Little v. Structural Systems

No. 79-44 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 LESTER D. LITTLE, Claimant and Respondent, STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS, Employer, U. S.F. & G. and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANYI Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Larry Riley argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Goldman and Goldman, Missoula, Montana Bernard Goldman argued, Missoula, Montana Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana David A. Hopkins argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: April 17, 1980 Decided: 7 c dL(t I lgp~n " Filed: Honorable J o s e p h B. Gary, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t . c l a i m a n t , who had had t r o u b l e w i t h a knee s i n c e 1941, i n j u r e d h i s knee on two s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s i n 1978 w h i l e working f o r S t r u c t u r a l Systems, I n c . The f i r s t i n j u r y o c c u r r e d on A p r i l 4 , 1978, when t h e c l a i m a n t s l i p p e d on a r o o f of t h e Craighead Apartments a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana i n M i s s o u l a , Montana. A t t h a t time, S t r u c t u r a l Systems was i n s u r e d f o r w o r k e r s ' compensation p u r p o s e s by U.S.F.&G. C l a i m a n t ' s second i n j u r y o c c u r r e d on J u n e 6 , 1978, when c l a i m a n t was c a r r y i n g i r o n b a r s w h i l e working on t h e Reserve S t r e e t B r i d g e i n Missoula. A t t h e t i m e of t h e second a c c i d e n t , I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity Co. was S t r u c t u r a l Systems' i n s u r e r f o r w o r k e r s ' compensation p u r p o s e s . Both i n j u r i e s w e r e i n f l i c t e d upon c l a i m a n t ' s r i g h t knee. Claimant d i d n o t c o n s u l t a doctor a f t e r t h e f i r s t a c c i d e n t and was a b l e t o c o n t i n u e working a l t h o u g h he con- t i n u e d t o e x p e r i e n c e s e v e r e d i f f i c u l t i e s and p a i n w i t h t h e knee. C l a i m a n t a l s o c o n t i n u e d t o work f o r a month a f t e r t h e second a c c i d e n t u n t i l he w a s l a i d o f f . A t that time, he sought medical a t t e n t i o n . I t w a s determined t h a t claimant was t e m p o r a r i l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d pending a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a - t i o n by t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t . C l a i m a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t on November 1 5 , 1978, a g a i n s t U.S.F.&G. and I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity. A p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e was h e l d , and a f u l l h e a r i n g began on A p r i l 1 0 , 1979. The c o u r t e n t e r e d a n i n t e r i m o r d e r on A p r i l 23, 1979, i n which U.S.F.&G. and I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity were o r d e r e d t o r e i m b u r s e c l a i m a n t f o r a l l a c c r u e d temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s and m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s on an e q u a l s h a r e b a s i s . On September 28, 1979, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law h o l d i n g t h a t U.S.F.&G. was t o r e i m b u r s e I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity f o r any and a l l b e n e f i t s t h a t had been p a i d pur- suant t o the court's interim order. The c o u r t h e l d t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s stemmed p r i m a r i l y from one i n j u r y which o c c u r r e d on A p r i l 4 , 1978, and which was r e i n j u r e d and a g g r a v a t e d on J u n e 6, 1978. S i n c e t h e second i n j u r y w a s m e r e l y a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t took t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t U.S.F.&G. was l i a b l e f o r c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s b e c a u s e , a c c o r d i n g t o Montana law, i t w a s improper t o a p p o r t i o n t h e l i a b i l i t y f o r w o r k e r s t compensation bene- f i t s between s u c c e s s i v e i n s u r e r s . From t h i s judgment, U.S.F.&G. a p p e a l s and r a i s e s t h e following issue: Whether t h e c l a i m a n t s u f f e r e d a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n on J u n e 6 , 1978; i f s o , whether t h e i n s u r e r on t h e r i s k a t t h e t i m e of t h e l a s t i n j u r i o u s exposure i s l i a b l e f o r t h e r e s u l t i n g d i s a b i l i t y ? U.S.F.&G. s u b m i t s t h a t t h e r e i s no d i s p u t e by t h e p a r t i e s t h a t c l a i m a n t d i d i n f a c t s u f f e r a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n on J u n e 6 , 1978. I t f u r t h e r submits t h a t c l a i m a n t had a h i s t o r y o f knee t r o u b l e and t h a t t h e A p r i l 4 , 1978, a c c i d e n t was a l s o a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a p r e - e x i s t i n g i n j u r y which would have e n t i t l e d him t o b e n e f i t s had he i n c u r r e d m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s o r l o s t wages. I t con- t e n d s , however, t h a t on J u n e 6 c l a i m a n t s u f f e r e d a new and compensable i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t and t h a t s i n c e t h i s was t h e d i s a b l i n g i n j u r y c a u s i n g him t o s e e k m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n , I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity Co. i s s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r compen- s a t i n g claimant. U.S.F.&G. p r e m i s e s i t s argument on t h e w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e i n Montana t h a t a n employer t a k e s a n employee a s he f i n d s him. I t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s r u l i n g w a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e above d o c t r i n e and t h a t t h e " l a s t i n j u r i o u s exposure" r u l e should o p e r a t e here, p l a c i n g t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c l a i m a n t ' s compensation on I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity. I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity a r g u e s t h a t under H a r t l v. Big Sky of Montana, I n c . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 540, 579 P.2d 1239, 35 St.Rep. 806, i t i s improper t o a p p o r t i o n w o r k e r s ' compensa- t i o n b e n e f i t s between s u c c e s s i v e i n s u r e r s . I t submits t h a t t h e w o r k e r s ' compensation c o u r t c o r r e c t l y f o l l o w e d t h e d i c t a t e s of H a r t l i n h o l d i n g U.S.F.&G. l i a b l e f o r compensa- t i n g claimant. I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity a l s o c i t e s Newman v. Kamp (1962) , 1 4 0 Mont. 487, 374 P.2d 100, f o r t h e p r o p o s i - t i o n t h a t where a second i n j u r y o c c u r s b e f o r e t h e f i r s t i n j u r y i s h e a l e d , t h e f i r s t c a r r i e r i s l i a b l e f o r a l l com- p e n s a t i o n , and t h e second c a r r i e r i s r e l i e v e d of l i a b i l i t y . I t c o n t e n d s t h a t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e i s a p l e t h o r a of m e d i c a l and l a y t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i n j u r y r e s u l t - i n g from c l a i m a n t ' s f i r s t a c c i d e n t had n o t c o m p l e t e l y h e a l e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e second a c c i d e n t . Therefore, I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity c o n t e n d s t h a t b o t h H a r t l and Newman p r o v i d e ample a u t h o r i t y f o r h o l d i n g U.S.F.&G. l i a b l e f o r c l a i m a n t ' s com- pensa t i o n . C l a i m a n t i n t h i s c a s e b a s i c a l l y a g r e e s w i t h t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n h o l d i n g U.S.F.&G. liable for h i s compensation. F i r s t of a l l , i n examining t h e c o n t e n t i o n s by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s appeal, it should be pointed o u t t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h e t e s t of s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o b e whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t . S e e S t a m a t i s v. B e c h t e l Power Co. (1979), - Mont. , 601 P.2d 403, 36 St.Rep. 1866; Head v . Larson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , - 592 P.2d 507, 36 St.Rep. 571; S t r a n d b e r g v . Reber Company ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. , 587 P.2d 1 8 , 35 St.Rep. 1742; J e n s e n v . Zook B r o t h e r s C o n s t r u c t i o n Company (1978) , - Mont. , 582 P.2d 1191, 35 St.Rep. 1066. I n S t a m a t i s and J e n s e n , t h i s C o u r t f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t where t h e f i n d i n g s a r e based on c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , t h i s C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n on r e v i e w i s c o n f i n e d t o d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s and n o t t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support c o n t r a r y findings. With t h a t a s t h e b a s i c p r e m i s e , w e w i l l t h e n examine t h e f a c t s and t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t h e r e t o . I t i s u n d i s p u t e d i n Montana t h a t a n employer t a k e s h i s employee s u b j e c t t o t h e employee's p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n a t t h e t i m e of employment. I t i s a l s o u n d i s p u t e d t h a t a n aggrava- t i o n of a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n i s a compensable i n j u r y under t h e Workers' Compensation Act. Robins v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont. 514, 575 P.2d 67, 35 St.Rep. 213; Schumacher v. Empire S t e e l Mfg. Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 4 1 1 , 574 P.2d 9871 34 S t - R e p . 1 1 1 2 . Where t h e r e have been two a c c i d e n t s , e a c h o c c u r r i n g under a d i f f e r e n t i n s u r e r , and t h e second happens b e f o r e t h e f i r s t i n j u r y i s c o m p l e t e l y h e a l e d , t h e second a c c i d e n t i s i n c i d e n t t o t h e f i r s t and t h e f i r s t i n s u r e r i s r e q u i r e d t o pay a l l compensation. Newrnan v. Kamp, s u p r a . This i s so b e c a u s e i n Montana t h e r e i s no a p p o r t i o n m e n t of w o r k e r s ' compensation b e n e f i t s between s u c c e s s i v e i n s u r e r s . Hart1 v. Big Sky of Montana, I n c . , supra. There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t c l a i m a n t h e r e s u f f e r e d a compensable i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y . The main f a c t u a l i s s u e b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t was which c a r r i e r was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r compensating c l a i m a n t . R e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e r e s t s on a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e second i n j u r y was s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t o r merely a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a preexisting condition. I n e s s e n c e , t h e n , r e s o l u t i o n of l i a b i l i t y i s d e p e n d e n t on a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of which p a r t i c u - l a r i n j u r y w a s t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r which c l a i m a n t s e e k s compensation. The Workers' Compensation C o u r t , i n e f f e c t , h e l d t h a t t h e second i n j u r y , s i n c e i t o c c u r r e d b e f o r e t h e f i r s t had c o m p l e t e l y h e a l e d , was m e r e l y a n a g g r a v a t i o n of a p r e e x i s t - i n g c o n d i t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e f i r s t i n j u r y was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of c l a i m a n t ' s d i s a b i l i t y . U.S.F.&G. con- t e n d s t h a t t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d and t h a t t h e second i n j u r y was s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t from the f i r s t . U.S.F.&G. b a s e s i t s argument on t h e f a c t t h a t c l a i m a n t c o n t i n u e d t o work a f t e r t h e f i r s t a c c i d e n t and d i d n o t s e e k m e d i c a l h e l p ; however, i t a r g u e s , h e d i d see a d o c t o r and q u i t working a f t e r t h e second a c c i d e n t . It c o n t e n d s t h a t under o u r h o l d i n g i n H a r t l , I n d u s t r i a l Indem- n i t y should be l i a b l e . T h i s i s n o t , however, a c o m p l e t e l y a c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e f a c t s of e i t h e r t h i s c a s e o r of Hartl. The t e s t i m o n y o f D r . C . G . Cragg, a n o r t h o p e d i c s u r - geon, i n d i c a t e d t h a t c l a i m a n t had had knee problems s i n c e 1941. Both a c c i d e n t s , i n h i s o p i n i o n , were a g g r a v a t i o n s of t h a t preexisting condition. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e J u n e 6 a c c i d e n t , c l a i m a n t had n o t r e c o v e r e d from the April 4 accident. The r e c o r d showed t h a t c l a i m a n t was somewhat s t o i c a l and had a h i g h t o l e r a n c e f o r p a i n . I t a l s o showed t h a t c l a i m a n t a t t i m e s had c o n t i n u e d t o work even though he w a s i n pain. I n f a c t , c l a i m a n t c o n t i n u e d working a f t e r t h e J u n e 6 a c c i d e n t u n t i l h e was l a i d o f f . H e apparently sought m e d i c a l h e l p t h e n b e c a u s e t h e p a i n had become t o o much and b e c a u s e he was a f r a i d of d o i n g s t e e l w o r k above t h e ground f o r f e a r of h i s knee c o l l a p s i n g . I n H a r t l , t h e c l a i m a n t a l s o s u f f e r e d from a p r e e x i s t i n g condition. The p h y s i c i a n t h e r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l o f t h e c l a i m a n t ' s back i n j u r i e s c o n t r i b u t e d t o h i s p r e s e n t c o n d i - t i o n , and i t w a s i m p o s s i b l e t o s e p a r a t e t h e a c c i d e n t s as t o t h e c a u s e of c l a i m a n t ' s d i s a b i l i t y . The p h y s i c i a n i n Hartl, u n l i k e D r . Cragg h e r e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t c l a i m a n t ' s most r e c e n t i n j u r y w a s a s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t one and h i s p r e s e n t impairment was g r e a t e r a s a r e s u l t of i t . A s pointed o u t above, D r . Cragg t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e J u n e 6 i n j u r y h e r e was n o t a s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t i n j u r y b u t m e r e l y an a g g r a v a t i o n o f t h e p r e e x i s t i n g one. I n c a s e s l i k e t h i s , i t i s incumbent on t h e i n s u r e r s e e k i n g t o be r e l i e v e d from l i a b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n was c a u s e d by a n a c c i d e n t o c c u r r i n g when t h e o t h e r i n s u r e r was on r i s k . Newman v. Karnp, s u p r a , 374 P.2d a t 104. A r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t U.S.F.&G. has f a i l e d t o do t h i s and t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t . U.S.F.&G. contends w e should apply t h e " l a s t i n j u r i o u s e x p o s u r e " r u l e , a s s t a t e d i n 4 L a r s o n , The Law of Workmen's Compensation S95.12 a t 17-71. T h i s C o u r t h a s , however, p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h i s r u l e t o be i n a p p l i c a b l e i n Montana because we are committed to the doctrine that the particular injury must be the proximate cause of the present condition for which the claimant seeks compensation. Newman, 374 P.2d at 104. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court. Its deci- sion is therefore affirmed. One further matter merits discussion. This appeal essentially involves only a question of liability between the two insurers, with both U.S.F.&G. and Industrial Indem- nity agreeing that claimant had suffered a compensable injury. Claimant's attorney, however, filed a brief and made an appearance at oral argument. He now requests attor- ney fees and costs for that appearance. In a case such as this, where the claimant is assured of compensation, it is unnecessary for him to make an appearance other than the filing of a short brief stating his position and that he will not appear. As the appearance was unnecessary, claim- ant's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal is denied. A£ firmed. tdio-< Judge, sitting in &lace o%;r~r.Justice Gene B. Daly We concur: Chief Justice