No. 79-100
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
ART NEWBERGER d/b/a
AMUSEMENT CONSPIRACY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula.
Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Goldman and Goldman, Missoula, Montana
Jon Oldenburg argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana
Harold Dye argued, Missoula, Montana
Terry L. Adkins argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Bismarck, North Dakota
Submitted: May 27, 1980
Decided : ,fu!.- 2 - lg8Q
Filed: JUL 1. - 1980
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
c his i s an a p p e a l from a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t i n Missoula
County ~ i s t r i c C o u r t f o r t h e r e c o v e r y of c e r t a i n monies
t
a l l e g e d l y owed t o North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y on a con-
t r a c t f o r t h e promotion of a r o c k c o n c e r t . Summary judgment
was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t S t a t e of North Dakota.
A p p e l l a n t Newberger a p p e a l s from t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e motion
f o r summary judgment.
A p p e l l a n t , t h r o u g h h i s b u s i n e s s , Amusement C o n s p i r a c y ,
promotes r o c k c o n c e r t s a t s e v e r a l u n i v e r s i t i e s and c o l l e g e s
t h r o u g h o u t t h e Northwest. A p p e l l a n t i s a r e s i d e n t of t h e
S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a w i t h h i s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e s l o c a t e d i n
Encino, C a l i f o r n i a . Appellant entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t with
North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y t o promote a r o c k c o n c e r t a t
t h e U n i v e r s i t y i n F a r g o , North Dakota, on F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1979.
The c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n e d a c l a u s e which p r o v i d e d t h a t , i n t h e
e v e n t of c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e c o n c e r t , p r o c e e d s from advance
t i c k e t s a l e s and c e r t a i n promotion e x p e n s e s would be r e -
funded. Due t o t h e i l l n e s s of one of t h e p e r f o r m e r s , t h e
r o c k c o n c e r t was n e v e r h e l d . A s a r e s u l t of t h e c a n c e l l a -
t i o n , a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e d l y owed monies f o r promotion e x p e n s e s
and advance t i c k e t sales.
On March 2 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r
t h e County of M i s s o u l a , t o r e c o v e r t h e monies a l l e g e d l y
owed. The c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d i n Missoula County b e c a u s e
a p p e l l a n t was a c t i v e l y promoting a n o t h e r r o c k c o n c e r t a t t h e
U n i v e r s i t y of Montana f i e l d h o u s e i n M i s s o u l a . The c o n c e r t
was s c h e d u l e d t o be h e l d on March 2 , 1979. I n f i l i n g the
c o m p l a i n t , r e s p o n d e n t c a u s e d a summons t o be i s s u e d .
However, a p p e l l a n t was n e v e r p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d w i t h t h e
summons.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e complaint, respondent a l s o f i l e d an
a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t of a prejudgment w r i t o f a t t a c h m e n t .
Respondent s o u g h t t o a t t a c h t h e p r o c e e d s of t h e Missoula
c o n c e r t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y would s a t i s f y t h e d e b t
a l l e g e d l y owed t o North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . After
t e s t i m o n y was t a k e n a t a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d
a n o r d e r f o r a w r i t o f a t t a c h m e n t , and t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e
Missoula c o n c e r t w e r e a t t a c h e d i n t h e amount r e q u e s t e d .
On March 5, a p p e l l a n t , t h r o u g h h i s c o u n s e l , a p p e a r e d t o
d i s c h a r g e t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t on t h e ground t h a t i t was
i m p r o p e r l y and i r r e g u l a r l y i s s u e d . Appellant argued t h a t
t h e w r i t s h o u l d b e d i s c h a r g e d b e c a u s e i t was accompanied
o n l y by one u n d e r t a k i n g , t h e s u r e t y , and s e c t i o n 27-18-204,
MCA, r e q u i r e d t h a t i t be accompanied by two. The motion t o
d i s c h a r g e was d e n i e d . On March 28, 1979, a p p e l l a n t a g a i n
a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and moved t h a t t h e a c t i o n
b e d i s m i s s e d f o r improper venue and l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n .
T h a t motion, t o o , was d e n i e d .
P r i o r t o a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s , on March 20,
1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r t h i r t e e n a d m i s s i o n s
from a p p e l l a n t . A p p e l l a n t , however, d i d n o t respond t o t h e
requests. On J u n e 2 1 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t ,
b e c a u s e t h e r e had been a f a i l u r e t o answer t h e r e q u e s t s
w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r o v i d e d by law, t h a t t h e m a t t e r s would be
deemed a d m i t t e d . Again, a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t respond.
On J u l y 1 7 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a motion f o r summary
judgment, based upon t h e a d m i s s i o n s which had been o b t a i n e d .
A p p e l l a n t t h e n f i l e d o n August 1 3 , 1979, a motion f o r t h e
w i t h d r a w a l o f p r e v i o u s a d m i s s i o n s and a r e q u e s t f o r a n
e x t e n s i o n of t i m e s o t h a t t h e answers c o u l d be f i l e d . A
h e a r i n g was h e l d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e m o t i o n s f i l e d by t h e
p a r t i e s on August 23, 1979. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d
a p p e l l a n t ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e answers and e n t e r e d
summary judgment f o r r e s p o n d e n t .
A p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on
t h i s appeal:
(1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying a p p e l -
l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n ?
( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying a p p e l -
l a n t ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e answers t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s
r e q u e s t s f o r admissions?
( 3 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n c o n t i n u i n g t h e
w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r l i e n s which may p o s s i b l y have been
superior t o respondent's i n t e r e s t i n t h e attached proceeds?
Appellant's f i r s t issue i s t o the e f f e c t t h a t the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r him.
in
A p p e l l a n t i s , o f c o u r s e , a n o n r e s i d e n t , and - personam
in
j u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d o v e r n o n r e s i d e n t s by Montana's
"long-arm s t a t u t e , " Rule 4 B , M.R.Civ.P., provided t h a t
certain criteria are met. That r u l e provides i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
" A l l p e r s o n s found w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of Montana
a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t s
of t h i s s t a t e . I n a d d i t i o n , any p e r s o n i s sub-
j e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t s of t h i s
s t a t e a s t o any c l a i m f o r r e l i e f a r i s i n g from
t h e d o i n g p e r s o n a l l y , t h r o u g h a n employee, o r
t h r o u g h a n a g e n t , o f any of t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t s :
" ( a ) t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o f any b u s i n e s s w i t h i n
this state;
" ( c ) t h e ownership, u s e o r p o s s e s s i o n of any
p r o p e r t y , o r of any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , s i t u a t e d
within t h i s s t a t e ;
" (e) e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o n t r a c t f o r s e r v i c e s t o
b e r e n d e r e d o r m a t e r i a l s t o be f u r n i s h e d i n t h i s
s t a t e by such p e r s o n ; "
I n i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t e "long-arm" s t a t u t e s , w e have
s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a c o u r t may assume
j u r i s d i c t i o n over a nonresident defendant without offending
t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f due p r o c e s s i s a two-step p r o c e s s . "The
c o u r t must f i r s t l o o k t o t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e t o d e t e r m i n e
whether t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c -
t i o n under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of t h e c a s e , and s e c o n d , t h e
c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e whether i t would o f f e n d due p r o c e s s t o
assert jurisdiction. " May v . F i g g i n s (1980) , - Mont.
, 607 P.2d 1132, 1134, 37 St.Rep. 493, 495, q u o t i n g 2
Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1 [ I ] a t 4 - 4 2 1 . W e have a l s o
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e i s a p r e v a i l i n g t r e n d toward expanding
t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e f u l l e s t
extent possible. May v . F i g g i n s , s u p r a , 607 P.2d a t 1134,
37 St.Rep. a t 496; P r e n t i c e Lumber Company v . Spahn ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,
156 Mont. 68, 76, 474 P.2d 1 4 1 , 145.
The b a s i c r u l e w i t h r e g a r d t o due p r o c e s s l i m i t a t i o n s
imposed upon a s t a t e ' s power t o e x e r c i s e - personam j u r i s -
in
d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t was s t a t e d i n t h e
landmark case o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington
". . . due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t i n o r d e r t o
s u b j e c t a d e f e n d a n t t o a judgment i n personam,
i f he be n o t p r e s e n t w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e
forum, he have c e r t a i n minimum c o n t a c t s w i t h i t
s u c h t h a t t h e maintenance of t h e s u i t d o e s n o t
o f f e n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and
substantial justice.'" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a ,
326 U.S. a t 316.
The Supreme C o u r t went on t o e l a b o r a t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
o f t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t :
"Whether due p r o c e s s i s s a t i s f i e d must depend
r a t h e r on t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e a c t i v i t y
i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a i r and o r d e r l y a d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n of t h e laws which i t was t h e p u r p o s e of t h e
due p r o c e s s c l a u s e t o i n s u r e . That c l a u s e does
n o t c o n t e m p l a t e t h a t a s t a t e may make a b i n d i n g
judgment i n personam a g a i n s t a n i n d i v i d u a l o r
c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t w i t h which t h e s t a t e h a s no
contacts, ties o r r e l a t i o n s . . .
"But t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n e x e r c i s e s
t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n a
s t a t e , i t e n j o y s t h e b e n e f i t s and t h e p r o t e c -
t i o n of t h e l a w s o f t h a t S t a t e . The e x e r c i s e o f
t h a t p r i v i l e g e may g i v e r i s e t o o b l i g a t i o n s ; a n d ,
s o f a r a s t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e o u t of o r a r e
connected with t h e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e ,
a p r o c e d u r e which r e q u i r e s t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t o
respond t o a s u i t b r o u g h t t o e n f o r c e them c a n ,
i n most i n s t a n c e s , h a r d l y be s a i d t o be undue."
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a , 326 U.S. a t 319.
The d o c t r i n e of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t
d e f e n d a n t h a s s i n c e been developed i n a l o n g l i n e of c a s e s .
See Hanson v . Denckla ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2
L.Ed.2d 1283; M c G e e v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co. (1957),
355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223; P e r k i n s v . Ben-
q u e t C o n s o l i d a t e d Mining Co. ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct.
413, 96 L.Ed. 485; L.D. Reeder C o n t r a c t o r s v . H i g g i n s I n -
d u s t r i e s , Inc. ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 5 9 ) , 265 F.2d 768; T r a v e l e r s
H e a l t h A s s ' n . v . V i r g i n i a e x r e l . S t a t e C o r p o r a t i o n Comm'n
I f a nonresident defendant's a c t i v i t i e s within a s t a t e
a r e " s u b s t a n t i a l " o r " c o n t i n u o u s and s y s t e m a t i c , " t h e r e i s a
s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e s t a t e
t o s u p p o r t j u r i s d i c t i o n even though t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n i s
d i s t i n c t from, u n r e l a t e d t o , o r d o e s n o t a r i s e o u t of t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i v i t y w i t h i n t h e forum s t a t e . Perkins,
s u p r a , 342 U.S. a t 446-447; W e l l s Fargo & Co. v . Wells Fargo
E x p r e s s Co. ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 556 F.2d 413; Data D i s c . , Inc.
v . Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc. ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F.2d
1280; s e e a l s o Annot., 2 L.Ed.2d 1664, 1670.
Applying t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , we f i n d
a p p e l l a n t h a s s u f f i c i e n t and s u b s t a n t i a l "minimum c o n t a c t s "
w i t h t h i s s t a t e f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o have assumed
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s m a t t e r . Appellant purposely a v a i l s
h i m s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e s and b e n e f i t s of t h e l a w s of t h i s
s t a t e by c o n d u c t i n g h i s b u s i n e s s of promoting r o c k c o n c e r t s
i n Montana and t h r o u g h o u t t h e Northwest. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s
t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s promoted c o n c e r t s i n Montana p r i o r t o t h e
o n e i n M i s s o u l a a t which t h e p r o c e e d s were a t t a c h e d . As
p a r t of h i s b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t a l s o e n t e r s
i n t o c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s t o be p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s t a t e .
I t i s o u t of a s i m i l a r and r e l a t e d c o n t r a c t t h a t r e s p o n -
d e n t ' s claim f o r r e l i e f o r c o u r s e of a c t i o n arises. The
b a s i s of r e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m i s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t t o t a l l y
u n r e l a t e d t o o r d i s t i n c t from t h e a c t i v i t i e s of a p p e l l a n t i n
this state. F u r t h e r , a t t h e t i m e of t h i s a c t i o n , a p p e l l a n t
was i n p o s s e s s i o n of monies o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n t h i s
s t a t e which were a l l e g e d t o have r i g h t f u l l y belonged t o
respondent. I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t respondent chose t o
f i l e t h i s a c t i o n i n Missoula.
I t a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s "minimum
c o n t a c t s " w i t h t h i s s t a t e ; a p p e l l a n t w a s found i n Montana,
t r a n s a c t s b u s i n e s s i n Montana, had an i n t e r e s t i n p r o c e e d s
i n Montana which were a t t a c h e d , and c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s
t o be p r o v i d e d i n Montana. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e s a t i s f y
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 4B (1)( a ) , ( c ) and ( e ), M.R.Civ.P.
W f i n d f u r t h e r t h a t , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s
e
c a s e and f o r t h e r e a s o n s a f o r e m e n t i o n e d , t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l
n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e " w e r e n o t
o f f e n d e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n .
Respondent, by f i l i n g t h i s a c t i o n , i n no way s o u g h t t o
"vex," "harass" or "oppress" appellant by inflicting upon
him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to
pursue his remedy. To the contrary, respondent chose the
Missoula District Court because both appellant and the
proceeds could be found there. While there may have been,
from the choice of this forum, some inconvenience to both
parties, it is clear that no advantages or obstacles to a
fair trial were thereby created. To deny jurisdiction of
this cause would be to thwart the public interest this state
has in providing a forum for companies doing business and
for the carrying on and enforcing of proper business prac-
tices, such as the payment and collection of debts. See
Prentice Lumber Company v. Spahn, supra. We find, there-
fore, that the District Court did not err in denying appel-
lant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
In any event appellant through his counsel appeared
without objection to jurisdiction over his person. He
thereby waived any objection under Rule 12, M.R.Civ.P.
Appellant's second issue concerns whether the District
Court erred in denying appellant leave to file late answers
to admissions which respondent had previously obtained.
Appellant contends that there were compelling circumstances
which explained the failure to answer, since he was hospi-
talized for a substantial period of time.
Respondent served on appellant requests for thirteen
admissions pursuant to Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P.; appellant did
not respond within the time provided by law. After respon-
dent gave notice to appellant that the matters would be
deemed admitted, the District Court granted respondent
summary judgment based upon the admissions. The following
timetable is pertinent:
March 20 Respondent r e q u e s t e d 1 3 admis-
s i o n s . No r e s p o n s e .
June 19 Appellant hospitalized.
June 2 1 Respondent n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t
t h a t m a t t e r s would b e deemed
admitted. N response.
o
J u l y 17 Respondent moved f o r summary
j udgment .
August 6 A p p e l l a n t r e l e a s e d from
hospital.
August 9 A p p e l l a n t moved f o r l e a v e t o
f i l e l a t e answers.
T h i s C o u r t h a s r e c e n t l y had two o c c a s i o n s t o d i s c u s s
t h e i s s u e of whether l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers s h o u l d have
been a l l o w e d when p r e v i o u s a d m i s s i o n s had been o b t a i n e d by a
p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o respond. H e l l e r v . Osburnsen ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162
Mont. 182, 510 P. 2d 1 3 ; Morast v . Auble ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont.
1 0 0 , 519 P.2d 157. I n H e l l e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court allowed a
p a r t y t o f i l e l a t e answers b e c a u s e t h e d e l a y was c a u s e d by a
mixup i n o f f i c e p r o c e d u r e and n o t by bad f a i t h . W e upheld
t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and, q u o t i n g 2 Moore's
F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 1[15.05[21 a t 1156, s t a t e d t h e g e n e r a l r u l e :
" ' * * * F a i l u r e t o t a k e any a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e
p e r i o d s t a t e d i n t h e r e q u e s t r e s u l t s i n an ad-
m i s s i o n of t h e f a c t s s t a t e d t h e r e i n , a l t h o u g h
t h e c o u r t may p e r m i t t h e p a r t y t o f i l e h i s an-
s w e r a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of s u c h t i m e where
t h e d e l a y was n o t c a u s e d by a l a c k of good
f a i t h . O r i n t h e a b s e n c e of any p r e j u d i c e t o
t h e p a r t y requesting t h e admission.'" Heller ,
162 Mont. a t 190, 510 P.2d a t 17. (~mphasis
added. )
I n c o n t r a s t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n Morast r e f u s e d
p l a i n t i f f s l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers. T h e r e , a n eight and
one-half month d e l a y o c c u r r e d and a n i n t e r v e n i n g a d m o n i t i o n
d u r i n g a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e had been g i v e n and names had
been f u r n i s h e d t o p l a i n t i f f s t h r o u g h i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s d u r i n g
discovery. On a p p e a l , t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t
Court had not abused its discretion, emphasizing that a
litigant's right to file a late response is "not a matter of
right," but is rather "a matter resting within the discre-
tion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." Morast.
164 Mont. at 105, 519 P.2d at 159.
In this case, approximately a five-month delay occurred.
During seven weeks in the latter part of the period, appel-
lant was hospitalized. For the first three months, however,
including the thirty-day period the law allows for a response
to the requests, appellant was carrying on the normal daily
affairs of his business. The transcript indicates that the
District Court was well aware of this:
"THE COURT: Well, where was he [appellant] from
March until June 19th?
"MR. OLDENBURG: I believe he was traveling in
his business, Your Honor . . ."
At no time during this traveling or the period of his
hospitalization did appellant or his counsel ask for an
extension of time to reply to the requests or indicate any
reason for the failure to respond. Where respondent served
notice of the consequences of failing to answer the re-
quests, which is not required by the rules, appellant simply
chose not to respond. In other courts, arguments similar to
those advanced by appellant here have fallen on "deaf ears."
See Oscola Inns v. State Highway Dept. (Ga. 1975), 213
S.E.2d 27, 29. Under these circumstances, we find that
appellant has not demonstrated a manifest abuse of discre-
tion, and the District Court did not err in denying appel-
lant leave to file late answers.
Appellant's final issue concerns whether the District
Court erred in continuing the writ of attachment over liens
which p o s s i b l y may have been s u p e r i o r t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r -
e s t i n t h e a t t a c h e d proceeds. A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e motion
f o r l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers and t h e motion f o r summary
judgment, a p p e l l a n t made a b r i e f and p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e t o
t h e f a c t t h a t a t h i r d party allegedly held a perfected
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e proceeds. The t r i a l c o u r t con-
t i n u e d t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r any o t h e r l i e n s i n t h e
money.
I n conducting our research, w e f i n d , a s both p a r t i e s
acknowledged, t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y on t h i s i s s u e .
Where t h e s i t u a t i o n h a s a r i s e n b e f o r e , t h e t h i r d p a r t y h a s
intervened t o a s s e r t h i s perfected security i n t e r e s t i n the
a t t a c h e d p r o c e e d s and s u b s e q u e n t l y moved t o d i s s o l v e t h e
attachment. See Barocas v . Bohemia Import Co., Inc. (Colo.
1 9 7 4 ) , 518 P.2d 850. W e find that i f the third party's
i n t e r e s t i s t o be a s s e r t e d a t a l l , s u c h i n t e r v e n t i o n i s
n e c e s s a r y and d e f e n d a n t l a c k s s t a n d i n g t o r a i s e a t h i r d
p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t a s a defense t o t h e attachment. Therefore,
w i t h o u t s u c h i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n
c o n t i n u i n g t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r any l i e n s which may
p o s s i b l y have been s u p e r i o r t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e
proceeds.
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s
affirmed.
We concur:
$ b 4
~ h r ( $ Justice