No. 14710
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
BETTE ANN HERRING,
Petitioner and Appellant,
JOSEPH HERRING, An
Incompetent Person,
Respondent and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Randono, Lewis and Donovan, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Richard Ganulin, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on briefs: October 4, 1979
Decided :
, <<".1;
NOV 2 1 1'79
,.\,: 5
. i
Filed: .?.,,!k,
\
& s. ' - ' d
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a n o r d e r o f t h e Cascade County
D i s t r i c t Court dismissing a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r an equi-
t a b l e apportionment of a m a r i t a l estate.
A p p e l l a n t w i f e and r e s p o n d e n t husband w e r e m a r r i e d on
August 1 6 , 1956, i n Golden, Colorado- Appellant i s 51 y e a r s
o l d and r e s p o n d e n t i s 80 y e a r s o l d . On August 11, 1977,
a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o have
t h e marriage dissolved. On March 23, 1978, t h e p e t i t i o n was
g r a n t e d , and t h e m a r r i a g e o f t h e p a r t i e s was d i s s o l v e d by
decree of d i s s o l u t i o n . In granting the dissolution, the
c o u r t r e s e r v e d t h e r i g h t t o e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e assets
of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d b o t h p a r t i e s
t h a t t h e y w e r e t o a t t e m p t t o r e a c h a p r o p e r t y agreement
between t h e m s e l v e s and t h a t , i f no agreement c o u l d be
reached, e i t h e r p a r t y could f i l e a p e t i t i o n t o equitably
apportion t h e m a r i t a l estate. The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t a s s e t s
o f t h e p a r t i e s w e r e some diamond r i n g s , a c q u i r e d by t h e
p a r t i e s d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and worth a p p r o x i m a t e l y $3000 t o
$4000 a t t h e t i m e of p u r c h a s e , and a p a r c e l of r e a l p r o p e r t y
and home l o c a t e d a t 307 F i f t h Avenue South i n Great F a l l s ,
Montana, which r e s p o n d e n t had purchased 16 y e a r s p r i o r t o
t h e marriage.
The p a r t i e s b e i n g u n a b l e t o r e a c h a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e -
ment, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on October 1 6 ,
1978, f o r a n e q u i t a b l e a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .
I n the p e t i t i o n appellant alleged t h a t she w a s e n t i t l e d t o
one-half o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n t h e G r e a t F a l l s p r o p e r t y on t h e
b a s i s o f a n o r a l agreement s h e had made w i t h r e s p o n d e n t .
A p p e l l a n t e s t i m a t e d h e r e q u i t y i n t h e p r o p e r t y a s $6500. A
h e a r i n g w a s h e l d c o n c e r n i n g t h e p e t i t i o n on October 23,
1978, A p p e l l a n t was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e h e a r i n g , h a v i n g
moved h e r r e s i d e n c e t o t h e S t a t e of Colorado. Two a t t o r n e y s
t e s t i f i e d on a p p e l l a n t ' s b e h a l f t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had a t t e m p t e d
t o a r r a n g e a s a l e of t h e G r e a t F a l l s p r o p e r t y i n s a t i s f a c -
t i o n of t h e a l l e g e d o r a l agreement. The s a l e , however, was
n e v e r completed. Respondent t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w a s
p u r c h a s e d s i x t e e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h a t
a p p e l l a n t had made no s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e pur-
c h a s e o r maintenance o f t h e p r o p e r t y .
From t h e e v i d e n c e adduced a t t h e h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t had n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p u r -
c h a s e o r maintenance o f t h e p r o p e r t y and t h a t , a s a m a t t e r
o f law, i t would b e i n e q u i t a b l e t o award a p p e l l a n t a n
i n t e r e s t i n the property. The c o u r t a l s o concluded t h a t t h e
o r a l agreement was u n e n f o r c e a b l e b e c a u s e a n i n t e r e s t con-
veyed i n r e a l p r o p e r t y must be i n w r i t i n g . Accordingly, t h e
D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n be dismissed. From
t h a t o r d e r , appellant appeals.
Appellant r a i s e s s e v e r a l i s s u e s on appeal. Within t h e
c o n t e x t of h e r b r i e f , however, w e n o t e two i s s u e s which w e
think a r e dispositive. F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t it
w a s e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t n o t t o a s c e r t a i n t h e n e t w o r t h of
t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e time of t h e i r divorce.
W e have h e l d i n a number of cases t h a t , b e f o r e t h e r e
may be a p r o p e r d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , t h e is-
t r i c t C o u r t must f i r s t d e t e r m i n e t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r -
t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r d i v o r c e . G r e n f e l l v. G r e n f e l l
(1979) r Mont. , 596 P.2d 205, 207, 36 St.Rep. 1100,
1103; Brown v. Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 361,
365, 35 St.Rep. 1733, 1738; V i v i a n v . V i v i a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,
Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 1074, 35 St.Rep. 1359, 1361.
Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made no s u c h f i n d i n g . While t h e
c o u r t d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t assets w e r e t h e
diamond r i n g s and t h e l o t and home, t h e r e was no a t t e m p t t o
p l a c e a p r e s e n t , f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e upon t h e s e i t e m s o r t o
determine t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r
divorce. One w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e diamond r i n g s w e r e
w o r t h a b o u t $3000 t o $4000 when t h e y w e r e p u r c h a s e d s e v e r a l
y e a r s ago. Another w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e f a i r m a r k e t
v a l u e o f t h e home w a s $13,000. Nowhere i n t h e r e c o r d o r t h e
o r d e r f o r d i s m i s s a l , however, i s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t
t h e t r i a l c o u r t made a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n e t worth.
for
Appellant a l s o a l l e g e s it w a s e r r o r / t h e c o u r t n o t t o
permit f u l l inquiry i n t o appellant's contribution t o t h e
marriage. While i t a p p e a r s from t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e c o u r t
d i d a d m i t e v i d e n c e of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n i n some
i n s t a n c e s , i t a l s o a p p e a r s t h a t t h e c o u r t w a s under t h e
i m p r e s s i o n a t c e r t a i n t i m e s i n t h e h e a r i n g t h a t t h e i s s u e of
c o n t r i b u t i o n was most p r o p e r l y h e a r d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
e n t r y of t h e decree, n o t a t t h e hearing. Where c o u n s e l f o r
r e s p o n d e n t a t t e m p t e d t o go i n t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e
p a r t i e s , t h e following colloquy occurred:
"THE COURT: With a l l due r e g a r d t o your r i g h t
t o examine, I would j u s t a s soon n o t r e t r y t h e
divorce case, a l l r i g h t ?
"MR. GANULIN: A l l r i g h t . I ' m just trying t o
g e t her c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , i f
y o u ' r e c o n s i d e r i n g d i s t r i b u t i n g them, t h e n h e r
c o n t r i b u t i o n would be one o f t h e f a c t o r s .
"THE COURT: T h a t s h o u l d have been h e a r d a t t h e
t i m e t h i s d e c r e e was e n t e r e d , s h o u l d n ' t i t ,
Counselor?
"MR. GANULIN: Excuse me?
"THE COURT: T h a t s h o u l d have been p a r t and p a r -
c e l of t h i s d e c r e e , s h o u l d n ' t i t ?
"MR. GANULIN: Perhaps.
"THE COURT: N p e r h a p s a b o u t it. The c o u r t h a s
o
g o t t o make a n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of prop-
e r t y a t t h e t i m e it e n t e r s t h e decree. "
Contribution i s , of course, a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r t o be
considered i n d i v i d i n g t h e a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l estate,
e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t t o property acquired p r i o r t o t h e
marriage. S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
". . . I n disposing of property acquired p r i o r
t o t h e marriage ... the c o u r t s h a l l consider
t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e o t h e r spouse t o t h e
marriage, including:
" ( a ) t h e nonmonetary c o n t r i b u t i o n o f a home-
maker;
" ( b ) t h e e x t e n t t o which such c o n t r i b u t i o n s
have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e maintenance of t h i s
p r o p e r t y ; and
" ( c ) whether o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n
s e r v e s a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance
arrangements. "
W f i n d i t was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o f a i l t o
e
d e t e r m i n e t h e n e t w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s and p e r m i t f u l l
i n q u i r y regarding a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e marriage.
A c c o r d i n g l y , w e r e v e r s e t h e o r d e r o f t h e c o u r t and remand
t h i s case f o r a f u l l and p r o p e r h e a r i n g upon t h e e q u i t a b l e
apportionment of t h e m a r i t a l estate.
W e concur: