No. 80-80
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN
1980
ESTHER KNOEPKE, e t a l . ,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY C O . , et al.,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f J u d i t h B a s i n ,
The H o n o r a b l e W. W. L e s s l e y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
R o b e r t L. J o h n s o n and T o r g e r O a a s , Lewistown,
Montana
For Respondent:
R o b e r t J . Emmons, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
D z i v i , C o n k l i n & Nybo, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
A l e x a n d e r and Baucus, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted on B r i e f s : October 9, 1980
Filed :
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The p l a i n t i f f s i n f o u r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and s u r v i v o r s h i p
l a w s u i t s , E s t h e r Knoepke, A l l a n Samson and J u d i t h M i k k e l s o n ,
Thomas and J u n e B r a d y , and F r a n k and M a r i o n D u s e k , appeal
from the judgment of the Tenth Judicial District Court,
J u d i t h B a s i n County. On December 2 8 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e Hon. W. W.
Lessley directed the e n t r y of final judgment of an o r d e r
entered June 7, 1977, in which the Hon. LeRoy McKinnon
dismissed all the nonresident defendants from the
plaintiffs' lawsuits. I n h i s o r d e r , J u d g e L e s s l e y f o u n d no
r e a s o n f o r d e l a y i n g t h e e n t r y o f J u d g e McKinnon's o r d e r and
therefore directed final judgment be entered pursuant to
R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. In the plaintiffs' previous attempt
to a p p e a l J u d g e McKinnon's order, this Court declined to
entertain the appeal because the dismissal order did not
comply w i t h R u l e 5 4 ( b ) . See, Knoepke v . S o u t h w e s t e r n Ry.
Co. (1979), Mont. , 595 P.2d 3 7 6 , 36 S t . R e p . 957.
The appeal i s now p r o p e r l y before us. For reasons
s t a t e d below, we a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
t o d i s m i s s t h e n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t s from t h e s e l a w s u i t s .
Plaintiffs are the, l e g a l survivors and relatives of
passengers killed i n a n a i r p l a n e c r a s h which o c c u r r e d n e a r
Stanford, Montana. Plaintiffs a l l e g e t h a t an employee o f
the nonresident defendants negligently operated the
airplane. T h i s Court has twice reviewed t h e f a c t s of t h i s
tragic accident, in -- o e p--,
Kn ke supra, and in Haker v.
S o u t h w e s t e r n Ry. Co. (1978), Mont . , 578 P.2d 7 2 4 ,
35 S t . R e p . 523. The Haker case involved a wrongful d e a t h
and s u r v i v o r s h i p l a w s u i t b r o u g h t by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e
e s t a t e of a passenger killed i n t h i s same a i r p l a n e c r a s h .
Although t h e f a c t s surrounding t h i s a c c i d e n t a r e provided i n
o u r p r e v i o u s Knoepke and Haker d e c i s i o n s , we s h a l l r e i t e r a t e
them b r i e f l y .
On S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1973, an a i r p l a n e p i l o t e d by A r t h u r
Myllymaki, J r . , c r a s h e d i n t o t h e h i l l s s u r r o u n d i n g S t a n f o r d ,
Montana. The aircraft was owned by defendant, Charles
Newman and l o a n e d t o d e f e n d a n t , D u d l e y Newman, f o r a f l i g h t
from A r i z o n a t o W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e . Following t h e f l i g h t t o
Washington, Dudley Newman gave Myllymaki, a pilot for
d e f e n d a n t Sawyer Aviation Company, permission to fly the
airplane t o Stanford, t o v i s i t Myllymaki's relatives. At
t h e t i m e o f t h e c r a s h , Myllymaki was g i v i n g a j o y r i d e t o h i s
f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g Lenny Haker , P a t r i c i a and
L y l e Myllymaki, Zane A a r o Samson, J o h n Raymond B r a d y and
L e s l i e David Dusek. None s u r v i v e d t h e a i r p l a n e c r a s h .
Plaintiff E s t h e r Knoepke i s t h e g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m f o r
the t h r e e minor children of Patricia and L y l e Myllymaki.
P l a i n t i f f s A l l a n Samson and J u d i t h M i k k e l s o n a r e t h e p a r e n t s
and l e g a l h e i r s o f Zane Aaro Samson. P l a i n t i f f s Thomas and
J u n e B r a d y a r e t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and l e g a l h e i r s o f J o h n
Raymond B r a d y . P l a i n t i f f s F r a n k and Marion Dusek a r e t h e
n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and l e g a l h e i r s o f L e s l i e David Dusek.
The o r i g i n a l d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e Knoepke l a w s u i t i n c l u d e d
t h e A r i z o n a R a i l w a y Company, Sawyer A v i a t i o n Company and t h e
s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r of Arthur Myllymaki's e s t a t e , C e c e l i a
K. Bailey. The original defendants in the other three
lawsuits included S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Company, Sawyer
Aviation Company and Cecelia Bailey. The corporate
defendants a r e a l l Arizona c o r p o r a t i o n s .
Other d e f e n d a n t s l a t e r included i n t h e s e l a w s u i t s were
C h a r l e s Newman, Dudley Newman and D a r r e l l Sawyer. Charles
Newman and Dudley Newman a r e b r o t h e r s and a r e b o t h r e s i d e n t s
of t h e S t a t e of Arizona, and o f f i c e r s and s t o c k h o l d e r s i n
Southwestern Railway Company. Additionally, the two
brothers are engaged in a p a r t n e r s h i p doing business as
S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Company. D a r r e l l Sawyer, another
Arizona r e s i d e n t , i s t h e p r i n c i p a l s t o c k h o l d e r and g e n e r a l
manager o f Sawyer A v i a t i o n Company. He a l s o d o e s b u s i n e s s
i n d i v i d u a l l y a s Sawyer A v i a t i o n Company and a s Sawyer S c h o o l
of Aviation.
I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e c o m p l a i n t s f i l e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f s ,
defendant Sawyer Aviation Company entered a "special
a p p e a r a n c e " i n e a c h c a s e moving t o q u a s h s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s ,
claiming lack of personal jurisdiction in the Montana
District Court. Defendant Southwestern Railway Company
f i l e d a n answer i n t h e Samson, B r a d y and Dusek s u i t s a l s o
challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court.
S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Company was n o t named a s a d e f e n d a n t i n
t h e Knoepke suit. Defendant Cecelia K. Bailey filed an
answer i n a l l four cases. Extensive discovery took p l a c e
a f t e r t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s made t h e i r i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e .
On S e p t e m b e r 2 8 , 1976, t h e Knoepke p l a i n t i f f filed a
motion requesting t h a t A r i z o n a R a i l w a y Company b e d r o p p e d
from h e r lawsuit a s a defendant. Knoepke r e q u e s t e d that
S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Company b e substituted in its place.
On t h e same d a y , t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n a l l f o u r s u i t s moved t o
add Dudley Newman, Thomas Newman and Darrell Sawyer as
-8ef endants.
On J u n e 7, 1977, Judge McKinnon granted plaintiffs'
motions to add D u d l e y Newman, C h a r l e s Newman and Darrell
Sawyer a s d e f e n d a n t s . The j u d g e o r d e r e d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f
S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Company i n t h e Knoepke l a w s u i t . The
judge further ordered that the defenses previously
interposed by the defendants in the suits be deemed
interposed a s t o the joined defendants.
At t h e same t i m e , however, J u d g e McKinnon e n t e r e d t h e
following order :
" I T I S ORDERED a s f o l l o w s :
"1. The m o t i o n o f t h e D e f e n d a n t s D a r r e l l Sawyer
a n d S a w y e r A v i a t i o n Company t o d i s m i s s t h e
c o m p l a i n t a s t o s a i d D e f e n d a n t s b e , and i t i s
hereby, granted.
"2. The m o t i o n o f t h e D e f e n d a n t s S o u t h w e s t e r n
R a i l w a y Company, a c o r p o r a t i o n , D u d l e y Thomas
Newman and C h a r l e s R. Newman, t o d i s m i s s t h e
c o m p l a i n t a s t o s a i d D e f e n d a n t s b e , and i t i s
hereby, granted.
"3. The m o t i o n o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s f o r p a r t i a l
summary judgment be and i s h e r e b y , d e n i e d . "
The p l a i n t i f f s ' attorney thereupon d i s q u a l i f i e d Judge
McKinnon . Judge W. W. Lessley thereafter assumed
jurisdiction of the cases and entered the December 1979
o r d e r d i r e c t i n g e n t r y o f judgment on J u d g e McKinnon's o r d e r .
From this order for final judgment, plaintiffs appeal,
p r e s e n t i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r our review:
1. Is a " s p e c i a l a p p e a r a n c e " made by a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t
to quash service of a summons allowed under t h e Montana
Rules of C i v i l Pro c e d u r e ?
2. May a D i s t r i c t C o u r t u s e a f f i d a v i t s t o d e t e r m i n e
i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r t y t o a l a w s u i t without denying
any of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e s u i t t h e r i g h t t o a t r i a l ?
3. Did the District Court err by ordering the
d i s m i s s a l of t h e n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t s from t h e l a w s u i t ?
In their responding briefs, defendants raise an
additional issue: Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n i t s J u n e
1977 o r d e r j o i n i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l d e f e n d a n t s w i t h o u t n o t i c e ?
W shall discuss
e these issues in the order they are
presented.
If a p a r t y t o a l a w s u i t p l a n s t o appea.r i n c o u r t to
attack the court's personal jurisdiction, a special
a p p e a r a n c e of t h e p a r t y , a s o p p o s e d t o a g e n e r a l a p p e a r a n c e ,
i s no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d . R u l e 1 2 , M.R.Civ.P., abolished the
distinction between special and general appearances.
Following s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s a p a r t y can a t t a c k t h e c o u r t ' s
personal jurisdiction simply by raising the jurisdiction
i s s u e i n an i n i t i a l r e s p o n s e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m by m o t i o n
b e f o r e answering t h e c l a i m o r i n an answer t o t h e c l a i m . If
t h e p a r t y ' s i n i t i a l response t o t h e opponent's claim r a i s e s
a personal j u r i s d i c t i o n i s s u e , then the p a r t y is not subject
to the general power of the court s o l e l y because of the
response. S e e , 2A M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 5 1 2 . 1 2 .
In t h i s case, t h e Arizona defendants included a t t a c k s
on the District Court's personal jurisdiction in their
initial responses t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' complaints. I n each
response, the defendants moved the court t o dismiss the
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. A 1though
defendant Sawyer Aviation Company labeled its initial
response a "special appearance", the contents of the
response serve as a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The c o u r t d i d n o t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by
g r a n t i n g a motion t h a t used t h e a n t i q u a t e d l a b e l of s p e c i a l
appearance.
On t h e s e c o n d i s s u e , the plaintiffs contend t h a t the
court erred by using affidavits and discovery material
included i n t h e c o u r t f i l e t o determine whether t h e deceased
p i l o t was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s employment w i t h t h e
Arizona defendants when the airplane crash occurred.
P l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d t h e c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n h e r e b a s e d on
the discovery materials and affidavits, amounts to a
d e c i s i o n of the defendant's ultimate t o r t l i a b i l i t y rather
than a factual determination of the court's jurisdiction
over the Arizona defendants. We disagree. This
d e t e r m i n a t i o n was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o u r t t o r e s p o n d t o t h e
Arizona defendants' claim regarding the court's
jurisdiction. S u f f i c i e n t minimum c o n t a c t s b e t w e e n Montana
and n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t s m u s t b e f o u n d t o e x i s t i n o r d e r
for the court to exercise jurisdiction over these
defendants. S e e , S t a t e ex rel. Goff v. D i s t r i c t Court of
F i r s t Jud. D i s t . ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 4 9 5 , 487 P.2d 292.
We agree with defendants' argument that while
jurisdiction and u l t i m a t e l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t where d i s p u t e s
of f a c t e x i s t a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o d e t e r m i n a t i o n by m o t i o n ,
common collateral issues related to the defendant's
connection with the t o r t i o u s a c t a r e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l issues
which may be resolved before trial. The court's use of
a f f i d a v i t s t o r e s o l v e t h e s e c o l l a t e r a l i s s u e s was c o r r e c t .
The p l a i n t i f f s ' constitutional r i g h t s w e r e n o t v i o l a t e d by
the court's action.
In Halsey Brant v. Gatens Cattle Co. et al.
(unpublished opinion, Civil No. 761, decided August 20,
1 9 6 9 ) , t h e Hon. W i l l i a m Jameson u s e d a f f i d a v i t s t o d e c i d e a
personal uri
.j s d i c t i o n question quite similar to the
question before Judge McKinnon. In Halsey, affidavits
s u b m i t t e d by t h e p a r t i e s w e r e u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o n e
of the named defendants was employed by a second named
defendant, a non-Montana resident. Through t h e a f f i d a v i t s ,
J u d g e Jameson f o u n d t h e n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t was not the
employer, which d e f e a t e d the plaintiff's claim of minimum
c o n t a c t s between t h e n o n - r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t and t h e S t a t e o f
Montana. With regard to his use of the affidavits to
determine j u r i s d i c t i o n , the court held:
"The u s e o f a f f i d a v i t s . . . ( t o determine per-
s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ) under Rule 1 2 ( d ) is p r o p e r .
While t h e r u l e i t s e l f does n o t s p e c i f y t h e t y p e of
e v i d e n c e w h i c h may b e p r e s e n t e d , R u l e 4 3 ( e )
p r o v i d e s t h a t , 'When a m o t i o n i s b a s e d on f a c t s
n o t a p p e a r i n g o f r e c o r d t h e c o u r t may h e a r t h e
m a t t e r on a f f i d a v i t s p r e s e n t e d by t h e r e s p e c t i v e
p a r t i e s , b u t t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t t h a t t h e m a t t e r
be h e a r d w h o l l y o r p a r t l y on o r a l testimony or
depositions.'
" R u l e 5 6 ( e ) , r e l a t i n g t o m o t i o n s f o r summary judg-
ment, p r o v i d e s t h a t , ' S u p p o r t i n g and o p p o s i n g
a f f i d a v i t s s h a l l be made o n p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e ,
s h a l l s e t f o r t h s u c h f a c t s a s would be a d m i s s i b l e
i n e v i d e n c e , and s h a l l show a £ £ i r m a t i v e l y t h a t t h e
a f f i a n t is competent t o t e s t i f y t o t h e m a t t e r s
stated therein.'"
Buttressing their a r g u m e n t on t h i s i s s u e , p l a i n t i f f s c i t e
H a r r i n g t o n v . H o l i d a y Rambler C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont.
3 2 , 525 P.2d 556. I n H a r r i n g t o n , we commented on t h e u s e o f
a f f i d a v i t s a s follows:
"The most t r o u b l e s o m e a s p e c t h e r e i s t h a t
d e f e n d a n t was p e r m i t t e d s i m p l y t o s a y 'Nay' upon
a f f i d a v i t and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t p l a i n t i f f s from
having t h e i r day i n c o u r t . W a r e n o t disposed t o
e
s a y it i s a l w a y s i m p r o p e r t o g r a n t a m o t i o n t o
dismiss f o r lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e
d e f e n d a n t when a t a h e a r i n g on t h a t m o t i o n t h e
d e f e n d a n t o f f e r s n o t h i n g more i n s u p p o r t o f i t s
p o s i t i o n t h a t a n a f f i d a v i t , b u t we d o f e e l t h a t i n
t h e normal c o u r s e o f t h i n g s p l a i n t i f f s a t l e a s t
ou g h t t o have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o cross-examine t h e
defendant. Fundamental f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t o
the extent p l a i n t i f f s a r e denied such an
o p p o r t u n i t y , d e f e n d a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t s h o u l d be g i v e n
less weight."
The case now before us is significantly different
than Harrington. Here, extensive discovery materials and
a f f i d a v i t s were p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t . W approve of t h e
e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s use of t h e s e e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y m a t e r i a l s
and affidavits in determining its jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs were given a
s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o examine t h e n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t s
t h r o u g h d e p o s i t i o n s and i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and t o d e v e l o p t h e i r
argument r e g a r d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e r e i n .
Plaintiffs' third issue asserts the District Court
erred i n a c t i n g on i t s own i n d i s m i s s i n g the nonresident
defendants from these lawsuits. Plaintiffs argue that
because t h e defendants d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y f i l e a motion t o
d i s m i s s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , t h e c o u r t was p o w e r l e s s t o d i s m i s s
the defendants. Plaintiffs, however, misstate the
defendants' actions. An examination of the initial
p l e a d i n g s f i l e d by t h e n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t s i n d i c a t e s t h e
defendants s p e c i f i c a l l y requested the court t o dismiss the
actions for lack of jurisdiction. These e x p r e s s r e q u e s t s
necessitated t h e c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of jurisdiction and
d i s m i s s a l of d e f e n d a n t s from t h e l a w s u i t s . The d e f e n d a n t s '
r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g s empowered t h e c o u r t t o a c t .
The fourth issue is brought by the nonresident
defendants in their briefs filed in this appeal. The
d e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g
plaintiffs' motions to add additional parties to the
l a w s u i t s without f i r s t providing n o t i c e of t h e motion t o t h e
defendants. W a r e asked t o c o n s i d e r t h i s i s s u e under t h e
e
" d o c t r i n e of compensatory e r r o r " . W d e c l i n e t o do s o .
e We
find the court's action caused no prejudice to the
d e f e n d a n t s and t h e r e f o r e , we s h a l l n o t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n .
For the foregoing reasons, we a f f i r m t h e judgment of
the District Court dismissing the nonresident defendants
from t h e s e l a w s u i t s .
I
i
Justice
W e Concur:
Chi, f J u s t i c e
17
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