State v. Coleman

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No. 13296 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF YONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- DEWEY EUGENE COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses, Tolliver and Wright, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Forsythe argued, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana Lee Overfelt, Billings, Montana Submitted: March 1, 1978 Decided :APR 2 6 1978 Filed: \Pi? 2 c 1978 Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e Court. D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e f i n a l judgment o f t h e ~ i s t r i c t o u r t , Rosebud County, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l . C D e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n f l i c t - ing bodily injury. On J u l y 4 , 1974, Peggy Lee H a r s t a d , 21 y e a r s o f a g e , d i s a p p e a r e d w h i l e d r i v i n g a l o n e from Harlowton t o Rosebud, Montana. She was l a s t s e e n a l i v e a r o u n d 9:00 p.m. that n i g h t a t M e l s t o n e , Montana. On J u l y 5 , 1 9 7 4 , h e r c a r was found w i t h i n a few m i l e s o f h e r home, n e a r Rosebud. On J u l y 7 , 1974, a r a n c h hand d i s c o v e r e d a p u r s e and o t h e r a r t i c l e s b e l o n g i n g t o Peggy Lee H a r s t a d i n s i d e a c u l v e r t a p p r o x i - m a t e l y t e n m i l e s w e s t o f h e r abandoned c a r . I n t h e developing i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an e l d e r l y couple informed t h e s h e r i f f o f Rosebud County t h a t t h e y had s e e n a b l a c k man a n d a w h i t e man h i t c h h i k i n g on J u l y 4 between Roundup and F o r s y t h , Montana a t a b o u t t h e t i m e o f day Peggy L e e H a r s t a d was d r i v i n g between t h o s e towns. Subsequently, t h e s e two men were i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e d e f e n d a n t , Dewey Eugene Coleman, a b l a c k man, and R o b e r t Dennis Nank, a w h i t e man. On J u l y 9 , 1974, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Rosebud County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e went t o t h e V e t e r a n ' s ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming, where t h e s e men w e r e , to q u e s t i o n them. D e f e n d a n t and Nank a d m i t t e d b e i n g i n t h e a r e a o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s d i s a p p e a r a n c e and h i t c h h i k i n g t h r o u g h Forsyth on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4th. On August 6 , 1974, t h e F.B.I. l a b o r a t o r y provided a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t l i f t t a k e n from t h e e x t e r i o r o f t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e and a sample f i n g e r p r i n t o f ~ a n k . The F.B.I. a l s o r e p o r t e d a p o s i t i v e comparison between a f i n g e r p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t and a l i f t t a k e n from a paper found i n H a r s t a d ' s purse. I n a n i n t e r v i e w w i t h F.B.I. a g e n t s o n August 1, 1974, d e f e n d a n t and Nank a d m i t t e d s e e i n g t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e abandoned on t h e r o a d . When h e was asked about h i s f i n g e r p r i n t i n t h e purse, defendant s t a t e d t h a t he found a p u r s e along t h e road they w e r e h i t c h h i k i n g . Vacuumings w e r e t a k e n i n t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e . These w e r e s e n t t o t h e F.B.I. laboratory f o r analysis. They r e p o r t e d , on September 1 3 , 1974, t h a t Negroid head h a i r s w e r e f o u n d i n t h e l o o s e h a i r s t a k e n from t h e f r o n t s e a t . In a d d i t i o n , two Negroid p u b i c h a i r s w e r e f o u n d i n t h e vacuumings. On August 29, 1 9 7 4 , t h e decomposed body o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d w a s found o n t h e n o r t h bank o f t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e R i v e r , j u s t w e s t o f F o r s y t h , Montana. A f o r e n s i c patholo- g i s t , D r . J o h n P f a f f , i d e n t i f i e d t h e r e m a i n s a s Peggy Lee H a r s t a d by t h e u s e of d e n t a l c h a r t s . Because o f t h e s t a t e of decomposition of h e r remains, D r . Pfaff could n o t d e t e r - mine a c a u s e of d e a t h . S i n c e t h e i r o r i g i n a l q u e s t i o n i n g i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming, t h e d e f e n d a n t and Nank had moved t o B o i s e , I d a h o , sometime i n August. A t t h e r e q u e s t o f Rosebud County a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e B o i s e p o l i c e had k e p t t h e s e men u n d e r s u r v e i l l a n c e . On O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1974, t h e t h e n Rosebud County a t t o r n e y , W i l l i a m M e i s b u r g e r , and U n d e r s h e r i f f Graham u akin went t o B o i s e , I d a h o t o f u r t h e r i n t e r r o g a t e d e f e n d a n t and Nank. he n e x t d a y , O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1974, M e i s b u r g e r and m akin went t o see t h e Boise police. They t a l k e d t o D e t e c t i v e m rake of t h e B o i s e p o l i c e a b o u t b r i n g i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t and ~ a n k o t h e t police s t a t i o n f o r questioning. They i n f o r m e d him o f a l l t h e e v i d e n c e t h e y had c o n n e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t and ~ a n k i t h w t h e d e a t h of Peggy L e e K a r s t a d . D e t e c t i v e Brake, s i n c e he had been d o i n g some o f t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e two men, knew a b o u t most o f t h e e v i d e n c e e x c e p t a b o u t h e r body b e i n g found. A f t e r d i s c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h M e i s b u r g e r and Makin, D e t e c t i v e Brake and a D e t e c t i v e C r o w e l l went t o t h e a p a r t - ment where t h e s e two men w e r e l i v i n g . There t h e defendant and Nank w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t f o r d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e i n t h e d e a t h o f Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . A f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t and being placed i n custody, a r r e s t w a r r a n t s and c o m p l a i n t s were i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e f o r Rosebud County. The w a r r a n t s and c o m p l a i n t c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t and Nank w i t h d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e . Upon t h e i r a r r e s t , d e f e n d a n t and Nank w e r e a d v i s e d o f their rights. The d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o w a i v e h i s r i g h t s . Nank d i d w a i v e h i s r i g h t s a n d , a f t e r b e i n g i n c u s t o d y f o r a few h o u r s , g a v e a f u l l c o n f e s s i o n . I n h i s confession, he i m p l i c a t e d h i m s e l f and t h e d e f e n d a n t . H e confessed t h a t t h e y k i d n a p p e d , r a p e d , and murdered Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . Nank c o n s e n t e d t o a s e a r c h o f t h e i r a p a r t m e n t and c a r f o r t h e murder weapons h e s a i d w e r e u s e d i n t h e crime--namely, their m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t s and a r o p e . A s e a r c h w a r r a n t was o b t a i n e d and t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e r e c o v e r e d . On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1974, a m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o f i l e a n I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Rosebud County, was r e q u e s t e d and g r a n t e d . The I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g e d t h e d e f e n d a n t with t h r e e counts: Count I , d e l i b e r a t e homicide; Count 11, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ; and Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y . ~ e f e n d a n tp l e a d not g u i l t y t o a l l counts. On J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1975, d e f e n d a n t moved t o s u p p r e s s a l l c o n f e s s i o n s , s t a t e m e n t s and e v i d e n c e , i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . A s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g was h e l d . Following t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a - t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e by t h e S t a t e and t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e c a s e t o a n o t h e r j u d g e , a second s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g was h e l d and d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n d e n i e d . On May 7 , 1 9 7 5 , t h e S t a t e e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h R o b e r t Nank. Under t h e t e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t , Nank a g r e e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y t o d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e and s o l i c i t a t i o n t o commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , and f u r t h e r a g r e e d t o t e s t i f y a t d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l i n r e t u r n f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e aggravated kidnap- ping charge. On May 1 9 , 1 9 7 5 , d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e n c o u r t a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l made a n o r a l o f f e r o f a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a o f g u i l t y i n r e t u r n f o r d i s m i s s a l of t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e . On May 2 3 , 1975, a w r i t t e n o f f e r o f a c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a o f g u i l t y was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t . In t h i s o f f e r , defendant i n s i s t e d on maintaining h i s innocence. The S t a t e r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t a g u i l t y p l e a w i t h defendant maintaining h i s innocence. Following a change o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l , a c h a n g e o f v e n u e from Rosebud County t o C u s t e r County and f i n a l l y t o Y e l l o w s t o n e County, and o t h e r p r e - t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s and m o t i o n s , d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l commenced on O c t o b e r 2 3 , 1 9 7 5 , i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County. A t t r i a l , Coleman and Nank r e l a t e d o p p o s i t e s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t a s t o t h e i r involvement w i t h M i s s Harstad. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e and Coleman w e r e t r a v e l i n g between Roundup and F o r s y t h on U. S. 12 on h i s motorcycle when t h e y r a n o u t o f g a s . They t h e n t r i e d t o h i t c h h i k e . He s a i d t h a t one c a r stopped, b u t t h e e l d e r l y couple refused t o g i v e them a r i d e . Nank s t a t e d t h a t M i s s H a r s t a d s t o p p e d and g a v e them a ride. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e d r i v i n g down t h e r o a d , h e r e a c h e d o v e r and t u r n e d t h e key on h e r c a r o f f and s t e e r e d the car t o a stop. H e s t a t e d t h a t he p u t t h e g i r l i n t h e back s e a t , t o o k h e r c l o t h e s o f f , and a t t e m p t e d t o r a p e h e r , b u t f a i l e d , w h i l e Coleman d r o v e t h e c a r . Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman t h e n r a p e d h e r w h i l e h e h e l d h e r f o o t , t e s t i f y i n g t h a t h e had a f o o t f e t i s h . Nank s a i d t h a t t h e y t h e n went down by t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e R i v e r . He c a r r i e d t h e g i r l , now f u l l y c l o t h e d , o v e r h i s s h o u l d e r , w h i l e Coleman came from b e h i n d s w i n g i n g h i s s i l v e r motor- c y c l e h e l m e t by t h e c h i n s t r a p and c r a s h e d i t a g a i n s t h e r skull. Nank s a i d t h a t Coleman t h e n t o o k a y e l l o w n y l o n r o p e and a t t e m p t e d t o s t r a n g l e h e r and a s k e d Nank t o h e l p , b u t h e did not strangle her. Then t h e y t o o k h e r down t o t h e r i v e r and dumped h e r i n t o i t . A s s h e was n o t d e a d , Nank h e l d h e r head u n d e r w a t e r w h i l e Coleman h e l d h e r l e g s . Nank t h e n t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d r o v e h e r c a r back toward F o r s y t h u n t i l i t r a n o u t o f g a s . They removed some t h i n g s from t h e c a r and walked i n t o F o r s y t h . Nank l e f t Coleman i n F o r s y t h , h i t c h h i k e d w i t h g a s t o t h e m o t o r c y c l e , and r e t u r n e d t o p i c k up Coleman. They t h e n went t o t h e V. A. H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n where t h e y s t a y e d u n t i l g o i n g t o B o i s e . D e f e n d a n t Coleman, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e m o t o r c y c l e r a n o u t o f g a s and t h e y were r e f u s e d a r i d e , Nank s u g g e s t e d t h a t b e c a u s e Coleman was b l a c k and t h e r e w e r e few b l a c k s i n t h a t a r e a , h e s h o u l d go g e t t h e g a s alone. Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e h e was s i t t i n g o f f t h e highway smoking, Nank g o t a r i d e . A f t e r s e v e r a l h o u r s , Nank r e t u r n e d i n a c a r a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o Coleman, Nank was w e t , u p s e t and a c t i n g s t r a n g e . Coleman s a i d he was t o l d t o g e t t h e i r t h i n g s o f f t h e motor- c y c l e and g e t i n t h e c a r . When t h e y b o t h were i n t h e c a r , Nank a d v i s e d Coleman t h a t he had k i l l e d a g i r l . The c a r r a n o u t o f g a s , and t h e y s t a r t e d t o walk. Nank gave Coleman a p u r s e t o c a r r y and l a t e r t o l d him t o g e t r i d of i t . Coleman threw t h e p u r s e i n t o a c u l v e r t . They t h e n had b r e a k f a s t i n F o r s y t h , and Nank l e f t Coleman w h i l e he went t o g e t t h e motorcycle. Coleman a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t Nank t h r e a t e n e d him i f he e v e r d i s c l o s e d any of t h e s e f a c t s . The t r i a l ended on November 1 4 , 1975. The j u r y r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on a l l t h r e e c o u n t s . On November 21, 1975, t h e c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t Coleman t o 1 0 0 y e a r s on Count I ( d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ) ; t o d e a t h by hanging on Count I1 ( a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) ; and t o 4 0 y e a r s on Count I11 ( s e x u a l intercourse without consent i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y ) . D e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . A s t a y of e x e c u t i o n h a s been g r a n t e d pending t h i s a p p e a l . Defendant r a i s e s 4 1 s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on a p p e a l . W e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s e a l l e g e d e r r o r s w i t h i n t h e broader c o n t e x t of t h e i s s u e t o which t h e y r e l a t e . W e w i l l r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s manner: 1. Whether t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , imposed a s d e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e f o r c o n v i c t i o n on Count I1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ? 2. Whether d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d have been s e n t e n c e d f o r 4 0 y e a r s on h i s c o n v i c t i o n under Count I I I ? 3. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d a f t e r h i s a r r e s t s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d ? 4. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n a l o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y s h o u l d have been a c c e p t e d ? 5. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s t h e t h r e e c o u n t s of t h e I n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d and whether t h e I n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d have been amended a f t e r d e f e n d a n t ' s e n t r y of a p l e a ? 6. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s second j u r y c h a l l e n g e s h o u l d h a v e been s u s t a i n e d ? 7. Whether t h e s c o p e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s was i m p r o p e r l y l i m i t e d ? 8. Whether N a n k ' s competency a s a w i t n e s s s h o u l d h a v e been d e t e r m i n e d p r i o r t o h i s t e s t i m o n y ? 9. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , a t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , f o r l a c k of c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d h a v e been g r a n t e d ? 10. Whether some o f t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s w e r e a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y improperly t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of defendant? 11. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury? 12. Whether c e r t a i n S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e a d m i s s i b l e and w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s e x h i b i t s w e r e p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d ? 13. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d ? I s s u e 1. Defendant argues t h a t h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e cannot s t a n d because it i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . H e r a i s e s two claims. The f i r s t i s t h a t two j u r o r s were e x c u s e d f o r c a u s e by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t b a s e d on t h e i r v i e w s o f c a p i t a l p u n i s h - ment. D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s i s i n v i o l a t i o n of Witherspoon v. I l l i n o i s , ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 391 U.S. 510, 88 S . C t . 1 7 7 0 , 2 0 L Ed 2d 776. H i s second c l a i m i s t h a t M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e , u n d e r which h e was s e n t e n c e d , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e . The Witherspoon r u l e i s t h a t a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h c a n n o t b e c a r r i e d o u t i f t h e j u r y t h a t imposed o r recommended i t was c h o s e n by e x c l u d i n g p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s f o r c a u s e s i m p l y because they voiced g e n e r a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e death penalty. There i s an exception t o t h e r u l e . It provides t h a t i f a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r i s i r r e v o c a b l y committed t o v o t i n g a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e a t h p e n a l t y , h e may be p r o p e r l y excluded f o r c a u s e and a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h carried out. I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t Witherspoon makes h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n v a l i d a s two j u r o r s were i m p r o p e r l y excluded. W e disagree. W h o l d t h a t t h e two p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s i n t h i s c a s e e were p r o p e r l y excluded under t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e o f Witherspoon. One j u r o r s t a t e d t h a t no matter how s t r o n g t h e e v i d e n c e of g u i l t was, h e c o u l d n o t v o t e t o c o n v i c t i f a d e a t h p e n a l t y c o u l d b e imposed. The o t h e r j u r o r s t a t e d t h a t she f e l t she could not l i v e with h e r s e l f i f she was o n a j u r y t h a t c o n v i c t e d a p e r s o n and t h a t p e r s o n r e c e i v e d a death sentence a s a r e s u l t . Thus, b o t h of t h e s e j u r o r s were i r r e v o c a b l y committed t o v o t i n g a g a i n s t a c o n v i c t i o n because defendant could r e c e i v e t h e d e a t h penalty. Their b e i n g excused f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r i r r e v o c a b l e commit- ment a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y d o e s n o t i n v a l i d a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s death sentence. A t t h e t i m e of d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l , t h e death penalty s t a t u t e i n Montana f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g was s e c t i o n 94- 5-304, R.C.M. 1947. I t read: "A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i f i t f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t . " Defendant was s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h under t h i s s t a t u t e . T h i s s t a t u t e was r e p e a l e d by t h e 1977 s e s s i o n of t h e state legislature. S e c t i o n 1 6 , Chapter 338, Laws of Montana 1977. The new d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s a r e c o d i f i e d a s s e c - t i o n s 95-2206.6 t o 95-2206.15, R.C.M. 1947. The c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of Montana's p r e s e n t d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s a r e n o t involved i n t h i s case. S e c t i o n 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947, a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975, i s a mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . I n t h e l i g h t of r e c e n t U. S. Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n s , t h i s s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l on i t s f a c e , and d e f e n d a n t ' s d e a t h s e n t e n c e t h e r e u n d e r cannot stand. I n 1976, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , r u l e d o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s . Woodson v . North C a r o l i n a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L ed 2d 944. The s t a t u t e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t was North C a r o l i n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . It p r o v i d e d t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r a l l p e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. I n holding t h i s s t a t u t e unconstitu- t i o n a l , t h e Supreme C o u r t s a i d : " * * * North C a r o l i n a ' s mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e f o r f i r s t - d e g r e e murder d e p a r t s markedly from contemporary s t a n d a r d s r e s p e c t i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e punishment of d e a t h and t h u s c a n n o t be a p p l i e d con- s i s t e n t l y w i t h t h e E i g h t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments' r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s power t o p u n i s h ' b e e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n t h e 1 l i m i t s of c i v i l i z e d s t a n d a r d s . ' " Woodson v . North C a r o l i n a , 428 U.S. a t 301, quothng from Trop v . D u l l e s , ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L ed 2d 630. I n two l a t e r c a s e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a l s o I h e l d mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t ~ t u t i o n a l . I Coker v . G e o r g i a , (1977), U.S. , 97 b . C t . 2861, 53 I L e d 2d 982; Harry R o b e r t s v . L o u i s i a n a , (197l7), U.S. , 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L ed 2d 637. I n Cokex t h e C o u r t h e l d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a Georgia s t a t u t e r e q u i ~ i n gt h e imposi- t i o n of t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e f o r r a p e , when one^ o r more s p e c i - f i e d a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s were found t o b e p r e s e n t . In Harry R o b e r t s t h e C o u r t h e l d unconstitutional^ a Louisiana s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a d e a t h s l e n t e n c e f o r k i l l i n g a peace o f f i c e r . Concerning t h e L o u i, s i a n a s t a t u t e , t h e Court s a i d : " * * * it i s essential t h a t the c a p i t a l sentencing decision allow f o r consideration o f w h a t e v e r m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s may b e relevant t o e i t h e r the particular offender o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . Because t h e Louisiana s t a t u t e does n o t allow consideration of p a r t i c u l a r i z e d m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , it i s unconstitutional." Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 U.S. a t 1996. The same p r o b l e m s t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n Woodson, Coker, and H a r r y R o b e r t s a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e s t a t u t e u n d e r which d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d i n 1975. I t i s a mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e . Under t h i s s t a t u t e , i f t h e court finds, a s it did i n t h i s case, t h a t t h e v i c t i m of a n aggravated kidnapping d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e c r i m e , t h e c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t must b e s e n t e n c e d t o die. T h e r e i s no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r any m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It only allows the court t o determine t h e aggravating circumstance of death. This i s n o t constitutionally permissible. To have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d d e a t h p e n a l t y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s e s t a b l i s h e d c e r t a i n n e c e s - s a r y p r o c e d u r e s . See: Gregg v . G e o r g i a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 1 5 3 , 96 S . C t . 2909, 4 9 L ed 2d 859; P r o f f i t t v. F l o r i d a , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L e d 2d 913; J u r e k v . Texas, ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L e d 2d 929. None o f t h o s e r e q u i r e d p r o c e d u r e s a r e p r e s e n t i n Montana's d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a s it e x i s t e d i n 1974, nor w e r e t h e y p r o v i d e d o t h e r w i s e i n t h i s c a s e . Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s death sentence cannot stand. I s s u e 2. D e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o 40 y e a r s f o r Count 111, s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n f l i c t i n g bodily injury. T h i s s e n t e n c e was imposed p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 94-5- 503 ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s : " I f t h e v i c t i m i s l e s s t h a n 16 y e a r s o l d and t h e o f f e n d e r i s 3 o r more y e a r s o l d e r t h a n t h e v i c t i m o r i f t h e of f e n d e r i n £ l i c t s b o d i l y i n j u r y upon anyone i n t h e c o u r s e of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent, he s h a l l be imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any term of n o t l e s s t h a n 2 y e a r s o r more t h a n 4 0 y e a r s , e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n 95-2206.18." Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y upon Peggy Lee H a r s t a d i n t h e c o u r s e of committing sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. Since t h a t i s so, defendant argues t h a t h i s 4 0 year sentence i s erroneous. We agree. The s t a n d a r d used t o measure j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i s w e l l settled i n this state. S t a t e v . Pascgo, (1977), Mont. , 566 P.2d 802, 34 St.Rep. 657. The r u l e i s t h a t q u e s t i o n s of f a c t must be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e j u r y and g i v e n t h e r e q u i r e d l e g a l minimum of e v i d e n c e , t h i s C o u r t on r e v i e w w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e jury. S t a t e v. M e r s e a l , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 167 Mont. 409, 538 P.2d 1364. The e v i d e n c e i s examined t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e s t a t e . S t a t e v . Pascgo, supra; S t a t e v. Merseal, supra; S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976), Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270. Applying t h e s e s t a n d a r d s h e r e , we f i n d i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o support t h e v e r d i c t t h a t t h e defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y i n t h e c o u r s e of committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e . The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defend- a n t did so. Negroid p u b i c h a i r s w e r e found i n t h e c a r . However, Nank d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t d e f e n d a n t i n f l i c t e d b o d i l y i n j u r y upon Peggy L e e H a r s t a d w h i l e engaged i n s e x u a l intercourse. The p a t h o l o g i s t , D r . Pfaff, specifically t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e found no e v i d e n c e o f p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o Peggy L e e H a r s t a d d u r i n g h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e body. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s show t h a t Peggy L e e H a r s t a d was k i l l e d f o l l o w i n g h e r r a p e . his, t h e y s a y , f i t s t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 93-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, t h a t b o d i l y i n j u r y was i n f l i c t e d i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e r a p e . W e a r e unconvinced. To s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r s e x u a l intercourse without consent, i n f l i c t i n g bodily i n j u r y , t h e r e must b e a showing o f b o d i l y i n j u r y a s t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l c o d e , s e c t i o n 94-2-101 ( 5 ) , R.C.M. 1947. That s e c t i o n reads: " ' B o d i l y i n j u r y ' means p h y s i c a l p a i n , i l l n e s s , o r any impairment of p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n and i n c l u d e s m e n t a l i l l n e s s o r impairment. " T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e showing t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n f l i c t e d any s u c h i n j u r i e s on Peggy L e e H a r s t a d . Thus, t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d bodily i n j u r y i n t h e c o u r s e of committing s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by a n y e v i d e n c e and c a n n o t s t a n d . Defendant s h o u l d p r o p e r l y h a v e b e e n s e n t e n c e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 94-5- 5 0 3 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, f o r c o m m i t t i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. I s s u e 3. P r i o r t o t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t moved t o h a v e suppressed t h e evidence s e i z e d i n Idaho--the motorcycle h e l m e t s and t h e r o p e . H e a r g u e s t h a t h i s a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t was u n l a w f u l b e c a u s e o f a l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o arrest. H e contends t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have probable c a u s e t o a r r e s t him u n t i l a f t e r Nank's c o n f e s s i o n s e v e r a l hours a f t e r h i s a r r e s t . H e f u r t h e r c l a i m s t h a t Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e Nank's c o n f e s - s i o n and c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h w e r e i n v o l u n t a r y . The D i s - t r i c t Court refused t o suppress t h e evidence. Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h i s was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and r a i s e s t h e same arguments on a p p e a l t h a t he d i d i n t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g . W f i n d t h e r e was p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t d e f e n d a n t e w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t . The l e g a l i t y of an a r r e s t i s determined by t h e law of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e a r r e s t was e f f e c t e d . M i l l e r v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U . S . 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L ed 2d 1332. I n t h i s c a s e , s i n c e t h e a r r e s t took p l a c e i n I d a h o , I d a h o law must b e a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a r r e s t . D e t e c t i v e Brake a r r e s t e d d e f e n d a n t and Nank i n B o i s e w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t f o r a d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n Montana. I d a h o ' s g e n e r a l a r r e s t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 19- 603(3), I.C., provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A p e a c e o f f i c e r may make a n a r r e s t i n o b e d i e n c e t o a w a r r a n t d e l i v e r e d t o him, o r may, w i t h o u t a warrant, a r r e s t a person: " 3 . When a f e l o n y h a s i n f a c t been committed and h e h a s r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e f o r b e l i e v i n g t h e p e r s o n a r r e s t e d t o have committed i t . " A e x a m i n a t i o n of Idaho law d i s c l o s e s no c a s e d e t e r m i n i n g n whether a p e a c e o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a p e r s o n i n Idaho f o r a c r i m e committed e l s e w h e r e , w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , by t h e a u t h o r i t y g i v e n him i n t h i s s t a t u t e . I d a h o , l i k e Montana, h a s a d o p t e d t h e Uniform C r i m i n a l E x t r a d i t i o n Act. There i s a p r o v i s i o n i n t h a t a c t f o r a r r e s t s w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t of f u g i t i v e s from a n o t h e r s t a t e , which d e f e n d a n t and Nank a r e . T h i s p r o v i s i o n i s s e c t i o n 19- 4514, I . C . , which r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : " A r r e s t w i t h o u t a warrant.--The a r r e s t of a p e r s o n may be l a w f u l l y made a l s o by a n o f f i c e r o r a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t upon r e a s o n a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e a c c u s e d s t a n d s charged w i t h a c r i m e punish- a b l e by d e a t h o r imprisonment f o r a term e x c e e d i n g o n e (1) y e a r i n t h e c o u r t s of a n o t h e r s t a t e ; b u t when s o a r r e s t e d t h e accused must b e t a k e n b e f o r e a judge o r m a g i s t r a t e w i t h a l l p r a c t i c a b l e speed and c o m p l a i n t must be made a g a i n s t him under o a t h s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e ground f o r t h e a r r e s t a s i n t h e l a s t s e c - t i o n ; and t h e r e a f t e r h i s answer s h a l l b e h e a r d a s i f h e had been a r r e s t e d on a w a r r a n t . " The c o u r t s i n I d a h o have n o t had o c c a s i o n t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s statute. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have h e l d t h a t t h i s p r o v i s i o n of t h e Uniform C r i m i n a l E x t r a d i t i o n Act i m p l i e s t h e n e c e s s i t y of some p r i o r c o u r t a c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e where t h e c r i m e w a s committed, b u t t h e a c t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o r e p u d i a t e t h e common law r u l e t h a t a n a r r e s t may b e made on p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d p e r s o n had committed a c r i m e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of l a c k of c o m p l a i n t o r w a r r a n t in that state. D e s j a r l a i s v. S t a t e , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 73 Wis.2d 480, " I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s a n o f f i c e r h a s no a u t h o r i t y t o a r r e s t w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t a f u g i t i v e from j u s t i c e from a n o t h e r s t a t e , even on t e l e g r a p h i c o r p e r s o n a l r e q u e s t of t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e demanding s t a t e . I n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s a n a r r e s t may b e made by a n o f f i c e r w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , a t l e a s t under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s where t h e f u g i t i v e h a s committed a f e l o n y * * * ." 35 C.J.S. E x t r a d i t i o n , 512 ( b ) . These a r e m a t t e r s l e f t wholly t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . Burton v . New York Cent. R.R. Co., ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 245 U.S. 315, 38 S.Ct. 108, 62 L.Ed. 314. Thus, t h e i n q u i r y must b e whether o r n o t I d a h o r e c o g n i z e s t h e common law r u l e . I n o u r view Idaho law r e c o g n i z e s t h e common law r u l e t h a t a n a r r e s t may b e made w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t where t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r has probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h e person a r r e s t e d had committed a c r i m e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e . Defendant's a r r e s t was l e g a l i n t h i s c a s e a s D e t e c t i v e Brake had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t had committed a f e l o n y i n Montana. Under Idaho law, p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t s where t h e r e i s s u c h a s t a t e of f a c t s a s would l e a d a man of o r d i n a r y c a r e and prudence t o b e l i e v e o r e n t e r t a i n a n h o n e s t and s t r o n g s u s - p i c i o n t h a t such p e r s o n h a s committed a c r i m e . State v. Polson, ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 8 1 I d a . 147, 339 P.2d 510; S t a t e v . Loyd, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 92 I d a . 20, 435 P.2d 797. Here, D e t e c t i v e Brake knew Peggy Lee H a r s t a d had d i s a p p e a r e d on t h e n i g h t of J u l y 4 , 1974. H e knew d e f e n d a n t and Nank had been s e e n t o g e t h e r i n t h e a r e a of h e r d i s a p p e a r a n c e on t h a t n i g h t . He knew t h e i r f i n g e r p r i n t s had been i d e n t i f i e d on h e r c a r and p u r s e . H e knew Negroid head h a i r s and p u b i c h a i r s were found i n h e r c a r and t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a Negro. This c o n s t i t u t e d probable c a u s e t o a r r e s t them. Next w e must l o o k t o see i f t h e s e a r c h of t h e a p a r t m e n t and c a r , where t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e w e r e r e c o v e r e d , was lawful. W e n o t e t h a t t h i s s e a r c h was n o t t h e p r o d u c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s and Nank's a r r e s t . I t was based on Nank's consent t o t h e search. Defendant q u e s t i o n s whether Nank's c o n s e n t was f r e e l y g i v e n . However, d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t a s s e r t any v i o l a t i o n s of Nank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t have s t a n d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e v i o l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of a c o - d e f e n d a n t o r t h i r d p a r t y by law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s . S t a t e v . Braden, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 1 2 4 , 515 P.2d 692. his r u l e i s based on Alderman v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L e d 2d 176. T h e r e f o r e , we h o l d d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t c l a i m any v i o l a t i o n of Nank's F o u r t h mend- ment r i g h t s and h i s c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h made i t a l a w f u l search. There was no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s . I s s u e 4. Defendant c l a i m s t h e S t a t e r e f u s e d t o p l e a b a r g a i n w i t h him o r t o a c c e p t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y b e c a u s e he i s a b l a c k man. H e c l a i m s i t was b e c a u s e of h i s r a c e t h a t t h e S t a t e i n s i s t e d upon having a f u l l t r i a l i n t h i s c a s e , where, upon c o n v i c t i o n , a d e a t h s e n t e n c e c o u l d be imposed. He a r g u e s i t i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e S t a t e n o t t o p l e a bargain o r t o accept h i s o f f e r t o plead g u i l t y . How t h i s would be s o , d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t made c l e a r t o u s . W r e c o g n i z e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may p l e a d g u i l t y w h i l e e maintaining h i s innocence, e s p e c i a l l y t o avoid a d e a t h sentence. Brady v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L e d 2d 747; North C a r o l i n a v . A l f o r d , (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 9 1 S.Ct. 1 6 0 , 27 L ed 2d 162. However, t h e s e c a s e s d e a l w i t h a t t e m p t s t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a a f t e r i t h a s been e n t e r e d and d e a l w i t h t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a of g u i l t y . These c a s e s do n o t r e q u i r e t h e t r i a l court o r t h e prosecution t o accept a g u i l t y plea. The acceptance of a g u i l t y p l e a t o a charged o f f e n s e i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . A c c o r d i n g l y , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e S t a t e ' s r e f u s a l t o plea bargain with defendant o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l t o a c c e p t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l p l e a of g u i l t y w h i l e maintaining h i s innocence. I s s u e 5. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying h i s motion t o d i s m i s s t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e an offense. His argument i s t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947, r e l a t i n g t o t h e form of a c h a r g e , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c h a r g e t o be i n o r d i n a r y and c o n c i s e l a n g u a g e , and i n such a manner t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t would know what was i n t e n d e d . H e alleges that the I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e d i d n o t meet t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . Defendant p r e m i s e s h i s argument on t h e S t a t e ' s a t t e m p t t o amend t h e I n f o r m a t i o n a f t e r e n t r y of d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a . He a l l e g e s t h a t t h e S t a t e , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o amend t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o n . a d m i t t e d t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was d e f e c t i v e . The t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e I n f o r m a t i o n t o b e amended. However, t h e c o u r t i t s e l f amended Count 11, t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e , t o add t h e words: " r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d e a t h of Peggy Lee H a r s t a d . " W e f a i l t o s e e how t h e S t a t e ' s a t t e m p t t o amend t h e Information a i d s t h e defendant i n claiming t h e Information i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The S t a t e by amending t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was t r y i n g t o make i t a b e t t e r I n f o r m a t i o n . They w e r e n o t c l a i m i n g i t was i n s u f f i c i e n t a s i t e x i s t e d . An I n f o r m a t i o n need o n l y b e s u f f i c i e n t t o a p p r i s e t h e a c c u s e d of t h e n a t u r e of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . I t need n o t be p e r f e c t . "It i s frequently stated, a s a general rule, e i t h e r w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s t a t u t o r y misdemeanors, o r t o s t a t u t o r y offenses generally, t h a t a charge i s s u f f i c i e n t which f o l l o w s t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e c r e a t i n g t h e o f f e n s e ; and i t h a s been h e l d t h a t , i f a c c u s e d i n s i s t s on g r e a t e r p a r t i - c u l a r i t y , i t i s incumbent on him t o show t h a t from t h e o b v i o u s i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r known p r i n c i p l e s of law t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e forms a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . " 4 2 C.J.S. I n d i c t m e n t s and I n f o r m a t i o n s , § 1 3 9 ( c ) . Montana f o l l o w s t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e . An I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p r o p e r l y c h a r g e s a n o f f e n s e i n t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e describing the offense i s sufficient. S t a t e v. R a n d a l l , ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Shannon, ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 280, 26 P.2d 380; S t a t e v . Haley, (1957), 132 Mont. 366, 318 P.2d 1084; S t a t e v . Duncan, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 130 Mont. 562, 305 P.2d 761; S t a t e e x r e l . G l a n t z v. D i s t r i c t Court, ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 1 3 2 , 461 P.2d 193. W e h o l d t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e was sufficient. Each c o u n t f o l l o w e d t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e s f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , s e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. 1947, and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. A s f o r t h e amendment by t h e c o u r t t o Count 11, c o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s contention, w e f i n d t h a t it w a s a proper amendment. S e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975, a l l o w e d a n I n f o r m a t i o n t o b e amended a s t o form a f t e r e n t r y of p l e a b u t n o t a s t o substance. Defendant argues t h a t t h e amendment t o Count I1 was o n e o f s u b s t a n c e . He c l a i m s t h a t p r i o r t o t h i s amendment, h e was n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e death penalty. W e disagree. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t any amendment t o a n I n f o r m a t i o n which charges a crime d i f f e r e n t i n penalty i s a m a t t e r of substance and i m p e r m i s s i b l e . S t a t e v. Fisher, ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 46, 254 P . 872; S t a t e v . K n i g h t , ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 27, 387 P.2d 22. Here, however, t h e amendment was o n e of form. Defendant knew from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was g o i n g t o be sought. P r i o r t o t h e amendment t o Count 11, t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , upon a c o n v i c t i o n , c o u l d have b e e n s o u g h t u n d e r e i t h e r Count I o r Count 11. The amendment s i m p l y l i m i t e d i t t o Count 11. Furthermore, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant was n o t s u r p r i s e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was b e i n g s o u g h t . He o b j e c t e d t o t h e amendment i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t , b u t h e d i d n o t a s k f o r any continuance a s a r e s u l t of it. H e c l e a r l y knew p r i o r t o t h e amendment t h a t t h e S t a t e was s e e k i n g t h e d e a t h penalty. I n a n y e v e n t , no l e g a l p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t e d from t h e amendment o f Count I1 i n t h e l i g h t o f o u r h o l d i n g t h a t M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a s i t e x i s t e d i n 1975 i s unconstitutional. I s s u e 6. On O c t o b e r 20, 1975, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a c h a l - l e n g e t o t h e j u r y p a n e l c l a i m i n g t h a t i t was n o t drawn and summoned i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s . The c h a l l e n g e was made i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s how a j u r y c h a l l e n g e i s t o b e made. A f t e r a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court dismissed t h e jury panel. The c o u r t t h e n o r d e r e d a new p a n e l of 60 j u r o r s be drawn and summoned t o a p p e a r f o r t r i a l on October 23, 1975. Defendant r a i s e d a second j u r y c h a l l e n g e t o t h i s p a n e l . He a g a i n a r g u e d t h a t t h e p a n e l was n o t drawn and summoned i n accordance with t h e s t a t u t e s . The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e c h a l - lenge. Defendant, on a p p e a l , c l a i m s h i s second j u r y c h a l - l e n g e s h o u l d have been g r a n t e d . W e disagree. B a s i c a l l y , d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h r e e arguments c o n c e r n i n g why t h e j u r y p a n e l t h a t t r i e d him was i m p r o p e r l y drawn and summoned. F i r s t , h e s a y s t h a t t h e r e w e r e more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names on t h e j u r y l i s t . There w e r e 55,763 numbers i n t h e box and 44,765 on t h e l i s t . When a number was drawn h i g h e r t h a n 44,765, i t w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e box. Defendant c l a i m s t h a t h a v i n g more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names o n t h e j u r y l i s t f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply w i t h t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e error. S e c t i o n 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h name on t h e j u r y l i s t be a s s i g n e d a number. S e c t i o n 93-1404, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e numbers b e p l a c e d i n t h e j u r y box i n s u c h a manner t h a t t h e y c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each o t h e r . N e i t h e r of t h e s e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e be o n l y a s many numbers i n t h e j u r y box a s names on t h e j u r y l i s t e x c e p t t h e r e c a n o n l y b e one number f o r e a c h j u r o r . Defendant makes no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was more t h a n o n e number f o r e a c h j u r o r . T h e r e f o r e , w e h o l d t h a t h a v i n g more numbers i n t h e j u r y box t h a n names on t h e j u r y l i s t d o e s n o t d e s t r o y t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e p a n e l drawn. The p u r p o s e of t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e r e b e no u n f a i r n e s s i n t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e j u r y . S t a t e e x r e l . ~ e n n i n g s e nv . D i s t r i c t Court, ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 354, 348 ~ . 2 d 143; I n r e J u r y Box C a p s u l e s , ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 5 0 Mont. 583, 447 P.2d 687. We f i n d no u n f a i r n e s s h e r e i n t h e d r a w i n g o f t h e j u r y p a n e l . Second, d e f e n d a n t c o m p l a i n s t h a t t h e 200 j u r o r s drawn were n o t i f i e d by t e l e p h o n e by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k t o see i f t h e y would b e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r i a l on O c t o b e r 23, 1975. S i x t y - o n e o f t h o s e c a l l e d r e p l i e d t h e y would b e available. Defendant c l a i m s t h a t , i n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k e x c u s e d 139 j u r o r s , and t h a t , u n d e r t h e law, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e r k may n o t e x c u s e j u r o r s from j u r y d u t y . F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e j u r o r s were a l l o w e d t o excuse themselves f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l cause i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e o n b e i n g e x c u s e d from j u r y d u t y . S e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e t o draw and summon a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s f o r a t r i a l when i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o d o s o . This s e c t i o n f u r t h e r provides t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s may b e n o t i f i e d by t e l e p h o n e by t h e c l e r k of court. I n t h i s case, a f t e r dismissing t h e f i r s t j u r y p a n e l , a d d i t i o n a l j u r o r s w e r e needed. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e drew 200 numbers o u t o f t h e j u r y box t o g e t a 60 member j u r y p a n e l . H e authorized the c l e r k t o o r a l l y notify the jurors. The c l e r k , a s s e c t i o n 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s , n o t i f i e d t h e j u r o r s by t e l e p h o n e . Thus, d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t n o t i f y i n g t h e j u r o r s by t e l e p h o n e was i m p r o p e r i s without m e r i t . S e c t i o n 93-1305, R.C.M. 1947, d o e s d e a l w i t h t h e g r o u n d s f o r b e i n g e x c u s e d from j u r y d u t y . It provides t h a t a juror may n o t b e e x c u s e d f o r s l i g h t o r t r i v i a l c a u s e . On t h e r e c o r d t h a t i s b e f o r e u s , t h e r e i s no showing t h a t t h e c l e r k excused any of t h e j u r o r s c a l l e d . W e note t h a t the d i s t r i c t j u d g e had o r d e r e d t h e c l e r k t o h a v e a p a n e l o f 60 j u r o r s f o r t h e t r i a l o n O c t o b e r 23, 1975, which h e d i d . Further, the r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f a j u r o r t o a p p e a r , i f properly n o t i f i e d , w i l l n o t i n v a l i d a t e a subsequent t r i a l , a s a defendant has no r i g h t t o select a p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r , b u t has only a r i g h t t o r e j e c t a juror. S t a t e v . Moran, (196311 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. Applying t h a t r u l e t o t h i s case, w e hold t h a t defendant's t r i a l should n o t be i n v a l i d a t e d b e c a u s e 60 o u t o f 200 j u r o r s a p p e a r e d which was t h e s i z e o f t h e p a n e l o r d e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . F i n a l l y , defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e speed used i n s e l e c t i n g t h e j u r y d e n i e d him h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury panel. H e argues t h a t t h e jury panel d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e community a s most o f t h e j u r o r s came from t h e w e s t s i d e o f B i l l i n g s , Montana. The r u l e i s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s a r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y s e l e c t e d from t h e p r o p e r p l a c e and drawn and summoned a c c o r d i n g t o law. The s y s t e m a t i c and i n t e n t i o n a l e x c l u s i o n o f a c l a s s o f p e r s o n s o r a p u r p o s e f u l and d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o s e c u r e t h e j u r y from a l i m i t e d a r e a i n s t e a d o f t h e e n t i r e county d e p r i v e s a defendant of fundamental c o n s t i t u - tional rights. S t a t e v . Hay, ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232. I n - t h i s C o u r t found t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d Hay t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t h e had b e e n d e p r i v e d o f h i s r i g h t t o have a j u r y t a k e n from a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e c o u n t y by showing t h a t a l l members o f t h e j u r y p a n e l w e r e r e s i d e n t s o f t h e c o u n t y s e a t , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a showing t h a t i t was t h e r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t e design. I n t h i s case, t h e r e was no showing o f d e l i b e r a t e d e s i g n t o g e t a j u r y p a n e l from o n l y t h e w e s t s i d e of B i l l i n g s . W e h o l d t h a t t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d i n s u b s t a n t i a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e law and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t h e was d e n i e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y must f a i l . Issue 7. Defendant claims error in improperly restrict- ing his cross-examination of some of the State's witnesses. At the time of trial section 93-1901-7, R.C.M. 1947, governed the scope of permissible cross-examination. In substance it permits cross-examination as to any testimony elicited on direct examination or facts connected therewith and all other facts connected with the witness's testimony which tends to enlighten the jury on the question in controversy. State Highway Commission v. Bennett, (1973), 162 Mont. 386, 513 P.2d 5. We have examined the District Court's rulings concerning cross-examination of State's witnesses Ash, Schiffer and Nank, and find no error. The questions asked were either argumentative, immaterial or otherwise answered. Defendant also claims error in connection with his attempted cross-examination of State's expert witness Hippard from the F.B.I. laboratory concerning identification of the hairs taken from the Harstad vehicle and comparison of these hairs with defendant Coleman's hair. The District Court properly disallowed cross-examination of Hippard concerning his ability to identify hair from pictures as the witness testified that he could not look at a picture of a hair and identify it. Hippard testified on direct examination that the only way of identifying and comparing hair was by a comparison microscope which was the method he used. Although defendant offered to submit hair samples to Hippard, he did not speci- fically state how this would be done or offer to furnish a comparison microscope. The District Court did tell defendant to proceed with his cross-examination and that they were then through with the witness unless defendant himself c a l l e d him on d i r e c t , which d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t do. The m a t t e r of p e r m i t t i n g e x p e r i m e n t s , t e s t s , and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i s o n e a d d r e s s e d t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . S t a t e v . London, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 4 1 0 , 310 P.2d 571; S t a t e v . ~ e l l e r , ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 142, 246 P.2d 817; S t a t e v . ~ h o m p s o n , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115. W e f i n d no a b u s e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n h e r e under t h e o f f e r of t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g s . I s s u e 8. Defendant a s s i g n s e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a l l e n g e t o Nank's m e n t a l competency a s a w i t n e s s . A Montana s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s t h a t t h o s e of unsound mind c a n n o t be w i t n e s s e s . S e c t i o n 93-701-3(1), R.C.M. 1947. It i s t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge t o d e t e r m i n e t h e competency of a w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y . S t a t e v . Newman, ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. 180, 213 P . 805. There i s no presumption A t h a t a witness i s i n c o m p e t e n t and t h e burden i s on t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g t h e incompetency t o p r o v e i t . S t a t e v . Newman, s u p r a . This d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t do. F u r t h e r m o r e , i f a w i t n e s s i s s u f f i c i e n t l y competent t o u n d e r s t a n d and a p p r e c i a t e t h e n a t u r e and o b l i g a t i o n of a n o a t h and c a n c o r r e c t l y n a r r a t e t h e f a c t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a s e , h e may t e s t i f y and t h e s t a t e of h i s m e n t a l i t y g o e s o n l y t o t h e w e i g h t o f h i s t e s t i m o n y and n o t t o i t s admis- sibility. M a r t i n v . Hover, ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 60 Mont. 302, 199 P. 694. W f i n d no e r r o r by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h i s i s s u e . e I s s u e 9. A t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t moved t o d i s m i s s t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r a judgment o f a c q u i t t a l f o r l a c k of c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y . C o r r o b o r a t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y of one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e i s necessary t o s u s t a i n a conviction. S e c t i o n 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947. his s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s c o r r o b o r a t i o n by e v i d e n c e which t e n d s t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e , w i t h o u t t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p e r s o n l e g a l l y accountable o r responsible. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. W e disagree. The r u l e on c o r r o b o r a t i o n i s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Cobb, ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. In t h a t case, w e held t h a t t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e may b e s u p p l i e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ; i t may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ; i t need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of g u i l t ; and i t need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e c r i m e b u t must t e n d t o c o n n e c t him w i t h t h e c r i m e . I n S t a t e v . Keckonen, ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341, w e h e l d t h a t where t h e a l l e g e d c o r r o b a t i v e evidence i s e q u a l l y consonant with a reasonable explanation p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of d e f e n d a n t , t h e n s u c h e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t t e n d t o c o n n e c t him w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e and i s i n t h e r e a l m of s p e c u l a t i o n , not corroboration. Where t h e claimed c o r r o b o r a t i o n shows no more t h a n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit a c r i m e and s i m p l y proves suspicion, it i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration t o j u s t i f y a c o n v i c t i o n upon t h e t e s t i m o n y of an accomplice. S t a t e v. Jones, ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 317, 26 ~ . 2 d341. Applying t h o s e r u l e s t o t h i s c a s e , w e h o l d t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank's t e s t i m o n y t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction. The c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e i s : he c r a c k i n d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t ; a h a i r of Peggy ~ e e H a r s t a d b e i n g on t h e r o p e b e l o n g i n g t o t h e s e men; t h e f i n g e r - p r i n t s on h e r c a r and i n h e r p u r s e ; t h e Negroid p u b i c h a i r s s i m i l a r t o d e f e n d a n t ' s and t h e Negroid head h a i r found i n h e r c a r ; and, t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t and Nank were s e e n t o g e t h e r on t h e same r o a d and a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e t h a t ' Peggy L e e H a r s t a d d i s a p p e a r e d . This evidence tends t o c o n n e c t d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e s charged. I t i s e v i d e n c e of more t h a n mere o p p o r t u n i t y o r s u s p i c i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed t h e s e o f f e n s e s . This e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h any r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t . W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s motion. Issue 10. On a p p e a l , a s a t t h e t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s o b j e c t i o n s t o c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s and answers e l i c i t e d from t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses. H e argues t h a t t h e s e a r e cumulative errors requiring reversal. W e do n o t a g r e e . H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o Nank's b e i n g a l l o w e d , on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t o t e s t i f y t h a t he had t o l d t h e same s t o r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c r i m e t o t h e p o l i c e and t h e F.B.I. prior t o the t r i a l . Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y was used t o b u t t r e s s and f o r t i f y Nank's t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e h i s testimony w a s challenged. B a s i c a l l y , t h e q u e s t i o n s t o Nank w e r e t o f i n d o u t i f Nank was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e t r u t h . This Court has held i n t h e p a s t t h a t t h e S t a t e may a s k s u c h q u e s t i o n s on d i r e c t examination. S t a t e v. C o l l e t t , ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 118 Mont. 473, 167 P.2d 584. I n C o l l e t t , t h i s Court s a i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g t h e w i t n e s s t o answer a q u e s t i o n a s t o whether h e was t e s t i f y i n g t o t h e truth. The r a t i o n a l e i s t h a t w h i l e t h e answer i s i n t h e n a t u r e of a s e l f - s e r v i n g d e c l a r a t i o n , i t i s o n l y a r e a f f i r m a - t i o n of what t h e w i t n e s s promises t o d o when h e t a k e s t h e oath. W b e l i e v e t h i s approach i s sound and w i l l f o l l o w it e here. W h o l d t h e q u e s t i o n s and answers a s t o Nank's p r i o r e statements do n o t c o n s t i t u t e p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . Defendant t h e n o b j e c t s t o a n F.B.I. agent being allowed t o t e s t i f y about defendant's a t t i t u d e i n h i s interview with d e f e n d a n t a t S h e r i d a n , Wyoming. Specifically, the agent t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was e v a s i v e d u r i n g q u e s t i o n i n g . W e a g r e e t h a t t h i s was improper o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e . However, t e c h n i c a l e r r o r s o r d e f e c t s w i l l n o t p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r reversal i n a criminal prosecution. S t a t e v. Gallagher, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 501, 4 4 5 P.2d 4 5 . W hold t h a t e t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h i s t e s t i m o n y was o n l y a t e c h n i c a l e r r o r and i s n o t a b a s i s f o r r e v e r s a l . Next, d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a F . B . I . fingerprint e x p e r t was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y on r e - d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n beyond t h e s c o p e of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . The q u e s t i o n s t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d concerned t h e d a t e on which t h e F.B.I. laboratory received c e r t a i n f i n g e r p r i n t cards. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h e r e was some c o n f u s i o n a s t o t h e d a t e s v a r i o u s f i n g e r p r i n t c a r d s were r e c e i v e d . Under t h o s e circum- s t a n c e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o c l a r i f y t h e i s s u e on r e - d i r e c t . F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o w i t n e s s Makin t e s t i f y i n g a s t o where h e was t o l d c e r t a i n h a i r s came from. Defendant c l a i m s t h i s was h e a r s a y . An e a r l i e r w i t n e s s , Ash, who was t h e d e c l a r a n t , t e s t i f i e d as t o where h e found t h e h a i r s . Here, u n d e r s h e r i f f Makin was t e s t i f y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e chain of evidence. He had r e c e i v e d t h e h a i r s from O f f i c e r Ash, who t o l d Makin he o b t a i n e d t h e h a i r s from t h e abandoned H a r s t a d v e h i c l e . Thus, t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of ~ s was h a p a r t of t h e c h a i n of e v i d e n c e . W f i n d no c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r i n t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e e S t a t e ' s witnesses s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant reversal. I s s u e 11. Defendant o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n t o t h e j u r y and o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were r e f u s e d . W e f i n d t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d . D e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 22. This i n s t r u c t i o n was t h a t i f t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t committed a homicide and no c i r c u m s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , e x c u s e o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n a p p e a r s , t h e y may i n f e r t h a t t h e homicide was committed knowingly and p u r p o s e l y . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was b a s e d on s e c t i o n 9 5 - 3 0 0 4 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. The i n s t r u c t i o n follows the s t a t u t e . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n a s a s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , c i t i n g Leary v . United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L e d 2d 57. T h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s t h a t t o have a v a l i d c r i m i n a l s t a t u - t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n , t h e presumed f a c t must more l i k e l y t h a n n o t f l o w from t h e proved f a c t on which i t depends. W e f i n d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e a r e c o n s t i t u - tionally valid. The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e y "may" f i n d knowledge o r p u r p o s e when t h e r e a r e no c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m i t i g a t i o n , excuse, o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . They a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o find this. Thus, i t i s n o t a c o n c l u s i v e p r e s u m p t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t u t e d o n o t v i o l a t e t h e Leary r e q u i r e - ment b e c a u s e a f i n d i n g o f knowledge o r p u r p o s e would more l i k e l y t h a n n o t f l o w from t h e proved f a c t t h a t a homicide was committed by d e f e n d a n t and where t h e r e w e r e no circum- s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , j u s t i f i c a t i o n , o r excuse. D e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 26, which g a v e t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "knowingly", and f u r t h e r o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 1 6 , which d e a l t w i t h c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n , was n o t g i v e n . I n s t r u c t i o n 26 was t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f "knowingly" a s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101(28), R.C.M. 1947. The p o r t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e and i n s t r u c t i o n d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o i s : "When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s a n e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , s u c h knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n i s aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . " Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n d o e s n o t comply w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t . T h a t i s why, a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t , h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16 s h o u l d have been g i v e n a s i t e x p l a i n e d t h e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n neces- s a r y f o r a c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. W b e l i e v e t h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s g i v i n g of e I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 16. W have c o n s i d e r e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y e on c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p r e m e d i t a t i o n b e f o r e . S t a t e v. Sharbono, (1977), Mont. , 563 P.2d 61, 34 St.Rep. 196. I n t h a t c a s e , we found no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s refusal t o give an instruction identical t o defendant's o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 16. There, w e held t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had changed t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f mens r e a . T h i s C o u r t s a i d , i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t : "Upon t h e whole i t i s t h e p e r s o n who means t o do t h e t h i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a c r i m e , knows h e i s d o i n g i t , and knows t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l and u n j u s t i f i a b l e r i s k i n d o i n g i t , whose c o n d u c t w a r r a n t s condemnation of t h e k i n d from which c o n v i c t i o n r e s u l t s . " Sharbono, 563 P.2d a t 72. Therefore, w e f i n d t h e c o u r t properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o t h e "knowledge" r e q u i r e d f o r a c o n v i c t i o n i n I n s t r u c t i o n 26 and p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d d e f e n d a n t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 16. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10 w a s n o t given. T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l s w i t h t h e burden of p r o o f . I t comes from S t a t e v . Halk, ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 49 Mont. 173, 1 4 1 P. The C o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e burden of proof i n I n s t r u c t i o n 4 . Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 10. Next d e f e n d a n t complains t h a t h i s proposed I n s t r u c t i o n 1 4 on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t was n o t g i v e n . W believe the court e r i g h t f u l l y refused t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n c e t h e jury w a s a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n s 5, 6 , 7 , and 10. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n would have o n l y been r e d u n d a n t , and, t h e r e f o r e , was u n n e c e s s a r y . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 s h o u l d have been g i v e n . This i n s t r u c t i o n d e a l t with t h e n o t having t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e g r e a t e r number of w i t n e s s e s i f t h e i r t e s t i m o n y d o e s n o t produce conviction i n t h e i r minds. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t w i t h t h e number of w i t n e s s e s t h e S t a t e produced, h e was e n t i t l e d t o t h i s instruction. W e disagree. W e must p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d e f e n d a n t proposed was a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d i n t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n 2 . This i n s t r u c t i o n read i n part: "You a r e n o t bound t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s of any number of w i t n e s s e s , n o t p r o d u c i n g c o n v i c t i o n i n your minds, a g a i n s t a l e s s number o r a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e s a t i s f y i n g your minds. The d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of o n e w i t n e s s who i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e proof of any f a c t i n t h i s case." T h i s i s a s t a n d a r d Montana J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n Guide i n s t r u c t i o n which c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s t h e law. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 34 c o v e r i n g t h e same s u b j e c t . Next, d e f e n d a n t a l l e g e s t h a t h i s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n 35A s h o u l d have been g i v e n . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was on t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Where t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e o f m i t i g a t i o n t h a t would f i t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e , s e c t i o n 94-5-103, R.C.M. 1947, t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d p r o p e r l y r e f u s e t o i n s t r u c t on s u c h c r i m e . State v . Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315. I n v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d h e r e , w e f i n d no e v i d e n c e o f mitigation. This i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d . D e f e n d a n t a l s o o b j e c t s t o I n s t r u c t i o n 40. This instruc- t i o n t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t s e n t e n c i n g was v e s t e d i n t h e c o u r t and t h e j u r y was n o t t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t defendant could r e c e i v e i n reaching a v e r d i c t . Defendant's o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , and i n v o i r d i r e o f t h e jury, t h e j u r y was l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e j u d g e had d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i m p l y t o l d t h e j u r y s e n t e n c i n g was up t o t h e judge. The i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t s t a t e t h a t t h e judge c a n m i t i g a t e punishment. I t o n l y s a y s t h a t h e h a s t h e power t o impose p u n i s h m e n t , which i s c o r r e c t . I t i s where t h e jury i s i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e various p o s s i b i l i t i e s of sentence t h a t prejudice t o t h e defendant e x i s t s . S t a t e v . Zuidema, ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 367, 485 P.2d 952. T h i s i s n o t t h e case here. The i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r . F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t form u s e d o n Count 11. The j u r y was s p e c i f i c a l l y a s k e d t o f i n d i f Peggy Lee H a r s t a d d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping. The j u r y f o u n d t h a t s h e d i d . Defendant argues t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s by t h e j u r y . The j u r y was g i v e n g e n e r a l v e r d i c t s a s k i n g f o r a f i n d i n g o f g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y on e a c h c o u n t . The j u r y was t o make t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e element necessary f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was p r e s e n t . Under t h o s e circumstances, t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g does n o t f a l l i n t o t h e v i c e of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . I t does n o t r e q u i r e a f a c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n which c o u l d b e u s e d t o undermine t h e general verdict. Thus, t h e v e r d i c t f o r m s w e r e p e r m i s s i b l e . I n any e v e n t , o u r h o l d i n g on M o n t a n a ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e r e n d e r s t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r n o n p r e j u d i c i a l . I s s u e 12. D e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s t o some e x h i b i t s which w e r e a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e and some o f h i s own which w e r e refused admission. H i s f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s t o S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 20. T h i s was a p i c t u r e o f t h e a r e a i n which Peggy L e e H a r s t a d ' s body was found. I n t h e p i c t u r e , h e r decomposed body c a n be s e e n . D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s p i c t u r e was p r e j u d i c i a l b e c a u s e i t i s a gruesome p h o t o g r a p h . H e c l a i m s t h a t any r e l e v a n c y of t h i s p h o t o g r a p h i s outweighed by i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t p h o t o g r a p h s which h e l p t h e jury understand t h e c a s e a r e admissible, b u t photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse t h e sympathies o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e jury a r e properly excluded. S t a t e v. Bischert, ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 9 6 9 . T h i s C o u r t went o n t o s a y , i n t h a t c a s e , t h a t p h o t o g r a p h s may n o t b e u s e d i f i n t e n d e d t o i n f l a m e t h e minds of t h e j u r y r a t h e r t h a n e n l i g h t e n them a s t o t h e f a c t s . W e a f f i r m t h e r u l e of t h e B i s c h e r t case, but r e j e c t its application t o t h i s case. I n B i s c h e r t , t h e p h o t o g r a p h was e x t r e m e l y d i s t a s t e f u l and d i d n o t make a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d e v e l o p - ment o f t h e f a c t s i n t h a t c a s e . This i s n o t the case here. W e have examined t h e p h o t o g r a p h and f i n d t h a t it i s h a z y , i n d i s t i n c t , and o f p o o r q u a l i t y . Any gruesome c h a r a c t e r t h a t t h e photograph might o t h e r w i s e p o s s e s s i s l o s t i n i t s development and r e p r o d u c t i o n . The p h o t o g r a p h i s r e l e v a n t i n t h a t i t shows t h e j u r y t h e a r e a i n which t h e body was found; and i t c o r r o b o r a t e s Nank's t e s t i m o n y a s t o h e r b e i n g f u l l y c l o t h e d and a s t o where t h e body was. Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e , t h e p h o t o g r a p h ' s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e outweighs i t s p r e j u d i c i a l effect. Defendant o b j e c t s t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of two o t h e r photo- g r a p h s , namely, S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 4 1 and 43. These w e r e p i c t u r e s of t h e a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g and t h e p a r k i n g l o t i n B o i s e , where d e f e n d a n t and Nank were a r r e s t e d . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s w e r e i r r e l e v a n t and c u m u l a t i v e evidence. A s a g e n e r a l r u l e , p h o t o g r a p h s , when r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a p e r s o n , p l a c e o r t h i n g , a r e a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a s e . F u l t o n v. Chouteau County F a r m e r s ' Co., ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 9 8 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. The p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g and p a r k i n g l o t h e l p e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e p l a c e where t h e d e f e n d a n t and Nank w e r e arrested. These p h o t o g r a p h s showed where t h e h e l m e t s and r o p e were r e c o v e r e d . These photographs a s s i s t e d t h e j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e a r r e s t and s e a r c h i n B o i s e . They were properly admitted. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of Nank's m o t o r c y c l e helmet i n t o e v i d e n c e . H i s complaint i s t h a t t h e chain of evidence w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o t h e admission o f t h e h e l m e t and f u r t h e r complains t h a t h e was n o t a l l o w e d t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o i t s a d m i s s i o n . Defendant s t a t e s t h e r e was a problem w i t h t h e c h a i n of e v i d e n c e i n t h a t t h i s h e l m e t was l a b e l e d a s b e l o n g i n g t o d e f e n d a n t and n o t ~ a n k . S i n c e Nank, p r i o r t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h e h e l m e t , p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d i t a s h i s , we f i n d t h e c h a i n of evidence e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o i t s admission. The mismarked l a b e l i s of no consequence a s t h e l a b e l was n o t a d m i t t e d i n t o evidence. W r e c o g n i z e t h a t d e f e n d a n t might have been e allowed t o v o i r d i r e Nank p r i o r t o t h e a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e of t h e h e l m e t b u t such was n o t r e q u i r e d . T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t such a v o i r d i r e would have produced a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . A t most, o n l y a p r o c e d u r a l e r r o r n o t a f f e c t i n g t h e m e r i t s was i n v o l v e d , and n o t a p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r r e q u i r i n g r e v e r s a l . S t a t e v. Heiser, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 413, 407 P.2d 370. Defendant f u r t h e r c l a i m s e r r o r i n a d m i t t i n g i n e v i d e n c e t h e w a i v e r of r i g h t s form g i v e n t o d e f e n d a n t i n B o i s e , which he r e f u s e d t o s i g n . Defendant c l a i m s t h i s e x h i b i t was i r r e l e v a n t and s h o u l d have been excluded a s c u m u l a t i v e evidence. W c a n f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h i s e x h i b i t . e This e x h i b i t aided i n t h e jury i n understanding t h e events o f t h i s c a s e t h a t o c c u r r e d i n B o i s e , Idaho. It supported t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e B o i s e d e t e c t i v e s a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e a r r e s t , t h e t i m e of t h e a r r e s t , and t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s informed of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The e x h i b i t was properly admitted. Defendant o b j e c t s t h a t h i s E x h i b i t s V , W, X and Y were r e f u s e d . These e x h i b i t s were p i c t u r e s of t h e S t a t e ' s f i n g e r - p r i n t p h o t o s . They were e n l a r g e m e n t s and a n o v e r l a y of them was made. By u s e of t h e o v e r l a y , d e f e n d a n t wanted t o show any d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s . Our r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t l a y a f o u n d a t i o n , p r i o r t o moving f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n of h i s e x h i b i t s , showing t h a t f i n g e r p r i n t s c o u l d be compared i n t h e manner d e f e n d a n t was a t t e m p t i n g t o compare them. What d e f e n d a n t wanted t o do was t o show t h e j u r y by a c t u a l measurement t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e r i d g e s between a known p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t and t h e p r i n t found i n Peggy Lee Harstad's purse. A f i n g e r p r i n t c a n n o t be compared i n t h i s manner. The same f i n g e r p r i n t w i l l produce d i f f e r i n g r e s u l t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o a measurement between t h e r i d g e s depending upon t h e p r e s s u r e a p p l i e d i n making t h e p r i n t and t h e manner i n which t h e p r i n t was l e f t upon t h e s u r f a c e . Fingerprints a r e compared by d e t e r m i n i n g i f t h e same r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e p r e s e n t i n a known p r i n t and unknown p r i n t . These r i d g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l n o t v a r y between t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n which a n i m p r e s s i o n i s made on a s u r f a c e . The r u l e i s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a s been l a i d i n o r d e r t o i n t r o d u c e e x h i b i t s i n t o e v i d e n c e r e s t s w i t h t h e lower c o u r t and i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t b e o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r a b u s e of discretion. S t a t e v . Olsen, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y e x c l u d e d t h e e x h i b i t s b e c a u s e no p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n w a s l a i d f o r t h e i r a d m i s s i o n . Finally, defendant claims t h a t t h e c o u r t erred i n r e f u s i n g h i s E x h i b i t T showing some c a l c u l a t i o n s 1 a s t o t h e h e i g h t of t h e w a t e r l e v e l i n t h e Yellowstone River on J u l y 4 , 1974. T h i s e x h i b i t was t o a i d d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t Peggy Lee H a r s t a d was n o t drowned i n t h e r i v e r a s Nank t e s t i f i e d s h e was. Defendant was t r y i n g t o p r o v e t h a t t h e r i v e r , on ~ u l y , 1974, was t o o d e e p , i n t h e a r e a where t h e body was 4 found, f o r Nank and d e f e n d a n t t o b e h o l d i n g h e r under t h e water. This e x h i b i t w a s n o t a d m i s s b l e b e c a u s e of a l a c k of a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n . Our r e v i e w of t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s who p r e p a r e d t h i s e x h i b i t were n e v e r shown t o have t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o p r e p a r e such a n e x h i b i t ; i t was n o t made c l e a r how t h e y a r r i v e d a t t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s t h e y made of t h e h e i g h t , f l o w , and volume of t h e r i v e r ; a n d , i t was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e h e i g h t of t h e r i v e r on J u l y 4 , 1974, were competent. Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e was no e r r o r i n d e n y i n g t h i s e x h i b i t admission i n evidence. I s s u e 13. Following h i s c o n v i c t i o n , d e f e n d a n t moved f o r a new t r i a l . One of t h e grounds d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d was t h a t a f t e r b o t h s i d e s had r e s t e d t h e i r c a s e , d e f e n d a n t was c o n t a c t e d by a w i t n e s s who knew of d e f e n d a n t ' s good c o n d u c t and c h a r a c t e r . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i s grounds f o r a new t r i a l under s e c t i o n 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947. " I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l n o t be g r a n t e d upon t h e ground of newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i - dence where i t a p p e a r s t h a t such new e v i d e n c e c a n have no o t h e r e f f e c t t h a n t o d i s c r e d i t t h e t e s t i m o n y of a w i t n e s s a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l . I t i s o n l y when i t i s shown by competent and s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e t h a t a p p e l l a n t would n o t have been con- v i c t e d , b u t f o r t h i s e v i d e n c e , t h a t a new t r i a l w i l l b e g r a n t e d f o r newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) " S t a t e v. Schleining, (1965), 146 Mont. 1, 1 7 , 403 P.2d 625. I n t h i s c a s e , d e f e n d a n t ' s newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e would o n l y go t o d i s c r e d i t Nank's t e s t i m o n y and d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t shown t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e would make t h e d i f f e r e n c e between h i s b e i n g o r n o t b e i n g c o n v i c t e d i n a new t r i a l . Under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w e w i l l f o l l o w t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i n f i n d i n g no e r r o r i n t h e d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . W have examined t h e s u b s i d i a r y c o n t e n t i o n s of d e f e n d a n t e and f i n d t h a t none would change o u r h o l d i n g s i n t h i s c a s e o r merit s p e c i a l discussion i n t h i s opinion. The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n on a l l t h r e e c o u n t s i s a f f i r m e d . The s e n t e n c e s imposed f o r Counts I1 and I11 a r e vacated. The c a s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g on Counts I1 and 111. zL&g%& Chief J u s t i c e W Concur: e A ,' -I f/d 92-d J u s t i c e dr" dd>i