Jermunson v. Jermunson

No. 14489 IN THE SUPREME COUKI' OF THE STATE OF PKNTANA 1979 IN RE THE M7muAGE OF J A C r n A MAE -SCPJ, Petitioner and Appellant, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal frm: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Honorable R. D. Whillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Gale R. Gustafson, Conrad, Mntana For Respondent: David H Nelson, Brady, bbntana . Sut=anitted on briefs: February 28, 1979 Decided: lRAR L 1379 Filed : @O;r - 7 - $cfjQ Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A p p e l l a n t J a c i n t a Mae Jermunson f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e a g a i n s t Dennis C a r t e r Jermunson on F e b r u a r y 2, 1978, a f t e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y f o u r y e a r s of m a r - riage. On March 6 , 1978, s h e f i l e d a n amended p e t i t i o n , and t h e m a t t e r was h e a r d t h e same day by t h e Honorable Ronald D . McPhillips. The p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o t h e e n t e r i n g of a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n r e s e r v i n g w i t h t h e c o u r t r u l i n g s on t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o p e r t y and s u p p o r t f o r p e t i t i o n e r . On March 2 4 , 1978, t h e d i s t r i c t judge e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, and a d e c r e e . D e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s were r e s e r v e d u n t i l a l a t e r d a t e . The p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t was d e c r e e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on J u l y 1 4 , 1978. From t h e s e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , and d e c r e e p e t i t i o n e r a p p e a l s . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a r i t a l property? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f a i l i n g t o p r o v i d e maintenance f o r a period s u f f i c i e n t t o enable p e t i t i o n e r t o obtain appropriate education o r training? The p a r t i e s w e r e m a r r i e d on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1974. A t the t i m e of t h e m a r r i a g e p e t i t i o n e r had n o t f i n i s h e d h i g h s c h o o l . She d i d n o t a t t e n d s c h o o l d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e , a l t h o u g h s c h o o l i n g was a v a i l a b l e t o h e r . She had no m a r k e t a b l e s k i l l s o r v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g and no o u t s i d e income o t h e r t h a n a job s h e h a s h e l d . Petitioner desires t o obtain v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g t o become a n u r s e . Respondent i s a h i g h s c h o o l g r a d u a t e and h a s had t r a i n - i n g i n t h e m i l i t a r y a s a d i e s e l mechanic. A t the present t i m e h e f a r m s some 80 acres of l a n d which was g i v e n t o him by h i s f a t h e r . H e i s employed by h i s f a t h e r a s a f a r m e r and i s c a p a b l e o f d o i n g o u t s i d e c a r p e n t r y , backhoe work and g e n e r a l r e p a i r work. The p a r t i e s had a n a d j u s t e d g r o s s income i n 1977 of $14,601.59. During t h e i r m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s l i v e d i n a m o b i l e home l o c a t e d i n Brady, Montana. T h i s m o b i l e home w a s p u r - c h a s e d f o r $8,900 f o r u s e a s t h e m a r i t a l home. Payments w e r e made on t h e m o b i l e home d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e mar- riage. During t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e p a r t i e s p a i d f o r a 1972 Thunder- b i r d a u t o m o b i l e which had p r e v i o u s l y been p u r c h a s e d by t h e husband and h i s f a t h e r and a l s o had p a i d f o r a 1974 J e e p pickup. They a c q u i r e d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e and a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 0 p e r c e n t of t h i s p r o p e r t y was t a k e n by r e s p o n d e n t when t h e m a r r i a g e f a i l e d . P r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e , a s n o t e d , r e s p o n d e n t had a c q u i r e d 80 a c r e s o f l a n d from h i s f a t h e r , a 1968 Ford t r u c k , t o o l box, m o t o r c y c l e , snow m o b i l e , a W i l l y ' s C - J J e e p , a d i s h - w a s h e r , and a d r y e r . Petitioner contributed t o the assets o f t h e f a m i l y by h e r homemaking, a i d i n g h e r h u s b a n d ' s work a t t i m e s , and c o n t r i b u t i n g some of h e r s m a l l income t o t h e marriage. D i r e c t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l property. Both p a r t i e s were young when m a r r i e d . Petitioner w a s n o t o u t o f h i g h s c h o o l and d i d n o t p o s s e s s any p r o p e r t y o t h e r t h a n wedding g i f t s . Respondent, f i v e y e a r s o l d e r t h a n p e t i t i o n e r , had a c q u i r e d some p r o p e r t y and had been g i v e n p r o p e r t y by h i s f a t h e r . I n f o u r y e a r s of m a r r i a g e , t h e p a r t i e s acquired l i t t l e property other than personal i t e m s which w e r e d i v i d e d by t h e t r i a l j u d g e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e dissolution. Due t o i n d e b t e d n e s s on t h e p a r t of t h e c o u p l e , p r o p e r t y was a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d . A t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u - tion, the court estimated t h a t t h e p a r t i e s w e r e i n debt i n e x c e s s o f $20,000. T h i s f i g u r e was i n e r r o r , however, and t h e t o t a l d e b t amount, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t r a n s c r i p t , was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $11,000. The c o u r t r e q u i r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o assume t h a t d e b t , s o p e t i t i o n e r i s l e f t f r e e of a n y d e b t s t h a t accumulated d u r i n g t h e marriage. S i n c e t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t which became e f f e c t i v e i n Montana on J a n u a r y 1, 1976, t h i s C o u r t h a s had numerous c a s e s which c o n t r o l t h e d i s t r i - bution of m a r i t a l property according t o t h e A c t . See Vivian v. Vivian (1978), Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 35 S t . R e p . 1359; I n r e M a r r i a g e o f R e i l l y ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 577 P.2d 840, 35 St.Rep. 451; and I n r e M a r r i a g e o f J o h n s r u d (1977) Mont. , 572 P.2d 902, 34 S t . R e p . 1417. The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n and f o l - lowed t h e s t a t u t e s and case law i n Montana. W e f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s f i r s t issue. A s t o t h e second i s s u e , whether o r n o t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a w a r d i n g p e t i t i o n e r $1,500 a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , w e f i n d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d , and p r o p e r l y s o , t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had a c q u i r e d no n e t w o r t h d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e . P e t i t i o n e r c l a i m s s h e i s n o t r e c e i v i n g h e r j u s t d u e from t h e m a r r i a g e i n t h e amount o f $1,500 and t h a t t h e amount i s insufficient. P e t i t i o n e r s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e , however, t h a t u n d e r s e c t i o n 36-103, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-2-102 MCA, s h e h a s a j o i n t a n d m u t u a l o b l i g a t i o n t o pay f o r t h e n e c e s - s i t i e s of t h e marriage. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u i r e d r e s p o n - d e n t t o assume a l l d e b t s , f r e e i n g p e t i t i o n e r o f t h e s e o b l i - g a t i o n s which a p p r o x i m a t e $5,500 ( h e r o n e - h a l f of a n $11,000 indebtedness). The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a l l t h e f a c t s and d e t e r - mined n e i t h e r p a r t y a t f a u l t . W e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s award o f $1,500 t o p e t i t i o n e r . I n n o t awarding maintenance t o p e t i t i o n e r under s e c t i o n 48-322, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-4-203 MCA, again the t r i a l c o u r t i s r e q u i r e d t o balance t h e needs of t h e p a r t i e s . Here t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were b o t h c a p a b l e o f working a n d t h a t no m a i n t e n a n c e was r e q u i r e d . T h i s C o u r t i n P o r t e r v . P o r t e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 451, 457, 473 P.2d 538, h e l d t h a t : ". . . a reviewing c o u r t i s never j u s t i f i e d i n substituting i t s discretion f o r t h a t of the t r i a l court. I n determining whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t h e q u e s t i o n i s n o t whether t h e reviewing c o u r t agrees with t h e t r i a l c o u r t , but, rather, did the t r i a l court i n the exercise of i t s d i s c r e t i o n act a r b i t r a r i l y without t h e em- ployment o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment o r e x c e e d t h e bounds o f r e a s o n , i n view o f a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i g n o r i n g r e c o g n i z e d p r i n c i p l e s r e s u l t i n g i n sub- stantial injustice. " Here t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y o r e x c e e d t h e bounds o f r e a s o n . The judgment a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. ! W e concur: