No. 80-117
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1980
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
WILLIAM S . DAHL,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , The H o n o r a b l e
William J. Speare, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
M i c h a e l J . Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
H a r o l d I I a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted on B r i e f s : J u l y 11, 1980
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m Dahl a p p e a l s from a judgment o f the
Y e l l o w s t o n e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t , e n t e r e d f o l l o w i n g a j u r y
t r i a l , c o n v i c t i n g him o f r o b b e r y . H e a l s o a p p e a l s from t h e
t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r d e s i g n a t i n g him a s a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r
for purposes of parole eligibility. We affirm the
conviction but remand for redetermination of status for
parole eligibility.
Defendant r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s . He f i r s t challenges the
order of the trial court refusing to suppress evidence
relating t o p r e t r i a l photographic line-up procedures. He
next c h a l l e n g e s t h e r e f u s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t
t h e j u r y t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r a b o u t t h e s c e n e where a
c r i m e i s c o m m i t t e d d o e s n o t make o n e a p a r t y t o t h e c r i m e . "
L a s t , he c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n g
that section 46-18-404, MCA, required defendant t o be
c l a s s i f i e d a s a dangerous offender f o r p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y .
The r o b b e r y c h a r g e stems f r o m a r o b b e r y o f a B i l l i n g s
Superamerica gas s t a t i o n and convenience store on the
evening of August 30, 1979. Two men entered the store,
waited until all the customers were gone, and then
a p p r o a c h e d t h e c l e r k , R o b e r t Heimer , and demanded t h e money
from t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r . One o f t h e men, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s
the defendant, g r a b b e d him by h i s s h i r t c o l l a r , p u l l e d him
t o t h e c o u n t e r , and p u t t i n g a k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t , t o l d him
t o h u r r y up. W h i l e t h e c l e r k g a t h e r e d t h e money, t h e man
held him w i t h a k n i f e to the clerk's throat. The c l e r k
p l a c e d t h e money i n a s a c k and g a v e i t t o one o f t h e men.
The men a l s o t o o k a c a s h d r a w e r and t h e n f l e d .
The clerk immediately reported the robbery to the
p o l i c e and gave them a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e men--one of the
d e s c r i p t i o n s f i t t i n g t h a t of the defendant. Two w i t n e s s e s
saw t h e men flee the s t o r e and g e t into a car, and they
r e l a y e d t h e c a r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n t o t h e c l e r k who i n t u r n g a v e
the description t o the police. A few m i n u t e s later, the
p o l i c e n o t i c e d a v e h i c l e n e a r t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a s t o r e which
matched t h e d e s c r i p t i o n g i v e n t o t h e m , and t h e y g a v e c h a s e .
They f o l l o w e d t h e v e h i c l e f o r a s h o r t d i s t a n c e b e f o r e
the vehicle was driven into an alley and abandoned, the
o c c u p a n t s f l e e i n g on f o o t . The p o l i c e g a v e c h a s e on f o o t .
Sometime l a t e r , another o f f i c e r found the defendant hiding
under a n e a r b y c a r and a r r e s t e d him. The c a s h d r a w e r and
money s t o l e n from S u p e r a m e r i c a w e r e f o u n d n e a r t h e a b a n d o n e d
c a r , and p o l i c e a l s o f o u n d n e a r b y a p a p e r bag s i m i l a r t o t h e
ones used at Superamerica--bearing the defendant's
fingerprint. Later that evening, while at the police
s t a t i o n , o n e of t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t a s
being the driver of the car to which the officers gave
chase.
The identification process began after the defendant
was a r r e s t e d . H e was t a k e n t o t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a s t a t i o n i n
t h e back s e a t o f a police car. The s t o r e c l e r k c o u l d n o t
then make a positive identification of the suspect,
a p p a r e n t l y d u e t o p o o r l i g h t i n g i n t h e c a r and s t a t i o n a r e a ,
and b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t was s l o u c h e d o v e r and e x p o s e d o n l y h i s
profile. But the store clerk went down to the police
s t a t i o n l a t e r on t h e same e v e n i n g and g a v e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f
t h e man who t h r e a t e n e d him w i t h t h e k n i f e , which d e s c r i p t i o n
v e r y c l o s e l y matched d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t u a l a p p e a r a n c e . He a l s o
s t a t e d t o the police while giving the description, t h a t he
was f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t t h e man b r o u g h t t o t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a
s t a t i o n e a r l i e r t h a t n i g h t had b e e n o n e o f t h e r o b b e r s .
The n e x t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s t o o k p l a c e some e i g h t
days after the robbery, after the d e f e n d a n t had been in
custody, and a f t e r c o u n s e l had b e e n a p p o i n t e d . The s t o r e
c l e r k came t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o l o o k a t a p h o t o g r a p h i c
line-up f o r p u r p o s e s of identification. The p o l i c e showed
him s i x p h o t o g r a p h s o f p e r s o n s r e s e m b l i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f
t h e man he had p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n t o t h e p o l i c e , and t h e c l e r k
i m m e d i a t e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t man. Defendant
was i n c u s t o d y a t t h e time b u t was not present for this
photographic line-up. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l was n o t p r e s e n t .
D e f e n d a n t moved t o s u p p r e s s t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
and t h u s p r e v e n t t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m f r o m t e s t i f y i n g i n c o u r t
that he had identified defendant through a photographic
l i n e - u p p r e s e n t e d t o him by t h e p o l i c e .
Both the robbery victim and the police officer who
arranged the photographic line-up, testified that the
p h o t o g r a p h s showed b o t h a f u l l f a c e v i e w and a p r o f i l e v i e w
of the subjects involved. The p o l i c e o f f i c e r testified,
however, t h a t he a l s o p o s s e s s e d a P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e of the
d e f e n d a n t showing o n l y a f a c e v i e w . H e a g r e e d t h a t i t was
possible that the robbery victim had seen the Polaroid
picture b e f o r e h e made t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e photo-
graphic line-up, b u t s t a t e d h e had no knowledge t h a t t h i s
was s o . D e f e n s e c o u n s e l a t no t i m e a s k e d t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m
i f he had been shown t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e - u p .
Defendant's motion to suppress was based on the
contentions that t h e robbery v i c t i m ' s ability to identify
him a s t h e man who h e l d t h e k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t was t a i n t e d
by t h e f a c t t h a t h e had s e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e
r o b b e r y when h e was i n p o l i c e c u s t o d y , and t h a t t h e r o b b e r y
v i c t i m may h a v e s e e n t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e
photographic line-up identification. The trial court denied
this motion to suppress, and defendant now urges this as his
first appeal contention.
At trial the robbery victim positively identified
defendant as the man who had held the knife to his throat.
Defendant testified in his own behalf and admitted that he
was at the Superamerica station in his automobile when the
robbery occurred, but denied that he was directly involved.
His story is that he was giving two friends a ride in his
car, and one of them asked him to stop at the Superamerica
store to get some beer. He states he did not know of any
plans for a robbery, or of any robbery, until his friends
returned to his car. He claims his friends committed the
crime without his knowledge.
The jury convicted defendant of robbery, and the trial
court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, also
designating him, pursuant to section 46-18-404, MCA, as a
dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility.
Defendant contends that the pretrial photographic
identification process was so suggestive as to create a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. He also argues
that his right to counsel was denied him because counsel was
not present at the photographic line-up session.
The touchstone of a denial of due process emanating
from a photographic identification process is whether the
process was so suggestive as to present a "substantial
likelihood of misidentification." State v. Pendergrass
(19801, Mont. , 615 P.2d 201, 37 St.Rep. 1370;
Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53
L.Ed.2d 140; Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct.
375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. See, for example, State v. Lara
(1978)I Mont . , 587 P.2d 930, 35 St.Rep. 1699;
State v. Oppelt (1978), 176 Mont. 499, 580 P.2d 110; where
we have applied the rules set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. An in-cour t identification of the defendant
is permitted if it is determined that the pretrial
identification process did not violate these rules.
Here the robbery victim was in an excellent position to
view the robber. They were very close to each other in a
well-lit location for at least thirty seconds. His first
description of the man who held the knife to his throat was
a fair description of the defendant. Eight days later, when
he chose the defendant from the photo-array line-up, he did
so immediately and with assurance. This eight-day lapse
between the robbery and the photo-identification was not,
under the circumstances here, sufficient to purge from the
victim's mind a reasonably precise picture of the attacker's
identity. Nor, of course, can we ignore the testimony which
clearly placed the defendant in the car which sped away from
the Superamerica station after the robbery. The fact that
his car was identified as belonging to the defendant, and
that defendant had abandoned his car in an alley a few
blocks away from the Superamerica station and was found by
the police hiding under another car, is more than a little
indicative of his involvement in the robbery. Nor can we
ignore the fact that the cash drawer and money stolen from
the Superamerica were found abandoned near the car from
which defendant had fled, and that defendant's fingerprint
was found on a paper sack near the car which was similar to
paper sacks used at Superamerica. These factors must be
considered along with the identification process, and when
so considered, they do not point to a substantial chance of
misidentification. Rather, they point straight at
defendant's guilt.
W do n o t
e find error in the f a i l u r e t o have d e f e n s e
counsel p r e s e n t a t t h e photo-array i d e n t i f i c a t i o n process.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U.S. v. Ash ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 413
U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619, h a s held t h a t t h e
confrontation clause is not violated by a photo-array
identification process, and therefore, that the right to
counsel does not a t t a c h . W have
e followed -
Ash, and h a v e
refused presently to adopt a s t r i c t e r r u l e under o u r own
constitution. See S t a t e v. Strain and Young, C a u s e No.
14863, Decided October 22, 1980.
Defendant next contends that because his defense
involve d an a d m i s s i o n o f b e i n g a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e c r i m e b u t
of not being involved except a f t e r the fact, t h a t h e was
e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r a b o u t
t h e s c e n e where a c r i m e is c o m m i t t e d d o e s n o t make o n e a
party to a crime." He offers no authority for this
instruction, and neither was he prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to give this instruction. Here, the
i n s t r u c t i o n f a i r l y covered t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . The c h a r g e o f
robbery, p l u s t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , required t h a t t h e j u r y
f i n d n o t o n l y t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t a t t h e s c e n e b u t
that he was the person who held the knife to the store
clerk's throat. Thus, t h e j u r y was f u l l y a w a r e t h a t mere
p r e s e n c e a t t h e s c e n e of a c r i m e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e
criminal involvement. The jury believed that defendant
committed the crime by holding the knife to the store
clerk's throat, and t h e e v i d e n c e is c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t to
sustain this belief.
We agree, however, with defendant's final contention
that the trial court erroneously determined that under
s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, h e was r e q u i r e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
t o d e s i g n a t e defendant a s a dangerous offender f o r purposes
of parole e l i g i b i l i t y . D e f e n d a n t had b e e n p r e v i o u s l y b e e n
convicted of a felony. in Wyoming less than five years
p r e c e d i n g t h e commission of t h e c r i m e i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e .
At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor urged the
c o u r t t o s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t t o impose a t w e n t y - y e a r prison
s e n t e n c e and t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r .
Defense counsel urged the court t o impose no more t h a n a
ten-year prison sentence and t o designate defendant as a
nondangerous offender. In response to these
recommendations, the sentencing court stated that "I am
g o i n g t o d e s i g n a t e him ( t h e d e f e n d a n t ) d a n g e r o u s , b e c a u s e I
feel I have no option under the statute." The court
sentenced defendant to fifteen years in prison and
designated him as a dangerous offender for purposes of
parole eligibility.
D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was
not statutorily required t o d e s i g n a t e him as a dangerous
offender, and thus, had he chosen to do so, could have
designated him a s nondangerous. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r
hand, a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e l e a v e s no d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e
s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t , and t h a t u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e t h e
d u t y of the court to designate defendant as a dangerous
o f f e n d e r was m a n d a t o r y .
For purposes of analysis, we first set forth the
s t a t u t e i n its e n t i r e t y . S e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, provides:
" D e s i g n a t i o n a s n o n d a n q------------- r f o r
erous o f f e n d e
p u r p o s --- o f p a -l e- l i g i -----y .
es r o- e bilit ( 1 ) The
s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s h a l l d e s i g n a t e an o f f e n d e r
a nondangerous offender f o r purposes of
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r p a r o l e under p a r t 2 of
c h a p t e r 23 i f :
"(a) during the 5 years preceding the
commission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which t h e
o f f e n d e r i s b e i n g s e n t e n c e d , t h e o f f e n d e r was
n e i t h e r c o n v i c t e d of nor i n c a r c e r a t e d f o r an
o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d i n t h i s s t a t e o r any o t h e r
j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r which a s e n t e n c e t o a t e r m
of imprisonment i n e x c e s s of 1 y e a r could
h a v e been imposed; and
" ( b ) t h e c o u r t h a s d e t e r m i n e d , b a s e d on a n y
p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d
a t t h e t r i a l and t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h a t
t h e offender does not r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l
danger t o o t h e r persons or s o c i e t y .
"(2) A c o n v i c t i o n o r i n c a r c e r a t i o n may n o t
be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (1) a ) i f :
(
" ( a ) t h e o f f e n d e r was l e s s t h a n 1 8 y e a r s o f
age a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e
present offense; or
" ( b ) t h e o f f e n d e r h a s been p a r d o n e d f o r t h e
p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e on t h e g r o u n d s o f i n n o c e n c e
o r t h e c o n v i c t i o n f o r s u c h o f f e n s e h a s been
s e t aside i n a postconviction hearing.
" ( 3 I f t h e c o u r t determines t h a t an
o f f e n d e r i s n o t e l i g i b l e t o be d e s i g n a t e d a s
a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r , i t s h a l l make t h a t
d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e imposed
and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t o n i n t h e
judgment. Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment
do n o t c o n t a i n s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e
offender is considered to have been
d e s i g n a t e d a s a nondangerous of f e n d e r f o r
parole. "
Although t h i s statute is n o t a model of clarity, we
c o n c l u d e t h a t it i s m a n d a t o r y o n l y where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
require the sentencing court to sentence one as a
nondangerous o f f e n d e r .
The s t a t u t e i m p o s e s l i m i t a t i o n s on a s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e
in three situations: First, if t h e judge finds that the
d e f e n d a n t was not convicted of felony within 5 years
immediately preceding the offense in question, and also
f i n d s " t h a t t h e offender does n o t r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l
danger t o o t h e r persons o r s o c i e t y , " t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t be
designated as a nondangerous offender. Section
46-18-404(1)(a) and ( b ) , supra. T h i s p a r t of the statute
d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e judge t o d e s i g n a t e one a s dangerous;
rather, it sets forth the circumstances under which the
d e f e n d a n t must be d e s i g n a t e d a s n o n d a n g e r o u s .
S e c o n d , s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 ) ( a ) and ( b ) , s e t f o r t h t h e c i r -
c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which a c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r
p u r p o s e s of t r i g g e r i n g a p o s s i b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t one is
'a dangerous offender . If the offender was less than
e i g h t e e n y e a r s of a g e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e " p r e s e n t o f f e n s e " ,
t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t be u s e d a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a
finding that the defendant is dangerous. Or, if the
offender had either been pardoned on the grounds of
innocence for the previous offense, or had the previous
o f f e n s e set a s i d e i n a postconviction hearing, t h e previous
o f f e n s e c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a f i n d i n g
that the defendant is dangerous. We note here, that
defendant makes no claim to come under any of these
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e s t a t u t e .
The t h i r d s i t u a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is d e t e r m i n a t i v e of the
i s s u e here. S e c t i o n 46-18-404 ( 3 ) , s u p r a , sets forth the
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e judgment i n o r d e r t h a t a d e s i g n a t i o n o f
dangerousness t a k e e f f e c t . The f i r s t s e n t e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t
if t h e c o u r t d e s i g n a t e s one a s a dangerous offender, the
c o u r t m u s t "make t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e
imposed and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e j u d g m e n t . "
But t h e second s e n t e n c e of t h i s subsection requires t h a t a
different result attach if the sentencing court either
r e f u s e s o r f a i l s t o make t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e j u d g m e n t .
It states:
"Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment do n o t
c o n t a i n such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e o f f e n d e r is
c o n s i d e r e d t o have been d e s i g n a t e d a s a
nondangerous offender for purposes of
e l i g i b i l i t y for parole." S e c t i o n 46-18-
4 0 4 ( 3 ) , MCA.
W cannot ignore t h i s sentence.
e To d e c l a r e a d e f e n d a n t
ineligible for parole e l i g i b i l i t y , t h e sentencing court is
s t a t u t o r i l y required t o d e s i g n a t e him a s dangerous f o r t h a t
purpose. C l e a r l y , by f a i l i n g t o make s u c h d e s i g n a t i o n p a r t
of t h e judgment, e i t h e r by o v e r s i g h t o r by a n e x e r c i s e o f
sentencing discretion, the statute declares that the
defendant involved is t o be "designated a s a nondangerous
o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s of p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . "
A l t h o u g h t h e r e is a d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e judgment that
the "defendant be punished as a dangerous offender, by
imprisonment a t hard l a b o r . . . for t h e term of FIFTEEN
( 1 5 ) YEARS," the underlying assumption of the sentencing
c o u r t when s u c h judgment was e n t e r e d is that the statute
required the sentencing court t o designate defendant a s a
dangerous offender. But, as we have reasoned, the
s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was n o t r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e t o make t h i s
designation. By m e r e l y f a i l i n g t o make a n y d e s i g n a t i o n i n
t h e judgment as to the defendant's status, the defendant
would be s t a t u t o r i l y d e c l a r e d n o n d a n g e r o u s . The s e n t e n c i n g
court did not consider t h i s o p t i o n when it sentenced the
defendant.
The judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n i s a f f i r m e d . W remand t h i s
e
cause t o the D i s t r i c t Court for resentencing.
W Concur:
e
...........................
Chief J u s t i c e
p-":-*--- Justices
M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and
dissenting i n part:
I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e i n i t s e n t i r e t y .
I concur i n a f f i r m i n g t h e judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e
reasons s t a t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y opinion. I dissent from the
m a j o r i t y c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA and r e m a n d i n g t h e
cause t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r resentencing t h e defendant.
Although the statute i s i n a r t f u l l y drafted, it implies, at
l e a s t , t h a t a c o n v i c t e d o f f e n d e r i s i n e l e g i b l e f o r d e s i g n a t i o n as
a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r i f he was c o n v i c t e d o r i n c a r c e r a t e d i n
any j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r a f e l o n y d u r i n g t h e preceding f i v e years.
Section 46-18-404(1)(a), MCA. I n t h i s c a s e d e f e n d a n t was c o n -
v i c t e d o f b u r g l a r y on A u g u s t 2 5 , 1976, i n t h e S t a t e o f Wyoming.
Subsection (3) o f the statute simply provides a catchall f o r the
b e n e f i t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i n cases where t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t
neglects t o incorporate defendant's none1 i g i b i l i t y f o r non-
dangerous o f f e n d e r s t a t u s i n t h e judgment. I do not construe
s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) as a d i s c r e t i o n a r y g r a n t o f a u t h o r i t y t o t h e sen-
t e n c i n g c o u r t t o c o n f e r nondangerous o f f e n d e r s t a t u s t o a con-
v i c t e d f e l o n who h a s a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s .
Chief Justice