Borkoski v. Yost

No. 14265
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1979

JEROME F. BORKOSKI,
individually, and as the Administrator
of the Estate of MARY J. BORKOSKI,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ROBERT P. YOST, JAMES E. GOUAX and
ST. PATRICK'S HOSPITAL,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

Knight, Dahood, Mackay and McLean, Anaconda, Montana
David M. McLean argued, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondents:
Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana
Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: February 9, 1979
Decided: ~ P 2R 1979
4
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

P l a i n t i f f and a p p e l l a n t Jerome Borkoski f i l e d t h i s

m e d i c a l m a l p r a c t i c e and wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n on J u n e 1 7 ,
1975, i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,

M i s s o u l a County, f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h of h i s w i f e , Mary J a n e

Borkoski, a s a r e s u l t of a n a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t . Defendants

i n t h e a c t i o n o r i g i n a l l y w e r e S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l and
D r s . R o b e r t Y o s t and James Gouax. P r i o r t o t r i a l , however,

Borkoski s e t t l e d w i t h S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l f o r $90,000.

The h o s p i t a l i s n o t i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a p p e a l .

T r i a l commenced o n December 1 2 , 1977. On t h a t d a y ,

Borkoski argued h i s motion t o p e r m i t v o i r d i r e examination

of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s a s t o t h e i n f l u e n c e of a n a t i o n a l

campaign by l e a d i n g i n s u r a n c e companies w i t h r e g a r d t o j u r y
awards. During d i s c o v e r y , i t had been d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e

i n s u r a n c e companies t h r o u g h which Y o s t and Gouax c a r r i e d

t h e i r m a l p r a c t i c e i n s u r a n c e had been v e r y a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d

i n t h i s campaign.

The g i s t o f t h e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s was t h a t l a r g e j u r y

awards would r e s u l t i n everyone p a y i n g h i g h e r i n s u r a n c e

premiums. A f a i r example o f t h e s e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s d e p i c t s a

holding j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n " which states :

"When awarding damages i n l i a b i l i t y c a s e s , t h e
j u r y i s c a u t i o n e d t o b e f a i r and t o b e a r i n mind
t h a t money d o e s n o t grow on t r e e s . I t must b e
p a i d t h r o u g h i n s u r a n c e premiums from u n i n v o l v e d
p a r t i e s , such a s yourselves."
Beneath t h i s p i c t u r e i n l a r g e t y p e i s t h e s t a t e m e n t :
"Too bad judges c a n ' t r e a d t h i s t o a j u r y . " The a d v e r t i s e -

ment t h e n d e s c r i b e s s e v e r a l c a s e s which t h e s p o n s o r i n g
i n s u r a n c e company p o i n t s o u t a s i l l u s t r a t i v e o f " w i n d f a l l "

j u r y awards. The two-page ad t h e n l i s t s s e v e r a l s u g g e s t i o n s

t o c l e a n up t h e "mess" c o n c l u d i n g :
 "We can a s k j u r i e s t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t a v i c -
t i m ' s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s l o s s e s . And w e
c a n u r g e t h a t awards r e a l i s t i c a l l y r e f l e c t t h e
a c t u a l l o s s s u f f e r e d - - t h a t t h e y b e a f a i r compen-
s a t i o n , b u t n o t a reward.

" I n s u r e r s , l a w y e r s , judges--each of u s s h a r e s
some blame f o r t h i s m e s s . But i t i s you, t h e
p u b l i c , who c a n b e s t b e g i n t o c l e a n i t up.
D o n ' t u n d e r e s t i m a t e your own i n f l u e n c e . U s e i t ,
a s w e a r e trying t o use ours."

The s p o n s o r o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r ad w a s Aetna L i f e and

Casualty. Dr. Gouax c a r r i e d h i s m a l p r a c t i c e i n s u r a n c e w i t h

Aetna L i f e and C a s u a l t y . Borkoski h a s p r e s e n t e d c o p i e s o f

t h i s and o t h e r s i m i l a r a d s which a p p e a r e d i n T i m e , Newsweek,

S p o r t s I l l u s t r a t e d , and R e a d e r ' s D i g e s t magazines d u r i n g t h e

a p p r o x i m a t e t i m e of t h e i m p a n e l i n g of t h e j u r y .

I n h i s motion Borkoski asked:

"For p e r m i s s i o n t o examine p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s
w i t h a l i n e o f i n q u i r y t o d e t e r m i n e whether any
p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s have been exposed t o , have
o b s e r v e d , o r a r e aware o f t h e n a t i o n a l campaign
by l e a d i n g i n s u r a n c e companies, d i r e c t e d p a r t i -
c u l a r l y a t prospective jurors, t o t h e e f f e c t
t h a t l a r g e j u r y v e r d i c t s a r e i n f a c t p a i d by t h e
g e n e r a l p u b l i c a t l a r g e and c o n s t i t u t e d 'wind-
f a l l s ' t o the recipients."

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h i s motion. According t o

t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e argument on t h i s m o t i o n , however, t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d a l l o w Borkoski t o " i n q u i r e a s t o e a c h

j u r o r w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y f e e l t h a t d o c t o r s a r e unneces-

s a r i l y o r p r o f e s s i o n a l p e o p l e a r e u n n e c e s s a r i l y o p p r e s s e d by

suits or large verdicts . . ." Further, according t o an

a f f i d a v i t f i l e d by t h e a t t o r n e y f o r d e f e n d a n t d o c t o r s ,
Borkoski d i d i n q u i r e a s t o whether e a c h j u r o r was p r e j u d i c e d
a g a i n s t t h i s t y p e o f c a s e and whether p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s had
r e a d any a r t i c l e s o r a d v e r t i s e m e n t s a b o u t t h i s t y p e of c a s e
which would a f f e c t t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c a s e . The

e x a c t q u e s t i o n s a s k e d d u r i n g v o i r d i r e a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e due

t o l a c k of t r a n s c r i p t .
 The t r i a l l a s t e d from December 1 2 t o December 1 9 , 1977.

~ f t e r e c e i v i n g t h e c a s e , t h e jury d e l i b e r a t e d approximately

f o r t y m i n u t e s b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of d e f e n -

dants.

~orkoski
moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e grounds t h a t h e

had been d e n i e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y when h i s v o i r d i r e

motion had been d e n i e d and t h a t t h e v e r d i c t w a s n o t sup-

p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . The c o u r t d e n i e d h i s m o t i o n , and

Borkoski a p p e a l s .

On a p p e a l Borkoski raises two r e l a t e d i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g

t h e d e n i a l o f h i s v o i r d i r e motion. These may b e c o n s o l i -

d a t e d as f o l l o w s :

Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and

d e n i e d Borkoski h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y when

it r e f u s e d t o a l l o w Borkoski t o p u r s u e a l i n e of i n q u i r y on

v o i r d i r e t o d e t e r m i n e whether any p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s w e r e

b i a s e d a g a i n s t Borkoski a s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e n a t i o n a l

a d v e r t i s i n g campaigns by l e a d i n g i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r s t o t h e

e f f e c t t h a t l a r g e j u r y awards a r e i n f a c t p a i d by t h e gen-

e r a l p u b l i c and c o n s t i t u t e " w i n d f a l l s " t o t h e r e c i p i e n t s .

By t h i s a p p e a l , Borkoski b r i n g s t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of

t h i s C o u r t a m a t t e r of i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n t o b o t h l a y p e r -

s o n s and l a w y e r s . See e.g., T i m e , F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1978, a t

65; B u s i n e s s Week, J u l y 31, 1978, a t 39; 6 4 A . B . A . J . 531

(1978). The p o s s i b i l i t y of s e r i o u s p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g t o

p e r s o n a l i n j u r y p l a i n t i f f s as a r e s u l t of t h e a d v e r t i s i n g

cam2aign b e i n g waged by t h e i n s u r a n c e companies c o n s t r a i n s

t h i s C o u r t t o reexamine i t s r u l e s on t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e

mention of i n s u r a n c e by a t t o r n e y s on v o i r d i r e . A s evidence

o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e j u d i c e , see t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d y

r e p o r t e d a t 65 A.B.A.J. 68 (1979) which c o n c l u d e s t h a t "even
a s i n g l e e x p o s u r e t o o n e of t h e s e a d s c a n d r a m a t i c a l l y lower

t h e amount of award a j u r o r i s w i l l i n g t o g i v e . " 65 A . B . A . J .

I n i t i a l l y , w e a g r e e w i t h Borkoski a s t o t h e p u r p o s e o f

v o i r d i r e examination:

"The p u r p o s e of v o i r d i r e i s s i m p l y t o e n a b l e
c o u n s e l t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x i s t e n c e of b i a s and
p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s
and t o e n a b l e c o u n s e l t o e x e r c i s e i n t e l l i g e n t l y
h i s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . " S t a t e e x r e l .
S t e p h e n s v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont.
22, 27, 550 P.2d 385, 388.

"Although t h e t r i a l judge may s e t r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t s on

t h e e x a m i n a t i o n , h e s h o u l d p e r m i t ' l i b e r a l and p r o b i n g

examination c a l c u l a t e d t o discover p o s s i b l e b i a s o r preju-

dice ... I 11 B a r t o n v . Owen ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 7 1 Cal.App.3d 484, 5 0 8 ,

139 C a l . R p t r . 494, 508 ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . The r e a s o n a b l e

l i m i t s t o be s e t must have due r e g a r d f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s of

f a i r n e s s t o b o t h p a r t i e s . Kiernan v . Van S c h a i k ( 3 r d C i r .

1 9 6 5 ) ) 347 F.2d 775, 778; Langley v . T u r n e r ' s E x p r e s s , I n c .

(4th C i r . 1 9 6 7 ) , 375 F.2d 296, 297.

With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, we t u r n t o a n examina-

t i o n of t h i s C o u r t ' s t r e a t m e n t of t h e mention of i n s u r a n c e

during v o i r d i r e .

This Court's opinion t h e p r o p r i e t y of i n q u i r y by an

attorney i n t o a prospective juror's relationship t o the in-

surance i n d u s t r y has varied over time. The f i r s t case i n

which t h e i s s u e w a s p r e s e n t e d w a s Beeler v . B u t t e & London

Copper Development Co. ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 4 1 Mont. 465, 1 1 0 P. 528. In

t h a t c a s e , t h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e p e r m i t t e d t o a s k e a c h of

t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s whether t h e y had any b u s i n e s s r e l a -

t i o n s w i t h t h e C a s u a l t y Company of America. The C o u r t con-

cluded :
 ". . . A p p a r e n t l y r e s p o n d e n t s deemed t h i s i n f o r -
mation necessary a s an a i d t o t h e i n t e l l i g e n t
e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . It
does n o t appear t h a t e i t h e r t h e purpose o r ten-
dency o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s was t o i n f o r m t h e j u r y
t h a t t h e burden of a judgment, i f o b t a i n e d ,
would f a l l on a n i n s u r a n c e company i n s t e a d o f
t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h e company w a s n o t a f t e r w a r d
mentioned i n t h e c a s e . The f i r s t t i m e t h e ques-
t i o n was a s k e d , no o b j e c t i o n whatever was made,
and w e a r e u n a b l e t o see how t h e a p p e l l a n t c o u l d
have been p r e j u d i c e d by t h e e x a m i n a t i o n . " 41
Mont. a t 473, 110 P . a t 530.

Beginning w i t h t h e v e r y n e x t c a s e on t h e i s s u e , how-

e v e r , t h i s d e c i s i o n began t o be e r o d e d , p r i m a r i l y on t h e

b a s i s of t h e t i m e l i n e s s o f o b j e c t i o n t o t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n

c o n c e r n i n g a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s w i t h an

i n s u r a n c e company. Robinson v. F.W. Woolworth Co. (1927),

80 Mont. 431, 261 P. 253, o v e r r u l e d - o t h e r g r o u n d s ,
on

Hayward v . Richardson C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont.

241, 347 P.2d 475; Thomas v . W h i t e s i d e ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont.

394, 421 P.2d 449. B e e l e r was d i s t i n g u i s h e d :

". . . t h e opinion i n t h a t c a s e does n o t say
what s h o u l d have been t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l
c o u r t if o b j e c t i o n had been made t h e f i r s t t i m e
t h e q u e s t i o n w a s asked and w e s a y now had t h a t
been done i n t h i s c a s e t h e o b j e c t i o n would have
been v a l i d and, i n t h a t e v e n t , s h o u l d have been
s u s t a i n e d ; t o have done o t h e r w i s e , i n such
e v e n t , would have c o n s t i t u t e d p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r .
On t h a t p o i n t , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a r e d i v i d e d b u t
t h e w e i g h t o f a u t h o r i t y and, w e b e l i e v e , sound
r e a s o n a r e a g a i n s t t h e p r i v i l e g e of a s k i n g s u c h
questions. A venireman's business, occupation
and c o n n e c t i o n s can b e l e a r n e d , i n a p r o p e r
--
way, on v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n , w i t h o u t b r i n g i n g
i n t o t h e t r i a l such i n c o m p e t e n t matter a s t h e
c a r r y i n g by d e f e n d a n t of i n d e m n i t y i n s u r a n c e . "
80 Mont. a t 443, 261 P. a t 257.

Although Robinson w a s a c t u a l l y d e c i d e d t h e same a s

B e e l e r because of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n t e r p o s e an o b j e c t i o n t h e

f i r s t time t h e q u e s t i o n w a s asked, t h e p e n a l t y suggested i n

Robinson w a s imposed o n e y e a r l a t e r i n Wilson v . T h u r s t o n

Co. ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 82 Mont. 492, 495-96, 267 P . 801, 801-02. This

C o u r t o r d e r e d a new t r i a l b e c a u s e of t h e p r e j u d i c e c a u s e d
when, o v e r s e a s o n a b l e o b j e c t i o n , t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s w e r e

a s k e d whether t h e y had any immediate r e l a t i v e s employed by

any i n s u r a n c e company.

By 1967, t h e t y p e of q u e s t i o n p e r m i t t e d i n Beeler w a s

completely prohibited:

"The f i r s t p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r examined by c o u n s e l
f o r M r s . Avery w a s M r s . Anna B e r r y . Counsel f o r
M r s . Avery i n q u i r e d :

"'Q. Now, I a m g o i n g t o a s k you i f you o r your
husband a r e t h e i n v e s t o r s i n any i n s u r a n c e
companies? '

"At t h a t t i m e a n o b j e c t i o n was i n t e r p o s e d by t h e
C i t y and a motion f o r m i s t r i a l p r e s e n t e d . The
motion was d e n i e d and t h e v o i r d i r e c o n t i n u e d .

" T h i s same q u e s t i o n w a s asked o f e a c h o f t h e
twenty p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s . I n some i n s t a n c e s ,
c o u n s e l ~ f o r ~ ~ ~ s v e would a s k t h e q u e s t i o n a s
r . r ~
t h e l a s t q u e s t i o n - -e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r . The
of t h
p u r p o s e of s u c h q u e s t i o n i n g was o b v i o u s , improper
and- c o m p l e t e l y p r e j u d i c i a l .

"The law i s w e l l - s e t t l e d i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t t h e
a c t i o n of t h e lower c o u r t i n p e r m i t t i n g t h i s
t y p e of q u e s t i o n i n g on v o i r d i r e w a s p r e j u d i c i a l
and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " Avery v . C i t y o f Anaconda
( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149 Mont. 495, 497, 428 P.2d 465, 466.
(Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . )

D e s p i t e t h i s f o r c e f u l pronouncement i n 1967, t h e C o u r t ,

i n 1973, i n e f f e c t r e v e r s e d i t s p o s i t i o n , e x p l a i n i n g :

"As a g e n e r a l r u l e i f c o u n s e l a c t s i n good f a i t h ,
h e may q u e s t i o n p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s on v o i r d i r e
respecting t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n , o r connection with
l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e companies. See: Anno. 4
A.L.R.2d 761, 792, e t s e q . f o r a n e x h a u s t i v e
l i s t i n g of a u t h o r i t i e s i n s u p p o r t . The r a t i o n a l e
behind t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e a s i n d i c a t e d by t h e s e
c a s e s i s t h a t every l i t i g a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a
f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y ; t h a t t o s e c u r e t h i s
r i g h t , counsel f o r a l i t i g a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o
q u e s t i o n p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s f o r t h e p u r p o s e of
d e t e r m i n i n g any b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e on t h e i r p a r t ;
t h a t one o f t h e s e n s i t i v e areas of j u r o r b i a s
and p r e j u d i c e r e l a t e s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o r non-
e x i s t e n c e of i n s u r a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y l i a b i l i t y
i n s u r a n c e ; and a c c o r d i n g l y c o u n s e l f o r a liti-
gant i s e n t i t l e d t o a reasonable l a t i t u d e i n
v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n t o e x p o s e any such b i a s
o r p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r
and t o e n a b l e a l i t i g a n t i n t e l l i g e n t l y t o e x e r -
c i s e h i s c h a l l e n g e s , l i m i t e d o n l y by c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n s of good f a i t h . " Haynes v . County of M i s -
s o u l a ( 1 9 7 3 ) t 163 Mont. 270, 287-88, 517 P.2d
370, 380.
 The r u l e t h u s a d o p t e d e n j o y s wide, a l t h o u g h n o t u n a n i -
mous, s u p p o r t among o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have c o n s i d e r e d

the question, Annot., 4 ALR2d 761 and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n .

A s l i g h t e x p a n s i o n o f t h i s r u l e which a l s o e n j o y s f a i r l y

wide s u p p o r t i n v o l v e s a s k i n g n o t o n l y w h e t h e r p r o s p e c t i v e

j u r o r s have a f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t o r c o n n e c t i o n i n t h e i n s u r -

a n c e b u s i n e s s a s s t o c k h o l d e r s o r employees, b u t a l s o w h e t h e r

t h e y are i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y h o l d e r s i n a p a r t i c u l a r company

themselves. E.g., Fowler v . Burks ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 52 Ala.App. 14,

288 So.2d 798, 799; Kath v . B r o d i e ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 132 Colo. 338,

287 P.2d 957, 958; Haston v . Hightower ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 1 Ga.App.
1

87, 140 S.E.2d 525, 526; B a r r e t t v . M o r r i s (Mo. App. 1 9 7 3 ) ,

495 S.W.2d 100, 103. T h i s l a t t e r e x p a n s i o n g e n e r a l l y ap-

p l i e s o n l y i f t h e i n s u r a n c e company i s a named p a r t y o r i s a

m u t u a l i n s u r a n c e company i n which member p o l i c y h o l d e r s '

premiums a r e d e t e r m i n e d d i r e c t l y by t h e amount of damages

paid. The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e r u l e i n t h e f o r m e r c i r c u m s t a n c e

i s t h a t i f t h e i n s u r a n c e company i s a named d e f e n d a n t , t h e

need t o k e e p i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e from t h e

j u r y d i s a p p e a r s ; i n t h e l a t t e r c i r c u m s t a n c e , where t h e

i n s u r a n c e premium p a i d by a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r may b e d i r e c t l y

d e t e r m i n e d by t h e amount of damages awarded, t h e p l a i n t i f f

i s e n t i t l e d t o l e a r n of t h e j u r o r ' s d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t

i n t h e outcome.

On t h e more s p e c i f i c i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by B o r k o s k i o f

w h e t h e r a n a t t o r n e y may i n q u i r e on v o i r d i r e i n t o t h e p r o -

spective jurors' p o s s i b l e b e l i e f , formed by r e a d i n g o r

h e a r i n g i n s u r a n c e company a d v e r t i s i n g , news a r t i c l e s , o r

o t h e r o u t s i d e m a t e r i a l , t h a t l a r g e jury v e r d i c t s w i l l r e s u l t
i n l a r g e r i n s u r a n c e premiums f o r them, t h e c a s e s a r e f a r

f e w e r i n number. The c a s e s a d d r e s s i n g t h i s i s s u e a r e a l s o

f a r from any s o r t o f a g r e e m e n t .
 The j u r i s d i c t i o n s o f C a l i f o r n i a , Kentucky, H i s s o u r i ,

North C a r o l i n a , Texas, and t h e C o u r t of Appeals f o r t h e

T h i r d C i r c u i t h o l d t h a t s u c h i n q u i r y i s p r e j u d i c i a l and i f

allowed c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . B a r t o n v . Owen ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,

7 1 Cal.App.3d 484, 508, 139 C a l . R p t r . 494, 508; M u r r e l l v .

S p i l l m a n (Ky. 1 9 6 9 ) , 442 S.W.2d 590, 591; Butcher v . Main

1 9 M.C.App. 386, 198 S.E.2d 752, 753; B r o c k e t t v . ice

(Tex.Civ.App. 1 9 6 9 ) , 445 S.W.2d 2 0 , 22; Kiernan v . Van

S c h a i k (3d C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 347 F.2d 775, 782-83.

The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e s e d e c i s i o n s v a r i e s . I n t h e North

C a r o l i n a , C a l i f o r n i a and Texas c a s e s , t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u r t s

h e l d t h a t t h i s t y p e o f i n q u i r y i m p r o p e r l y conveyed t h e

i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o v e r e d by l i a b i l i t y

i n s u r a n c e . Exemplary of t h e i r r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t o f t h e Texas

C o u r t of C i v i l Appeals i n B r o c k e t t :

". . . c o u n s e l t h e n asked t h e whole p a n e l 'whe-
t h e r any of them t h o u g h t t h a t a v e r d i c t i n t h e
c a s e would a f f e c t t h e i r i n s u r a n c e r a t e s . ' The
n e c e s s a r y e f f e c t of t h i s w a s t o i n f e r t h a t
a p p e l l a n t had i n s u r a n c e b e c a u s e a v e r d i c t c o u l d
n o t p o s s i b l y a f f e c t t h e i r r a t e s u n l e s s h e had
insurance. T h i s was e r r o r . " 445 S.W.2d a t 22.

Accord, Maness, 198 S.E.2d a t 753; B a r t o n , 139 C a l . R p t r . at

I n t h e M i s s o u r i , Kentucky and T h i r d C i r c u i t C o u r t of

Appeals c a s e s , t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u r t s m e r e l y h e l d t h a t e x c l u -

s i o n of t h i s t y p e of q u e s t i o n i n g l i e s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n

of t h e t r i a l court. (Parenthetically, w e note t h a t the

o t h e r F e d e r a l C o u r t s of Appeal which have c o n s i d e r e d t h e

mention of i n s u r a n c e d u r i n g v o i r d i r e d i s a g r e e . S e e , Annot.,

40 A.L.R.Fed. 541 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; c f . L a n g l e y v . T u r n e r ' s E x p r e s s ,

Inc. (4th C i r . 1 9 6 7 ) , 375 F.2d 296 (any mention o f i n s u r a n c e

h e l d p r e j u d i c i a l ) w i t h Wichman v . United D i s p o s a l , I n c . (8th
Cir. 1 9 7 7 ) , 553 F.2d 1104 ( i n q u i r y o n l y as t o b u s i n e s s

involvement w i t h a n i n s u r a n c e company i s p e r m i s s i b l e ) .

K i e r n a n , s u p r a , r e l i e d on h e a v i l y by B o r k o s k i , does s u p p o r t

t h i s l a t t e r view. 347 F.2d a t 782.)

A t t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e , t h e Supreme C o u r t of Arkansas, in

a very r e c e n t case v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e i n s t a n t appeal,

h a s h e l d such i n q u i r y i s p r o p e r , s o l o n g a s i t i s conducted

i n good f a i t h . King v . Westlake ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Ark. , 572
S.W.2d 841. The s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e a s w e l l a s

t h e d e c i s i o n by t h e Arkansas c o u r t i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e

following excerpt:

"The r e c o r d shows t h a t f o r sometime p r e c e d i n g t h e
t r i a l d a t e a number of l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e com-
p a n i e s had r u n a d v e r t i s e m e n t s i n T i m e , The Wall
S t r e e t J o u r n a l and t h e S m i t h s o n i a n I n s t i t u t e maga-
z i n e aimed a t j u r o r s i n g e n e r a l t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t
j u r o r s t h e m s e l v e s w e r e a f f e c t e d by t h e v e r d i c t s
t h e y r e n d e r e d i n t h a t such v e r d i c t s r e s u l t e d i n
i n c r e a s e d premiums.

"On v o i r d i r e by a p p e l l e e ' s c o u n s e l and i n re-
s p o n s e t o q u e s t i o n i n g a number o f p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s
responded t h a t t h e y had r e a d - --l S t r e e t
T i m e , The W a l
J o u r n a l , o r t h e S m i t h s o n i a n I n s t i t u t e magazine.
A l l b u t two o f t h e j u r o r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y had
s e e n one o r more of t h e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s . There-
a f t e r , a s a b s t r a c t e d by a p p e l l a n t t h e r e c o r d shows:

"'Mr. Eubanks c o n t i n u e d :

" ' I t i s improper f o r e i t h e r s i d e t o imply o r sug-
g e s t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d o e s o r d o e s n o t have i n -
s u r a n c e , and t h e q u e s t i o n s I w i l l now d i r e c t t o
you have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h whether o r n o t t h e
defendant has insurance. The q u e s t i o n s I w i l l a s k
c o n c e r n your i n s u r a n c e premiums, n o t i n s u r a n c e i n
t h i s case. How many o f you b e l i e v e t h a t j u r y v e r -
d i c t s a f f e c t i n s u r a n c e premiums?

"'Your i n s u r a n c e premiums may n o t b e a f f e c t e d
g r e a t l y one way o r t h e o t h e r , b u t w i l l n o t t h e
v e r d i c t s t h a t you r e n d e r have some e f f e c t on your
insurance r a t e s ?

"'Venireman G e r a l d Hudgens responded: Y e s .

"'Mr. Eubanks c o n t i n u e d :

" ' T h e q u e s t i o n I have been b u i l d i n g up t o i s
t h i s : Assuming t h a t t h e v e r d i c t you r e n d e r c o u l d
 c o s t you a l i t t l e more o r a l i t t l e less money on
your i n s u r a n c e premiums, can you l i s t e n t o t h e
t e s t i m o n y , t h e s t a t e m e n t s of c o u n s e l , and t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e n p u t a s i d e t h e f i n a n c i a l
i n t e r e s t you have i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e of your
i n s u r a n c e premiums and r e n d e r a v e r d i c t ? (All
jurors raised their hands.)'

"The v o i r d i r e o f t h e j u r y was o b v i o u s l y i n good
f a i t h and a s s u c h was p r o p e r . See Dedmon v .
Thalheimer, 226 Ark. 402, 290 S.W.2d 16 ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,
where w e h e l d t h e p u r p o s e o f v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n
i s t o enable counsel t o a s c e r t a i n whether t h e r e
i s ground f o r a c h a l l e n g e of a j u r o r f o r c a u s e , o r
f o r a peremptory c h a l l e n g e and t h a t s o long a s
c o u n s e l a c t s i n good f a i t h , h e may, i n one form
o r another question prospective jurors respecting
t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n o r connection with l i a b i l i t y
i n s u r a n c e companies." 572 S.W.2d a t 843-44.

Approaching t h e i s s u e from a d i f f e r e n t a n g l e , t h e

Supreme C o u r t of Queens County i n New York h e l d t h a t t h e

t y p e of i n s u r a n c e company a d v e r t i s e m e n t s a t i s s u e h e r e i n

v i o l a t e d a p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y and con-

s t i t u t e d j u r y tampering and t h e r e f o r e c o u l d b e r e s t r a i n e d .

Quinn v . Aetna I n s u r a n c e Co. (1978), N.Y.Misc.2d I

409 N.Y.S.2d 473. S i m i l a r l y , t h e Commissioners of I n s u r a n c e

i n Kansas and C o n n e c t i c u t have e n t e r e d i n t o c o n s e n t d e c r e e s

w i t h one i n s u r a n c e company whereby t h e company a g r e e d t o

s t o p publishing s i m i l a r advertisements i n those s t a t e s . In

re Crum and F o r s t e r I n s u r a n c e Companies, Kan., O f f i c e of t h e

Commissioner of I n s u r a n c e , June 27, 1978; I n r e Crum and

F o r s t e r I n s u r a n c e Companies, Conn., O f f i c e of t h e S t a t e

I n s u r a n c e Commissioner, August 1 4 , 1978.

Somewhere between t h e above e x t r e m e s l i e t h e d e c i s i o n s

o f c o u r t s i n C o n n e c t i c u t , Maryland, and Oregon. Lowell v .

Daly ( 1 9 6 1 ) r 148 Conn. 266, 169 A.2d 888; Kujawa v . B a l t i -

more T r a n s i t Co. ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 2 2 4 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96; Johnson

v . Hansen ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 237 Ore. 1, 389 P.2d 330. These t h r e e

j u r i s d i c t i o n s h e l d t h a t , on t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , t h e

i n q u i r y was improper y e t i n d i c a t e t h a t had t h e p r o p e r founda-
t i o n been l a i d f o r t h e i n q u i r y , i t would have been permis-

sible. I n t h e words o f t h e Oregon Supreme C o u r t :

-n- -c a s - t b a r t h e r e w a s- p r e l i m i n a r y
"I the -e a - no
showing of any --might -- r e l e -
fact that have made
vant aninquiryc o n c e r n i n g b i a s a r i s i n g -t-
-- o u of
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of v e r d i c t s and i n s u r a n c e p r e -
miums. Where a l i n e o f q u e s t i o n i n g o b v i o u s l y
i s g o i n g t o open up p r e j u d i c i a l s p e c u l a t i o n ,
e . g . , of a r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l o r o t h e r
e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d n a t u r e , t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of
which w i l l m a n i f e s t l y i n c i t e s i m i l a r s p e c u l a t i o n
upon t h e p a r t of l i s t e n i n g j u r o r s , c o u n s e l must
b e p r e p a r e d t o show t h e need which m i g h t make
s u c h a n i n q u i r y r e l e v a n t , o r r u n t h e r i s k of an
immediate m i s t r i a l . Insurance m a t t e r s should
b e handled w i t h t h e same s a f e g u a r d s . - - In the
case b e f o r e u s c o u n s e l - - a d v i s e - c o u r t
did not the
of t -
- h e e x i s t e n c e of r e c e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l a d v e r -
t i s i n g , - - o t h e r c u r r e n t propaganda c a l c u l a t e d
o r of
- produce --- e p a r t of j u r o r s - -e
to b i a s upon t h i n th
l o c a l c o u r t . Thus t h e r e w a s n o o c c a s i o n t o open
up t h e m a t t e r of i n s u r a n c e , whether i n n o c e n t l y
o r w i t h s c i e n t e r . W e h o l d t h a t t h e i n q u i r y was
improper." Johnson, 3 8 9 P.2d a t 331. (Emphasis
added. )
Accord, Kujawa, 167 A.2d a t 98; Lowell, 169 A.2d a t 889.

The h o l d i n g s i n t h e s e c a s e s a r e i m p o r t a n t i n o u r r e s o l u -

t i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n s u c h a s t h e one p r e s e n t e d i n t h e

i n s t a n t appeal. The a t t o r n e y f o r Borkoski d i d p r e s e n t t o

t h e t r i a l c o u r t evidence of r e c e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l a d v e r t i s i n g
by t h e v e r y i n s u r a n c e companies i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a s e ; a d v e r -

t i s i n g c a r r i e d i n p o p u l a r n a t i o n a l magazines a t a b o u t t h e

t i m e of t h e drawing o f t h e j u r y p a n e l ; a d v e r t i s i n g c a l c u -
l a t e d t o produce b i a s upon t h e p a r t o f j u r o r s a g a i n s t award-

i n g l a r g e amounts of damages t o p e r s o n a l i n j u r y p l a i n t i f f s
s u c h a s Borkoski. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w e c o n c l u d e
t h a t a l i n e of i n q u i r y d e s i g n e d t o uncover t h i s p o s s i b l e

b i a s s h o u l d be p e r m i t t e d .
When i n s u r a n c e companies i n j e c t t h e i s s u e of i n s u r a n c e

i n t o t h e consciousness of every p o t e n t i a l juror through a

h i g h p r i c e d a d v e r t i s i n g campaign, a s h a s been i l l u s t r a t e d i n
t h i s case, they t h r e a t e n every p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o an
i m p a r t i a l jury. 1972 Mont. C o n s t . A r t . 11, 526. I n such

c a s e s , i t i s o n l y f a i r t h a t a t t o r n e y s h a v e some means t o

secure t h i s r i g h t f o r t h e i r clients. Liberal voir d i r e i s

t h e b e s t means t o t h i s e n d . S t a t e ex rel. Stephens v. D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t , 170 Mont. a t 27, 550 P.2d a t 388. See a l s o ,

comments o f U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Law P r o f e s s o r J e f f r e y

O ' C o n n e l l i n Time, F e b r u a r y 20, 1978, a t 65.

Therefore, w e hold t h a t i n appropriate cases an a t t o r -

ney upon v o i r d i r e may i n q u i r e of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s w h e t h e r

t h e y have a n y b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n s u r a n c e companies

and w h e t h e r t h e y a r e p o l i c y h o l d e r s o f a n i n s u r a n c e company

named a s a d e f e n d a n t o r o f a m u t u a l i n s u r a n c e company i n -

volved i n t h e case. W e f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t , upon a p r o p e r

showing o f p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e , a n a t t o r n e y may i n q u i r e

whether a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r has heard o r r e a d anything t o

indicate t h a t jury verdicts f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n personal

i n j u r y c a s e s r e s u l t i n h i g h e r i n s u r a n c e premiums f o r e v e r y -

one; i f s o , whether t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r b e l i e v e s such

m a t e r i a l s ; and i f s o , whether t h a t b e l i e f w i l l i n t e r f e r e

w i t h t h e j u r o r ' s a b i l i t y t o r e n d e r a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l

verdict. Depending upon t h e r e s p o n s e s r e c e i v e d t o t h e s e

i n q u i r i e s and s u b j e c t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ,

l i m i t e d f o l l o w - u p i n q u i r i e s may b e made. W e decline t o

hypothesize a s t o t h e p e r m i s s i b l e n a t u r e o r e x t e n t of t h e s e

follow-up q u e s t i o n s a t t h i s t i m e . W e d o c o n c l u d e , however,

t h a t t h e alleged plan of Borkoski's a t t o r n e y t o c i r c u l a t e

among t h e j u r y p a n e l c o p i e s o f t h e i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n i e s '
a d v e r t i s e m e n t s would h a v e b e e n b e e n i m p r o p e r and would h a v e

l e d t o t h e v e r y p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t which B o r k o s k i i s now

arguing. L i b e r v . F l o r ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 160 C o l o . 7 , 415 P.2d 332,

339.
 I t i s n o t o u r i n t e n t t o i g n o r e t h e e q u a l r i g h t of a

d e f e n d a n t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . Therefore, w e

f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t , a s a p r e l u d e t o any q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g

whether a p o t e n t i a l j u r o r h a s r e a d o r h e a r d a n y t h i n g t o

i n d i c a t e t h a t jury v e r d i c t s f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n personal

i n j u r y c a s e s r e s u l t i n h i g h e r i n s u r a n c e premiums f o r e v e r y -

o n e , an a t t o r n e y must a s k c e r t a i n g e n e r a l i n t r o d u c t o r y ques-

tions. These i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n s may b e approached from two

directions: (1) whether t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r h a s h e a r d of

o r read anything ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d t o insurance)

which m i g h t a f f e c t h i s a b i l i t y t o s i t a s a n i m p a r t i a l j u r o r

( a s was done by t h e t r i a l judge i n t h i s c a s e ) ; o r ( 2 ) whe-

t h e r t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r r e g u l a r l y r e a d s any of t h e maga-

z i n e s o r newspapers i n which i t h a s been d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t

t h e i n s u r a n c e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s o r a r t i c l e s had a p p e a r e d ( a s

w a s done i n W e s t l a k e ) . An a t t o r n e y may u t i l i z e e i t h e r o r

b o t h of t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s . I f , however, no p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e s

a r e r e c e i v e d t o t h e s e i n t r o d u c t o r y i n q u i r i e s , t h e r e i s no

r e a s o n t o p u r s u e f u r t h e r t h e l i n e of i n q u i r y w e have approved

above.

The f o r e g o i n g r u l e s a r e a l l s u b j e c t t o a showing t h a t

c o u n s e l i s a c t i n g i n good f a i t h and i s n o t m e r e l y a t t e m p t i n g

t o i m p r e s s on t h e j u r y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t may be

c o v e r e d by i n s u r a n c e . Haynes v . County of M i s s o u l a , 163

Mont. a t 287, 517 P.2d a t 380. W e f u l l y subscribe t o the

f o l l o w i n g p r o c e d u r e and s t a t e m e n t a d o p t e d by t h e New Mexico

Supreme C o u r t i n C a n t e r v . Lowry ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 69 N.M. 81, 364

". . . t h e p r a c t i c e which h a s d e v e l o p e d i n many
j u r i s d i c t i o n s of a d v i s i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n
t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e j u r y , of t h e q u e s t i o n s pro-
posed t o b e a s k e d , t h e purpose t h e r e o f , and
 making of a showing of good f a i t h , i s d e f i n i t e l y
preferred ... F a i l u r e t o follow such p r e f e r r e d
p r a c t i c e h a s a tendency t o n e g a t i v e a c l a i m of
good f a i t h . C o n t r a r i w i s e , t h e f o l l o w i n g o f such
p r a c t i c e would minimize t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f any
p r e j u d i c e o r i n j u s t i c e t o e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s
i n many c a s e s , a s w e l l a s b e i n g a c o n s i d e r a b l e
saving of t r i a l t i m e . " (Citation omitted. )

The q u e s t i o n of whether t h e v o i r d i r e i s i n f a c t b e i n g

conducted i n good f a i t h i s t h u s l e f t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t .

S t a t e e x r e l . S t e p h e n s v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 170 Mont. a t 27,

550 P.2d a t 388. For t h e g u i d a n c e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t s i n

t h e s e matters, w e commend t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t h e v o i r d i r e

approved by t h e Arkansas Supreme C o u r t i n King v. Westlake

(1978) t Ark. , 572 S.W.2d 841, 843-44, and q u o t e d

above.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n c l u s i o n s do n o t a v a i l

Borkoski on t h i s a p p e a l . Even though w e a c c e p t B o r k o s k i ' s

arguments, i t i s u n d e n i a b l e t h a t t h e p u r p o s e of t h e a d v e r -

-
t i s e m e n t s was t o r e d u c e t h e amount o f damages awarded by a

jury. A t no p o i n t i s i t s u g g e s t e d , e i t h e r by Borkoski o r i n

t h e advertisements themselves, t h a t j u r i e s should n o t f i n d a

party negligent i n t h e f i r s t place. The a d s speak o n l y t o

damages, n o t l i a b i l i t y . Here, t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t

doctors not l i a b l e a t a l l . The j u r y d i d n o t even r e a c h t h e

q u e s t i o n of damages. I n s u c h a c a s e , B o r k o s k i ' s arguments
l o s e t h e i r v i t a l i t y , and any e r r o r committed must b e viewed

as h a r m l e s s and n o t grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . Rule 61, M . R . C ~ V . P .

The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:

4 d%
,g
Chief J u s t i c e

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ustices
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