No. 79-26
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
JEAN SORENSON
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver BOW,
The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
M. F. Hennessey and Leonard J. Haxby, Butte,
Montana
M. F. Hennessey argued, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Chris Tweeten and Mike McGrath argued, Assistant
Attorney Generals, Helena, Montana
John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana
Michael Wheat argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte,
Montana
Submitted: September 16, 1980
Filed: MQV 2 4 1980
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
J e a n Sorenson a p p e a l s h e r c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e
homicide and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e
Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of S i l v e r Bow, t h e Honor-
a b l e Arnold Olsen p r e s i d i n g . W e affirm.
On December 6 , 1978, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a n i n f o r m a t i o n
c h a r g i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t , J e a n Sorenson, w i t h one c o u n t of
m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and one c o u n t of a g g r a v a t e d
assault. On May 4 , 1979, f o r t y - f i v e d a y s p r i o r t o t r i a l ,
t h e S t a t e moved t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r l e a v e t o amend t h e
information. The motion was g r a n t e d . The amended informa-
t i o n changed t h e c h a r g e o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o
d e l i b e r a t e homicide and r e t a i n e d t h e c h a r g e of a g g r a v a t e d
assault.
Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of one c o u n t of d e l i b e r a t e
homicide and one c o u n t o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t f o l l o w i n g a
jury t r i a l . The c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o s e r v e twenty-
f o u r y e a r s ' imprisonment on t h e homicide c o u n t and t w e l v e
y e a r s ' imprisonment on t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c o u n t , t h e
t e r m s t o run concurrently.
Defendant Sorenson owns and o p e r a t e s t h e Stockman Bar
i n B u t t e , Montana. On November 9, 1978, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y
11:45 p.m., G e r a l d L o j e s k i , Sam P e r n e l l and S t e v e n Sims
e n t e r e d and o r d e r e d a round of b e e r s . Defendant r e f u s e d t o
s e r v e them and o r d e r e d them t o l e a v e t h e b a r . Sims l e f t ,
b u t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l d i d n o t . An argument e n s u e d , d u r i n g
which d e f e n d a n t p r o c u r e d a handgun from behind t h e b a r ,
p o i n t e d i t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , and
f i r e d three shots. One b u l l e t s t r u c k P e r n e l l i n t h e s h o u l d e r .
Another s t r u c k L o j e s k i i n t h e f a c e , k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y .
~ e f e n d a n t aintained she f i r e d i n self-defense.
m She
c l a i m e d s h e had r e f u s e d t o s e r v e L o j e s k i , P e r n e l l and Sims
b e c a u s e t h e y were l o u d and b e l l i g e r e n t . According t o de-
f e n d a n t , L o j e s k i became a n g r y and a s k e d i f s h e had r e f u s e d
them s e r v i c e b e c a u s e P e r n e l l was a b l a c k man. She t e s t i f i e d
t h a t s h e t h r e a t e n e d t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e and t h a t L o j e s k i
t h e r e u p o n t h r e a t e n e d t o " k i c k t h e s--- o u t of [her]." She
t h e n moved down t h e b a r and s e c u r e d a handgun, and, p o i n t i n g
i t a t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , o r d e r e d them t o l e a v e . A t that
t i m e , Sorenson contended, t h e v i c t i m s a t t e m p t e d t o s l a p o r
s t r i k e h e r , and P e r n e l l t h r e a t e n e d t o "'whup [ h e r ] a s s . ' "
She t e s t i f i e d s h e was a f r a i d t h e v i c t i m s would "come o v e r
t h e b a r , " s o she s t a r t e d shooting. Defendant d e n i e d h a v i n g
any i n t e n t t o k i l l o r i n j u r e anyone.
The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d t e s t i m o n y from t h r e e b a r t e n d e r s and
a b a r p a t r o n , a l l of whom had d e a l t w i t h L o j e s k i , P e r n e l l ,
and Sims p r i o r t o t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e Stockman B a r , and a l l
o f whom t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e men had n o t been l o u d ,
belligerent, o r aggressive.
D e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y a l s o c o n t r a s t s markedly w i t h t h e
t e s t i m o n y of t h r e e e y e w i t n e s s e s . D a r r e l l Halvorson, a t r u c k
d r i v e r and h i m s e l f a former b a r t e n d e r , w a s s e a t e d a t t h e b a r
w i t h i n a few f e e t o f d e f e n d a n t , L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l . He
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a l t e r c a t i o n between Sorenson and t h e
v i c t i m s was n o t s e r i o u s , t h a t i t w a s a t y p i c a l barroom
argument " w i t h a l o t of c u s s i n g and s w e a r i n g on b o t h s i d e s . "
Halvorson s t a t e d t h a t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l had been d r i n k i n g
b u t d i d n o t a p p e a r t o be o v e r l y a g g r e s s i v e u n t i l Sorenson
became a b u s i v e towards them. According t o Halvorson,
Sorenson c a l l e d P e r n e l l a " f - ' n i g g e r c--- s ----- .I1 It
w a s t h e n t h a t t h e argument h e a t e d up. Halvorson t e s t i f i e d
t h a t n e i t h e r of t h e two men a t a n y ' t i m e punched o r s l a p p e d
a t d e f e n d a n t ; n o r had e i t h e r e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o "come o v e r
t h e bar." A t no t i m e , a c c o r d i n g t o Halvorson, d i d t h e two
men p l a c e d e f e n d a n t i n d a n g e r of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y
injury. I n h i s o p i n i o n , it w a s n o t a t a l l n e c e s s a r y t o u s e
a gun t o e j e c t t h e men from t h e p r e m i s e s .
Two Montana Tech s t u d e n t s , Greg L a C l a i r e and P a t
R o l l i n s , were s e a t e d a t t h e o p p o s i t e end of t h e b a r from
Halvorson. Their testimony s u b s t a n t i a l l y corroborated h i s .
LaClaire t e s t i f i e d t h a t the victims w e r e "loose" b u t n o t
l o u d when t h e y e n t e r e d t h e b a r . H e s t a t e d t h a t Sorenson
c a l l e d P e r n e l l " a m ----- f ----- and a c--- S ----- " and t o l d
him " t o l i c k h i s b ---- ." He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a r g u -
ment between Sorenson and t h e v i c t i m s n e v e r became p h y s i c a l
and t h a t t h e v i c t i m s n e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o " c l i m b t h e b a r . "
R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson s t a r t e d t h e argument,
t h a t s h e used p r o f a n i t y a g a i n s t t h e v i c t i m s t h e whole t i m e
t h e y were i n t h e b a r , and t h a t most o f t h e p r o f a n i t y was
directed a t Pernell. H e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t n e i t h e r man
t h r e a t e n e d Sorenson, and t h a t n e i t h e r "climbed t h e b a r " nor
a t t e m p t e d t o s t r i k e Sorenson. R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d , moreover,
t h a t neither w a s i n a position t o s t r i k e her. Neither
L o j e s k i n o r P e r n e l l had b r a n d i s h e d a weapon of any k i n d . He
i d e n t i f i e d Sorenson a s t h e a g g r e s s o r i n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
According t o R o l l i n s , t h e argument h e a t e d up a s t h e r e s u l t
of defendant's profanity.
Both L a C l a i r e and R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson
walked from t h e n o r t h end of t h e b a r , where t h e c o n f r o n t a -
t i o n w i t h t h e v i c t i m s t o o k p l a c e , t o t h e s o u t h end of t h e
b a r , where t h e two s t u d e n t s w e r e s e a t e d , t o p r o c u r e t h e gun.
Both L a C l a i r e and R o l l i n s had worked a s b a r t e n d e r s and
bouncers. R o l l i n s was 6 ' 2 " t a l l and weighed 215 pounds.
I n s t e a d of r e m a i n i n g a t t h e s o u t h end of t h e b a r w i t h t h e
two s t u d e n t s , where s h e c e r t a i n l y would have been s a f e from
any supposed danger posed by L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , d e f e n d a n t
r e t u r n e d w i t h t h e gun t o t h e n o r t h end o f t h e b a r .
P e r n e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant then stationed h e r s e l f
d i r e c t l y i n f r o n t of him b u t f a r enough away s o t h a t he
c o u l d n o t have grabbed o r s t r u c k h e r even i f he had t r i e d .
P e r n e l l i n s i s t e d t h a t n e i t h e r he n o r L o j e s k i made t h e
s l i g h t e s t e f f o r t t o harm d e f e n d a n t and t h a t when t h e s h o t s
w e r e f i r e d , d e f e n d a n t was i n no danger of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s
bodily injqry. H i s t e s t i m o n y i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e a b s e n c e
o f blood on t h e b a r s e p a r a t i n g d e f e n d a n t from t h e v i c t i m s ,
a s w e l l a s by t h e t e s t i m o n y of f o r e n s i c e x p e r t Donald
Reedman. Based on t h e p a t t e r n o f powder b u r n s on P e r n e l l ' s
c l o t h i n g , Reedman t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was p r o b a b l y
f o u r and one-half t o f i v e f e e t from t h e v i c t i m s when t h e
shots w e r e fired.
L a C l a i r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a f t e r p r o c u r i n g t h e handgun,
Sorenson t o l d t h e v i c t i m s t o g e t o u t b u t t h e n " a l m o s t
instantaneously" s t a r t e d shooting. Rollins t e s t i f i e d t h a t
d e f e n d a n t f i r e d no warning s h o t s f i r s t . Based on t h e i r
p e r s o n a l b a r t e n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e s , Halvorson and t h e two
s t u d e n t witnesses a l l t e s t i f i e d , i n essence, t h a t t h e bar-
room a l t e r c a t i o n posed no t h r e a t of imminent danger t o
Sorenson which would make i t n e c e s s a r y f o r h e r t o d e f e n d
herself.
Sorenson raises t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l :
1. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s
motion t o amend t h e i n f o r m a t i o n changing t h e c h a r g e of
m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide?
2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s
motion i n l i m i n e t o e x c l u d e r e f e r e n c e t o m a r i j u a n a u s e by
t h e v i c t i m s and w i t n e s s e s t w e l v e h o u r s p r i o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g ?
3. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos.
27 and 28 d e a l i n g w i t h t h e u s e of f o r c e i n s e l f - d e f e n s e by
a n a g g r e s s o r and a n a g g r e s s o r ' s d u t y t o withdraw?
4. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e
j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e ?
5. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t ?
I n h e r f i r s t a s s i g n m e n t of e r r o r d e f e n d a n t e s s e n t i a l l y
a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s v i o l a t i v e of b o t h t h e s t a t u -
t o r y mandates of s e c t i o n 46-11-403, MCA, and of t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s of 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, 520, and
o f t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e s o f t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i -
tutions. H e r argument h a s t h r e e p a r t s , e a c h o f which w i l l
be d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y .
A. S t a t u t o r y Argument.
I n her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , defendant pursues mainly a
s t a t u t o r y argument. She r e l i e s on t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n
S t a t e v . Hallam ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, t h a t
amendments s u b s e q u e n t t o p l e a d i n g a r e a l l o w e d o n l y a s t o
m a t t e r s of form and o n l y when no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e
defendant a r e prejudiced. She c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e lower c o u r t
e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g a n amendment of s u b s t a n c e a f t e r s h e
p l e a d e d on t h e o r i g i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n .
~ e f e n d a n t ' sr e l i a n c e on Hallam i s , however, m i s p l a c e d .
T h a t c a s e c o n s t r u e d t h e n u m e r i c a l p r e d e c e s s o r t o s e c t i o n 46-
11-403, MCA, p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1977. p r i o r t o 1977,
s u b s e c t i o n (1) of t h e s t a t u t e p e r m i t t e d amendments of sub-
stance only p r i o r t o pleading. The 1977 amendment removed
t h a t l i m i t a t i o n , a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e amendments w i t h o u t
leave of the court at any time not less than five days
before trial. The procedural safeguards governing substan-
tive amendments of criminal informations are hereafter
declared by this Court's holding in State v. Cardwell (1980),
- Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1230, 37 St.Rep. 750, and not by
Hallam.
B. Burden Shifting.
In its brief in support of its motion to amend the
information, the State listed, as one justification for
increasing the degree of the offense charged, the fact that
defendant had failed to supply the State with the names of
witnesses who would justify retaining the lesser offense of
mitigated deliberate homicide. As a result, defendant
contends that the State has attempted to shift its burden of
proving that defendant committed mitigated deliberate homi-
cide to her. She relies on In Re Winship (1970), 397 U.S.
358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375.
Defendant's argument that the State unconstitutionally
shifted its burden of proving an element of mitigated de-
liberate homicide to her is unfounded. The burden-shifting
rationale was developed by the United States Supreme Court
in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881,
44 L.Ed.2d 508, and In Re Winship, supra. Mullaney invali-
dated a rule of Maine law that a defendant must, to reduce a
homicide charge to manslaughter, bear the burden of proving
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted "in
the heat of passion on sudden provocation." The case held
that a necessary element of murder, malice, may not be
presumed, thereby relieving the State of the burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court applied the same principle in
winship to invalidate a New York statute providing that, for
a juvenile to be found guilty of an act which would consti-
tute a crime if committed by an adult, the State need prove
guilt only by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, does not support defendant's
position. In 1977 the United States Supreme Court, distin-
guishing Mullaney, held that a New York law requiring that
the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the
offense to manslaughter did not violate the due process
clause. Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97
S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The Court held that a State is
not required to prove the nonexistence of every fact which
it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating
circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the
severity of the punishment. 432 U.S. at 207-209, 97 S.Ct.
2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The due process clause does not put
the states to a choice between abandoning affirmative de-
fenses "or undertaking to disprove their existence in order
to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its consti-
tutional powers to sanction . . ." 432 U.S. at 208, 97
S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281.
The Patterson Court noted that Mullaney was distin-
guishable because the Maine law which Mullaney invalidated
presumed malice, a requisite element of murder, if the
defendant did not prove mitigating circumstances. 432 u.S.
at 215-216, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 286. In summary,
Patterson stands for the proposition that a state may re-
quire a criminal defendant to prove mitigating circumstance
when this circumstance constitutes a defense rather than
e s s e n t i a l elements of t h e offense. A s t h e A n n o t a t o r ' s Note
t o s e c t i o n 45-3-115, MCA, p r o v i d e s :
" There d o e s n o t seem t o be any f e d e r a l c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l problem i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a burden
g r e a t e r than a 'reasonable doubt' s i n c e the
U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a s t a t e
need n o t a l l o w any a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s a t a l l .
P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197.
And, where i t c h o o s e s t o a l l o w such d e f e n s e s ,
t h e S t a t e may r e g u l a t e t h e burden of p r o d u c i n g
e v i d e n c e and t h e burden of p e r s u a s i o n a s l o n g
a s it does n o t thereby s h i f t t o t h e defendant
i t s own burden of proof a s t o e a c h of t h e e l e -
ments of t h e o f f e n s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
- The Supreme C o u r t h a s even h e l d t h a t an
Id.
Oregon s t a t u t e , which r e q u i r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t
t o p r o v e t h e d e f e n s e of i n s a n i t y beyond a r e a -
s o n a b l e d o u b t , was n o t v i o l a t i v e of due pro-
cess. Leland v . Oregon ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 343 U.S. 790."
C. Cardwell Argument.
A f t e r defendant f i l e d her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , t h i s Court
d e c i d e d S t a t e v. Cardwell ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. , 609 P.2d
1230, 37 St.Rep. 750. I n t h a t c a s e , t h i s Court held t h a t
s e c t i o n 46-11-403, MCA, a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e amendments
w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under 1972 Mont.
Const., A r t . 11, 520. Furthermore, t h e Court held t h a t t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s j u d i c i a l s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e informa-
t i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u r s e o f p r o s e c u t i o n and t h a t a sub-
s t a n t i v e change i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n may o n l y be made i n
compliance w i t h c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s . Cardwell,
609 P.2d a t 1233. I n her r e p l y b r i e f , defendant contends
t h a t t h e C a r d w e l l h o l d i n g a p p l i e s t o t h i s case. H e r argu-
ment i s twofold.
I n i t i a l l y , Sorenson c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e t r o a c t i v e
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell r u l e i s n o t a t i s s u e . She
a r g u e s t h a t Cardwell a p p l i e s d i r e c t l y t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e
f o r e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e reasons: (1) C a r d w e l l ' s t r i a l o c c u r r e d
b e f o r e t h e Sorenson t r i a l ; ( 2 ) t h e defendant has consis-
t e n t l y contended t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s amendment of t h e informa-
t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a p p l i e d t o h e r ( s h e c o n t e n d s
t h a t t h e S t a t e i m p e r m i s s i b l y p u t t h e burden on h e r t o j u s -
t i f y r e t a i n i n g t h e c h a r g e of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide
o r s e e t h e c h a r g e i n c r e a s e d t o d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ) ; and ( 3 )
d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i -
c a t i o n , a s announced by S t a t e v . Campbell ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t .
, 597 P.2d 1146, 1149, 37 St.Rep. 1264, a p p l i e s o n l y t o
new, c o u r t - c r e a t e d r u l e s , n o t t o s t a t u t e s which have been
declared unconstitutional.
I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e defendant argues t h a t i f r e t r o -
a c t i v i t y i s an i s s u e , then, pursuant t o t h e three-pronged
t e s t of S t a t e v. Campbell, s u p r a , t h e e q u i t i e s f a v o r t h e
r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell h o l d i n g i n t h i s
case.
C a r d w e l l r e p r e s e n t s t h i s C o u r t ' s view t h a t l e a v e of
c o u r t t o amend a n i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l f u l l y p r o t e c t t h e c r i m i n a l
d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s under 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , Art. 11, 520.
Cardwell i d e n t i f i e s two i n t e r e s t s p r o t e c t e d by t h a t c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l provision. The f i r s t i s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n be s u p p o r t e d by p r o b a b l e c a u s e a t a l l s t a g e s of
t h e proceeding. 609 P.2d a t 1233. The second i n t e r e s t i s
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t , r o o t e d i n t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e , t h a t
d e f e n d a n t have n o t i c e of t h e c h a r g e and a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
prepare a defense. 609 P.2d a t 1233. To p r o t e c t t h e s e
i n t e r e s t s , Cardwell e s t a b l i s h e s t h r e e procedural safeguards
t h a t must be complied w i t h b e f o r e a s u b s t a n t i v e amendment t o
an information i s allowed: (1) t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n must
b e approved by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ; ( 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t must
have a d e q u a t e n o t i c e of t h e c h a r g e and a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
p r e p a r e f o r t r i a l ; and ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t " s h o u l d " be r e -
a r r a i g n e d on t h e new c h a r g e . 609 P.2d a t 1233.
The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e shows t h a t t h e s e t h r e e
p r o c e d u r a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o s u b s t a n t i v e amendments of i n f o r -
ma t i o n s have been m e t :
(1) Here, a l t h o u g h s e c t i o n 46-11-403 ( I ) , MCA, d i d n o t
f a c i a l l y r e q u i r e i t , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s o u g h t and r e c e i v e d
l e a v e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t b e f o r e i t f i l e d t h e amended i n f o r -
mation. On May 4 , 1979, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion t o amend
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n accompanied by a b r i e f i n s u p p o r t of t h e
motion. A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e motion on May 11, 1979,
a t which d e f e n d a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . By i t s o r d e r
o f May 2 5 , 1979, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion t o
amend.
( 2 ) Defendant c l e a r l y had a d e q u a t e n o t i c e and a d e q u a t e
t i m e t o prepare her defense. The motion t o amend was f i l e d
on May 4 , 1979, some f o r t y - f i v e d a y s p r i o r t o t h e b e g i n n i n g
o f t r i a l on J u n e 18, 1979. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e amended i n f o r -
m a t i o n d i d n o t change t h e s u b s t a n t i v e e l e m e n t s of t h e
charge. The S t a t e h a s t h e burden of p r o v i n g t h e s a m e ele-
ments under b o t h m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and d e l i b e r a t e
homicide. The amended i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t i n u e d t o a l l e g e t h a t
d e f e n d a n t p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly k i l l e d G e r a l d L o j e s k i .
Defendant h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d how any of h e r s u b s t a n t i a l
r i g h t s were p r e j u d i c e d ; n o r h a s d e f e n d a n t e x p l a i n e d how s h e
was u n f a i r l y s u r p r i s e d o r r e n d e r e d i n c a p a b l e of p r e p a r i n g a
d e f e n s e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s l e a v e t o amend t h e i n f o r m a t i o n .
S e e S t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 501, 505, 507 ~ . 2 d
1050. I f d e f e n d a n t f e l t s h e had a n i n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y
t o p r e p a r e a n a d e q u a t e d e f e n s e , s h e c o u l d have r e q u e s t e d a
continuance.
( 3 ) A m i n u t e e n t r y of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d a t e d J u n e 11,
1979, c l e a r l y shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t was r e a r r a i g n e d under t h e
amended i n £orma t i o n .
Because t h e l e a v e of c o u r t w a s g r a n t e d , t h e p r o c e d u r a l
s a f e g u a r d s of Cardwell w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied w i t h and
d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p r o c e -
d u r a l s t a t u t e which was l a t e r r u l e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Since
s h e was n o t i n j u r e d by t h e s t a t u t e , d e f e n d a n t h a s no s t a n d -
i n g t o a r g u e f o r t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell
rule.
W e f i n d no m e r i t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t a s s i g n m e n t of
error.
I n h e r second i s s u e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t e r r e d i n p r o h i b i t i n g t h e d e f e n s e from r e f e r r i n g t o t h e
u s e of m a r i j u a n a by P e r n e l l , Sims, and L o j e s k i w h i l e e n
r o u t e t o B u t t e by bus a t a r e s t s t o p i n I d a h o , some t w e l v e
hours before t h e shooting. D e f e n d a n t ' s arguments a r e l a r g e l y
s p e c u l a t i v e and c o n c l u s o r y .
Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e e x c l u d e d e v i d e n c e i s "ex-
t r e m e l y r e l e v a n t " t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e fundamental t e s t i -
monial c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e ' s two p r i m a r y w i t n e s s e s ,
P e r n e l l and Sims. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t much of t h e t e s t i -
mony t h a t t h e s e men gave a t t r i a l r e l a t e d t o e v e n t s t a k i n g
p l a c e on t h e bus t o B u t t e w h i l e t h e y were " u n d e n i a b l y " under
t h e i n f l u e n c e of b o t h a l c o h o l and m a r i j u a n a , which c o u l d
have c o l o r e d t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of t h o s e e v e n t s . Defendant
i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s an "obvious d e f e c t " i n t h e i r c r e d i -
b i l i t y t h a t s h o u l d have been b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e
jury. Defendant a l s o s p e c u l a t e s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s c o u l d
have a g a i n used d r u g s a f t e r t h e i r a r r i v a l i n B u t t e and c o u l d
have been i n a "drug-induced s t u p o r " when t h e y e n t e r e d t h e
Stockman Bar.
Defendant also implies that the excluded evidence was
relevant to the "central issue" of her case, presumably her
theory of self-defense. This contention seems to be premised
on an assumption that the smoking of marijuana would be
likely to produce aggressive tendencies.
The District Court excluded any mention of the use of
marijuana by Pernell, Sims and Lojeski twelve hours before
the shooting on the grounds of remoteness.
In State v. Gleim (1895), 17 Mont. 17, 31, 41 P. 998,
this Court stated that the mere use of narcotics is not
admissible to impeach witness credibility "unless it is
proposed to show that the witness was under the influence of
the drugs at the time the events happened about which she
testified." Defendant has laid no foundation tending to
show that the witnesses were under the influence of drugs at
the time of the events in question. She merely assumes that
they were and that their behavior was adversely affected.
Defendant has, therefore, failed to make the requisite
showing under Gleim.
Evidence that a witness was intoxicated is admissible
on cross-examination to impeach the witness's ability to
accurately perceive the events about which he has testified.
)a-efzi3
2ss=mq V. Sandberg (1918), 54 Mont. 538, 540, 172 P. 132,
133; State v. Trueman (1906), 34 Mont. 249, 252, 85 P. 1024,
1025. Evolving a satisfactory rule for cases in which the
witness uses drugs is considerably more difficult, however.
Although the psychological effects of alcohol usage are far
from clear, much less is known about the effect of drugs.
The multiplicity of drugs and the varying reactions they
cause have compounded the difficulties.
Only a minority of state courts has adopted a blanket
rule of admissibility. Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743;
see also Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Those courts allow
evidence of drug usage,without requiring proof that the
witness's testimentary capacities were impaired, usually on
the theory that a user of drugs is a liar. That is, how-
ever, a theory of impeachment which seemingly rests more on
the witness's character than on his mental capacity. Such a
theory would now be governed by Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid.
The majority of state courts has adopted the sounder
rule that evidence of drug usage is not permitted "unless it
can also be proved that the use of narcotics has impaired
the sensory, zetentive, or communicative f
eht*%
witness." Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743.
The federal courts, operating under the Federal Rules
of Evidence upon which Montana's rules are based, have
endorsed a variety of approaches. See generally, 3 Wein-
stein's Evidence, §607[04] (1978). There does not seem to
be a clear consensus in the federal system.
State v. Gleim, supra, indicates that Montana has
endorsed the majority rule requiring a showing that drug
usage has impaired the witness's facilities before evidence
of the witness's use of the drug is admissible. Implicit in
the formulation of the rule in Gleim (drug use is inadmis-
sible unless it is shown that the witness was under the
influence of drugs - - - - the events about which -
at the time he
testifies occurred) is a recognition of the concept of
remoteness. Here, the trial judge ruled that the smoking of
marijuana was too remote in time to be admitted. The ques-
tion of remoteness is directed to the discretion of the
trial court. ,
State v. Fitzpatrick (1980) - Mont. 1
606 P.2d 1343, 1355, 37 St.Rep. 194; State v. Satterfield
(1943), 114 Mont. 122, 127, 132 P.2d 372. While remoteness
is a matter that generally goes to the credibility of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility, Satterfield,
supra, evidence can be excluded if it is so remote that it
has no evidentiary value. Satterfield, supra; State v.
Pemberton (1909), 39 Mont. 530, 535, 104 P. 556. Given
defendant's failure to lay a proper foundation that the
witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time of
the material events in this case, exclusion of the evidence
was justified both under the Gleim rule and under the remote-
ness doctrine.
The District Court did not err in granting the State's
motion in limine.
Defendant next urges that the trial court erred in
giving the following instructions dealing with an aggressor's
use of force in self-defense and an aggressor's duty to
withdraw.
Instruction No. 27, to which defendant objects, reads:
"You are instructed that the use of force in
defense of a person is not available to a per-
son who purposely or knowingly provokes the use
of force against himself unless such force is
so great that he reasonably believes that he
has exhausted every reasonable means to escape
such danger other than the use of force which
is likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm to the assailant."
Defendant also objects to Instruction No. 28:
"You are instructed that the use of force in
defense of person is not available to a per-
son who purposely or knowingly provokes the
use of force against himself unless in good
faith, he withdraws from physical contact with
the assailant and indicates clearly to the
assailant that he desires to withdraw and
terminate the use of force but the assailant
continues or resumes the use of force."
Defendant p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y a two-pronged argument.
F i r s t , t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o j u s t i f y giving
I n s t r u c t i o n Nos, 27 and 28. Defendant p o i n t s s e l e c t i v e l y t o
e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d which, s t a n d i n g a l o n e , s u p p o r t s h e r
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s h e was n o t t h e a g g r e s s o r . She emphasizes
t h e f a c t t h a t s h e i s a 71-year-old woman. She c o n t e n d s t h a t
s h e was s u d d e n l y c o n f r o n t e d by t h r e e drunk men i n h e r b u s i -
ness. When s h e r e f u s e d t o s e r v e them a l c o h o l , a s s h e w a s
l e g a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o do under s e c t i o n 1 6 - 3 - 3 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA, s h e
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e men s u b j e c t e d h e r t o t h r e a t s of p h y s i c a l
violence. Second, d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s
w e r e a b s t r a c t and i n c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t s of t h e law. Defen-
d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a p e r s o n must have t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t of
becoming a n a g g r e s s o r b e f o r e he o r s h e may be d e p r i v e d of
t h e r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n s e on t h e ground of p r o v o c a t i o n .
S e c t i o n 45-3-105(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t s e l f - d e f e n s e is
n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a p e r s o n who:
" ( 2 ) p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly provokes t h e u s e of
force against himself, unless:
" ( a ) s u c h f o r c e i s s o g r e a t t h a t he r e a s o n a b l y
b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i s i n imminent d a n g e r of d e a t h
o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm and t h a t he h a s e x h a u s t e d
e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e means t o e s c a p e such danger
o t h e r t h a n t h e u s e of f o r c e which i s l i k e l y t o
c a u s e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm t o t h e a s -
sailant; or
" ( b ) i n good f a i t h , he withdraws from p h y s i c a l
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e a s s a i l a n t and i n d i c a t e s c l e a r l y
t o t h e a s s a i l a n t t h a t he d e s i r e s t o withdraw
and t e r m i n a t e t h e u s e o f f o r c e b u t t h e a s s a i l a n t
c o n t i n u e s o r resumes t h e u s e of f o r c e . "
I n S t a t e v. Buckley ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 238, 2 4 2 , 557
P.2d 283, t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t " t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c -
t i o n s must c o v e r e v e r y i s s u e o r t h e o r y h a v i n g s u p p o r t i n t h e
e v i d e n c e , and t h e i n q u i r y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t must o n l y be
whether o r n o t - e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d t o w a r r a n t
any
an i n s t r u c t i o n . . ." S u f f i c i e n t evidence i s c l e a r l y p r e s e n t
i n t h e record t o support t h e S t a t e ' s theory t h a t defendant
was t h e a g g r e s s o r i n h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e v i c t i m s .
The e v i d e n c e j u s t i f i e s g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and
28. A p e r s o n c a n become a n a g g r e s s o r i f h e o r s h e p u r p o s e l y
o r knowingly provokes t h e v i c t i m v e r b a l l y . The j u r y was
i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l s t a t e i n b o t h I n s t r u c t i o n
Nos. 27 and 28.
A s h e r f o u r t h i s s u e , Sorenson u r g e s t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g h e r p r o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s concern-
i n g t h e defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e .
S e c t i o n 45-3-103, MCA, d e f i n e s t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of
f o r c e i n d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e :
"A p e r s o n i s j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e o r
t h r e a t t o u s e f o r c e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r when and t o
t h e e x t e n t t h a t he reasonably b e l i e v e s t h a t
s u c h c o n d u c t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t o r ter-
m i n a t e such o t h e r ' s u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o o r
a t t a c k upon a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e . However,
h e i s j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e l i k e l y t o
c a u s e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm o n l y i f :
" (1) t h e e n t r y i s made o r a t t e m p t e d i n v i o l e n t ,
r i o t o u s , o r tumultuous manner and h e r e a s o n -
a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such f o r c e i s necessary t o
p r e v e n t an a s s a u l t upon o r o f f e r of p e r s o n a l
v i o l e n c e t o him o r a n o t h e r t h e n i n t h e occu-
pied structure; o r
" ( 2 ) h e r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such f o r c e i s
n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t t h e c o m i s s i o n of a f o r c i -
b l e felony i n t h e occupied s t r u c t u r e . "
T h i s s e c t i o n i s d e r i v e d from I l l i n o i s which h a s s u b s t a n -
t i a l l y t h e same s t a t u t e . I l l . C.C. 1961, T i t l e 38, S7-2.
B e f o r e t h e s t a t u t e i s a p p l i c a b l e , I l l i n o i s c a s e law
r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e e n t r y must be u n l a w f u l ; hence, t h e d e f e n -
d a n t may n o t a s s e r t j u s t i f i c a t i o n where t h e v i c t i m s e n t e r
upon t h e p r e m i s e s l a w f u l l y b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y engages i n
u n l a w f u l c o n d u c t f o r which t h e o c c u p a n t of t h e d w e l l i n g
seeks t o expel the victim. P e o p l e v . Chapman ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 4 9
Ill.App.3d 553, 364 N.E.2d 577; P e o p l e v . Brown ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 9
I l l . ~ p p , 3 d 757, 312 N.E.2d 789; s e e g e n e r a l l y , A n n o t a t o r ' s
Note, Montana C r i m i n a l Code Annotated 131-132 (rev. 1980).
S o r e n s o n ' s c l a i m i s t h a t once s h e had o r d e r e d t h e s e
c u s t o m e r s o u t o f h e r b a r , and t h e y r e f u s e d t o go, t h e n t h e i r
c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e i n t h e b a r became a n u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o
an occupied s t r u c t u r e . Based on t h a t s y l l o g i s m , s h e main-
t a i n s s h e was e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s b a s e d on s e c t i o n 45-
3-103, MCA.
By i t s t e r m s , t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y a p p l i e s t o e f f o r t s of a
d e f e n d a n t t o p r e v e n t o r t e r m i n a t e an u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o
occupied premises. I t h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l a w f u l e n t r y
i n t o premises. On t h e e v i d e n c e h e r e , w i t h o u t d o u b t , t h e
s h o o t i n g d i d n o t o c c u r w h i l e Sorenson was a t t e m p t i n g t o
prevent o r terminate an e n t r y i n t o her premises. N error
o
o c c u r r e d when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e f u s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s based
upon t h i s s e c t i o n .
N a u t h o r i t y h a s been found and none was c i t e d by
o
d e f e n d a n t t h a t a " t u m u l t u o u s e n t r y " i n t o a t a v e r n makes t h e
e n t r y unlawful. The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d d e f e n -
d a n t ' s p r o f e r r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d
s t r u c t u r e s i n c e t h e r e w a s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e e n t r y was
u n l a w f u l o r a n a t t a c k upon t h e s t r u c t u r e ,
F i n a l l y , Sorenson c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t i s n o t
s u p p o r t e d by s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e . The c o n t e n t i o n i s f r i v o -
lous. Defendant merely a s s e r t s i n a c o n c l u s o r y f a s h i o n t h a t
t h e c a u s e of t h e s h o o t i n g w a s t h e v i c t i m s ' i n s i s t e n c e on
b e i n g s e r v e d l i q u o r , t h a t t h e s h o o t i n g of t h e v i c t i m s was
e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d even when t h e e v i d e n c e i s viewed i n t h e
l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e , and t h a t s h e was under
e x t r e m e s t r e s s which m i t i g a t e d t h e crime.
The jury is not bound to blindly accept defendant's
version of the facts. It is free to pick and choose the
evidence it wishes to believe. State v. Seitzinger (1979),
Mont. , 589 P.2d 655, 658, 36 St.Rep. 122, 125;
State v. Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d
605. The jury chose to believe the State's witnesses, not
Sorenson.
The verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.
Af f irmed .
1
We concur:
4 A A d @&&&$7
Chief Justice
Justices
~igtrict Judge, sitting in
place of Mr. Justice Daniel Shea.