No. 13845
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978
GEORGE CLARK,
Claimant and Appellant,
-vs-
HILDE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Emloyer,
and
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: Workers' compensation Court,
Hon. William E Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Charles E. Snyder, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings,
Montana
H. Elwood English, Billings, Montana
Cause Submitted on briefs; March 3, 1978, 1978
Decided: MAR 2 I! 1978
, . .--2
Filed: MCz % zi -
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court :
Claimant appeals t h e decision of t h e Workers' Compensation
Court, dated A p r i l 27, 1977, denying compensation f o r an
a l l e g e d i n j u r y s u f f e r e d i n t h e course of h i s employment on J u l y
11, 1975.
O Friday, J u l y 11, 1975, a t approximately 4:00 t o 4:30
n
p.m., claimant was changing a t i r e on a t r u c k he was operating
f o r Hilde Construction Company, a t a job s i t e 7 o r 8 miles n o r t h of
Lame Deer, Montana. Claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t while changing t h e
t i r e , he f e l t something " s l i p " i n h i s back. He received a s s i s -
tance from another worker, and proceeded t o complete h i s d a i l y
route. Claimant then drove t o h i s home i n Absarokee, Montana.
He t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he a r r i v e d , he experienced s e r i o u s pain i n
h i s lower back, and could hardly walk.
Claimant's w i f e , t h e s o l e witness t o s e e claimant during t h e
period of time immediately following t h e i n j u r y , returned t o t h e
family home i n Absarokee on Sunday, J u l y 13, a f t e r a weekend
i n Idaho F a l l s , Idaho. She t e s t i f i e d claimant was i n a g r e a t
d e a l of pain and could n o t stand e r e c t .
On Monday, J u l y 14, claimant attempted t o c o n t a c t h i s foreman
concerning t h e i n j u r y , but was unable t o reach him. He then
reported t h e i n j u r y t o t h e s e c r e t a r y of h i s union, so t h a t a
replacement worker would be located. Hilde Construction Company
received n o t i c e of t h e i n j u r y by c l a i m a n t ' s claim f o r compensa-
t i o n , dated August 22, 1975, and received by i t s c a r r i e r , T r a v e l e r s
Insurance Company on August 25, 1975.
Following t h e i n j u r y , claimant consulted and was .treated by
numerous physicians, neurosurgeons, orthopedic s p e c i a l i s t s and
chiropractors. The diagnoses of t h e r e s p e c t i v e physicians a r e
not c l e a r regarding t h e n a t u r e of c l a i m a n t ' s d i s o r d e r . While
some physicians conclude claimant manifests symptoms of m u l t i p l e
s c l e r o s i s , o t h e r s diagnosed t h e condition a s s p o n d y l o l i s t h e s i s - -
a d e f e c t i n o r lack of s o l i d bone i n p o r t i o n s of t h e s p i n e ,
u s u a l l y i n t h e lower spine.
The cause came on f o r hearing before t h e Workers' Compensa-
t i o n Court on November 4 , 1976. I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and
conclusions of law, t h e Workers' Compensation Court denied
compensation t o claimant, finding:
"Claimant f a i l e d t o prove by a preponderance of t h e
c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t he s u f f e r e d an i n d u s t r i a l
a c c i d e n t r e s u l t i n g i n a compensable i n j u r y t h a t s a t i s -
f i e s t h e requirements of Sections 92-418 I n j u r y o r i n j u r e d
defined; and 92-614(1) ' * ** an i n j u r y a r i s i n g out of
and i n t h e course of h i s employment ** *I."
The determinative i s s u e on t h i s appeal i s whether claimant
s u f f e r e d a compensable "injury" within t h e course of h i s employ-
ment. W hold t h e Workers' Compensation Court was c o r r e c t i n
e
concluding he d i d n o t .
Section 92-418(1), R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n
of "injury1' f o r purposes of compensation a s :
"(1) a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e from an
unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n , r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r
e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l physical harm, and such physical
condition as a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding d i s e a s e
not traceable t o injury * * *.I'
To e s t a b l i s h a compensable i n j u r y , a claimant must prove,
by a preponderance of t h e evidence, t h a t t h e condition was proxi-
mately caused by a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e from
an unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n . McAndrews v. Schwartz,
(1974), 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379. Where a c l a i m a n t ' s d i s -
order o r d i s a b i l i t y i s t h e r e s u l t of a d i s e a s e not t r a c e a b l e
t o a work r e l a t e d i n j u r y , i t i s , a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , not com-
pensable under t h e language of s e c t i o n 92-418(1). McAndrews v.
Schwartz, supra; LaForest v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , (1966), 147
Mont. 431, 414 P.2d 200. W f i n d claimant f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y h i s
e
burden of proving "injury" .
The bulk of t h e medical evidence tends t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t
c l a i m a n t ' s symptoms a r e t h e r e s u l t of m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s , a
d i s e a s e which, a s p r e s e n t l y understood, i s n o t t r a c e a b l e t o an
"injury" such a s t h a t claimant purports t o have s u f f e r e d . Indeed,
claimant admitted having been t r e a t e d f o r symptoms commonly
a s s o c i a t e d with m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s one year p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t .
Claimant simply f a i l e d t o prove, by a preponderance of t h e evidence,
t h a t h i s physical condition was proximately caused by an
industrial injury .
A t t h e hearing of November 4, 1976, D r . Howard E. Hultgren,
a B i l l i n g s c h i r o p r a c t o r who had t r e a t e d claimant, t e s t i f i e d he
was of t h e opinion t h a t claimant was s u f f e r i n g from spondylo-
listhesis. D r . Hagen, a B i l l i n g s o r t h o p e d i s t , a l s o t e s t i f i e d
by way of d e p o s i t i o n , t h a t claimant was s u f f e r i n g from
s p o n d y l o l i s t h e s i s , b u t t h e condition had e x i s t e d p r i o r t o the
accident a s revealed by a comparison of X-rays taken both before
and a f t e r t h e accident. Thus, the workers' Compensation Court
could w e l l have concluded t h e complained of physical c o n d i t i o n ,
even i f n o t c o n s i d e d a "disease", predated t h e a c c i d e n t .
It i s of course t h e r u l e , urged by claimant, t h a t an
employee who s u f f e r s from a p r e e x i s t i n g condition i s e n t i t l e d t o
compensation i f t h e condition was aggravated o r a c c e l e r a t e d by
an i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y . Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, (1975),
166 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433; Gaffney v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident B d . ,
(1955), 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256; Weakley v. Cook, (1952),
126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926. However, t h e c r i t i c a l shortcoming
of c l a i m a n t ' s c a s e , even assuming, arguendo, t h e p r e e x i s t i n g
condition and t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e symptoms complained o f , i s
h i s f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e occurrence of a work r e l a t e d i n j u r y .
Claimant's u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e of proof of a work r e l a t e d
i n j u r y i s e v i d e n t , when considering t h e evidence he f a i l e d t o
introduce. Claimant c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e
i n j u r y had " a r i s e n out of and i n t h e course of h i s employment"
a s required by s e c t i o n 92-614(1), R.C.M. 1947. Williams v.
G l a c i e r Park Co., (1962), 140 Mont. 440, 373 P.2d 517.
Claimant f a i l e d t o l o c a t e and produce t h e co-worker who
a l l e g e d l y a s s i s t e d him i n changing t h e t i r e following t h e claimed
accident. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e union s e c r e t a r y t o whom t h e a c c i d e n t
was reported on Monday, J u l y 14, 1975, was not l o c a t e d , produced a t
t r i a l , nor deposed, although claimant was afforded a 30 day
period following t h e hearing t o do so. Therefore, d e s p i t e t h e
a v a i l a b i l i t y of p r o o f , claimant produced no witnesses t o corroborate
h i s obviously s e l f - s e r v i n g testimony concerning t h e occurrence of
t h e i n j u r y during t h e course of h i s employment.
Where weaker evidence i s o f f e r e d , and i t appears i t was
w i t h i n t h e power of t h e o f f e r i n g p a r t y t o produce s t r o n g e r and
more s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence, t h e o f f e r e d evidence, i . e . claimant's
testimony regarding t h e i n j u r y , i s t o be viewed with d i s t r u s t .
Section 93-2001-1, R.C.M. 1947. F u r t h e r , s e c t i o n 93-1301-7,
R.C.M. 1947, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e following presumptions:
"5. That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse, if produced.
"6. That higher evidence would be adverse from
in£erior , being producedI'.
Given the rules of evidence noted above, we conclude the
Workers' Compensation Court could properly infer the testimony
not produced would be adverse to claimant's position on the issue
of whether the injury arose out of the course of his employment.
The decision of the workers ' Compensation Court denying
compensation is affirmed.
We Concur:
Chief Justice
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Hon. Bernard Thomas, District
Judge, sitting.