State v. Case

i

No. 80-159

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F

1980

THE STATE O M N A A
F O T N ,

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

vs .
CRISS ALLEN CASE,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k .
Honorable P e t e r Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant:

H u l l and S h e r l o c k , H e l e n a , Montana
J e f f r e y S h e r l o c k a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana

For Respondent :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
C h a r l e s G r a v e l e y , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , H e l e n a ,
Montana

Submitted: November 1 8 , 1980

Decided: BEG 2 9 5980
Filed: OEC 2 9 1980
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d the Opinion of the
Court.

D e f e n d a n t C r i s s A l l e n C a s e a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n
.
i n the D i s t r i c t Court, First Judicial District, Lewis and
C l a r k C o u n t y , o f one c o u n t o f r o b b e r y . For r e a s o n s h e r e i n -

a f t e r s e t f o r t h , we r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and d i s m i s s t h e
charge.
D e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l :

1. Was defendant denied his right to a speedy t r i a l
where 3 4 0 d a y s e l a p s e d b e t w e e n t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
and t r i a l ?

2. Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to
support a conviction?

3. Was the accomplice t e s t i m o n y o f Ron Worden s u f -
f i c i e n t l y corroborated?

4. Was e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d ?

5. Did jury instructions allowing permissive infer-
e n c e s s h i f t t h e burden of p r o o f ?

C a s e and h i s t h r e e c o d e f e n d a n t s R i c k Worden, Ron Worden
and A u s t i n M e t c a l f d r o v e t o Montana t o g e t h e r from C a l i f o r n i a
i n November 1 9 7 8 . D u r i n g t h e t r i p , t h e men d i s c u s s e d p l a n s
f o r r o b b e r i e s o f r o a d h o u s e s a l o o n s , p u r c h a s e d a gun and t a p e
for restraining victims, and cased a number of bars as

p o t e n t i a l r o b b e r y s i t e s b e f o r e a r r i v i n g i n Montana.
On November 7 , 1 9 7 8 , t h e Worden B r o t h e r s r o b b e d Mac's
Bar i n Wolf C r e e k w h i l e C a s e and M e t c a l f r e m a i n e d o u t s i d e i n
the car. The victims of the robbery, C h a r l e s and C a r o l
Marcus p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t , and
neither could identify him as having p a r t i c i p a t e d in the
crime. E m i l Kersey, a p a t r o n who l e f t t h e b a r i m m e d i a t e l y
preceding t h e robbery, saw t h e g e t a w a y c a r a s h e d e p a r t e d

and n o t i c e d someone h e i d e n t i f i e d a s a b l o n d e woman s i t t i n g
in the driver's position. Other testimony concerning t h e

Wolf Creek r o b b e r y was p r e s e n t e d p r i m a r i l y by Ron Worden,

who had t u r n e d S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e , and a l s o by Deputy R i c h a r d

Hammerbacker who had t a k e n s t a t e m e n t s f r o m R i c k Worden and

Metcalf.

On t h e e v e n i n g o f November 8 , 1978, t h e day f o l l o w i n g

t h e M a c ' s Bar r o b b e r y , d e f e n d a n t and h i s companions r o b b e d a

bar i n L o r i n g , Montana. All f o u r men p a r t i c i p a t e d in that

robbery, which i n v o l v e d m u l t i p l e k i d n a p p i n g s and h o m i c i d e s

a s w e l l a s robbery. D e f e n d a n t h a s a l r e a d y been t r i e d and

convicted f o r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Loring robbery. He

h a s been sentenced to a total of 175 y e a r s i n connection

with t h a t incident. T h a t s e n t e n c e i s u n r e l a t e d t o and n o t

a f f e c t e d by t h i s a p p e a l .

On November 30, 1 9 7 8 , C a s e was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n

i n Lewis and C l a r k C o u n t y w i t h r o b b e r y . He was t r i e d for

that o f f e n s e under the accountability statute, section

45-2-302, MCA. T r i a l was e v e n t u a l l y commenced on November

5, 1979, 340 days after the filing of the information.

D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s f r o m a v e r d i c t and judgment o f g u i l t y .

The Attorney General did not participate in oral

argument.

The s p e e d y t r i a l i s s u e h e r e i s e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o

the issue presented and discussed in detail in S t a t e v.

Worden (1980), Mont. , 6 1 1 P.2d 185, 37 S t . R e p .

869. The o n l y m a t e r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n h e r e f r o m Worden i s a

d e l a y o f an a d d i t i o n a l 19 d a y s b e f o r e commencement o f this

trial. The r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r a d d i t i o n a l d e l a y h e r e u n d e r t h e

same f a c t s a s Worden i s n o t s o s u b s t a n t i a l a s t o p u r s u a d e u s

t o abandon t h e p o s i t i o n w e a d o p t e d i n Worden. D e f e n d a n t was

n o t denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l .

D e f e n d a n t q u e s t i o n s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e on
t h r e e separate bases: (1) t h e e s s e n t i a l element of fear
was never directly established; (2) the testimony of Ron
Worden indicated defendant's actions did not bring him

w i t h i n t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y s t a t u t e ; and, (3) a f a t a l variance

e x i s t e d between t h e m a t t e r s a l l e g e d i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and

t h e proof adduced at trial. None o f t h e s e arguments a r e
persuasive.
Defendant u r g e s t h a t under S t a t e v. Merseal ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167
Mont. 412, 538 P.2d 1366, the State's failure to elicit
d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y from t h e M a r c u s ' t h a t t h e y were p l a c e d in

fear leaves that e l e m e n t unproven. The f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n
here is s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n that i n Merseal, and

t h e l a t t e r does n o t c o n t r o l .
I n Merseal, d e f e n d a n t was driving a car in which a

p o l i c e o f f i c e r was a p a s s e n g e r . Defendant slowed t h e c a r ,

moved t o jump o u t of t h e v e h i c l e and a l s o r e a c h e d t o w a r d t h e
f l o o r o f t h e a u t o , where i t was s u s p e c t e d h e had a c o n c e a l e d

gun. The officer, who was armed, drew his weapon and
restrained defendant. The o f f i c e r , a l l e g e d l y t h e v i c t i m o f
a n a s s a u l t , d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t h e had e x p e r i e n c e d f e a r .
H e r e t h e r o b b e r s w e r e i n more c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o f t h e
situation. Rick Worden inquired of Charles Marcus at

gunpoint if he understood about robbery. Charles and
C a r o l Marcus were p l a c e d f a c e down on t h e f l o o r , and bound

with tape, while the robbers took t h e money i n t h e till,
w h i s k e y and c i g a r e t t e s . The v i c t i m s w e r e t h e n admonished
n o t t o move f o r a q u a r t e r h o u r a f t e r t h e t h i e v e s ' d e p a r t u r e .
W h i l e t h e o n l y t e s t i m o n y which served a s an admission of
f e a r was C a r o l M a r c u s ' statement: "Well, I understood it

t h a t t h e y meant t h e y would k i l l u s i f we d i d n ' t ( r e m a i n on
t h e f l o o r ) ," a c t u a l f e a r may be d e d u c e d by t h e j u r y when t h e
victims are placed under such total domination by the
offenders. I t is w e l l w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of the jury to

determine t h a t f e a r e x i s t s i n such a s i t u a t i o n .
R i c k Worden's b r a n d i s h i n g of t h e gun c o u l d h a r d l y be
anything less than sufficient circumstances to place the

victims in fear. The Marcus' compliance with Worden's

o r d e r s and t h e i r t o t a l submission i n d i c a t e d a f e a r of the
c o n s e q u e n c e s of f a i l u r e t o d o s o . I t would be c o n t r a r y t o

the common experience of a l l mankind to conclude that a
person would experience no fear when confronted with a
robber w i e l d i n g a gun. Daellenbach v. S t a t e (Wyo. 1 9 7 7 ) ,
562 P.2d 679.

D e f e n s e c o u n s e l e l i c i t e d u n d i s p u t e d t e s t i m o n y f r o m Ron
Worden that Case did not engage in any of the acts
proscribed by s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 3 0 2 ( 3 ) , MCA, either before the

robbery or during the time t h e Wordens w e r e actually in
Mac's Ba r. Defendant t h e r e f o r e a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o m p l i c i t y
arose, if at all, o n l y a f t e r t h e r o b b e r y had c o n c l u d e d --

t h u s removing C a s e f r o m any a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e r o b b e r y .
Ron Worden a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t C r i s s C a s e d r o v e t h e c a r
d u r i n g t h e g e t a w a y from M a c ' s . D e f e n d a n t ' s argument h e r e i s
d e p e n d e n t on t h e v a l i d i t y o f h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r o b b e r y
ended t h e moment t h e Worden brothers stepped outside the

bar. However, i n Montana, t h e e n s u i n g f l i g h t i s c o n s i d e r e d

p a r t and p a r c e l o f a r o b b e r y u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s t h e c r i m i n a l
p u r p o s e , i n c l u d i n g c a r r y i n g away o f t h e s p o i l s o f t h e c r i m e ,

is completed. S t a t e v. J a c k s o n ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 7 1 Mont. 421, 230 P.
370. Here, defendant's involvement commenced before the
r o b b e r s had r e a c h e d a p l a c e o f s e e m i n g s e c u r i t y and b e f o r e
t h e proceeds had been divided. By s e r v i n g a s a getaway
d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t a i d e d t h e Wordens i n t h e commission o f t h e
robbery, and became liable for the robbery under section
45-2-302, MCA.
 Defendant's third assault on the evidence adduced at
trial is that it failed to establish the robbery in the mode
specified in the information -- purposely or knowingly put
the bar owners in fear of immediate bodily injury.
Defendant argues that the state's failure specifically to
prove fear, where fear was specifically alleged, is fatal.
This argument evaporates in light of our above ruling that
the fear element was indeed sufficiently established.
We turn now to the issue of corroboration of accomplice
testimony. The state's major witness was Ron Worden, who
testified regarding the events which occurred from the time
the four men left California through the commission of the
Loring robbery. It was Worden's testimony that placed Case
behind the wheel in the getaway vehicle. The only other
testimony regarding defendant's possible presence and
participation was presented by Kersey, Hammerbacker and
Officer Ralph Schmoldt, a jailer who overheard defendant
express anger at Ron Worden because, "Ronny had turned
State's evidence on some robberies and other things that had
gone on.'' The District Court ruled Kersey's testimony
sufficient to corroborate Worden.
Section 46-16-213, MCA, mandates that accomplice
testimony be corroborated by other independent evidence
which tends to connect the defendant with the offense. The
quantum and character of this requisite proof has been
recently discussed in State v. Kemp (1979), Mont .
, 597 P.2d 96, 36 St.Rep. 1215:
"To be sufficient, corroborating evidence
must show more than that a crime was in fact
committed or the circumstances of its com-
mission. (Citation.) It must raise more
than a suspicion of the defendant's involve-
ment in, or opportunity to commit, the crime
charged. (Citation.) But corroborative
evidence need not be sufficient, by itself,
to support a defendant's conviction or even
to make out a prima facie case against him.
 (Citations.) C o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e may be
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ( C i t a t i o n . ) and c a n come from
the defendant or h i s witnesses. (Citation.)

" With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n m i n d , e a c h c a s e
m u s t be examined on i t s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s t o
d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e t e n d s , i n and o f
i t s e l f , t o prove d e f e n d a n t ' s connection with
t h e crime charged.
"One a c c o m p l i c e c a n n o t s u p p l y t h e i n d e p e n d e n t
evidence necessary t o corroborate another
accomplice. (Citations.)" 597 P.2d a t 9 9 ,
36 S t . R e p . a t 1217-1218.

The c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e m u s t c l e a r l y :
(1) B e independent

(2) P o i n t t o w a r d d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t , and

(3) Provide a l e g a l l y sufficient connection between
d e f e n d a n t and o f f e n s e .

See, Civil Procedure and Evidence, Montana Supreme C o u r t

S u r v e y , 4 1 Mont.L.Rev. 293, 319 ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
D e p u t y Hammerbacker's t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n e d s t a t e m e n t s h e

had t a k e n from R i c k Worden and A u s t i n M e t c a l f i n L a s V e g a s ,
Nevada. Coming from a c c o m p l i c e s , the e v i d e n c e c a n n o t be
considered independent. Kemp, s u p r a .
E m i l Kersey p r o v i d e d i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e i n s o f a r a s he

saw a p e r s o n , a blonde female, i n t h e d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n of
t h e getaway v e h i c l e . Kersey could n o t i d e n t i f y t h e husky
r e d - h a i r e d d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t p e r s o n , however. The t e s t i m o n y

thus i m p l i c a t e s d e f e n d a n t o n l y when v i e w e d in conjunction
w i t h Ron W o r d e n ' s and t h e r e f o r e i s a l s o n o t i n d e p e n d e n t .
O f f i c e r S c h m o l d t ' s t e s t i m o n y was f u l l y i n d e p e n d e n t , b u t

vague. T h e Wolf Creek robbery was not mentioned by
defendant, whose anger a t Worden c o u l d j u s t a s e a s i l y be
a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e L o r i n g r o b b e r y o r some o t h e r intervening
incident. The e x p r e s s i o n o f anger a t Worden i s n o t more
c o n s i s t e n t with complicity than noncomplicity i n t h e Wolf
Creek robbery. It is therefore insufficient as

corroboration. S t a t e v. Keckonen ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. 253,
2 6 4 , 8 4 P.2d 3 4 1 , 346.

The S t a t e h a s c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o present any e v i d e n c e

corroborative of accomplice testimony. This failure

necessitates reversal.

The State presented testimony at trial, through Ron

Worden, of the planning and commission of the Loring

robbery. The e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e l i m i t e d p u r p o s e

of showing defendant's intent, preparation, plan and

knowledge. The specific details of the Loring robbery,

other than its commission, were not revealed. Defendant

a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t a l l evidence r e l a t i n g t o t h e Loring

r o b b e r y was i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . W e agree.

We have repeatedly expressed our concern over the

widespread use of other crimes evidence. Our a p p r e h e n s i o n

h a s l e d us t o a p p l y t h e g e n e r a l r u l e a g a i n s t use of evidence

of other crimes, and t o a l l o w s u c h e v i d e n c e o n l y u n d e r

closely limited circumstances. Toward this end, we have

established substantive and procedural guidelines for

a p p l i c a t i o n of the exception, which w e have set forth in

S t a t e v. J u s t (1979), Mont. , 602 P.2d 957, 36

St.Rep. 1649. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , n e i t h e r t h e s u b s t a n t i v e nor

t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s have been f u l f i l l e d .

Admissibility of evidence of other crimes is to be

d e t e r m i n e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o a f o u r e l e m e n t

test:

(1) S i m i l a r i t y o f c r i m e s ;

(2) N e a r n e s s i n time;

(3) Tendency to establish a common scheme, p l a n o r

system, and;

(4) The p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e e v i d e n c e is n o t sub-

s t a n t i a l l y o u t w e i g h e d by p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . Just,

s u p r a , 602 P.2d a t 961, 36 S t . R e p . a t 1653. Only t h e time
f a c t o r h a s been m e t h e r e .

First, t h e Wolf Creek and Loring robberies were too

dissimilar to allow the State to invoke the other crimes

exception. Where the alleged similarities between the

crimes r e v e a l l i t t l e i n common o t h e r t h a n a s e q u e n c e o f t i m e
from the crime charged, the acts are not unusual and

distinctive enough to come within the purview of the

similarity element of the exception. State v. Hansen

(198o)t Mont . , 608 P.2d 1 0 8 3 , 1 0 8 7 , 37 S t . R e p .
6 5 7 , 661.

I n Wolf Creek, the Wordens robbed the bar using no

force other than t h r e a t s , w h i l e C a s e and M e t c a l f w a i t e d i n

the car. I n L o r i n g , a l l f o u r men e n t e r e d t h e b a r , e a c h man

assumed a predesignated duty station, and the ensuing

v i o l e n c e r e s u l t e d i n m u l t i p l e homicides. The two i n c i d e n t s

are similar only in t h a t both i n v o l v e d barroom robberies.

That sole similarity between the two is clearly not

s u f f i c i e n t t o trigger the exception.

Next, the crimes do not tend to establish a common

scheme, p l a n o r s y s t e m . Again, t h e c r i m e s were c a r r i e d o u t

i n v a s t l y d i s s i m i l a r f a s h i o n w i t h i n t h e p e r v a s i v e l y common

s c e n a r i o o f t h e barroom h o l d u p . A b s e n t p r o o f o f any f u r t h e r

distinguishing event peculiar to the commission of both

c r i m e s , no common scheme e x i s t s . Hansen, s u p r a .

Finally, t h e p r o b a t i v e value of the e v i d e n c e must be

weighed against prejudice to the defendant. Evidence of

other crimes invariably will result in prejudice to a

defendant to a certain degree. The likelihood of such

prejudice was compounded here, where the other c r i m e had

been h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d . The l a c k o f p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e

evidence of the other crime, coupled with the prejudice

inherently connected with the admission of such evidence,
compels our conclusion that the prejudicial effect
outweighed i t s p r o b a t i v e value.
This case does not on its facts fall within the

exception to the general rule barring evidence of other
crimes. The i m p r o p e r admission of t h e evidence under the
exception is r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
Once h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s i s

a d m i s s i b l e , which we a g a i n e m p h a s i z e s h o u l d o n l y o c c u r u n d e r
limited conditions justifying a d e p a r t u r e from t h e g e n e r a l
rule, t h e c o u r t must f o l l o w t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s s e t
f o r t h i n J u s t , 602 P.2d a t 963-964, 36 S t . R e p . a t 1657-1658.

Failure to adhere to the procedural mandates of J u-
-s t
constitutes error. ~ h i s a s e was t r i e d two months a f t e r w e
c
handed down J u s t , y e t n o n e o f t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s w e r e

met.
First, the S t a t e must provide written notice to the

defendant, before the case is called for trial, that the
evidence is to be produced. The notice must include a

statement of t h e p u r p o s e s f o r which t h e e v i d e n c e is t o be
presented. Here, defendant received no written notice

whatsoever; before trial t h e S t a t e had v e r b a l l y indicated
o n l y t h a t it might p r e s e n t s u c h e v i d e n c e ; and t h e d e f e n d a n t

was f i n a l l y apprised of the State's definite intention to
p r e s e n t t h e e v i d e n c e , and o f t h e p u r p o s e f o r t h a t p r e s e n t a -
t i o n , only a t t h e conclusion of t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l .
Next, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must, a t t h e t i m e t h e evidence is

introduced, e x p l a i n t o t h e j u r y t h e purpose of t h e evidence
and admonish t h e j u r y t o w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e o n l y f o r t h o s e
purposes. The C o u r t d i d n o t s o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y .
The f i n a l p r o c e d u r a l s t e p r e q u i r e s :
"In its f i n a l charge, t h e c o u r t should
i n s t r u c t the jury i n unequivocal terms t h a t
s u c h e v i d e n c e was r e c e i v e d o n l y f o r t h e
l i m i t e d p u r p o s e s e a r l i e r s t a t e d and t h a t t h e
 d e f e n d a n t i s n o t b e i n g t r i e d and may n o t be
convicted for any o f f e n s e e x c e p t t h a t
c h a r g e d , w a r n i n g them t h a t t o c o n v i c t f o r
o t h e r o f f e n s e s may r e s u l t i n u n j u s t d o u b l e
punishment." 602 P.2d a t 9 6 4 , 36 S t . R e p . a t
1658.

The jury was instructed regarding such evidence as

follows:

" E v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s , w r o n g s , o r a c t s i s
n o t t o be u s e d by you t o p r o v e t h e c h a r a c t e r
o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show t h a t h e a c t e d i n
c o n fo r m i t y t h e r e w i t h , nor is such e v i d e n c e t o
be u s e d by you a s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
c o m m i t t e d t h e a c t w i t h which h e i s c h a r g e d .
However, e v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s , w r o n g s o r
a c t s may be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y f o r o t h e r
purposes such a s proof of i n t e n t , opport-
unity, maintenance, preparation, plan or
knowledge. "

The specifically required unequivocal warning of the

possibility for unjust d o u b l e p u n i s h m e n t was n o t i n c l u d e d .

Hence, the jury was inadequately instructed in its final

charge.

Again, the failure to provide necessary procedural

safeguards prejudiced defendant. This failure, of itself

dictates reversal.

Finally, defendant argues certain jury instructions

improperly shifted t h e burden of proof. The i n s t r u c t i o n s

c o m p l a i n e d of a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o i n f e r knowledge and i n t e n t

on the part of the defendant. Defendant submits the

i n s t r u c t i o n s v i o l a t e d t h e s p i r i t and i n t e n t o f S a n d s t r o m v .

Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 442 U.S. 5 1 0 , 99 S . C t . 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39.

W disagree.
e

W have p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e v a l i d i t y of
e similar

i n s t r u c t i o n s a l l o w i n g p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e s , S t a t e v . Sunday

(1980)I Mont. , 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561;

S t a t e v . Wogamon ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 610 P.2d 1 1 6 1 , 37

St.Rep. 8 4 0 , and h a v e d e t e r m i n e d s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e no

b u r d e n on d e f e n d a n t s . W s t a t e d i n Sunday:
e

"Since a permissive inference is involved,
 S u n d a y must show t h e i n v a l i d i t y of t h e
i n f e r e n c e a s a p p l i e d t o him. Sunday must
show t h e r e i s n o r a t i o n a l way u n d e r t h e f a c t s
o f t h i s c a u s e f o r t h e j u r y t o make t h e
c o n n e c t i o n p e r m i t t e d by t h e i n f e r e n c e . Only
t h e n i s t h e r e a r i s k the p r e s u m p t i v e l y
r a t i o n a l j u r y w i l l u s e t h e i n f e r e n c e t o make
an erroneous factual determination.
(Citation.) Sunday h a s n o t c a r r i e d h i s
b u r d e n upon a p p e a l . " 609 P.2d a t 1 1 9 6 , 37
St.Rep. a t 569.

The same reasoning applies here. Defendant was not

prejudiced through t h e use of permissive inferences.

R e v e r s e d and d i s m i s s e d .

Justice

W Concur:
e

.......................
Chief J u s t i c e

.......................
Justices
 Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell, s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g :
I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t of t h e f o r e g o i n g o p i n i o n b u t n o t

w i t h a l l t h e s t a t e m e n t s and d i s c u s s i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n .

Chief J u s t i c e

Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. S h e a c o n c u r s a n d w i l l f i l e a c o n c u r r i n g

opinion a t a later t i m e .
THE STATE O F MONTANA

vs .
No. 80-159
C R I S S ALLEN CASE

CONCURRING O P I N I O N OF MR. J U S T I C E DANIEL J . SHEA

.......................................................

Dated: January 5, 1 9 8 0
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring:

Generally, I concur in the majority opinion. The evidence
was legally insufficient, and therefore a reversal and dis-
missal is required. Even if the evidence was sufficient to
convict, the failure of the State to comply with the mandate
of State v. Just, supra, as the opinion states, would require a
reversal and a new trial. I would like to comment on the State's
failure to comply with Just.
I dissented in Just because the defendant was not given the
benefit of the ruling--which would have required a reversal and
a new trial. I also stressed the importance of the trial court
to first assess the State's need for the similar-crimes evidence,
and then determine whether the evidence, if admitted, would
be unduly prejudicial. Undoubtedly, the State needed the
evidence--with the testimony from the accomplice about the other
robbery, it tended to show that defendant and the accomplice
were involved in a common scheme or plan. This was an attempt
of the State to pull accomplice testimony up by its own boot
straps--clearly improper. Assuming the admissibility of the
accomplice testimony as to the robbery at Loring, the trial
court without question failed to consider the potential harmful
effects that the testimony would have as to the Loring robbery.
The so-called similar crime, was not only a robbery; it involved
multiple brutal murders committed by the accomplice and the
defendant. I doubt that any juror could fairly state that he
had not heard nor read about the robbery and murders at Loring.
Therefore, even if there was no direct reference to the murders
committed in the process of the robbery at Loring, there is no
doubt that the jury knew it had a person on trial who was involved
in the Loring murders. Proper consideration of these factors
before admitting the testimony, would have led to a decision
-14-
that the accomplice testimony as to the Loring robbery was
loaded with prejudice that could never be overcome.
I stress that just because State v. Just, supra, sets
out the procedural requirements for admission of similar crimes,
it does not mean that the trial court should always admit
such evidence when it is offered. The trial court should
carefully scrutinize the attempted use of such evidence and the
potential prejudice that will ensue, and where he has any doubt,
it should be resolved against use of such evidence.
Finally, the conviction of defendant in this case, has,
as its underlying cause, a manifest abuse of prosecutorial
discretion. We must remember that at the time defendant was
tried for the Wolf Creek robbery, he was already under sentence
of 175 years in prison for the Loring robbery and murders.
It is perhaps understandable that the prosecutor first
filed robbery charges against defendant arising from the Wolf
Creek robbery, for then the prosecutor was not confronted with
the thin evidentiary case and the legal requirements as to
corroboration of accomplice testimony. Maybe his initial charge
was supported by legally sufficient probable cause, I don't
know. But as the case neared the trial stage, the prosecutor
knew or should have know that he did not have sufficient legal
evidence on which to base a conviction that would withstand
the legal requirements. Therefore, he had every reason to believe
that a conviction would ultimately lead to a reversal and a
dismissal. Also, assuming that the prosecutor was unaware of
the rigorous requirements for accomplice testimony, it is sad
that he succeeded in getting the Loring robbery evidence admitted
when there was not even an attempt to comply with State v. Just.
It is not unreasonable to conclude here that the Loring robbery
evidence, coupled with the widespread press coverage of the Loring
murders,sealed the defendant's fate before the jury.

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