No. 13923
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978
JOHN F7AINMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
LARRY C. BOWLER, d/b/a TEE
DANIELS COUNTY LEADER,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial
District,
Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Robert A. Meldahl araued, Fairview, Montana
For Respondent:
Traynor and Hoversland, Scobey, Montana
Ken W. Hoversland argued, Scobey, Montana
Submitted: Jan. 26, 1978
Decided: MAR 2 8 1 7
98
Filed: MPR 2 5 "6
1
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by p l a i n t i f f from a judgment on t h e
pleadings. P l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n f o r l i b e l w a s commenced
f o l l o w i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f a r t i c l e s by d e f e n d a n t i n The
-
D a n i e l s County Leader.
The c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t p u b l i s h e d t h r e e
a r t i c l e s c o n t a i n i n g l i b e l o u s s t a t e m e n t s which were f a l s e ,
u n p r i v i l e g e d , and c a l c u l a t e d t o d r i v e p l a i n t i f f from h i s
office. Those s t a t e m e n t s , s e g r e g a t e d by p l a i n t i f f from t h e
e n t i r e a r t i c l e s , a r e a s follows:
September 1 6 , 1976: "There h a s been a d e r e l i c t i o n
of d u t y , b u l l y i n g of p e o p l e , concealment o r
d e l i b e r a t e non-recording of p u b l i c r e c o r d s ,
p l u s abysmal l a c k of normal and r e a s o n a b l e
a c c e s s t o t h e r e c o r d s which a r e r e c o r d e d . "
October 2 1 , 1976: " I n c r e a s i n g d i s c o u r t e s y
and n e g l i g e n c e by County and Scobey law
enforcement o f f i c i a l s i n d e a l i n g w i t h c i t i -
zens of t h e a r e a and ~ ~ s i t o r s . "
November 11, 1976: " * * * b u l l y boy c h i e f
of p o l i c e i n Scobey."
P l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t a c t i o n f o r l i b e l was commenced on
December 2 , 1976. This a c t i o n w a s dismissed. A second
a c t i o n was f i l e d a f t e r p r o p e r r e t r a c t i o n t i m e had p a s s e d
p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant
answered p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t and f i l e d a motion f o r
judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s . The motion was based on two
grounds. F i r s t , t h e c o m p l a i n t s t a t e s no c a u s e of a c t i o n
upon which r e l i e f c a n be g r a n t e d . Second, i f t h e s t a t e m e n t s
a r e viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ,
d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u t o r y d e f e n s e s of t r u t h and p r i v i l e g e n e g a t e
p l a i n t i f f ' s claims.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r
judgment o n t h e p l e a d i n g s and d i s m i s s e d p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t
w i t h p r e j u d i c e . The Memorandum Opinion accompanying t h a t
order reads:
"The i m p o r t a n t p l e a d i n g i n t h i s c a s e i s t h e
Complaint and a r e a d i n g of t h e Complaint r e v e a l s
t h a t a l l of t h e r e f e r e n c e s i n t h e D a n i e l s County
Leader t h a t w e r e p u b l i s h e d had r e f e r e n c e t o a
g e n e r a l c l a s s of p e o p l e , and a l t h o u g h t h e P l a i n -
t i f f was w i t h i n t h a t c l a s s , t h e l a n g u a g e was
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e l i b e l p e r s e . One
e x c e p t i o n w a s made and t h a t w a s t h e p u b l i c a t i o n
on November 11, 1976, when t h e E d i t o r of t h e
D a n i e l s County Leader r e f e r r e d t o t h e P l a i n t i f f
a s a ' b u l l y boy c h i e f of p o l i c e i n S c o b e y ' .
T h i s l a n g u a g e i s n o t l i b e l p e r s e , and t h e
f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e innuendo a r e n o t s e t
f o r t h i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. In addition,
i f l i b e l i s n o t p e r se i t must a p p e a r by innuendo
and s p e c i a l damages must be a l l e g e d . T h i s was
n o t done i n t h i s c a s e . "
Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r r e v i e w :
1. Whether t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e l i b e l o u s p e r s e ?
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g a
judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s ?
I s s u e 1. P l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t i s s u e r e q u i r e s a r e v i e w of
t h e pleadings. On t h e f a c e of t h e p l e a d i n g s , it i s o b v i o u s
t h a t t h e t h e o r y of p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t i s l i b e l p e r se.
N s p e c i a l damages w e r e a l l e g e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t .
o Montana
law i s c l e a r on t h i s s u b j e c t . To s t a t e a c a u s e of a c t i o n
f o r l i b e l , t h e c o m p l a i n t must s t a t e a l i b e l p e r se a c t i o n o r
p l e a d s p e c i a l damages t o uphold a l i b e l p e r quod a c t i o n .
S t e f f e s v . Crawford, ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 143 Mont. 4 3 , 47, 386 P.2d 842.
A c c o r d i n g l y , on t h e f a c e of t h e p l e a d i n g s and i n l i g h t
of s e t t l e d law, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was f a c e d w i t h t h e ques-
tion: Were t h e s t a t e m e n t s l i b e l o u s p e r s e ? These s t a t e -
ments must be examined w i t h t h e a i d of t h e r u l e s of i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n a s s e t f o r t h by t h i s C o u r t i n numerous c a s e s . In
K e l l e r v . Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 1 1 Mont. 28, 31-32,
1
108 P.2d 605, t h i s C o u r t summarized t h e r u l e s of i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n f o r l i b e l and s l a n d e r c a s e s :
" I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether f a l s e d e f a m a t o r y words
s a i d t o have been spoken of and c o n c e r n i n q t h e
p a r t y complaining a;e o r a r e n o t s l a n d e r o i s se,
t h e o p p r o b r i o u s words a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g
-
t o t h e i r u s u a l , p o p u l a r and n a t u r a l meaning and
common a c c e p t a t i o n , t h a t i s , i n t h e s e n s e i n which
p e r s o n s o u t o f c o u r t and of o r d i n a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e
would u n d e r s t a n d them, f o r t h e presumption i s t o
be indulged t h a t t h e t h i r d p a r t y o r p a r t i e s
p r e s e n t s o u n d e r s t o o d them. * * *
"The s t a t e m e n t made must be viewed by t h e c o u r t
as a s t r a n g e r might look a t it, w i t h o u t t h e a i d
of s p e c i a l knowledge p o s s e s s e d by t h e p a r t i e s
concerned. * * *
"The l a n g u a g e used must be s u s c e p t i b l e of b u t
o n e meaning and t h a t a n o p p r o b r i o u s one. * * *
"The a l l e g e d d e f a m a t o r y m a t t e r i s t o be c o n s t r u e d
a s a n e n t i r e t y and w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e remain-
i n g p o r t i o n s of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . * * *
" I f t h e language i s n o t s l a n d e r o u s -r- p e se, i t
c a n n o t be made s o by innuendo * * * b e c a u s e t h e
term " p e r s e " means by i t s e l f ; simply a s s u c h ; i n
i t s own n a t u r e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o i t s r e l a t i o n s .
* * * A s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d i n Manley v . H a r e r ,
supra: 'Words a r e d e f a m a t o r y -r-e which upon
pe s
t h e i r f a c e and w i t h o u t t h e a i d of e x t r i n s i c
proof a r e i n j u r i o u s t o t h e p e r s o n c o n c e r n i n g
whom t h e y a r e spoken. I f t h e i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r
o f t h e words d o e s n o t a p p e a r from t h e i r f a c e
when t a k e n i n t h e i r p l a i n and n a t u r a l meaning
and a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e n s e i n which t h e y a p p e a r
t o have been u s e d , t h e y a r e n o t d e f a m a t o r y p e r -
se b u t a r e s a i d t o r e q u i r e i n n u e n d o . ' "
-
Applying t h e s e r u l e s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e a r t i c l e s
of September 1 6 , 1976, and October 2 1 , 1976, r e v e a l s s e v e r a l
v i o l a t i o n s of t h e r u l e s by t h e p l a i n t i f f . First, plaintiff
s e g r e g a t e d t h e s t a t e m e n t s from t h e e n t i r e a r t i c l e s and
i m p o r t e d a l i b e l o u s p e r se meaning t o them. The words used
may n o t b e s e g r e g a t e d and c o n s t r u e d a l o n e . The e n t i r e
p r i n t e d s t a t e m e n t must be viewed by t h e c o u r t a s a s t r a n g e r
might look a t it. S t e f f e s , supra. A r e v i e w of t h e e n t i r e
a r t i c l e s of September 16 and October 21, t a k i n g t h e s t a t e -
ments w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h e whole and c o n s t r u i n g them w i t h
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e m a i n i n g p o r t i o n s , n e g a t e s any o p p r o b r i o u s
meaning.
Second, p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h e s t a t e m e n t s r e f e r t o him
p e r s o n a l l y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t n o t e d , and we a g r e e , t h e
s t a t e m e n t s r e f e r t o a g e n e r a l c l a s s of p e o p l e . While t h e
Scobey P o l i c e Department and t h e D a n i e l s County S h e r i f f ' s
o f f i c e a r e s m a l l , t h e a r t i c l e s , when r e a d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y ,
r e f e r t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t s o v e r a p e r i o d of y e a r s . There have
been many men employed by t h e s e d e p a r t m e n t s t o whom t h e
a r t i c l e s and s t a t e m e n t s c o u l d r e f e r . A t no p o i n t i n e i t h e r
a r t i c l e i s t h e defendant personally r e f e r r e d t o o r i s he
s p e c i f i c a l l y set out. To b e l i b e l o u s p e r se, t h e p u b l i c a -
t i o n must c o n t a i n d e f a m a t o r y words s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d a t
t h e person claiming i n j u r y . I n t e r - S t a t e D e t e c t i v e Bureau,
I n c . v . Denver P o s t , I n c . , ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 29 Colo.App. 313, 484
P.2d 1 3 1 , 133. Granger v . Time, I n c . , (1977), Mont.
, 568 P.2d 535, 34 St.Rep. 983, 989.
T h i r d , p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h e s t a t e m e n t s have a n oppro-
b r i o u s meaning. The r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e q u i r e t h a t
t h e l a n g u a g e must b e s u s c e p t i b l e of b u t o n e meaning t o
c o n s t i t u t e l i b e l p e r se. S t e f f e s , supra. Such u n e q u i v o c a l
s t a t e m e n t i s n o t p r e s e n t i n t h i s case. A r e a d e r of t h e
e n t i r e a r t i c l e s c o u l d r e a c h more t h a n one meaning.
The a r t i c l e o f November 11, 1976, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e
p l a i n t i f f a s " b u l l y boy c h i e f of p o l i c e " r e q u i r e s t h i s C o u r t
t o review t h e n a t u r e o f t h e words. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
r u l e d t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t d o e s n o t i m p o r t s u c h a meaning
t h a t l i b e l p e r s e c a n be imputed. W agree.
e
The d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l p e r se i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and
l o n g s t a n d i n g i n Montana. L e m m e r v . The " T r i b u n e " e t a l . ,
( 1 9 1 5 ) , 50 Mont. 559, 564, 148 P . 338; Manley v . H a r e r ,
( 1 9 2 5 ) , 73 Mont. 253, 235 P . 757; G r i f f i n v . Opinion p u b l i s h i n g
Co., ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 502, 508, 138 P.2d 580; ~ e w i s .
v
R e a d e r ' s ~ i g e s t , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 4 0 1 , 406, 512 P.2d 702.
Where t h e i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r of t h e words d o e s n o t a p p e a r
from t h e i r f a c e when t a k e n i n t h e i r p l a i n and n a t u r a l meaning
and a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e n s e i n which t h e y a p p e a r t o have been
used, they a r e n o t l i b e l per se. Manley, s u p r a .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r must b e a f a c t of
s u c h common n o t o r i e t y a s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e g e n e r a l
c o n s e n t of men s o t h a t t h e c o u r t t a k e s j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of
it. G r i f f i n , s u p r a . The words " b u l l y boy" a r e of d o u b t f u l
s i g n i f i c a n c e and t h e i r i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r d o e s n o t a p p e a r
on t h e i r f a c e . Defamatory words t o b e a c t i o n a b l e , a s ex-
p o s i n g a p e r s o n t o h a t r e d contempt, r i d i c u l e o r obloquy o r
which have a tendency t o i n j u r e him i n h i s o c c u p a t i o n must
be o f s u c h a n a t u r e t h a t t h e c o u r t c a n presume a s a matter
of law t h a t t h e y w i l l t e n d t o d i s g r a c e and d e g r a d e him o r
c a u s e him t o be shunned and a v o i d e d . It i s not sufficient,
s t a n d i n g a l o n e , t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e i s u n p l e a s a n t and annoys
o r i r k s him, and s u b j e c t s him t o j e s t s o r b a n t e r , s o a s t o
affect his feelings. Gang v . Hughes, (1953) I 1 1 F-Supp.
1
27, 29.
T h i s C o u r t n o t e s t h a t " p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n t h i s day
p e r h a p s must be t h i c k - s k i n n e d and p r e p a r e d f o r a b u s e " .
C o n c h i t o v . C i t y of T u l s a , (1974), 0kl.Cr. 521 P.2d 1384,
1392. J u s t i c e Powell i n Lewis v . C i t y of N e w O r l e a n s ,
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 2499, 33 L Ed 2d 321, remarked
on t h e s u b j e c t of e p i t h e t s spoken t o p o l i c e o f f i c e r s s a y i n g
t h a t t h o s e e p i t h e t s , had t h e y been a d d r e s s e d by one c i t i z e n
t o a n o t h e r , f a c e t o f a c e and i n a h o s t i l e manner, would
c l e a r l y have been f i g h t i n g words, i n h e r e n t l y l i k e l y t o
provoke a v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n . T h i s remark w a s t a k e n o n e s t e p
f u r t h e r by J u s t i c e Powell where i n h i s c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n t o
L e w i s v . C i t y o f New O r l e a n s , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct.
970, 39 L Ed 2d 2 1 4 , 220, h e r e i t e r a t e d :
" * * * a properly trained [police] o f f i c e r
may r e a s o n a b l y b e e x p e c t e d t o ' e x e r c i s e
a higher degree of r e s t r a i n t ' than t h e
a v e r a g e c i t i z e n , and t h u s b e less l i k e l y
t o respond b e l l i g e r e n t l y t o ' f i g h t i n g
words.'* * * "
P l a i n t i f f was a p o l i c e o f f i c e r and a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l .
Due t o t h e n a t u r e o f h i s employment and s t a t u s , h e w a s
s u b j e c t t o t h e v o c i f e r o u s comment by t h e p u b l i c . To t h i s
f a c t , we must q u o t e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Cohen
v. California, ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 403 U.S. 1 5 , 9 1 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L Ed
" * * * Indeed, a s M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r
h a s s a i d , ' [o] n e of t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s of
American c i t i z e n s h i p i s t h e r i g h t t o c r i t i -
c i z e p u b l i c men and measures--and t h a t means
n o t o n l y informed and r e s p o n s i b l e c r i t i c i s m
b u t t h e freedom t o speak f o o l i s h l y and
without moderation.' Baumgartner v . United
S t a t e s , 322 U.S. 665, 673-674, 88 L.Ed. 1525,
1531, 64 S.Ct. 1 2 4 0 ( 1 9 4 4 ) . "
I s s u e 2. The s t a t e m e n t s of September 1 6 , October 2 1 ,
and November 11, 1976, were n o t l i b e l o u s p e r s e . No s p e c i a l
damages were p l e a d . No l i b e l p e r quod a c t i o n was p l e a d .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n g r a n t i n g a judgment on t h e
p l e a d i n g s i n t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e s remained once a d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n was made t h a t l i b e l p e r s e was n o t i n v o l v e d .
S t e f f es, s u p r a .
The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e Concur:
Chief J u s t g c e