No. 14688
IN THE SUPlU3ME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
IN THE MATTER OF L.F G. ,.
Youth in Need of Care.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Robert L. Stephens, Jr. and David Kinnard, Billings,
Montana
David Kinnard argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Robert Waller argued, Deputy County kttorney,
Billings, Montana
Damon L. Gannett argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: June 15, 1979
:AUG 2 0
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Filed:
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Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
c his a p p e a l a r i s e s from a c u s t o d i a l h e a r i n g h e l d o n
September 29, 1978, i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h
J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County
S
o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , t h e Honorable R o b e r t H. Wilson p r e s i d i n g .
The c a s e was t r i e d o n t h e p e t i t i o n o f t h e Department o f
S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana
(SRS) t o have L.F.G. d e c l a r e d t o b e a y o u t h i n need o f care
and t o have h i s permanent c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l awarded
t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana, w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o c o n s e n t t o adop-
tion. The Y e l l o w s t o n e County a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e a p p e a r e d and
p a r t i c i p a t e d a s c o u n s e l f o r SRS. The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s w e r e
p r e s e n t a t t h e h e a r i n g and w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , and
a p r e v i o u s l y appointed g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m f o r t h e youth
a p p e a r e d and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e h e a r i n g a s t h e r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e of t h e child.
Upon c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e m a t t e r was t a k e n
u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I t entered findings of
f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w and o r d e r on O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1978,
g r a n t i n g t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d by SRS. Judgment was s u b s e -
q u e n t l y e n t e r e d i n a c c o r d a n c e t h e r e w i t h on O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1978.
The p a r e n t s o f t h e y o u t h a p p e a l .
L.F.G. was b o r n on September 29, 1977, i n ~ i l l i n g s ,
Montana. The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s of t h e c h i l d a r e J . C . G . and
R.G. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and
t h e c h i l d r e s i d e d i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County, Montana.
The s o c i a l worker i n t h e c a s e , Martha E v e r e t t , had h e r
f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e mother on September 1 9 , 1977, when
s h e and h e r mother c o n t a c t e d t h e l o c a l SRS o f f i c e t o l e a r n
t h e procedures r e l a t i v e t o t h e r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of t h e m o t h e r ' s
t h e n unborn c h i l d . The mother i n d i c a t e d t o E v e r e t t d u r i n g
t h e i r i n i t i a l c o n t a c t t h a t she d i d n o t f e e l t h a t "she w a s
s t r o n g enough t o t a k e c a r e of a baby."
The c h i l d was b o r n t e n d a y s a f t e r t h e m o t h e r ' s i n i t i a l
C o n t a c t w i t h t h e s o c i a l worker. A t birth, t h e baby weighed
f o u r pounds and e l e v e n ounces. He was normal i n a l l re-
s p e c t s , except t h a t h i s b i r t h weight w a s l i g h t f o r a f u l l -
t e r m infant.
On October 3, 1977, t h e mother informed E v e r e t t t h a t
s h e had changed h e r mind a b o u t r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e c h i l d , and
t h a t s h e no l o n g e r was i n t e r e s t e d i n having t h e c h i l d
placed adoptively. The baby was p l a c e d i n a f o s t e r home on
October 5, 1977, w i t h t h e knowledge, u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and
consent of t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l parents. A t t h e time of
placement i n f o s t e r c a r e , t h e mother i n d i c a t e d t h a t " s h e
d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t s h e was p h y s i c a l l y r e a d y f o r t a k i n g c a r e of
the child." Mrs. D e l o r e s Smith was t h e f o s t e r p a r e n t who
p r o v i d e d t h e primary c a r e f o r t h e baby d u r i n g h i s r e s i d e n c e
i n h e r f o s t e r home.
The baby remained i n t h e Smith f o s t e r home from October
5 , 1977, u n t i l A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. During t h a t six-month p e r i o d ,
t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s t o t h e f o s t e r home t o v i s i t h e r
child. The purpose of t h e m o t h e r ' s v i s i t s w i t h h e r c h i l d i n
t h e f o s t e r home was t o a l l o w h e r v i s i t a t i o n , t o o b s e r v e h e r
w i t h t h e c h i l d , and t o a t t e m p t t o t e a c h h e r t h e s k i l l s s h e
would need t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d on h i s r e t u r n t o h e r phy-
s i c a l custody. Mrs. Smith was p r e s e n t d u r i n g e a c h o f t h e
v i s i t s t h a t t h e mother had w i t h h e r c h i l d . During t h i s s i x -
month p e r i o d of f o s t e r c a r e , t h e f a t h e r made one v i s i t t o
s e e t h e c h i l d i n t h e Smith home.
The mother showed some improvement i n h e r a p p a r e n t
a b i l i t y t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of J a n u a r y
t o March 1978. Mrs. Smith i n d i c a t e d , however, t h a t s h e
n e v e r r e a l l y h e l d t h e baby p r o p e r l y , and t h a t s h e f a i l e d t o
d e m o n s t r a t e any a f f e c t i o n o r emotion towards t h e c h i l d . The
baby seemed t o c r y more t h a n u s u a l when he was around h i s
mother, and t h e mother a p p e a r e d t o be c o n f u s e d and u n c e r t a i n
a b o u t what t o d o w i t h t h e c h i l d i n g e n e r a l .
Mrs. Smith n e v e r o b s e r v e d any p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t o r
i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e c h i l d and h i s f a t h e r d u r i n g t h e
i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f f o s t e r c a r e i n h e r home.
The baby was r e t u r n e d t o h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s on A p r i l
1 0 , 1978. P r i o r t o t h a t r e t u r n , Martha E v e r e t t had made
a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of many s u p p o r t s e r v i c e s t o
a s s i s t t h e mother i n h e r c a r e of t h e c h i l d . Homemakers from
SRS and a p u b l i c h e a l t h n u r s e made r e g u l a r and f r e q u e n t
v i s i t s t o t h e c h i l d and his p a r e n t s . D e s p i t e t h e s e e f f o r t s
made t o upgrade t h e m o t h e r ' s c h i l d - c a r i n g s k i l l s , s h e f a i l e d
t o l e a r n t h e t h i n g s t h a t s h e was t a u g h t c o n c e r n i n g h e r care
of t h e c h i l d . T h e r e was a l s o a n a b s e n c e of p h y s i c a l con-
t a c t and p l a y between t h e c h i l d and h i s mother. The p u b l i c
h e a l t h n u r s e a l s o o b s e r v e d t h e mother l e a v e t h e baby u n a t -
t e n d e d on two o c c a s i o n s . The mother a l s o d e s c r i b e d t h e
f a t h e r a s having thrown t h e c h i l d i n t o t h e baby c r i b .
The c h i l d ' s s i t u a t i o n w i t h h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s began t o
deteriorate. According t o t h e homemakers and p u b l i c h e a l t h
n u r s e s who were i n t h e home, t h e mother became more d i s t a n t
and less c o o p e r a t i v e . F i n a l l y , on May 1 8 , 1978, b a s e d upon
t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s and t h e recommenda-
t i o n of a p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . Van Dyke, t h e c h i l d was removed
from t h e home o f h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and r e t u r n e d t o t h e
S m i t h f o s t e r home. A t t h e t i m e of t h e c h i l d ' s r e t u r n t o t h e
f o s t e r home, h i s head w a s d i r t y , h i s body was d i r t y , and h i s
"little penis was filthy." H e was s u b s e q u e n t l y o b s e r v e d
a p p a r e n t l y h a v i n g n i g h t m a r e s and waking up c r y i n g and s h a k i n g .
Evidence concerning t h e mother's p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n
was p r e s e n t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g . The m o t h e r had been e v a l u a t e d
i n November 1977 by D r . Ned T r a n e l and a g a i n o n March 21,
1978. Dr. T r a n e l d i a g n o s e d t h e m o t h e r a s h a v i n g two m a j o r
psychological disorders. The f i r s t i s t e c h n i c a l l y c l a s s i -
f i e d as s c h i z o p h r e n i c r e a c t i o n , c h r o n i c u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
type. The second d i s o r d e r was d e s c r i b e d by D r . T r a n e l a s
b e i n g a n o r g a n i c b r a i n syndrome o r c h r o n i c b r a i n syndrome.
Dr. T r a n e l o f f e r e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d should n o t be
r e t u r n e d t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e mother was t h e p r i m a r y
caretaker f o r the child.
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e :
1. Was t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e c u s t o d y h e a r i n g
s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e finding of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t
L.F.G. was a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e w i t h i n t h e meaning o f
s e c t i o n 41-3-102, MCA?
2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n t e r m i n a t i n g t h e
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f R.G., t h e f a t h e r , b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e
presented?
3. Was L.F.G. a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e ?
The f u n c t i o n o f a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t i n a case s u c h as
t h i s o n e h a s been w e l l d e f i n e d i n p r i o r d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s
Court. I n R e Gore ( 1 9 7 7 ) , ,
Mont. - 570 P.2d 1 1 1 0 , 34
St.Rep. 1 1 7 9 , i n v o l v e d a n a p p e a l from a ~ i s t r i c t o u r t
C
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i m i l a r t o o n e i n t h e i n s t a n t case. I n de-
c i d i n g t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had n o t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n
when i t g r a n t e d SRS's p e t i t i o n f o r permanent c u s t o d y , t h i s
Court s t a t e d :
". . . This Court i s mindful t h a t t h e primary
d u t y of deciding t h e proper custody of c h i l -
dren i s t h e task of t h e d i s t r i c t court. A s a
r e s u l t , a l l reasonable presumptions a s t o t h e
c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e d i s -
t r i c t c o u r t w i l l b e made. F o s s v . L e a f e r ,
Mont. 550 P.2d 1309, 33 St.Rep. 528
( 1 9 7 6 ) . Due t o t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s -
turbed unless t h e r e i s a mistake of l a w o r a
f i n d i n g o f f a c t n o t s u p p o r t e d by c r e d i b l e e v i -
d e n c e t h a t would amount t o a c l e a r a b u s e o f
discretion . . ." 5 7 0 P.2d a t 1112, 34 St.Rep.
a t 1181-1182.
The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t b e f o r e t h e r u l i n g o f t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n b e o v e r t u r n e d , i t must b e shown t h a t t h e
District Court c l e a r l y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n .
F o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o f i n d t h a t L.F.G. was a y o u t h
i n need o f c a r e , i t had t o f i n d t h a t he was d e p e n d e n t o r
s u f f e r i n g from a b u s e o r n e g l e c t . S e c t i o n 41-3-102(4), MCA.
S e c t i o n 4 1 - 3 - 1 0 2 ( 2 ) ( a ) and ( b ) , MCA, d e f i n e a b u s e o r n e g l e c t :
" ( 2 ) 'Abuse' o r ' n e g l e c t ' means:
" ( a ) t h e commission o r o m i s s i o n o f a n y a c t o r
a c t s which m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal phy-
s i c a l o r e m o t i o n a l development o f a y o u t h .
Any e x c e s s i v e p h y s i c a l i n j u r y ; s e x u a l a s s a u l t ,
o r f a i l u r e t o t h r i v e , taking i n t o account t h e
age and medical h i s t o r y of t h e youth, s h a l l
b e presumed t o b e n o n a c c i d e n t a l and t o m a t e r -
i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal development o f t h e
youth.
" ( b ) t h e commission o r o m i s s i o n o f a n y a c t o r
a c t s by a n y p e r s o n i n t h e s t a t u s o f p a r e n t ,
g u a r d i a n , o r c u s t o d i a n who t h e r e b y and by
reason of p h y s i c a l o r mental i n c a p a c i t y o r
o t h e r c a u s e r e f u s e s o r , w i t h s t a t e and p r i v a t e
a i d and a s s i s t a n c e , i s u n a b l e t o d i s c h a r g e t h e
d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r p r o p e r and
necessary subsistence, education, medical, o r
a n y o t h e r c a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e y o u t h ' s phy-
s i c a l , m o r a l , and e m o t i o n a l w e l l - b e i n g . "
A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e ,
t h e r e w a s a clear a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e
D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e e n t r y of i t s findings.
A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e h a s
d e c l a r e d t h e p o l i c y of t h i s s t a t e f o r a b u s e d and n e g l e c t e d
c h i l d r e n i n s e c t i o n 41-3-101(1), MCA, which p r o v i d e s :
" ( 1 ) I t i s h e r e b y d e c l a r e d t o be t h e p o l i c y o f
t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o :
" ( a ) i n s u r e t h a t a l l y o u t h a r e a f f o r d e d a n ade-
q u a t e p h y s i c a l and e m o t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t t o
promote normal development;
" ( b ) compel i n p r o p e r c a s e s t h e p a r e n t o r g u a r d i a n
o f a y o u t h t o p e r f o r m t h e m o r a l and l e g a l d u t y
owed t o t h e y o u t h ;
" ( c ) achieve t h e s e purposes i n a family environ-
ment whenever p o s s i b l e ; and
" ( d ) p r e s e r v e t h e u n i t y and w e l f a r e o f t h e f a m i l y
whenever p o s s i b l e . "
Where a c h i l d h a s a l l e g e d l y been a b u s e d o r n e g l e c t e d by
h i s natural parents, the State has a c l e a r duty t o protect
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d by means o f a j u d i c i a l h e a r i n g t o
determine whether t h e youth i s i n f a c t abused o r n e g l e c t e d .
The i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e n a t u r e and s c o p e o f t h i s j u d i c i a l
p r o c e e d i n g h a s p r e v i o u s l y been a d d r e s s e d by t h i s C o u r t i n a
r e c e n t case, I n t h e M a t t e r o f G u a r d i a n s h i p o f Doney ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,
Mont.
" T h e r e a r e , however, few i n v a s i o n s by t h e s t a t e
i n t o t h e p r i v a c y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a r e more
extreme than t h a t of depriving a n a t u r a l p a r e n t
o f t h e c u s t o d y o f h i s c h i l d r e n . F o r t h i s rea-
son, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c a r e f u l l y enunciated t h e
p r o c e d u r e s t h e s t a t e must f o l l o w and t h e f i n d -
i n g s which t h e c o u r t must make b e f o r e c u s t o d y o f
a c h i l d may l e g a l l y b e t a k e n from h i s n a t u r a l
parent.
" T h i s c a r e f u l p r o t e c t i o n of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s i s
n o t merely a m a t t e r of l e g i s l a t i v e grace, b u t
i s constitutionally required. S t a n l e y v. I l l i -
n o i s , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 3 1 L.Ed.2d
551 (1972) ."
The p r o v i s i o n s mandated by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e
r e l a t i v e t o r e q u i r e d p r o c e d u r e and f i n d i n g s by t h e D i s t r i c t
Court i n c a s e s of a l l e g e d abuse o r n e g l e c t are set f o r t h i n
several pertinent statutes. S e c t i o n 41-3-404, MCA, provides
i n pertinent part:
" ( 1 ) I n a h e a r i n g on a p e t i t i o n u n d e r 41-3-401,
t h e c o u r t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r --- t h i s
s a i d you
a n a b u s e d , n e g l e c t e d , o r d e p e n d e n t c h i l d , and
-
a s c e r t a i n , a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h e cause thereof. "
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
S e c t i o n 41-3-406, MCA, then c l e a r l y s t a t e s i n p a r t :
" ( 1 ) I f a y o u t h i s found t o be a b u s e d , n e g l e c t e d ,
o r d e p e n d e n t , t h e c o u r t may e n t e r i t s judgment
making any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s t o
p r o t e c t t h e w e l f a r e of t h e youth:
" ( b ) T r a n s f e r l e g a l c u s t o d y t o any o f t h e f o l l o w -
ing:
" ( i )Department o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
Services. "
A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e s e s t a t u t e s make i t c l e a r t h a t
a f i n d i n g o f a b u s e , n e g l e c t , o r dependency i s t h e j u r i s d i c -
t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o any c o u r t o r d e r e d t r a n s f e r of cus-
tody, c i t i n g In t h e Matter of F i s h (1977), Mont . I
569 P.2d 924, 927, 34 S t - R e p . 1080; Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1113,
34 St.Rep. a t 1183; Doney, 570 P.2d 577, 34 St.Rep. a t 1109-
10. A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e i t i s t h e n , and o n l y t h e n , t h a t t h e
" b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d " standard s o w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d
by t h i s C o u r t h a s i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e
q u e s t i o n of custody. Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1 1 1 4 , 34 St.Rep. at
1184; Doney, 570 P.2d a t 578, 34 St.Rep. a t 1110. Thus,
b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may c o n s i d e r what t h e " b e s t
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d " may i n f a c t b e , t h e c o u r t must have
found t h a t t h e c h i l d i n q u e s t i o n was i n f a c t a b u s e d o r
n e g l e c t e d p u r s u a n t t o s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n i n s e c t i o n 41-3-
102(2), MCA. T h i s e l e m e n t c a n n o t be s a t i s f i e d by a m e r e
r e c i t a t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t it f i n d s t h e c h i l d i n
q u e s t i o n t o be a b u s e d o r n e g l e c t e d ; t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d
t o t h e c o u r t must c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s u c h a f i n d i n g .
With this standard in mind, we have reviewed the evi-
dence presented to the District Court as it fits into the
general guidelines established by this Court in recent
decisions regarding abused and neglected youths. The child
here was placed in the family home for a period of only five
weeks. During this time, the family was subject to the
daily supervision of welfare department personnel. The
public health nurse, the personnel of the welfare depart-
ment, and a neighbor, all had the opportunity to observe the
child in the parents' home, and all agreed that during their
observations he appeared to be well-fed, well-clothed, and
clean. In addition, during this period there were no signs
of physical abuse, and the child appeared to have no learn-
ing disabilities or behavior problems in the home, nor was
he left alone for extensive periods of time without super-
vision.
On the basis of the above facts, appellants endeavor to
distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in several
cases involving physical abuse and neglect of a child jus-
tifying the termination of parental custody.
In addition, appellants endeavor to distinguish the
facts in this case from the facts in several cases in which
the mental condition of one or both parents was a factor
considered by the court together with other environmental
factors justifying the termination of parental custody. In
the Matter of T.E.R. (1979), Mont . , 590 P. 2d
1117, 36 St.Rep. 276; In the Matter of J.J.S. (1978),
Mont. , 577 P.2d 378, 35 St.Rep. 394; In re Moyer (1977),
Mont. , 567 P.2d 47, 34 St.Rep. 682; In re Matter
of Bessette (1976), 170 Mont. 122, 551 P.2d 653; In re
Henderson (1975), 168 Mont. 329, 542 P.2d 1204.
Appellants contend that a review of the evidence pre-
sented at the hearing presents the contrary view, i.e., that
the child suffered no adverse effects from his mother's
mental condition, and that he was in fact well cared for.
his, they claim, is the distinguishing factor from the
other Montana cases previously cited. The mental condition
of the mother standing alone, according to appellants, was
apparently found by the District Court to be the sole basis
for termination of parental rights, without a finding of the
relationship between the mental condition and any alleged
detriment to the child.
A review of Montana case law reveals no decisions in
which the mental condition of one or both parents was the
sole factor considered by the court. Other jurisdictions,
however, have considered this factor and some have arrived
at a different conclusion than that reached by the District
Court herein.
Appellants cite a minority view of Mr. Justice Murphy
in a 1972 termination of parental rights case from New York.
While we do not wish to disagree with our Irish brother in
New York, we find that relying on a minority view in making
our decision as to what the law is to be in this State,
while enlightening, is not persuasive. The majority found
that under the New York Family Court Act, Section 1012(f),
that the record amply supported a finding of neglect in that
the child is "in eminent danger of becoming impaired." The
court noted that a child living with a chronic paranoid and
severely psychotic schizophrenic mother is in eminent danger
of becoming physically and emotionally impaired. That is
the situation the trial judge faced here, and we do not find
fault with his judgment.
Appellants go on to discuss several cases from other
jurisdictions to substantiate their position on mental
conditions as the sole factor in a case involving parental
rights. See, In Interest of E. v. J.T. (1978), Utah2d
, 578 P. 2d 831; In the Matter of Anderson (1978), 35
32
0r.App. 561, 582 P.2d ; In the Matter of Wyatt (1978), 34
0r.App. 793, 579 P.2d 889; In the Matter of Fisher (1976),
169 Mont. 254, 545 P.2d 654; In the Matter of J.J.S., supra.
As these cases discuss, one of the controlling criteria to
be considered is, what are the possibilities of damage to
the child? What we have before us here is a case not of
possibilities, but of high probabilities, and in such a
case, the child's future must be paramount. As we noted in
In the Matter of J.J.S., 577 P.2d at 381, 35 St.Rep. at 397:
". ..What is, or what is not, the best interests
of the child depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of each case. The responsibility of de-
ciding custody is a delicate one that is lodged
in the District Court. The judge hearing oral
testimony in such a controversy has a superior
advantage in determining the same, and his deci-
sion ought not to be disturbed except under a
clear abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.]"
Dr. Tranel testified that because of the mother's
combination of a schizophrenic mental illness and organic
brain damage, there existed a condition of material depri-
vation known as "mask deprivation." This condition exists
where there is no emotional responsiveness to the child, but
this failure to "mother" the child is masked by the fact
that the parent is physically present. He further testified
that the mother would not be able to respond to the most
basic emotional needs of the child because of her mental
condition. Dr. Tranel stated that while it was possible
that the mother's condition could be stabilized at its
present level, it was unrealistic to expect any improvement.
Dr. T r a n e l concluded t h a t i f t h e c h i l d was r e t u r n e d t o t h e
mother, he would n o t r e c e i v e even m i n i m a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y
m a t e r n a l c a r e and would be exposed t o " e x t r e m e l y h i g h "
c h a n c e s of d e v e l o p i n g a m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f
t h e mother.
W e f i n d t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o sup-
p o r t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t t h e c h i l d was a
y o u t h i n need o f c a r e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e h a s been no a b u s e
of d i s c r e t i o n . I n removing t h e c h i l d permanently from t h e
n a t u r a l p a r e n t s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s a c t i n g i n t h e b e s t
i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d as i t was bound t o do.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s c a s e had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o
view t h e t e s t i m o n y o f J . C . G . , and was j u s t i f i e d i n f i n d i n g
t h a t t h e c h i l d w a s a y o u t h i n need of c a r e . I t is i n the
b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t h a t he n o t be r e t u r n e d t o t h e
n a t u r a l p a r e n t s b u t placed f o r adoption. The a t t o r n e y f o r
t h e y o u t h s u p p o r t s t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and
t h e S t a t e on t h i s i s s u e .
A p p e l l a n t s n e x t c o n t e n d t h a t i n t h e t r i a l of t h i s
m a t t e r R.G., t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , played an i n s i g n i f i c a n t
r o l e i n t h e evidence presented t o t h e c o u r t regarding t h e
c a p a c i t y and c a p a b i l i t i e s of R.G. and J . C . G . a s parents.
T h i s p r o c e e d i n g f o c u s e d p r i m a r i l y on a l l e g a t i o n s o f m e n t a l
i n c a p a b i l i t i e s on t h e p a r t of t h e mother. ~ u r i n gt h e p r o -
c e e d i n g s , t h e f a t h e r w a s mentioned o n l y i n p a s s i n g on
s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , and a t no t i m e d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s was
t h e r e any s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t made t o i n q u i r e i n t o h i s capa-
b i l i t i e s as a parent. A p p e l l a n t s c o n t e n d t h a t t h i s l a c k of
d i s c u s s i o n r e q u i r e s a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e v a l i d i t y of
t h e termination proceedings i n l i g h t of a r e c e n t d e c i s i o n
made a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f judgment i n t h e c a s e h e r e . In the
Matter o f T.E.R. (1979), supra. I n t h a t c a s e , t h e Court
d i r e c t e d i t s e l f t o e x a c t l y t h i s i s s u e f o r what was a p p a r -
e n t l y t h e f i r s t t i m e , and found an i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
o f t h e r i g h t s of t h e o t h e r p a r e n t :
"However, a c a r e f u l r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d d o e s
n o t r e v e a l t h a t t h e y o u t h c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y con-
s i d e r e d t h e r i g h t s o f T . E . R . ' s motion i n award-
i n g permanent c u s t o d y o f T.E.R. t o SRS w i t h
a u t h o r i t y t o consent t o her adoption. I n addi-
t i o n t o t h e r i g h t s a s a c o u p l e , p a r e n t s may
have i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r
children. The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e re-
v e a l s t h a t t h e mother's r i g h t s w e r e afforded
no more t h a n s u p e r f i c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . There-
f o r e , t h e o r d e r o f t h e youth c o u r t i s v a c a t e d
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o T.E.R. ' s
mother, and t h e c a s e i s remanded t o t h e y o u t h
c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings t o determine t h e
f u t u r e s t a t u s of t h e mother's p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . "
I n t h e Matter of T.E.R., 590 P.2d a t 1 1 2 1 , 36
St.Rep. a t 281.
A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t i n l i g h t o f t h i s d e c i s i o n and t h e
i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s a s a p a r e n t
h e r e i n , t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and remanded, i f f o r
no o t h e r r e a s o n t h a n t h i s i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n p r i o r t o
p a r e n t a l termination.
The S t a t e and t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e y o u t h c o n t e n d t h a t
t h e r i g h t s o f t h e f a t h e r were c o n s i d e r e d . They a r g u e t h a t
t h e f a t h e r was s e r v e d w i t h n o t i c e of t h e h e a r i n g , was p r e s e n t
a t t h e h e a r i n g , and had a c o u r t a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y t o r e p r e -
sent his interests. Dr. Tranel t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n h i s
o p i n i o n , t h e f a t h e r would n o t be a b l e t o p r o v i d e enough
i n f l u e n c e t o o f f s e t t h e marked d e p r i v a t i o n d e s c r i b e d above,
n o r i n f a c t , would anyone be a b l e t o do s o . In addition,
t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t t h e f a t h e r made no e f f o r t t o a s s i s t
t h e mother i n l e a r n i n g t o become a good p a r e n t . He v i s i t e d
t h e f o s t e r home o n l y o n c e w h i l e t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s .
The homemaker who t e s t i f i e d r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r n e v e r
a s s i s t e d t h e mother i n l e a r n i n g p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s and was, i n
fact, a distraction. The f a t h e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e
hearing. The mother r e p o r t e d t o t h e homemaker t h a t t h e
f a t h e r had a b u s e d t h e baby by t h r o w i n g him i n t o t h e c r i b .
W e b e l i e v e t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s
w e r e a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d p r i o r t o t e r m i n a t i o n and t h a t t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e them i s s u p p o r t e d by
c r e d i b l e evidence.
The f i n d i n g s o f f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w o f t h e
t r i a l c o u r t and t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:
%44?w*
Chief J u s t i c e