State Ex Rel. Flammond v. Flammond

No. 80-12 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F OTN 1980 STATE OF MONTANA, e x r e l . , SHELLEY ANN F A M N , L M O D P e t i t i o n e r s and A p p e l l a n t s , -vs- JOSEPH L. FA M N , L M O D Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f G l a c i e r , The H o n o r a b l e R. D. M c P h i l l i p s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana L a r r y E p s t e i n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , C u t Bank, Montana F o r Respondent: S t e v e n Bunch a r g u e d , Montana L e g a l S e r v i c e s , H e l e n a , Montana D. M i c h a e l E a k i n a r g u e d , Montana L e g a l S e r v i c e s , H a r d i n , Montana F o r Amicus C u r i a e : M i c h a e l G. G a r r i t y , Dept. o f Revenue, H e l e n a , Montana -- Submitted: September 1 5 , 1980 Decided: 1g lg80 Filed: ffEC 1 9 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Snea delivered the Opinion of the Court. P e t i t i o n e r S h e l l y a n n Flammond a p p e a l s a r u l i n g o f the G l a c i e r County D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s i n g , f o r l a c k o f j u r i s - d i c t i o n , an a c t i o n s e e k i n g t o e n f o r c e c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s under Montana's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), T i t l e 4 0 , Chapter 5, MCA. Having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked both s u b j e c t matter over t h e transaction and p e r s o n a l jurisdiction over the respondent, we a f f i r m . Lloyd Flammond i s an e n r o l l e d member of the Blackfeet Tribe. S h e l l y a n n Flammond is not. They were m a r r i e d on March 2 5 , 1976 i n Long B e a c h , C a l i f o r n i a , and t h e n moved t o Babb, Montana, which i s l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e Blackfeet Reservation. On A u g u s t 5 , 1 9 7 6 , t h e i r o n l y c h i l d , S u s i e Renee Flammond, was b o r n t o them. I n November o f t h e same y e a r , t h e c o u p l e s e p a r a t e d . Mother and c h i l d moved t o California and established residence there. The father r e m a i n e d on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n where h e s t i l l r e s i d e s . I n 1977 t h e m o t h e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n u n d e r C a l i f o r n i a ' s URESA s e e k i n g m o n t h l y c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s of $320 from the father. The County o f Los A n g e l e s , from whom t h e m o t h e r was r e c e i v i n g p u b l i c a i d f o r t h e c h i l d , j o i n e d t h e p e t i t i o n . The C a l i f o r n i a S u p e r i o r C o u r t f o r t h e C o u n t y of Los A n g e l e s f o u n d t h a t t h e f a t h e r owed a d u t y o f s u p p o r t and o r d e r e + t h e petition sent t o Glacier County D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n Montana f o r t h e f i l i n g o f an e n f o r c e m e n t a c t i o n u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f M o n t a n a ' s URESA, s e c t i o n 40-5-101, e t seq., MCA. The Montana court issued an o r d e r for the father to show c a u s e why he should n o t be required t o make support payments under t h e Montana A c t . A Glacier County Deputy S h e r i f f s e r v e d t h e show c a u s e o r d e r on t h e f a t h e r w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of the Blackfeet Reservation. The f a t h e r moved to dismiss on grounds that the District Court lacked p e r s o n a l and s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s was insufficient. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion. Finding, inter alia, that none of the acts of n o n s u p p o r t a l l e g e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n had o c c u r r e d i n Montana, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter juris- diction. Where, as here, neither the s t a t e nor the tribe has complied with the current federal enabling statutes, 25 U.S.C. S S 1321-1326, r e g u l a t i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n of s t a t e c i v i l and criminal jurisdiction to Indian reservations, Montana may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over transactions a r i s i n g on I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s ( s e e Blackwolf v. District Court (1972), 1 5 8 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293; Kennerly v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507), unless the transaction entails "significant" or "substantial" contacts with the state o u t s i d e of r e s e r v a t i o n b o u n d a r i e s . Crawford v. Roy ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 227, 557 P.2d 392, ( a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r payments f o r s e r v i c e s rendered to Indian attorney both on and off the r e s e r v a t i o n where t h e employment c o n t r a c t was e n t e r e d i n t o off the reservation); Little Horn State Bank v. Stops (1976), 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211, cert.den. Stops v. L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 430 U.S. 904, 97 S . C t . 1171, 5 1 L.Ed.2d 580 ( w h e r e I n d i a n p a r t i e s had o b t a i n e d l o a n s o f f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n b u t w i t h i n Montana); S t a t e ex r e l . Old E l k v. District Court (1976), 170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, (where the reservation Indian was a suspect in an off- reservation shooting); Bad Horse v. Bad H o r s e ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert.den. 419 U.S. 847, 95 S . C t . 8 3 , 42 L.Ed.2d 76 ( w h e r e t h e I n d i a n c o u p l e had b e e n m a r r i e d off the reservation); See also, Fisher v. District Court ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. 382, 389 n . 14, 96 S . C t . 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 0 6 ; De C o t e a u v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 420 U.S. 425, 429 n. 3 , 95 S . C t . 1 0 8 2 , 43 L.Ed.2d 300, reh.den. 421 U.S. 939, 95 S . C t . 1 6 6 7 , 44 L.Ed.2d 95. Nowhere d o e s e i t h e r T i t l e I V o f t h e S o c i a l S e c u r i t y A c t , 42 U.S.C. § 601, e t s e q . , or the r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated under it a f f i r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e t h e s t a t e s by means o f URESA l e g i s l a t i o n t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n over reservation Indians who have neglected to provide support for t h e i r dependents. Here there are absolutely no o f f - r e s e r v a t i o n acts in Montana sufficient to vest state courts with jurisdiction over the respondent, a reservation Indian. The o n l y o f f - reservation a c t s occurred i n California. I t is w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t a r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n ' s d o m i c i l e on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n i s n o t an i n - s t a t e c o n t a c t which g r a n t s j u r i s d i c t i o n to state courts. F i s h e r v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , s u p r a ; K e n n e r l y v. District Court (1971), supra; W i l l i a m s v. Lee ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 358 U.S. 217, 79 S . C t . 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251. As a prerequisite to in 7 personam jurisdiction, the f o r u m s t a t e and t h e p a r t y o v e r whom j u r i s d i c t i o n is sought m u s t be l i n k e d by c e r t a i n "minimum c o n t a c t s .. . such t h a t the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe v. W a s h i n g t o n ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S . C t . 1 5 4 , 90 L.Ed. 9 5 , q u o t i n g ~ i l l i k e n . Meyer ( 1 9 4 0 ) , v 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278. Here t h e respondent father has i n j u r e d n e i t h e r p e r s o n s nor p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana. The c a u s e o f a c t i o n t o e n f o r c e s u p p o r t payments a r i s e s s o l e l y from h i s d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s . The c o n t r o v e r s y is t h e outgrowth of a separation that did n o t o c c u r w i t h i n M o n t a n a ' s t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t was not otherwise connected with this state. Under essentially the same constellation of facts, the United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t a s t a t e ' s a s s e r t i o n of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n would be b o t h u n r e a s o n a b l e and imper- missible. Kulko v . California Superior Court ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 84, 96-97, 98 S . C t . 1 6 9 0 , 56 L.Ed.2d 132, reh.den. 438 U.S. 908, 98 S . C t . 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150; See a l s o , Rule 4(B), 14.R.Civ.P. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t had no b a s i s t o a s s e r t p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e respondent. C o n t r a r y t o t h e m o t h e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , Natewa v . Natewa ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691, does not support state jurisdiction in this case. There t h e N e w Mexico Supreme C o u r t f o u n d s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e URESA a c t i o n b r o u g h t by a non-Indian Wisconsin plaintiff against her Indian husband l i v i n g on t h e Zuni R e s e r v a t i o n . C i t i n g Daly v. Daly ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 21 N . J . 599, 1 2 3 A.2d 3 , t h e New Mexico c o u r t s t a t e d that "all that was needed for proper jurisdiction" under URESA was "the presence of the husband or father in the responding state, the presence of the wife or child in a n o t h e r s t a t e , and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d u t y o f s u p p o r t on t h e p a r t of t h e f a t h e r u n d e r t h e l a w s o f t h e r e s p o n d i n g s t a t e . " 499 P.2d at 693. In Natewa, the husband was clearly " p r e s e n t " i n t h e responding state (New M e x i c o ) f o r as the court held, he had s u b m i t t e d t o s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n when h e v o l u n t a r i l y appeared i n lower c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s . 499 P.2d a t 693. I n t h i s c a s e , however, t h e f a t h e r h a s c h a l l e n g e d s t a t e court jurisdiction from t h e o u t s e t . He h a s n o t a c q u i e s c e d in state jurisdiction so a s t o g i v e t h e Montana court - in personam jurisdiction over him. He c a n n o t be s a i d t o be "present" within t h e responding s t a t e , for the reservation is clearly beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Montana c o u r t s . S e e , Kennerly v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a . S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e e x i s t s no d u t y t o s u p p o r t on t h e p a r t o f t h e f a t h e r i n Montana. For, a s w e have determined, the Montana c o u r t s do n o t h a v e s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r the transaction in question. It is not our purpose here to deny M s . Flammond a forum. W have no c h o i c e b u t e t o a p p l y t h e law a s i t h a s b e e n d e c l a r e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . In his b r i e f and a t o r a l a r g u m e n t , respondent vigorously contended t h a t t h e t r i b a l c o u r t would p r o v i d e a f a i r and v i a b l e forum for the judicial e n f o r c e m e n t of c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s . In recent years, American Indian tribes have strived to become i n d e p e n d e n t and r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n m e n t e n t i t i e s . There is e v e r y r e a s o n t o hope, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e B l a c k f e e t Tribe w i l l afford the petitioning wife a viable remedy i n its courts. Should t r i b a l governments prove uncooperative or should their courts discriminate against non-Indian plaintiffs, they run the risk of eventual Congressional l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t c o u l d d e p r i v e them o f much o f t h e autonomy t h e y have s t r u g g l e d s o l o n g t o a c h i e v e . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r e i s no a p p e a l f r o m a t r i b a l c o u r t r u l i n g t o t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t system. S e e W e l l s v. Philbrick ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 486 F.Supp. 807, 809 and n . 2; ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 25 U.S.C. 9 1303. However, t h a t i s n o t an a r g u m e n t i n f a v o r o f state court jurisdiction. A s t a t e may simply n o t extend its j u r i s d i c t i o n by j u d i c i a l f i a t no m a t t e r how c o m p e l l i n g t h e p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r d o i n g s o may seem i f t h e r e i s no legal basis to support state jurisdiction. If a remedy o t h e r t h a n t r i b a l c o u r t i s t o e x i s t , Congress must p r o v i d e it. The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . W Concur: e C M f Justice Justices Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d i s s e n t i n g : I respectfully dissent. The m a j o r i t y h a s found t h a t t h i s s t a t e ' s c o u r t s c a n n o t e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r M r . Flamrnond b e c a u s e he h a s i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e S t a t e of Montana. For t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e URESA, he i s a c i t i z e n o n l y o f t h e Black- feet reservation. I b e l i e v e t h a t i n rendering such a d e c i - s i o n , m c o l l e a g u e s have c o n t i n u e d on a c o u r s e t h a t l e a d s y even f u r t h e r away from t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a common-sense r u l e of law i n I n d i a n j u r i s d i c t i o n c a s e s . T h i s C o u r t e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d an inherent fairness i n a r u l e t h a t ". . . ' I n d i a n s may s u e - or -- be sued i n s t a t e c o u r t s , s i n c e t h e ' l a t t e r a r e g e n e r a l l y open t o a l l p e r s o n s i r r e s p e c t i v e of r a c e , c o l o r , o r c i t i z e n s h i p . ' " Bonnet v . S e e k i n s ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 2 4 , 26, 243 P.2d 317, 318, c i t i n g 27 Am.Jur. I n d i a n s , S 2 1 a t 554. (Emphasis supplied.) I s it no l o n g e r t h e p o l i c y of t h i s C o u r t t o s t r i v e t o i n t e r p r e t t h e law i n a f a i r and j u s t manner w i t h - o u t regard t o t h e c o l o r of a person's skin? I am m i n d f u l t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e t r e n d of c a s e law i n t h i s a r e a , b u t I c a n n o t i n good con- s c i e n c e s u p p o r t a l e g a l t r e n d which o p e r a t e s upon t h e i n - e q u i t a b l e and u n f a i r p r e m i s e t h a t some c i t i z e n s c a n be c i t i z e n s f o r t h e purposes of s t a t e b e n e f i t s , y e t escape r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by t h e d e n i a l of t h a t c i t i z e n s h i p when a judgment t o s u p p o r t h i s c h i l d r e n may be r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t him. I t i s m view t h i s o p i n i o n s e r v e s o n l y t o p e r p e t u a t e y and expand a n a l r e a d y unworkable l e g a l framework. When Congress made I n d i a n s c i t i z e n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t a l s o made them c i t i z e n s of t h e s t a t e s i n which they lived. "An I n d i a n , becoming a c i t i z e n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and r e s i d i n g i n a s t a t e , i s h e l d t o be a c i t i z e n of that state." C o n f e d e r a t e d S a l i s h and Kootenai T r i b e s , Mont. v . Moe (D.c. Mont. 1 9 7 5 ) , 392 F.Supp. 1297 1319, n. 5 (Judge Smith, d i s s e n t i n g ) , c i t i n g Boyd v. Nebraska ( 1 8 9 2 ) , 143 U.S. 135-162, 1 2 S.Ct. 375, 36 L.Ed. 103. It is clear that this i s no l o n g e r p r e c i s e l y t r u e . A s t o t h e b e n e f i t s of s t a t e c i t i z e n s h i p , Indians a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e f u l l measure of s t a t e s e r v i c e s , b u t a s t o t h e burdens of s t a t e c i t i z e n s h i p , t h e r e s e r v a t i o n B l a c k f e e t Indians a r e c i t i z e n s n o t answerable i n our c o u r t s . Such a d o u b l e s t a n d a r d i s a n a f f r o n t t o common-sense p o l i c i e s of f a i r n e s s and e q u a l t r e a t m e n t under t h e law. How c a n t h e B l a c k f e e t p e o p l e s o h e a r t i l y embrace Montana c i t i z e n s h i p when e d u c a t i n g t h e i r c h i l d r e n , s e e k i n g s t a t e p u b l i c a s s i s - t a n c e , v o t i n g , and u s i n g s t a t e r o a d s on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , y e t u s e t h e i r s t a t u s as on-reservation Indians as a s h i e l d a g a i n s t t h e i r s o c i a l and l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s , w i t h o u t i n - f r i n g i n g on t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s o f non-Indian Montana c i t i z e n s ? I would submit t h a t t h e y c a n n o t . W a r e faced with a choice of inferences i n t h i s case. e W e c a n i n f e r t h a t Congress i n t e n d e d t o make J o s e p h Lloyd Flammond a f u l l and complete c i t i z e n o f t h i s s t a t e , o r t h a t i t d i d not. I f i t bestowed upon him a l l t h e r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of Montana c i t i z e n s h i p , t h e n i t must have i n - t e n d e d t h a t he be f u l l y a s a n s w e r a b l e i n s t a t e c o u r t s a s any o t h e r Montana c i t i z e n . To i n f e r o t h e r w i s e would be t o abandon t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e Congress no l o n g e r s e e k s t o e q u a l i z e t h e b e n e f i t s and burdens of government. M c o l l e a g u e s have concluded t h a t M r . y Flammond h a s i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s with t h e s t a t e f o r it t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r him. Mr. Flammond t r a v e l s on s t a t e r o a d s when he i s on t h e r e s e r v a t i o n . He i s e n t i t l e d t o v o t e f o r p e r s o n s who w i l l c o n d u c t s t a t e a f f a i r s . He is entitled to educate h i s children i n public schools. He is entitled to b r i n g h i s c l a i m s and l i t i g a t e them i n s t a t e c o u r t s . He i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e any p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e f o r which he qualifies. On a p p e a l , J o s e p h Lloyd Flammond w a s r e p r e s e n t e d by Montana L e g a l S e r v i c e s a t t o r n e y s , n o t t r i b a l a t t o r n e y s . Y e t , when a l l t h i s i s c o n s i d e r e d , t h e m a j o r i t y c o n c l u d e s t h a t M r . Flammond h a s i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e S t a t e o f Montana f o r s t a t e c o u r t s t o e n t e r t a i n a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t him. I n m opinion, M r . y Flammond i s a Montanan and answer- a b l e t o t h e s t a t e c o u r t l i k e a l l o t h e r Montanans who e n j o y these privileges. The m a j o r i t y a s s e r t s t h a t Kulko v . C a l i f o r n i a S u p e r i o r C o u r t ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 84, 96-97, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, r e h . d e n i e d , 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150, h a s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same s e t of f a c t s a s i n t h i s c a s e and s t a n d s f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a s t a t e ' s e x e r c i s e of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n would be b o t h u n r e a s o n a b l e and imper- missible. I i n t e r p r e t t h e f a c t s i n Kulko t o be c o m p l e t e l y d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case. I n Kulko t h e husband had v i r t u a l l y no c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a . He l i v e d i n N e w York and h i s w i f e , who b r o u g h t t h e a c t i o n , lived i n California. C a l i f o r n i a attempted t o e x e r c i s e per- sonal j u r i s d i c t i o n over M r . Kulko, b u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l e d t h a t C a l i f o r n i a d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c - t i o n , and i t would be u n r e a s o n a b l e t o compel h i s a p p e a r a n c e . T h i s was n o t a URESA a c t i o n , and t h e s u i t w a s n o t b r o u g h t i n t h e s t a t e of t h e r e s p o n d i n g s p o u s e . Compare t h i s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n before us. The s u i t was a URESA p e t i t i o n d e s i g n e d f o r t h e c o n v e n i e n c e of t h e r e s p o n d i n g s p o u s e and b r o u g h t w i t h i n a f e w m i l e s of M r . Flammond's home. Is t h i s more "unreasonable" than compelling h i s appearance i n C a l i f o r n i a , which he a d m i t s t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a c o u l d do? I con- c l u d e t h a t t h e S t a t e of Montana's e x e r c i s e o f p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n would n o t o n l y be p e r m i s s i b l e , b u t r e a s o n a b l e and p r o p e r , and i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e s p i r i t of URESA. I am n o t concerned h e r e w i t h t r i b e s , b u t w i t h i n d i - viduals. There i s something fundamental i n t h e c o n c e p t s of f a i r n e s s and e q u a l i t y t h a t someone a b l e t o s u e i n a c o u r t s h o u l d be amenable t o s u i t . What w e a r e s a y i n g i s t h a t M r s . Flammond, a C a l i f o r n i a c i t i z e n , c a n n o t b r i n g h e r a c t i o n i n s t a t e c o u r t s o l e l y b e c a u s e h e r husband i s now an o n - r e s e r - v a t i o n B l a c k f o o t I n d i a n . A r e we n o t denying h e r e q u a l pro- t e c t i o n of t h e law under t h e F i f t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments? I t s h o u l d be f u r t h e r n o t e d t h a t o u r d e c i s i o n t o d a y d o e s n o t j u s t t r a n s f e r M r s . Flammond's c a s e t o t r i b a l c o u r t , b u t i n a p r a c t i c a l s e n s e , may l e a v e h e r w i t h o u t any remedy. The B l a c k f e e t Code h a s n o t a d o p t e d any r e c i p r o c a l p r o v i s i o n which would c r e a t e a mechanism by which t h e y may p r o c e s s a URESA p e t i t i o n . Therefore, although t h e t r i b e has undis- puted j u r i s d i c t i o n , i t may be u n a b l e t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e p e t i t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e a b s e n c e of any r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n - ship with California. Assuming t h e t r i b e c a n l i t i g a t e a URESA a c t i o n , o r a l argument r e v e a l e d t h a t two URESA a c t i o n s had been r e f e r r e d t o t r i b a l c o u r t s i n Montana w i t h no r e s u l t s U n l e s s t h a t s i t u a t i o n h a s changed, t h e t r i b a l c o u r t s seem r e l u c t a n t t o d e c i d e URESA c a s e s a g a i n s t o n - r e s e r v a t i o n t r i b a l members. Mrs. Flammond c o u l d e i t h e r s u e M r . ~lammond i n C a l i f o r n i a s t a t e c o u r t , o r d i s r e g a r d URESA and come t o Montana t o s u e i n t r i b a l c o u r t f o r r e l i e f . Either a l t e r - n a t i v e c l e a r l y d e f e a t s t h e s p i r i t and p u r p o s e of t h e URESA system. F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f argument, I w i l l assume t h a t t h e t r i b a l c o u r t d i d e n t e r t a i n and r e s o l v e M r s . Flammond's case. I am s t i l l n o t persuaded t h a t s h e c o u l d r e c e i v e due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s s i n c e t h e r e a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r e may be no a d e q u a t e a p p e a l from t r i b a l c o u r t a t t h e f e d e r a l l e v e l . See Wells v. P h i l b r i c k ( D . S.D. 1 9 8 0 ) , 486 F.Supp. 8 0 7 , 809, n. 2 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t h a b e a s c o r p u s i s u n a v a i l a b l e i n d o m e s t i c relations cases). I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t w e have d e n i e d Mrs. Flamrnond h e r remedy. T h i s maze of l e g a l c r e a t i o n s s e r v e s o n l y t o impede t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e and make a mockery o u t o f j u d i c i a l economy. Not o n l y i s URESA de- f e a t e d , b u t t h e mechanical and p r a c t i c a l problems w i t h t h i s d e c i s i o n l e a d m e t o b e l i e v e t h a t M r s . Flammond and o t h e r s l i k e h e r w i l l have a v e r y d i f f i c u l t t i m e o b t a i n i n g r e l i e f . Although I r e s p e c t t h e m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i s i o n , t h e r e s u l t appears t o m e t o be u n f a i r t o M r s . Flammond and u n j u s t t o t h e p e o p l e o f Montana, and I c a n n o t j o i n i n t h e i r o p i n i o n .