which p r e j u d i c e d d e f e n d a n t . W e a r e unconviced t h e c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e r t was a w i t n e s s i n h i s c a s e t o whom t h e exclusionary r u l e applied. The f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t wanted t o u s e him as a r e b u t t a l w i t n e s s d i d n o t e x c e p t him from t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e d e f e n d a n t had a s k e d t h e c o u r t t o i n v o k e . Nor d o w e see t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e c o u r t ' s action. The S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t s ' t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n e d t h e r e p o r t t h e y had made on d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r defect. These w e r e r e p o r t s t h a t t h e d e f e n s e had been sup- p l i e d w i t h , a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 9 5 - 5 0 5 ( 5 ) , R.C.M. 1947. The S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s f i n i s h e d a t t h e end o f t h e day and d e f e n d a n t ' s r e b u t t a l began t h e n e x t d a y . T h e r e was t i m e t h e n t o i n f o r m t h e d e f e n s e e x p e r t of any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a - t i o n n o t i n t h e r e p o r t made by t h e s e e x p e r t s , and t o p r e p a r e r e b u t t a l testimony. Under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d . Defendant argues t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e v e r d i c t s r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t him. H e s p e c i f i c a l l y argues t h a t t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e v e r d i c t s t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e by t o r t u r e and t h a t a s a r e s u l t o f h e r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , Lana Harding died. I n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605, t h i s C o u r t s e t f o r t h i t s p o s i t i o n i n d e t e r - mining q u e s t i o n s of s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e : "As t h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d many t i m e s o v e r , t h e j u r y i s t h e f a c t f i n d i n g body i n o u r system of j u r i s p r u d e n c e , and i t s d e c i s i o n i s con- trolling. The j u r y i s f r e e t o c o n s i d e r a l l t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d and t o p i c k and choose which of t h e w i t n e s s e s i t w i s h e s t o b e l i e v e . I f s u f f i c i e n t t e s t i m o n y was i n t r o d u c e d , a s w e l l a s exhibits t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s find- ings, then i t s conclusion w i l l not be d i s - t u r b e d u n l e s s i t i s a p p a r e n t t h e r e was a c l e a r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e j u r y o r t h a t t h e r e was a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n made t o t h e jury. " I n t h i s case, t h e evidence presented t o t h e jury d i d n o t m i s l e a d them, n o r was any of i t e v e r m i s r e p r e s e n t e d t o them. The e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g t h a t Lana Harding w a s k i l l e d by means of t o r t u r e and t h a t s h e d i e d as a r e s u l t of h e r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g by defendant. The r u l e i s t h a t i f s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s found t o support t h e v e r d i c t , it w i l l stand. S t a t e v . White, (1965), 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761; S t a t e v . S t o d d a r d , ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 blont. 402, 4 1 2 P. 2d 827. Such i s t h e c a s e h e r e . Defendant a l l e g e s e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . He c o n t e n d s he was e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l due t o i n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e . He f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e c.umulation of e r r o r s committed i n h i s t r i a l d e n i e d him a f a i r t r i a l . S i n c e we have h e l d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction, w e f u r t h e r hold t h e c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n denying t h e motion f o r new t r i a l . W f i n d no m e r i t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s argument on c u m u l a t i v e e e r r o r , S i n c e we have h e l d t h a t no s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s w e r e committed, w e d o n o t b e l i e v e t h e d o c t r i n e of c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r a p p l i e s . W e a r e unconvinced t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s of " h a r m l e s s e r r o r " and " c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r " a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d . "Harmless e r r o r " r e f e r s t o t e c h n i c a l e r r o r s , which do n o t require reversal. S t a t e v. Gallagher, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 501, 445 P.2d 45. "Cumulative e r r o r " r e f e r s t o a number of e r r o r s which p r e j u d i c e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v . Meidinger, ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 310, 502 P.2d 58. Having found t h a t no s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s w e r e committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , w e h o l d t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r d o e s n o t a p p l y and a new t r i a l w i l l n o t be o r d e r e d . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by b a s i n g i t s judgment and s e n t e n c e upon e r r o n e o u s f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u - s i o n s , s e n t e n c e and o r d e r . X e f u r t h e r argues t h e death p e n a l t y imposed a s a s e n t e n c e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s u n c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . A s t o the e r r o r s i n the c o u r t ' s findings, conclusion, s e n t e n c e and o r d e r , t h e e r r o r s r e f e r r e d t o a r e e s s e n t i a l l y c l e r i c a l e r r o r s i n t h e body of t h a t document. A mistaken c i t a t i o n o f s u b s e c t i o n l e t t e r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-105, R.C.M. 1947, which was c a u s e d by t h e amendment which numbered t h e s e c t i o n , i s a n example. T h i s document i s n o t i n e r r o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a c t u a l o r l e g a l b a s i s of i t s f i n d i n g s . his C o u r t f i n d s no p r e j u d i c e i n t h e c l e r i c a l e r r o r s . Defendant was s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h f o r h i s c o n v i c t i o n of t h e o f f e n s e s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . T h i s s e n t e n c e was imposed by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n s 94-5-105 and 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947. A t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e s , t h e s e s t a t u t e s reads "94-5-105. S e n t e n c e Of Death For D e l i b e r a t e Homicide. " ( 1 ) When a d e f e n d a n t i s c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e c o u r t s h a l l impose a sentence of death i n t h e following circumstances, unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances: " ( a ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by a p e r s o n s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e o f imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e prison; o r " ( b ) The d e f e n d a n t was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d of a n o t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide; o r " ( c ) The v i c t i m o f t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was a peace o f f i c e r k i l l e d while performing h i s duty; o r " ( d ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by means of t o r t u r e ; o r " ( e ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide w a s committed by a p e r - s o n l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush; o r " ( f ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed a s a p a r t of a scheme o r o p e r a t i o n which, i f completed, would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h o f more t h a n one p e r s o n . " "94-5-304. S e n t e n c e of Death f o r Aggravated Kidnapping. "A C o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o l - lowing c o n v i c t i o n o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i f i t f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e criminal conduct unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances." These s e c t i o n s w e r e e n a c t e d i n 1973, and became e f f e c t i v e on J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 7 4 . I n 1974, s e c t i o n 94-5-304 w a s amended by Ch. 126, S 1 , L a w s of 1974, t o r e a d : " 94-5-304. S e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d - napping i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t . " T h i s amendment d e l e t e d t h e p h r a s e : "unless there a r e m i t i - gating circumstances." The amendment had a n e f f e c t i v e d a t e of March 11, 1974. A t t h e t i m e of t h e d e a t h of Lana H a r d i n g , t h i s amendment was n o t i n e f f e c t . Therefore, our a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s e d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s w i l l c o n c e r n them a s t h e y e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e s involved i n t h i s case. he d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n h e r e were a d o p t e d i n r e s p o n s e t o Furman v . G e o r g i a , ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L Ed 2d 346. I n Furman, t h e Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d and v a c a t e d d e a t h s e n t e n c e s imposed on t h r e e de- fendants. I t was a p e r c u r i a m o p i n i o n , w i t h f i v e s e p a r a t e c o n c u r r e n c e s and f o u r s e p a r a t e d i s s e n t s . The f i v e c o n c u r r i n g opinions each a s s e r t e d d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s f o r f i n d i n g t h e s t a t u t e s i n question unconstitutional. Essentially, the f a t a l f l a w i n t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , under t h e c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n s of Furman, w a s t h e a b s e n c e of c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e sanction. The c u m u l a t i o n of m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n s i n Furman l e d t o c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f u s i o n among t h e s e v e r a l s t a t e s ' l e g i s l a t u r e s which d e s i r e d t o r e t a i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v i a b l e d e a t h penalty, i.e., a d e a t h p e n a l t y t h a t was b e i n g imposed con- s i s t e n t l y and n o t a r b i t r a r i l y . I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s Furman was r e a d a s r e q u i r i n g a s t r i c t l y mandatory d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of proven c r i m e s . In other jurisdictions, Furman was r e a d a s a t t a c k i n g u n b r i d l e d d i s c r e t i o n r a t h e r than d i s c r e t i o n per se. These s t a t e s p a s s e d s t a t u t e s t o c o n t r o l t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y . These s t a t u t e s a l l o w e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y t o be imposed o n l y when unmitigated aggravating circumstances were p r e s e n t . I n 1976, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s . Woodson v . North C a r o l i n a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L Ed 2d 9 4 4 . The s t a t u t e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t was North C a r o l i n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . I t provided a d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r a l l p e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d of f i r s t d e g r e e murder. The Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as v i o l a t i v e of t h e E i g h t h and F o u r t e e n t h ~rnendments. I n two l a t e r cases, t h e Supreme C o u r t a l s o h e l d mandatory d e a t h penalty s t a t u t e s unconstitutional. Coker v . G e o r g i a , (1977), 433 U.S. 584, 97 S . C t . 2861, 53 L Ed 2d 982; Harry R o b e r t s v. Louisiana, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 431 U.S. 633, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L Ed 2d 637. The problem w i t h mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C o u r t , was : "* * * i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e c a p i t a l sen- t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n a l l o w f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of w h a t e v e r m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s may b e rele- v a n t t o e i t h e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r offender o r par- t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . * * *" H a r r y R o b e r t s , 431 U.S. 637. The d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s u n d e r a t t a c k i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , s e c t i o n s 94-5-105 and 94-5-304, a s they existed a t t h e t i m e o f t h e crimes, a r e n o t mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s . Thus, t h e y c a n w i t h s t a n d s c r u t i n y u n d e r t h e d e c i s i o n s o f Woodson, Coker, and H a r r y R o b e r t s b e c a u s e t h e y a l l o w f o r consideration of mitigating circumstances. A l s o i n 1976, t h e Supreme C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l i t y of t h o s e d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s t h a t c o n t r o l l e d t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e sentencing a u t h o r i t y . Unlike t h e i r mandatory c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e C o u r t u p h e l d t h e s e s t a t u t e s . Gregg v. G e o r g i a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 1 5 3 , 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L Ed 2d 859; P r o f f i t t v . F l o r i d a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 4 9 L Ed 2d 913; a n d , J u r e k v . T e x a s , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L Ed 2d 929. I n Gregg t h e Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : "Furman mandates t h a t where d i s c r e t i o n i s a£- f o r d e d a s e n t e n c i n g body on a m a t t e r s o g r a v e as t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h e t h e r a human l i f e s h o u l d b e t a k e n o r s p a r e d , t h a t d i s c r e t i o n must be s u i t a b l y d i r e c t e d and l i m i t e d s o a s t o m i n i m i z e t h e r i s k of wholly a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c o u s a c t i o n . " 428 U.S. 189. The Montana s t a t u t e s d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s a r e d e s i g n e d t o c o n t r o l t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e sentencing a u t h o r i t y . These s t a t u t e s a r e i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e ground between unbending mandatory d e a t h s e n t e n c e s and u n b r i d l e d d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . I n i t s d e c i s i o n s of Gregg, J u r e k and P r o f f i t t , t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t seems t o have e s t a b l i s h e d t h r e e g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a which a r e r e q u i s i t e t o a v a l i d d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t o r y scheme. F i r s t , t h e r e must b e a t l e a s t o n e s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e b e f o r e a d e a t h s e n t e n c e may b e c o n s i d e r e d . Second, t h e d e f e n s e must be a f f o r d e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g b e f o r e t h e s e n t e n c i n g body a t a s e p a r a t e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g any m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e i n d i - vidual defendant. T h i r d , t h e r e must b e a v a i l a b l e prompt j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of t h e s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n by a c o u r t of s t a t e - w i d e j u r i s d i c t i o n , p r o v i d i n g a means t o promote t h e evenhanded, r a t i o n a l and c o n s i s t e n t i m p o s i t i o n of d e a t h s e n t e n c e s under t h e law. S e c t i o n s 94-5-105 and 94-5-304 satisfy the f i r s t cri- t e r i o n s e t f o r t h above. Under s e c t i o n 94-5-105, the death p e n a l t y c a n n o t be imposed u n l e s s o n e of s i x a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s found by t h e trier of f a c t t o e x i s t . Here, i t was found t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed d e l i b e r a t e homicide by means of t o r t u r e . S e c t i o n 94-5-105 (1) d ) , R.C.M. ( 1947. Under 94-5-304, t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e c a n n o t be imposed u n l e s s i t i s found t h e k i d n a p v i c t i m d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e a g g r a - vated kidnapping. Such a f i n d i n g was made i n t h i s c a s e by the jury. The second c r i t e r i o n , t h a t m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s b e reviewed a t a s e p a r a t e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , i s s a t i s f i e d by two s e p a r a t e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s : F i r s t , both death penalty s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e t h a t t h e c o u r t " s h a l l " impose a s e n t e n c e of death "unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances". Defendant u r g e s t h e " u n l e s s " c l a u s e may p u r p o r t t o c i r c u m s c r i b e t h e sentencing judge's authority, but there are no guiding standards nor sources of information provided for. This argument ignores the second statutory provision relevant here--that is, the presentence investigation report to be delivered to and considered by the sentencing court in felony cases. Section 95-2204, R.C.M. 1947, provides the report shall contain information respecting "the charac- teristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities of the defendant; his criminal record and social history; the circumstances of the offense; * * * and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the community." The report provides the sentencing authority with whatever circumstances may exist in mitigation of the defendant's conduct. Reading the two provisions together, the sentencing court is required to consider mitigating circumstances and is required to consider the presentence investigation report which must contain any matters relevant to mitigation. In addition, all sentencing courts are directed by section 95- 2201, R.C.M. 1947, to perform their sentencing functions "to the end that persons convicted of a crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs and potentialities". This mandates the imposition of sentences which are not disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Finally, the defendant is autho- rized to seek a hearing to present to the court his testimony and evidence in mitigation of punishment. Prompt judicial review of death sentences is provided for by appeal to this Court as well as review to the Sentence Review Division. This Court determines the legality of the sentence imposed, State v. Simtob, (1969), 154 Mont. 286, 462 p.2d 8 7 3 , w h i l e t h e S e n t e n c e Review D i v i s i o n i s d e s i g n e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h re- s p e c t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l o f f e n d e r and p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . This s a t i s f i e s t h e t h i r d c r i t e r i a . Although M o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t o r y scheme i s u n l i k e t h o s e approved by t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Gregg, P r o f f i t t , and J u r e k , w e see no s u b s t a n t i v e f a i l u r e o f Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme t o comply w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards. Our s y s t e m i s n e i t h e r w h o l l y mandatory n o r wholly d i s c r e t i o n a r y . There a r e p r e c i s e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e - ments f o r f i n d i n g a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and a p r o c e d u r e f o r f l u s h i n g o u t t h e f a c t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o such circumstances. T h e r e i s a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w a t two l e v e l s , i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e i s b o t h l e g a l and p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e n a t u r e and c l a s s o f c r i m e . In short, we believe that t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y scheme i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e crimes herein, a f f o r d s defendant t h e procedural safeguards necessary t o p r o t e c t h i s s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s t o be sentenced without a r b i t r a r i n e s s o r caprice. Therefore, we hold t h a t t h e death penalty s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s c o n s i t u t i o n a l requirements. They a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on t h e i r f a c e and a s a p p l i e d t o t h i s d e f e n d a n t . Defendant n e x t contends t h a t s h i f t i n g t h e burden of proving i n s a n i t y t o t h e defendant o f f e n d s t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . D e f e n d a n t r e l i e s on t h e r e a s o n i n g o f a c o l o r a d o c a s e , S t a t e ex r e l . Juhan v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1968) I 1 6 5 Cola- 253, 439 P.2d 741. P r i o r t o J u h a n , t h e c o l o r a d o Supreme C o u r t had a l w a y s h e l d t h e b u r d e n was o n t h e s t a t e t o d i s p r o v e a p r o p e r l y r a i s e d d e f e n s e o f i n s a n i t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. The l e g i s l a t u r e s u b s e q u e n t l y p a s s e d a s t a t u t e pur- p o r t i n g t o s h i f t t h e burden t o d e f e n d a n t . The Colorado Supreme C o u r t i n J u h a n , i n a 3-2 d e c i s i o n , h e l d i t s p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s were i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e of t h e Colorado C o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was p o w e r l e s s t o v a r y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l i n g by l e g i s l a t i v e enactment. Defendant's reasoning i s s i m i l a r . I n 1895, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t i n t h e f e d e r a l system, t h e burden was o n t h e s t a t e t o d i s p r o v e i n s a n i t y beyond a r e a - sonable doubt. Davis v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 8 9 5 ) , 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.ed. 499. Three Montana c a s e s de- c i d e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r adopted t h e Davis r u l e f o r Montana. S t a t e v . Brooks, ( 1 8 9 9 ) , 23 Mont. 146, 57 P . 1038; S t a t e v . Peel, ( 1 8 9 9 ) , 23 Mont. 358, 59 P . 169; S t a t e v . F e l k e r , ( 1 9 0 3 ) , 27 Mont. 451, 7 1 P . 668. The Montana L e g i s l a t u r e i n 1925 p a s s e d Ch. 8 7 , Laws of 1925, imposing t h e burden on d e f e n d a n t t o p r o v e h i s i n s a n i t y by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e evidence. Thisbecame s u b s e c t i o n 2 o f former s e c t i o n 94-119, R.C.M. 1947. The p r e s e n t s t a t u t e , p a s s e d i n 1967, i s s e c - t i o n 95-503, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, t h e burden h a s remained on t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n c e 1925. Montana c a s e s s i n c e 1925 have r e l i e d upon t h e s t a t u t e and h e l d t h e j u r y s h o u l d be i n - s t r u c t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t must p r o v e i n s a n i t y by a prepon- d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e . S t a t e v. Vettere, ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 f/lont. 574, 248 P . 1 7 9 . The main t h r u s t of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s t h a t t h e o l d Montana c a s e s w e r e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and c o u l d n o t b e v a r i e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; thus ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e s have v i o l a t e d t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s i n c e 1925. The problem w i t h t h i s argument i s t h a t i t assumes Brooks, P e e l , and F e l k e r were based on t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . There i s no mention of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n i n any of them. They merely f o l - lowed t h e r u l e announced by t h e Supreme C o u r t i n Davis. The Supreme C o u r t i n Leland v . Oregon, ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1 0 0 2 , 9 6 L.ed 1302, n o t e d t h a t Davis " o b v i o u s l y e s t a b - l i s h e s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e , b u t o n l y t h e r u l e t o be followed i n f e d e r a l c o u r t s . " Similarly, it i s apparent t h a t Brooks, Peel and F e l k e r w e r e n o t e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e f o r Montana. J u s t a s Congress c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y change t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s e t f o r t h i n Davis, t h e Montana L e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y had t h e power t o change t h e r u l e announced i n t h e e a r l y Montana c a s e s . On remand from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , t h e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c - t i o n on m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t h e burden o f proof of s t a t e of mind t o d e f e n d a n t . The Supreme C o u r t d i r e c t e d u s t o r e c o n s i d e r o u r e a r l y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e i n l i g h t o f P a t t e r s o n v . New York, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. I n doing s o , w e w i l l examine t h e d e f e n s e of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a s i t e x i s t s under Montana law and a s a p p l i e d i n t h i s case. Evidence o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t i s a d m i s s i b l e i n Montana c r i m i n a l t r i a l s f o r two s t a t u t o r y d e f e n s e s . S e c t i o n 9 5 - 5 0 1 ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s : " A p e r s o n i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c r i m i n a l con- d u c t i f a t t h e t i m e of such c o n d u c t a s a r e s u l t of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t h e i s u n a b l e e i t h e r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s c o n d u c t o r t o conform h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of law." T h i s s e c t i o n d e f i n e s Montana's " l e g a l i n s a n i t y " d e f e n s e . S e c t i o n 9 5 - 5 0 3 ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947, p l a c e s upon t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s l e g a l i n s a n i t y by a p r e - ponderance o f t h e e v i d e n c e . Defendant concedes t h e S t a t e may a l l o c a t e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e burden of p r o v i n g h i s l e g a l i n s a n i t y w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u - tion. P a t t e r s o n v. New York, s u p r a ; R i v e r a v . Delaware, ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L Ed 2d 160; Leland v. Oregon, s u p r a . Defendant c o n t e n d s , however, t h a t t h e second c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e i n v o l v i n g m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t h e burden t o d e f e n d a n t t o d i s - prove i n t e n t , a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l e g a l i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e which, i f proven, e x c l u d e s a d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a n o t h e r - w i s e c r i m i n a l a c t , e v i d e n c e of a d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t i s a l s o a d m i s s i b l e i n Montana c r i m i n a l t r i a l s I' * * * whenever i t i s r e l e v a n t t o p r o v e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d o r d i d n o t have a s t a t e of mind which i s an e l e m e n t of t h e offense." S e c t i o n 95-502, R.C.M. 1947. This s e c t i o n i s a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e " d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y " d e f e n s e , under which a d e f e n d a n t may show t h a t h e s u f f e r e d from a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which, a l t h o u g h i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h l e g a l i n s a n i t y a s a c o m p l e t e d e f e n s e , made him i n c a p a b l e of forming t h e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e a s a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . I n 1967, when s e c t i o n 95-502, R.C.M. 1947, was e n a c t e d by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e , homicide i n Montana was d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , e a c h r e q u i r i n g a d i f f e r e n t and s p e c i f i c mental s t a t e . The i n t e n t e l e a e n t of f i r s t d e g r e e murder was d e l i b e r a t i o n , p r e m e d i t a t i o n and m a l i c e a f o r e - t h o u g h t , w h i l e t h a t of second d e g r e e murder w a s m a l i c e aforethought, without d e l i b e r a t i o n o r premeditation. Sec- t i o n 94-2503, R.C.M. 1947. S t a t e v . Brooks ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 9 1 . Voluntary manslaughter c o n s i s t e d of any u n l a w f u l k i l l i n g , w i t h o u t malice, upon a s u d d e n q u a r r e l o r h e a t of passion. S e c t i o n 9 4 - 2 5 0 7 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947. Involun- t a r y manslaughter, t h e f o u r t h c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of homicide u n d e r Montana c r i m i n a l law i n 1967, d i d n o t h a v e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t a s a s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e ; t h e i s s u e , r a t h e r , was o n e o f c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e . S e c t i o n 94-2507(2), R.C.M. 1947. S t a t e v. S o u h r a d a , ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 1 2 2 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792. The d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e was t r a d i t i o n a l l y u s e d t o show t h a t , d u e t o m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t h e d e f e n d a n t was u n a b l e t o form t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t which was a n e l e m e n t o f a h i g h e r d e g r e e o f a n o f f e n s e s u c h a s h o m i c i d e , and t h a t a lesser d e g r e e o f c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e , which l a c k e d t h a t s p e c i f i c i n t e n t a s a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e , was i n f a c t committed. S e e , Anno. 22 ALR3d 1228, 1238-43 (1968). Thus, u n d e r Montana law i n e f f e c t when s e c t i o n 95-502, R.C.M. 1947, was e n a c t e d , e v i d e n c e o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t was a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e o r d i s p r o v e , f o r example, t h a t , a l t h o u g h a d e f e n d a n t committed a n u n l a w f u l k i l l i n g w i t h m a l i c e a f o r e t h o u g h t , h e had n o t t h e c a p a c i t y t o form the specific intent--deliberation o r premeditation--which was a n e l e m e n t o f f i r s t d e g r e e murder. B y J a n u a r y 1974, when Lana Harding was k i d n a p p e d and murdered, Montana had a d o p t e d i t s p r e s e n t c r i m i n a l c o d e . The new c o d e a b o l i s h e d a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s between f i r s t and s e c o n d d e g r e e murder. M a l i c e a f o r e t h o u g h t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n a r e no l o n g e r e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e o f f e n s e . The i n t e n t e l e m e n t o f t h e crime o f h o m i c i d e u n d e r p r e s e n t Montana law i s m e r e l y " p u r p o s e l y , knowingly, o r n e g l i g e n t l y " c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f a n o t h e r human b e i n g . S e c t i o n 94-5-101, R.C.M. 1947. There a r e t h r e e t y p e s of c r i m i n a l homicide. D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h , and c o n v i c t e d o f , d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , a c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e committed p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly. S e c t i o n 94-5-102 (1) a ) , R.C.M. ( 1947. Mitigated deliberate h o m i c i d e , a lesser o f f e n s e , a l s o r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t commit t h e c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly, b u t t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e b e committed u n d e r t h e i n f l u - e n c e o f e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress f o r which t h e r e i s a reasonable excuse. S e c t i o n 94-5-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. The t h i r d t y p e o f c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e , n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e , i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s shown a t t r i a l . Because t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s o f b o t h d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e and m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e r e q u i r e p r o o f by t h e S t a t e of t h e i d e n t i c a l mental element--purposely or knowingly--there was no lesser d e g r e e o f c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e o f which d e f e n d a n t c o u l d have been c o n v i c t e d upon p r o o f t h a t he was u n a b l e t o form t h e m e n t a l s t a t e r e q u i r e d i n d e l i b - e r a t e homicide. The S t a t e c o n c l u d e s t h a t , b e c a u s e a l l o f t h e c h a r g e s r e q u i r e d a showing o f p u r p o s e f u l o r knowing c o n d u c t , t h e s e c t i o n 95-502 d e f e n s e o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t n e g a t i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o form a p u r p o s e f u l o r knowing i n t e n t was a c o m p l e t e , r a t h e r t h a n a p a r t i a l , d e f e n s e and a s s u c h merged w i t h t h e i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e o f s e c t i o n 95-501. W e do n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t , i n t h i s case, the d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y and i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e s w e r e n e c e s s a r i l y identical. The p r e s c r i b e d m e n t a l s t a t e of " p u r p o s e l y o r knowinglyv a p p l i e s t o each element of t h e c r i m e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. S e c t i o n 94-2-103(1) and ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. To b e g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , t h e r e f o r e , o n e must e i t h e r have t h e p u r p o s e t o k i l l o r know t h a t i t was h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t h i s a c t i o n s would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human being. While l e g a l i n s a n i t y would have c o m p l e t e l y exon- e r a t e d d e f e n d a n t from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s c r i m i n a l con- d u c t , t h e d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e c o u l d b e used i n a c r i m i n a l homicide c a s e t o show, f o r example, " * * * that a l t h o u g h d e f e n d a n t knew t h e n a t u r e and q u a l i t y of t h e a c t (the assault * * *) and knew t h a t it was wrong" and s o w a s n o t i r r e s p o n s i b l e under t h e l e g a l i n s a n i t y t e s t , "he l a c k e d m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t o form t h e i n t e n t t o k i l l * * *". Weihofen and O v e r h o l s e r , Mental D i s o r d e r A f f e c t i n g t h e Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L . J . 959, 979-80 (1948). A defendant then, due t o m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t p r e c l u d i n g him from forming t h e i n t e n t t o commit c r i m i n a l homicide, m i g h t be found g u i l t y of t h e lesser i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . See, S t a t e v . Booth, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 30 0r.App. 351, 567 P.2d 559, Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h e S t a t e w a s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e " * * * t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a d , and c o u l d have had, a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind which i s a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e " , and t h a t by making d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , t h e t r i a l judge u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t o d e f e n d a n t t h e burden of d i s p r o v i n g a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e s charged. " * * * t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e p r o t e c t s t h e a c c u s e d a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n e x c e p t upon proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t of e v e r y f a c t neces- s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e c r i m e w i t h which he i s charged." I n r e Winship, ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S . C t . 1068, 25 L Ed 2d 368. W e must t h e r e f o r e a n a l y z e Montana's d e l i b e r a t e homicide s t a t u t e t o d e t e r m i n e i f a d e f e n d a n t ' s l a c k of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , and h i s r e s u l t i n g a b i l i t y t o p u r p o s e l y o r know- i n g l y c a u s e t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r p e r s o n , i s a f a c t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . P a t t e r s o n v . New York, supra. I n Montana, a p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s e s t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human b e i n g . S e c t i o n s 94-5-102 (1)( a ) , 94-5-101 (1), R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d e l e m e n t s of t h e o f - f e n s e , e a c h of which t h e S t a t e must p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a r e t h e r e f o r e c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human b e i n g w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t you a r e c a u s i n g o r w i t h t h e purpose t o c a u s e t h e d e a t h of t h a t human b e i n g . A p e r s o n a c t s " w i t h knowledge" o r "knowingly" " * * * with respect t o t h e r e s u l t of c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when he i s aware t h a t i t i s h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t such r e s u l t w i l l be c a u s e d by h i s c o n d u c t . * * *" Section 94-2-101(27), R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t u t e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o p r o v e t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t s u f f e r from m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which would p r e v e n t t h e d e f e n d a n t from d o i n g t h e a c t p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly. Because s a n i t y o r l a c k of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t i s n o t a n e l e m e n t i n c l u d e d i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of any of t h e c r i m e s c h a r g e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t , t h e S t a t e may r e l y upon t h e r e b u t t a b l e presumption t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was s a n e when t h e o f f e n s e was committed. Cf. Mullaney v . W i l b u r , (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 4 4 L Ed 2d 508; s e e , P a t t e r s o n v . New York, 432 U.S. 212-216. The s a n i t y p r e s u m p t i o n i s a p r e s u m p t i o n which a l l t h e s t a t e s employ i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s . S e e , H. Weihofen, Mental D i s o r d e r - - C r i m i n a l Defense, as a ( 1 9 5 4 ) , pp. 214-215, and cases c o l l e c t e d t h e r e i n ; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. a t 799. Without a presumption t h a t every- o n e i s s a n e and c a p a b l e of committing c r i m e s , " * * * the government would always b e under t h e n e c e s s i t y of adducing a f f i r m a t i v e e v i d e n c e of t h e s a n i t y of t h e a c c u s e d . But a r e q u i r e m e n t of t h a t c h a r a c t e r would s e r i o u s l y d e l a y and embarrass t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e laws a g a i n s t c r i m e , and i n most c a s e s be u n n e c c e s s a r y . * * *" Davis v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 8 9 5 ) , 160 U.S. 469, 486, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.ed. 499. The t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y d e f e n d a n t w a s presumed t o have been s a n e a t t h e t i m e t h e o f f e n s e s were committed. Defendant h i m s e l f i n h i s r e q u e s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t "Every man i s presumed t o be s a n e , t h a t i s , t o be w i t h o u t mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t * * * ." The presumption of s a n i t y d i d n o t s h i f t t o d e f e n d a n t t h e burden of d i s p r o v i n g a f a c t necessary t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime charged. " * * * To r e c o g n i z e a t a l l a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance does n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o p r o v e i t s n o n e x i s t e n c e i n each c a s e i n which the f a c t i s put i n issue * * * . " * * * Proof of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a l l a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s h a s n e v e r been c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d * * *." P a t t e r s o n v . N e w York, 432 U.S. 209, 210. The s e c t i o n 95-502,diminished c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e , i s an affirmative defense. S e c t i o n 94-2-103(6), R.C.M. 1947. To r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s of s a n i t y and c a p a b i l i t y of forming a p u r p o s e f u l o r knowing i n t e n t , a d e f e n d a n t may a d m i t e v i - dence r e l e v a n t t o " * * * p r o v e t h a t he d i d n o t have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which i s a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e charged. I' S e c t i o n 95-503 ( b ) ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. These s e c t i o n s do n o t d e f i n e t h e s t a n d a r d of proof n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , and n e i t h e r s e c t i o n 95-502 nor s e c t i o n 9 5 - 5 0 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Court. W h o l d t h a t , t o p r o v e a s e c t i o n 95-502 d e f e n s e , a e d e f e n d a n t must p r o v e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t h e l a c k e d t h e a b i l i t y , due t o m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t o form t h a t c r i m i n a l m e n t a l s t a t e which i s d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e a s a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e w i t h which h e i s c h a r g e d . P l a c i n g on a defendant t h e burden of proving t h e diminished capacity defense does n o t offend " * * * 'some p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e s o r o o t e d i n t h e t r a d i t i o n s and con- s c i e n c e o f o u r p e o p l e a s t o b e r a n k e d as f u n d a m e n t a l . ' * * *" Speiser v. Randall, ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S . C t . 1332, 2 L Ed 2d 1460. S e v e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s do n o t e v e n allow diminished capacity a s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense. See, S t a t e v . Doss, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 1 6 A r i z . 1 5 6 , 568 P.2d 1054; B e t h e a v. United S t a t e s , (App.D.C. 1 9 7 6 ) , 365 A.2d 64; c a s e s c o l - l e c t e d i n 22 ALR3d 1228, 1235-1238. Indeed, i n t h e s o l e o p i n i o n i n which t h e Supreme C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d w h e t h e r a t r i a l c o u r t must i n s t r u c t j u r o r s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d c o n s i d e r e v i d e n c e of d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h i s was a m a t t e r o f p e c u l i a r l y l o c a l c o n c e r n e n t r u s t e d t o t h e local courts. " * * * For t h i s C o u r t t o f o r c e t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia t o a d o p t s u c h a [ d i m i n i s h e d capacity] requirement f o r criminal trials would i n v o l v e a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e i n t h e common law t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " F i s h e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318. 90 L.ed. 1382. (Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.) Because p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n a s t o s u b t l e g r a d a t i o n s o f m e n t a l i m p a i r m e n t i s h i g h l y s u b j e c t i v e and n o t w i t h i n t h e common e x p e r i e n c e of t h e layman j u r o r , t h e S t a t e may i n f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e a defendant t o convince t h e jury of h i s d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e . The f a c t t h a t p s y c h i a t r y i s a d e v e l o p i n g a n d , a t p r e - s e n t , i n e x a c t s c i e n c e h a s l o n g b e e n n o t e d by t h e c o u r t s . S e e , Greenwood v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 350 U.S. 366, 76 S.Ct. 410, 100 L.ed. 412; W a r h l i c h v . A r i z o n a , (9th C i r . 1 9 7 3 ) , 479 F.2d 1137; B e t h e a v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , s u p r a . "The s c i e n c e of p s y c h i a t r y i s a t most a n e d u c a t e d g u e s s a s t o t h e c e r t a i n t y of human b e h a v i o r , which c a n n o t be p r e d i c t e d w i t h any a b s o l u t e n e s s . * * * " P e o p l e v . Del G u i d i c e , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 345 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344. I n r e j e c t i n g t h e d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e , c o u r t s have a l s o compared d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y w i t h o t h e r d e f e n s e s and noted : "* * * u n l i k e t h e n o t i o n of p a r t i a l o r r e l a t i v e i n s a n i t y , c o n d i t i o n s such a s i n t o x i - c a t i o n , medication, epilepsy, infancy, o r s e n i l i t y a r e , i n varying degrees, s u s c e p t i b l e t o q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o r o b j e c t i v e demonstration, and t o l a y u n d e r s t a n d i n g . * * * " Bethea v. United S t a t e s , 365 A.2d 8 8 . See, Wahlrich v. A r i z o n a , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Doss, s u p r a . The myriad problems w i t h a l l o w i n g t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of p s y c h i a t r i c testimony t o determine c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e discussed i n Ennis & Litwack, P y s c h i a t r y - t h e P r e - and - sumption - E x p e r t i s e : of F l i p p i n g Coins - -e Courtroom, 62 i n th C a l . L.Rev. 693, 737 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . D e s p i t e t h e p o t e n t i a l problems of proof i n a l l o w i n g t h e d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , and d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a s t a t e v e r y l i k e l y i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y re- q u i r e d t o even a l l o w d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y a s a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , Montana d o e s a l l o w t h e d e f e n s e . While t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e was w i l l i n g t o r e c o g n i z e d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y : " * * * a s an exculpatory * * * circumstance a f f e c t i n g t h e degree of c u l p a b i l i t y * * * it was w i l l i n g t o d o s o o n l y i f t h e f a c t s making o u t t h e d e f e n s e were e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e de- fendant with s u f f i c i e n t certainty. The S t a t e was i t s e l f u n w i l l i n g t o u n d e r t a k e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a b s e n c e of t h o s e f a c t s beyond r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , p e r h a p s f e a r i n g t h a t proof would be t o o d i f f i c u l t and t h a t t o o many p e r s o n s de- s e r v i n g t r e a t m e n t a s m u r d e r e r s would e s c a p e t h a t punishment i f t h e e v i d e n c e need merely r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a b o u t t h e defend- . a n t ' s [diminished c a p a c i t y ] * * * " P a t t e r s o n v . New York, 432 U . S . 207. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e S t a t e m e t i c u l o u s l y proved t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a g g r a v a t e d kidnap- p i n g c r i m e s beyond any r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , based on a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i n c l u d i n g t h e e v i d e n c e of d e f e n d a n t ' s a l l e g e d mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . The S t a t e , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e Leland and R i v e r a c a s e s , c o u l d t h e n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e f u s e t o s u s t a i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y u n l e s s d e f e n d a n t proved t h a t d e f e n s e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e evidence. The i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e c o u r t c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d t h e S t a t e t o p r o v e e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t and more t h a n gave d e f e n d a n t t h e b e n e f i t of Montana law on t h e d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e burden of p r o o f . I n I n s t r u c t i o n 53 t h e j u r o r s were t o l d t h a t , before considering t h e diminished capacity defense, t h e y were t o " * * * f i r s t d e t e r m i n e from t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t whether t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d do t h e a c t s c h a r g e d a g a i n s t him i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n . " The c o u r t separately i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t t o f i n d defendant g u i l t y of any o f t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d , t h e y must f i r s t f i n d t h a t defendant " * * * committed t h e a c t o r a c t s c h a r g e d v o l u n t a r i l y , w h i l e h a v i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o e a c h e l e m e n t con- t a i n e d i n t h e law d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e o n e of t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s contained i n t h e s a i d d e f i n i t i o n " . (Instruction 29.) The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t o n l y i f i t found beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d any of t h e a c t s c h a r g e d a g a i n s t him i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d t h e y t h e n c o n s i d e r "whether o r n o t h e c o u l d have had t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l s t a t e f o r t h e a c t o r a c t s which you have found he committed." ( I n s t r u c t i o n 53.) ~ l t h o u g h h e c o u r t i n I n s t r u c t i o n 53 i n s t r u c t e d t h e t j u r y a s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s burden of proof f o r h i s l e g a l i n - s a n i t y d e f e n s e , nowhere i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f d i d t h e c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y a s t o what burden of proof d e f e n d a n t had t o s a t i s f y t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t h e c o u l d n o t form a m e n t a l s t a t e o f " p u r p o s e l y " o r "knowingly" due t o mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ( t h e diminished c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e ) . I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , however, t h a t " * * * a single instruc- t i o n i s n o t viewed i n a r t i f i c i a l i s o l a t i o n , b u t must be viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e o v e r a l l c h a r g e . " Cupp v . Naughten, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 4 U.S. 1 4 1 , 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L Ed 2d 368. I f a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d a s a whole f a i r l y and a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t t h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y , t h e f a c t t h a t one i n s t r u c t i o n , standing alone, i s n o t a s f u l l a s it might have been i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . S t a t e v . Brooks, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 91. Instruction 1 i n t h i s c a s e made t h e j u r y aware of t h i s r u l e of law. " * * * you a r e t o c o n s i d e r a l l of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole, and a r e t o regard each i n t h e l i g h t of a l l t h e o t h e r s . " The i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h i s c a s e , when c o n s i d e r e d a s a whole, imposed a more l e n i e n t burden of proof on d e f e n d a n t t h a n Montana law p r o v i d e d , b e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i m p r e s s e d upon t h e j u r y t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d h i s diminished capacity defense i f , a f t e r considering a l l t h e evidence i n t h e case, t h e jurors e n t e r t a i n e d a reasonable d o u b t as t o whether d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which p r e v e n t e d him from forming a p u r p o s e f u l o r knowing s t a t e of mind w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d . "A p e r s o n t o be g u i l t y of any of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d i n any of t h e s e v e n c o u n t s c h a r g e d i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n must have committed t h e a c t o r a c t s c h a r g e d v o l u n t a r i l y , w h i l e having w i t h r e g a r d t o e a c h e l e m e n t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e law d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e o n e of t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s contained i n s a i d d e f i n i t i o n . " ( I n s t r u c t i o n 29) " * * * I n order t o convict t h e defendant of t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d i n any of s a i d c o u n t s a l l of t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s contained i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t must be proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t * * *." (Instruction 6) "Reasonable d o u b t i s * * * t h a t s t a t e of t h e c a s e which, a f t e r t h e e n t i r e comparison and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e e v i d e n c e , l e a v e s t h e minds o f t h e j u r o r s i n t h a t c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y cannot say they f e e l an abiding conviction t o a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e c h a r g e . " (Instruction 7) The i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n t o t h e j u r y i n t h i s c a s e n o t o n l y p r o t e c t e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h i n t h e ambit of Montana law, b u t i n d e e d p o s i t e d a more l i b e r a l burden of proof t h a n t h a t t o which d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d . Not o n l y d i d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s n o t s h i f t t o d e f e n d a n t t h e burden of d i s p r o v i n g any e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d , b u t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , when r e a d t o g e t h e r , a l s o r e q u i r e d d e f e n d a n t t o e s t a b l i s h h i s d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y m e r e l y by r a i s i n g a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , r a t h e r t h a n by proof by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e . I n summary, w e have examined a l l t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t and f i n d no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . We have f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r e d t h i s c a s e i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v . N e w York, s u p r a , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e mandate of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on remand, and f i n d no e r r o r . The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n and t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h a r e affirmed. %A Chief J fts t i c e W e Concur: I d i s s e n t and w i l l f i l e a written dissent shortly. Justice