State v. Poncelet

No. 14395

I N THE SUPREME: COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN

1980

THE STATE OF MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

VS .
N I C K A. PONCELET,

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e Gordon R . B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

J a c k s o n and K e l l y , H e l e n a , Montana
Gregory J a c k s o n a r g u e d and Douglas K e l l y a r g u e d ,
H e l e n a , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Ann Smoyer a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana

Submitted: J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1980

~ e c i d e APR
d 24 1
9
a
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e

County of Lewis and C l a r k , t h e Honorable Gordon R. B e n n e t t

presiding.

Defendant i s a r e s i d e n t of W h i t e f i s h , Montana. H e has

been employed by T e l e p r o m p t e r , I n c . , f o r the past f i f t e e n

y e a r s working a s a microwave e n g i n e e r . I n October 1976,

d e f e n d a n t w a s informed by t h e Montana Department of Revenue

t h a t t h e S t a t e had n o t r e c e i v e d income t a x r e t u r n s from him

f o r t h e y e a r s 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976. I n those years,

t h e Department had r e c e i v e d informa t i o n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t

d e f e n d a n t had e a r n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g incomes: 1973--$10,400.00;

E n c l o s e d w i t h t h e Department' s l e t t e r t o d e f e n d a n t were

d e t a i l e d income t a x forms and i n s t r u c t i o n s . Defendant

responded t o t h e l e t t e r by r e q u e s t i n g c o p i e s of Montana code

s e c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e c o l l e c t i o n and payment of t a x e s and

t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The Department, i n t u r n , re-

sponded t o d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t by i n d i c a t i n g t h a t c e r t a i n

copying f e e s had t o be e n c l o s e d f o r t h e copying of t h e

r e q u e s t e d materials. Defendant a g a i n w r o t e a l e t t e r t o t h e

Department r e p e a t i n g h i s r e q u e s t . On November 2 1 , 1976,

f i v e d a y s a f t e r d e f e n d a n t ' s second l e t t e r , d e f e n d a n t m a i l e d

i n c o m p l e t e t a x r e t u r n s f o r t h e y e a r s 1973, 1974, and 1975 t o

t h e Department w i t h a n accompanying l e t t e r . The l e t t e r

stated:

" I have t a k e n t h e F i f t h Amendment s t a n d on m y
F e d e r a l Tax R e t u r n s and s i n c e t h e Montana D e -
p a r t m e n t of Revenue and t h e F e d e r a l Government
work hand i n hand I c a n n o t g i v e you any informa-
t i o n w i t h o u t you p a s s i n g it on t o t h e I . R . S . .
T h e r e f o r e , I am f o r c e d t o do t h e same w i t h t h e
 Montana Department of Revenue, b e c a u s e any i n -
f o r m a t i o n t h a t may t e n d t o i n c r i m i n a t e m e t h a t
i s g i v e n t o you w i l l b e p a s s e d on t o t h e I.R.S.
and nay i n c r i m i n a t e m e t h r o u g h a t h i r d p a r t y . "

I n t h e same l e t t e r , d e f e n d a n t r e q u e s t e d immunity from

p r o s e c u t i o n and added t h a t , I t i f you d o n o t a g r e e w i t h m e and

s h o u l d d e c i d e t o p r o s e c u t e m e , I w i l l make a good f a i t h

c h a l l e n g e i n a c o u r t of law b e f o r e a j u r y o f m p e e r s . "
y

Defendant a l s o a s k e d t h e S t a t e t o s c h e d u l e a c o n f e r e n c e t o

discuss h i s taxes.

Defendant f i l e d a n improper t a x r e t u r n on August 1 6 ,

1977, f o r t h e c a l e n d a r y e a r 1976.

On August 3, 1977, d e f e n d a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h f o u r

c o u n t s of " i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l i n g t o make o r r e n d e r a r e t u r n

o r t o s u p p l y i n f o r m a t i o n o r b o t h " under s e c t i o n 84-4924 ( 3 )

and ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 15-30-321 ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , MCA.

A j u r y t r i a l began on F e b r u a r y 21, 1978, and l a s t e d t h r e e

days. A t t h e end of t h e t r i a l , t h e j u r y d e l i b e r a t e d and

r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y on a l l f o u r c o u n t s . Defendant

moved f o r a new t r i a l , b u t t h e motion was d e n i e d . On A p r i l

1 9 , 1978, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment of c o n v i c t i o n ,

and d e f e n d a n t now a p p e a l s .

Twelve i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n upon

appeal. W e f i n d , however, t h a t it i s only necessary t o

d i s c u s s e l e v e n of t h e i s s u e s b e c a u s e of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of

t h i s case. The i s s u e s r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t are:

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e

j u r y t h a t " t h e l a w presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i -

n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . "

2. Whether p r o s e c u t i o n f o r t h e c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n

t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s .

3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o

admit defendant's withholding statement.
 4. whether t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y s w e r e p r o p e r l y
appointed s p e c i a l deputy county a t t o r n e y s .

5. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g d e f e n -
d a n t ' s motion f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f judge.

6. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n l i m i t i n g de-

f e n d a n t ' s v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e j u r y .

7. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e

t e s t i m o n y of W i l l i a m Koerner as a n e x p e r t w i t n e s s f o r d e f e n -

dant.

8. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n -

d a n t ' s motion f o r a change o f venue.

9. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s F i f t h Amend-

ment p r i v i l e g e was a d e f e n s e t o t h e c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e

i n £o r m a t i o n .

10. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n -

dant' s instructions.

11. Whether d e f e n d a n t , p r o c e e d i n g p r o s e , i s e n t i t l e d

t o have r u l e s of law and p r o c e d u r e a p p l i e d less s t r i c t l y

a g a i n s t him.

12. Whether t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d c l e a r l y prepon-

derated a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e jury.

A t t h e o u t s e t , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o c l e a r up any confu-

s i o n t h a t may e x i s t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c h a r g e s b r o u g h t by

t h e S t a t e i n t h i s case. H e r e , p r o s e c u t i o n was commenced by

t h e S t a t e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t f o r f a i l u r e t o f i l e a n income

t a x r e t u r n o r supply information, o r both. The ~ n f o r m a t i o n

s t a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h f o u r c o u n t s of " i n t e n -

t i o n a l l y f a i l i n g t o make o r r e n d e r a r e t u r n o r t o s u p p l y

information o r both." The p r o s e c u t i o n w a s n o t commenced f o r

any f a i l u r e t o pay t a x e s . What t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s t e m s from,

r a t h e r , i s t h e f i l i n g of a n i n c o m p l e t e o r improper r e t u r n .
Defendant here submitted signed returns with asterisks

inserted on several lines, accompanied by a blanket asser-

tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. According to well-

established legal precedent, returns which merely contain an
individual's social security number, name, and signature and
which are accompanied by a blanket Fifth Amendment assertion

of a privilege are not properly filed returns as provided by

law. See United States v. Porth (10th Cir. 1970), 426 F.2d
519, cert. denied 400 U.S. 824 (1970); United States v.
Jordan (7th Cir. 1975), 508 F.2d 750, cert. denied 423 U.S.
842 (1976); United States v. Pryor (8th Cir. 1978), 574
F.2d 440. This case, then, concerns the failure to file a
proper return.

As his first issue, defendant contends that the Dis-
trict Court erred in instructing the jury that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of

his voluntary acts." This instruction, commonly referred to
as the "Sandstrom instruction," has been considered by this

Court in several recent cases. The United States Supreme
Court declared it to be unconstitutional because it has, in
the minds of reasonable jurors, conclusive or persuasion-
shifting effect. Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), U.S.
, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39.
The State contends that we should not consider defen-

dant's first issue because defendant did not object to the
giving of the challenged instruction at trial. The State

submits that the issue cannot now be raised for the first
time on appeal. Although the State's point is well taken,
we note that an appellate court may, in some circumstances,

raise plain error upon appeal. We find that the effect of

the Sandstrom instruction deserves consideration, especially

because defendant appeared pro se in this matter.
 The t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i o n s s i m i l a r

o r i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e i n v o l v e d i n Sandstrom was e n u n c i a t e d

by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a s a n a l y z i n g t h e "way i n

which a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c -

tion." T h i s , o f c o u r s e , i n v o l v e s a s s e s s i n g t h e i m p a c t of

t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c -

t i o n s given i n t h e case. S e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n i n

t h i s case w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n t e n t and t h e proof t h e r e o f .

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n t e n t was a n e c e s s a r y
1

e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e t o be proven by t h e S t a t e beyond a

reasonable doubt. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t

was a f f o r d e d a presumption o f i n n o c e n c e , and I n s t r u c t i o n No.

2 r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e S t a t e prove e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 7 was i d e n t i c a l

t o t h e wording of t h e s o - c a l l e d "Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n " and

a f f o r d e d t h e S t a t e a presumption of i n t e n t . "Presumption"

was d e f i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 3, which s t a t e d :

" I n s t r u c t i o n - - 3: A presumption i s a deduc-
No.
t i o n which t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s t o b e made
from p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s . U n l e s s d e c l a r e d by law
t o be c o n c l u s i v e , i t may be c o n t r o v e r t e d by
o t h e r evidence, d i r e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , b u t
u n l e s s s o c o n t r o v e r t e d t h e j u r y i s bound t o
f i n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e presumption.

" I n t h i s r e g a r d , you a r e reminded i n a c r i m i n a l
c a s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s presumed i n n o c e n t u n t i l
t h e c o n t r a r y i s proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt. T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n c a r r i e s t h e f o r c e of
l a w and c a n o n l y be c o n t r o v e r t e d by e v i d e n c e
which l e a v e s t h e minds of j u r o r s i n t h a t con-
d i t i o n t h a t t h e y can s a y t h a t t h e y f e e l a n
a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n , t o a moral c e r t a i n t y , of
t h e t r u t h of t h e c h a r g e . "

I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 9 and 10 a l s o p e r m i t t e d a f i n d i n g of

i n t e n t through inference:

--
" I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9: The i n t e n t o r i n t e n t i o n i s
m a n i f e s t e d by t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h
t h e o f f e n s e , and t h e sound mind and d i s c r e t i o n
o f t h e accused. A l l p e r s o n s a r e of sound mind
who a r e n e i t h e r i d i o t s , n o r l u n a t i c s , n o r a £ -
 f e c t e d w i t h i n s a n i t y . The i n t e n t need n o t be
proved by d i r e c t e v i d e n c e , b u t may be i n f e r r e d
from a c t s , c o n d u c t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r i n g
i n e v i d e n c e and w a r r a n t i n g s u c h i n f e r e n c e be-
yond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . , .

"Instruction - - No. 10: The e l e m e n t of i n t e n t i n
e v e r y c o n t e s t e d case must n e c e s s a r i l y b e d e t e r -
mined from f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e p a r -
t i c u l a r case--this f o r the reason t h a t criminal
i n t e n t , b e i n g a s t a t e o f mind, i s r a r e l y s u s -
c e p t i b l e o f d i r e c t o r p o s i t i v e proof and t h e r e
must u s u a l l y be i n f e r r e d from t h e f a c t s t e s t i -
f i e d t o by w i t n e s s e s and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s
d e v e l o p e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . "

Analyzing t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e way o r ways a

r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d them, we b e l i e v e two

p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m i g h t have been reached--one permis-

s i b l e and t h e o t h e r i m p e r m i s s i b l e .

On o n e hand, a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d have u n d e r s t o o d

the instructions a s requiring the State t o f u l l y carry i t s

burden. The e l e m e n t of i n t e n t c o u l d have been p r o p e r l y and

p e r m i s s i b l y found t h r o u g h i n f e r e n c e a s s t a t e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n

Nos. 9 and 10. T h e r e would have been no c o n c l u s i v e o r

persuasion-shifting effect. Interpreting the instructions

a s p e r m i s s i b l e , t h e j u r o r s would have been f r e e t o a c c e p t o r

r e j e c t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s w i t h o u t a l l o c a t i n g any a d d i t i o n a l

burden t o t h e d e f e n d a n t i n coming forward w i t h f u r t h e r

proof. S e e S t a t e v . Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. 1 579

P.2d 732, 36 St.Rep. 2237; S t a t e v. Bad Horse ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,

Mont. , 605 P.2d 1113, 37 St.Rep. 45.

On t h e o t h e r hand, a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d have a l s o

i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s mandatory. In particular,

t h e j u r o r s c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 7 a s

a l l o w i n g f o r no d i s c r e t i o n and d i r e c t i n g t h e j u r o r s t o f i n d

t h e e l e m e n t of i n t e n t . S t a t e v. Sandstrom ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

Mont. , 603 P.2d 244, 36 St.Rep. 2099. This i n t e r p r e -

t a t i o n would have had a n i m p e r m i s s i b l e e f f e c t and m i g h t have
been e a s i l y r e a c h e d c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c o n t e x t o f I n s t r u c t i o n

No. 3. Where a n i m p e r m i s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o u l d have

been g l e a n e d from t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s by a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r , w e

c a n n o t d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e e r r o r

complained o f d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e v e r d i c t .

The S t a t e u r g e s t h a t , even i f t h e r e was e r r o r i n t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e e r r o r was h a r m l e s s . Given t h e n a t u r e of

e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e , however, we f i n d t h e a p p l i -

c a t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n e of h a r m l e s s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t o

be unpersuasive. There i s no overwhelming e v i d e n c e h e r e

t h a t i s of the convincing q u a l i t y o r c h a r a c t e r a s t h a t

p r e s e n t i n S t a t e v. Hamilton ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 605

P.2d 1121, 37 S t - R e p . 70, and S t a t e v. McKenzie ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,

Mont. I - P. 2d , 37 St.Rep. 325.

Having d e t e r m i n e d t h e e r r o r t o b e p r e j u d i c i a l and

h a r m f u l , t h i s c a s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r

r e t r i a l c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n s of t h i s

o p i n i o n and t h e g u i d e l i n e s enumerated by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

Supreme C o u r t i n Sandstrom.

AS h i s second i s s u e , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t any p r o s e -

c u t i o n f o r t h e o f f e n s e s charged i n t h e Information w a s

b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Defendant was c h a r g e d

under s e c t i o n 84-4924 ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n

15-30-321 ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , MCA, f o r f a i l u r e t o f i l e c o m p l e t e

income t a x r e t u r n s f o r t h e y e a r s 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976.

Each c o u n t w a s a misdemeanor p u n i s h a b l e by a f i n e n o t t o

e x c e e d $1,000 o r one y e a r imprisonment, o r b o t h .

Defendant s u b m i t s t h a t s e c t i o n 4 5 - 1 - 2 0 5 ( 2 ) ( b ) , MCA, i s

t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o e a c h of t h e f o u r

counts. The s t a t u t e s e t s f o r t h a one y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a

t i o n f o r misdemeanors. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e i s
b a r r e d from p r o s e c u t i n g any c o u n t where p r o s e c u t i o n com-

menced on August 3, 1977, more t h a n one y e a r from t h e d a t e

upon which t h e l a s t o f f e n s e w a s committed.

W e agree.

W e f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 15-30-322, MCA, i s n o t t h e con-

t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r t h e o f f e n s e s charged i n

t h i s case. The l a n g u a g e " [ e l x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by

law" c o n t r o l s a s t o when a misdemeanor i s removed from t h e

b a r of s e c t i o n 4 5 - 1 - 2 0 5 ( 2 ) ( b ) , MCA. S e c t i o n 15-30-322, MCA,

s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p l i e s o n l y t o a c t i o n s by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l

t o r e c o v e r due t a x e s , p e n a l t i e s and i n t e r e s t " a t any t i m e . "

T h i s i s n o t a n a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r unpaid t a x e s . I t i s an

action t o create criminal responsibility f o r not f i l i n g a

p r o p e r income t a x r e t u r n . The a u t h o r i z a t i o n e x t e n d e d t o t h e

a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l under s e c t i o n 15-30-322, MCA, is for a

c i v i l a c t i o n t o c o l l e c t governmental revenue. An open r i g h t

i n t h e S t a t e t o c o l l e c t i t s r e v e n u e " a t any t i m e " i n a c i v i l

a c t i o n s h o u l d n o t be e x t e n d e d t o c o v e r a c r i m i n a l m a t t e r .

P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , we n o t e t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s now p r o -

vided a five-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r t h i s t y p e of

c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , s e c t i o n 15-30-324, MCA, adopted i n

1979.

D e f e n d a n t ' s t h i r d i s s u e i s whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n

f a i l i n g t o admit h i s withholding statement. Defendant

a p p a r e n t l y c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was r e l e v a n t t o show
t h a t t a x e s had been p a i d and w i t h h e l d . It i s important t o

r e i t e r a t e h e r e t h a t t h i s i s n o t a p r o s e c u t i o n stemming from

a f a i l u r e t o pay t a x e s . R a t h e r , d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d and
found g u i l t y of f a i l u r e t o f i l e a p r o p e r r e t u r n . The f a c t

t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l h a s f e d e r a l and s t a t e income t a x e s w i t h -

h e l d from h i s g r o s s income i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n t o
abate the requirement of filing a proper, completed Montana
Individual Income Tax Return. The filing requirement is
contained in section 15-30-142, MCA. This statute, coupled
with section 15-30-321(3), MCA, sets forth the criminal

penalties for not filing, and no mention is made concerning
withholding tax.
In the presentation of the State's case, evidence of

documents pertaining to defendant's employment was presented
to show defendant's gross income for the years in question.
Defendant argues that it is the law in Montana that, when
part of a transaction is proven, the whole is admissible.
Rule 106, Mont.R.Evid. However, in this case, the pay
records referred to were used to develop the defendant's
income, and references to the withholding of taxes were
peripheral to the main issue. The offering of the with-
holding statements by defendant were irrelevant to the issue
of whether or not he filed returns for the years in ques-
tion.
Defendant relies on Varn v. Butte Electric Ry. Co.
(1926), 77 Mont. 124, 249 P. 1070, as authority for allowing
the admission of withholding statements. The issue in Varn
was whether an entire ordinance governing street cars was
admissible. The Court there held that, when one part of an
ordinance was admitted into evidence, the trial court should
have allowed the entire ordinance to be admitted. Varn,
however, is factually distinguishable from the situation
here. Here, defendant's withholding statements did not go
to the intent needed for failure to file his returns. In
fact, the evidence had no probative value on the charge in

the case at bar. The admission of such evidence could well
have distracted the jury from the charge at hand. See
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Gorman ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 6 8 ) , 393 F.2d 209, c e r t .

d e n i e d 393 U.S. 832, r e h . d e n i e d 395 U.S. 917. W e f i n d no

e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s h a n d l i n g of t h i s i s s u e .

~ e f e n d a n t ' sn e x t i s s u e i s whether t h e a t t o r n e y s who

p r o s e c u t e d t h i s a c t i o n , Ann Smoyer and R o b e r t W . Corcoran,

were p r o p e r l y a p p o i n t e d s p e c i a l d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y s i n

t h i s matter. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of M s .

Smoyer and M r . Corcoran v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 7-4-2703, MCA.

T h a t s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s t h a t a c o u n t y a t t o r n e y of a f i r s t o r

second c l a s s c o u n t y c a n o n l y a p p o i n t o n e c h i e f d e p u t y and

one deputy county a t t o r n e y . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t , b e c a u s e

L e w i s and C l a r k County a l r e a d y had such number of d e p u t i e s ,

Ms. Smoyer and M r . Corcoran w e r e i m p r o p e r l y a p p o i n t e d h e r e .

W e f i n d , however, t h a t t h e r e i s ample a u t h o r i t y t o

s u p p o r t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y s a c t e d under p r o p e r and

lawful authority t o prosecute t h i s action. Defendant sub-

m i t s t h a t s e c t i o n 7-4-2703, MCA, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e maximum

number of d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y s a l l o w e d by law. An exami-

n a t i o n o f o t h e r s t a t u t e s and c a s e s , however, r e v e a l s o t h e r -

wise. S e c t i o n 7-4-2401, MCA, provides f o r t h e appointment

of s u c h a d d i t i o n a l d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y s a s may be r e a s o n -
a b l y necessary t o discharge t h e d u t i e s of t h e o f f i c e . There

i s a l s o e a r l y a u t h o r i t y i n Montana, under a s t a t u t o r y p r e d e c e s -

s o r t o s e c t i o n 7-4-2703, MCA, which r e c o g n i z e s t h e a u t h o r i t y

of t h e county a t t o r n e y t o appoint a d d i t i o n a l d e p u t i e s i n

c e r t a i n circumstances. S t a t e v. Crouch ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 70 Mont.

551, 227 P . 818. I n d e p e n d e n t of t h i s ground, t h e a t t o r n e y

g e n e r a l i s g i v e n t h e a u t h o r i t y under s e c t i o n 15-30-322, MCA,

t o r e c o v e r t h e amount of any t a x e s , p e n a l t i e s and i n t e r e s t
under t h e revenue l a w s o f t h i s S t a t e . Here, t h e f i l e re-

f l e c t s t h a t Ms. Smoyer and M r . Corcoran w e r e n o t o n l y a p p o i n t e d
by Lewis and Clark County Attorney Charles Gravely as deputy

county attorneys, but were also appointed by Attorney General
Mike Greely as assistant attorney generals. That being the
case, they had lawful authority to prosecute the matter
here.
Defendant's fifth issue is whether the court erred in
denying his motion for substitution of judge. Defendant
filed an affidavit of disqualification on October 11, 1977,
in which he alleged that the Honorable Gordon R. Bennett was
biased and prejudiced. The filing of the affidavit came
approximately two months after the information was filed.
The affidavit was denied without a hearing on October 13,
1977, because it was not filed, pursuant to a rule of this
Court, within ten days of the time Judge Bennett assumed
jurisdiction of the case. Defendant argues that the motion
for disqualification should have been granted because Judge
Bennett had a duty to inform defendant of this Court's rule
concerning the disqualification and substitution of judges.
That rule is codified in section 3-1-801, MCA, and provides
in pertinent part:
". . . Whenevera judge is assigned a case for
10 consecutive days and the attorneys of record
on both sides have knowledge of the assignment
for that period of time, and if during this time
no motion for substitution of a judge is filed
against him, all rights to move for substitution
of a judge shall be deemed waived by all parties
unless the presiding judge disqualified himself
thereafter in which case the right to move for
substitution of a new judge is reinstated and
the 10 day period starts running anew . .".
Under the above rule, if the ten-day period does not
expire, a party in a criminal case is automatically entitled
to one substitution of a judge. When the period expires,
however, a judge may only be disqualified for cause under
paragraph 6 of section 3-1-801, MCA, which provides:
 "Whenever a party to any proceeding in any court
makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit
that a judge or justice of the peace, before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge or justice of the
peace shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge or justice of the peace shall be
assigned to hear such disqualification proceeding
by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, or by
a district judge, if the affidavit is against a
justice of the peace, police or municipal court
judge. The affidavit shall state the facts and
the reasons for the belief that bias or preju-
dice exists, and shall be filed not less than
20 days before the original date of trial, or
good cause shall be shown for failure to file
it within such time. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record stating
that it is made in good faith."
Here, defendant chose to act as his own counsel. There
was no duty on the part of Judge Bennett to constantly keep
in touch with defendant during the preparation of this case
and to tell him what the law is concerning disqualifications.
Defendant appeared before Judge Bennett on August 18, 1977,
for his initial appearance. He had filed many pleadings
concerning venue which had been disposed of in Judge Bennett's
court. He was well aware that Judge Bennett was presiding
and failed to challenge him within the proper time set
forth. See In re Petition of Larocque (1961), 139 Mont.
405, 406, 365 P.2d 950; State v. Parker (1973), 161 Mont.
394, 397, 506 P.2d 850. Judge Bennett properly denied the
affidavit because it was not timely filed. Paragraph 6 of
section 3-1-801, MCA, does not apply because the affidavit
was not accompanied by a certificate of good faith.
Defendant's sixth issue is whether the District Court
erred in limiting defendant's voir dire examination of the
jury. Prior to voir dire, the State sought, through a
motion in limine, to restrict defendant from inquiring into
the religious beliefs of the prospective jurors. In connec-

tion with the motion, the court asked the following questions:
 "THE COURT: D you i n t e n d i n any way t o b r i n g
o
up t h e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of t h e p r o s p e c t i v e
j u r o r s and t h e w i t n e s s e s i n t h i s c a s e ?

"MR. PONCELET: I w i l l n o t b r i n g up t h e s e c u l a r
b e l i e f s of t h e j u r o r s , b u t , I w i l l b r i n g up,
under t h e F i r s t Amendment of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e freedom o f b e l i e f and
how you want t o b e l i e v e , and how you f e e l w i t h
respect t o religion.

"THE COURT: T h a t ' s f i n e , b u t k e e p p e o p l e ' s secu-
l a r b e l i e f s o u t o f it. A r e you w i l l i n g t o do
that?

"MR. PONCELET: Yes."

I t h a s l o n g been h e l d i n t h i s s t a t e and o t h e r j u r i s d i c -

t i o n s t h a t a t r i a l judge h a s wide d i s c r e t i o n i n c o n d u c t i n g

voir dire. See A l d r i d g e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 283 U.S.

308, 5 1 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054; S t a t e v . A l l i s o n ( 1 9 4 8 ) ,

122 Mont. 120, 199 P.2d 279; S t a t e e x r e l . S t e p h e n s v .

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 22, 27, 550 P.2d 385. We

find t h a t the t r i a l court here properly limited inquiry i n t o

t h e j u r o r s ' b e l i e f i n God r a t h e r t h a n d e t a i l e d i n q u i r i e s

i n t o the prospective jurors' secular beliefs. I n Yarborough

v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 230 F.2d 56, c e r t . d e n i e d 351 U.S.

969, t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t p r o s e c u t e d f o r t a x

e v a s i o n was n o t e n t i t l e d t o v o i r d i r e j u r o r s on t h e i r r e l i -

gious b e l i e f s , S e e a l s o , 54 A.L.R.2d 1204; United S t a t e s v .

Mallinowski (Penn. 1 9 7 2 ) , 347 F.Supp. 347, 355, a f f ' d (3rd

Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) , 472 F.2d 850, c e r t . d e n i e d 4 1 1 U.S. 970. Given

t h e wide d i s c r e t i o n a l l o w e d a t r i a l judge, t h e l a c k of

r e l e v a n c y of r e l i g i o n t o t h e i s s u e s a t b a r , and t h e p e r -

mitted inquiry i n t o the jurors' g e n e r a l b e l i e f i n God,

defendant's contention i s without merit.

D e f e n d a n t ' s n e x t i s s u e i s whether t h e c o u r t committed

e r r o r i n denying t h e t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s ,

W i l l i a m Koerner. Koerner w a s o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t a s a n
e x p e r t w i t n e s s on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . K o e r n e r ' s background
was t h a t h e had t a u g h t c l a s s e s on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u -

t i o n and United S t a t e s Government i n p u b l i c s c h o o l s and t h e

m i l i t a r y and t h a t h e had a d v i s e d two l e g i s l a t o r s a b o u t

amendments t o be o f f e r e d and c o u n s e l e d them i n g e n e r a l

b e f o r e coming t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .

When d e f e n d a n t had e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n t o o f f e r

Koerner as a n e x p e r t w i t n e s s and t h e n proceeded t o q u e s t i o n

him, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o l l o q u y o c c u r r e d between d e f e n d a n t and

the court:

"MR. PONCELET: Your honor, t h i s p e r s o n h e r e i s
a n e x p e r t on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and h e knows i t
f r o n t w a r d s and backwards.

"THE COURT: H e i s a n e x p e r t on t h e c o n s t i t u -
tional law. The j u r y i s n o t concerned w i t h t h e
views on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . The j u r y i s
concerned w i t h t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case. T h a t i s
what t h e y must h e a r .

"THE COURT: Y e s , W e w i l l s u b m i t t h e law t o
t h e j u r y when t h e t i m e comes, and i f you are
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e way w e s u b m i t t h e law,
you have your a p p e a l .

"THE COURT: The j u r y w i l l g e t t h e l a w , t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w , as w e l l a s t h e s t a t u t o r y
law, from t h e C o u r t . You may s u b m i t any i d e a s
t h a t you have on t h e l a w t o t h e C o u r t a t t h e
t i m e t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y are b e i n g
s e t t l e d , b u t w e d o n ' t g e t t h e law from t h e tes-
timony o f w i t n e s s e s . "

Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t w a s

improper and t h a t h e s h o u l d have been a l l o w e d h i s r i g h t t o

p r e s e n t such e x p e r t testimony. W e f i n d , however, that the

t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g was c o r r e c t . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and

a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n was a q u e s t i o n

o f law and n o t a f a c t i n i s s u e . I t was a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o

b e made by t h e t r i a l judge w i t h i n h i s s t a t u t o r y powers.
I n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on t h e l a w n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e j u r y ' s

r e n d e r i n g of a v e r d i c t i n a c r i m i n a l case i s a d u t y w i t h i n

t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o v i n c e o f t h e t r i a l judge. S e c t i o n s 26-1-

201 and 4 6 - 1 6 - 4 0 1 ( 4 ) ( b ) , MCA. The r u l i n g was p r o p e r and d i d

n o t p r e j u d i c e t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of defendant. See,

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . A f f l e r b a c h ( h O t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 547 F.2d 522,

524, where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :

"The d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e income
t a x l a w s n o r t h e g e n e r a l f i s c a l system o f t h e
government, and he a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e s t h i s
strongly, b u t t h i s i s not a defense."

The n e x t i s s u e c o n c e r n s whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n

d e n y i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a change of venue. We first

note, i n connection with t h e i s s u e , t h a t defendant relies

h e r e on a p o r t i o n o f t h e lower c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s f o r which a

t r a n s c r i p t h a s n o t been s u b m i t t e d t o u s . The S t a t e p o i n t s

o u t t h a t it i s an a p p e l l a n t ' s duty t o o r d e r t h e e n t i r e

t r a n s c r i p t f o r t h e p r o c e e d i n g s and a r g u e s t h a t t h e matter i s

n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e u s and t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d

upon a p p e a l . S e c t i o n 46-20-302, MCA. However, i n view of

t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d p r o se i n t h i s m a t t e r , w e

w i l l summarily h a n d l e t h e m a t t e r by n o t i n g t h a t w e f i n d no
e r r o r here. Venue p r o p e r l y l i e s i n L e w i s and C l a r k County,

t h e p l a c e where t h e t a x r e t u r n s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o be f i l e d by

law.

Under s e c t i o n 15-30-144, MCA, income t a x r e t u r n s are

r e q u i r e d t o be f i l e d w i t h t h e Department of Revenue. The

Department, i n t u r n , i s r e q u i r e d by l a w t o be l o c a t e d i n

Helena, Montana. S e c t i o n 2 - 1 5 - 1 1 2 ( 1 ) ( i ) , MCA. Consequently,

t h e o f f e n s e of f a i l i n g t o f i l e a r e t u r n o r p r o v i d e informa-

t i o n as s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 15-30-321(3), MCA, i s committed

i n Lewis and C l a r k County, where Helena i s l o c a t e d . There-
fore venue properly lies in Lewis and Clark County. Section
46-3-101(1), MCA, provides that, in all criminal prosecu-
tions, trial shall be in the county where the offense was
committed unless otherwise provided by law.
Defendant's next two issues concern whether the trial
court erred in denying defendant's instructions. In parti-
cular, we are concerned with the issues of whether defen-
dant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege was a
proper defense to the charges contained in the Information
and whether the court erred in not giving an instruction on
defendant's failure to testify.
As previously noted, defendant submitted signed income
tax returns to the Department of Revenue with asterisks
inserted on several lines, accompanied with a blanket asser-
tion that he did not have to supply any further information
under his Fifth Amendment right. Under well-established
precedent, these returns were not properly filed returns as
provided by law, and the State, therefore, prosecuted the
defendant for failure to provide proper returns. Defendant

contends, nevertheless, that the assertion of his Fifth
Amendment privilege was a proper defense.
It is well established that the blanket assertion of
privilege against self-incrimination in a return is not a
proper defense to a prosecution for failure to file a com-
plete return. United States v. Ming (7th Cir. 1972), 466
F.2d 1000, cert. denied 409 U.S. 915, reh. denied 409 U.S.
1051; United States v. Afflerbach (10th Cir. 1976), 547 F.2d
522; United States v. Silkman (8th Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d

1218; United States v. Johnson (5th Cir. 1978), 577 F.2d
1304. There is no constitutional privilege granting an
i n d i v i d u a l t h e r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o answer a l l q u e s t i o n s on a n

income t a x r e t u r n . Nor c a n t h e broad r e f u s a l t o s u p p l y

i n f o r m a t i o n o r answer q u e s t i o n s be a p r o p e r d e f e n s e r a i s e d

a t trial. The j u r y c a n n o t be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a b l a n k e t

a s s e r t i o n of t h e F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e i s a d e f e n s e

e n t i t l i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a complete a c q u i t t a l of t h e

charges. I n Johnson, 577 F.2d a t 1310, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :

"Johnson c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d
i n t h e c o u r s e of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g
h i s c l a i m o f p r i v i l e g e under t h e F i f t h Amend-
ment on h i s f e d e r a l income t a x r e t u r n . H e rea-
s o n s , i n e f f e c t , t h a t a good f a i t h b l a n k e t c l a i m
o f t h e F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a u t o m a t i c a l l y
and c o m p l e t e l y i n s u l a t e s a t a x p a y e r from p r o s e -
c u t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o f i l e a r e t u r n , and t h e
j u r y s h o u l d have been s o i n s t r u c t e d . T h i s rea-
s o n i n g was r e j e c t e d o v e r f i f t y y e a r s ago when a
unanimous Supreme C o u r t , t h r o u g h M r . J u s t i c e
Holmes, h e l d a t a x p a y e r ' c o u l d n o t draw a con-
j u r e r ' s c i r c l e around t h e whole m a t t e r by h i s
own d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t o w r i t e any word upon t h e
g o v e r n m e n t ' s b l a n k would b r i n g him i n t o danger
of t h e l a w . ' [ C i t a t i o n omitted. 1

"Johnson e r r s i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s
r i g h t s under t h e F i f t h Amendment i n t h e c o n t e x t
of income t a x laws. He c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s p r i -
v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n p e r m i t s him
t o ' s t a n d mute' and r e f u s e t o c o o p e r a t e a t a l l
i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s t a x l i a b i l i t y . He
a r g u e s t h a t he h a s a p r i v i l e g e , under t h e F i f t h
Amendment, t o r e f u s e t o d i s c l o s e any income
i n f o r m a t i o n s i n c e h e c l a i m s t h a t some of h i s
income w a s d e r i v e d from i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s .
T h e r e f o r e , h e would have u s c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e
' r e t u r n ' which h e s u p p l i e d i n 1970 w a s p r o p e r
i n i t s b l a n k e t a s s e r t i o n of t h e F i f t h Amendment.
He a l s o seems t o j u s t i f y - h i s c o m p l e t e f a i l u r e t o
f i l e i n 1971 under t h e F i f t h Amendment. In
a d d i t i o n , h e a r g u e s t h a t he may f o r e v e r r e f u s e
t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e c o u r t s and t h e IRS i n
t h i s m a t t e r , and h i s a s s e r t i o n of t h e p r i v i l e g e
c a n n o t be t e s t e d o r q u e s t i o n e d . Under w e l l
e s t a b l i s h e d p r e c e d e n t s , Johnson i s wrong i n
these contentions."

T h i s i s n o t t o s a y , however, t h a t t h e F i f t h Amendment

p r i v i l e g e , a s s e r t e d p r o p e r l y , may n o t p r o t e c t t h e e r r o n e o u s

t a x p a y e r by p r o v i d i n g a d e f e n s e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i f t h e
jury finds that the claim, though erroneous, was made in
good faith. A proper assertion of the privilege is clearly,

however, not a blanket assertion:
"Three principles may be distilled from the
authorities: (1) the privilege must be claimed
specifically in response to particular ques-
tions, not merely in a blanket refusal to fur-
nish any information; (2) the claim is to be
reviewed by a judicial officer who determines
whether the information sought would tend to
incriminate; (3) the witness or defendant him-
self is not the final arbiter of whether or not
the information sought would tend to incrimi-
nate. [Citations omitted.]" Johnson, 577 F.2d
at 1311.
Defendant in this case offered to no one any particular
reason for his assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege. In
his tax return, there was no indication as to what source of
income he was claiming that privilege. Defendant did not,
for example, attempt to comply with the law and list his
alleged ill-gotten gains as "miscellaneous" income. See
Johnson, supra. Defendant did not indicate anything more on
his tax return than a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amend-
ment right to the Department of Revenue. Nor did he claim
the privilege in response to particular questions before the
judge in chambers at trial, who could have decided if the
privilege was applicable. See Johnson, supra; United States
v. Wade (1978), 42 AFTR2d 78-6295. Nor did he claim that
the privilege was related to another prosecution for a
criminal offense, or even the possibility of criminal prose-
cution. See Garner v. United States (1976), 424 U.S. 648,
96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370. Rather, there was simply a
broad or blanket assertion of the privilege.
Defendant's assertion was much like a defendant refus-
ing to give his name at trial, implying that, for some
reason, to release such information, would somehow incrimi-
nate him or subject him to criminal prosecution. It vio-
l a t e s common s e n s e t o s a y t h a t a n a s s e r t i o n of t h i s k i n d

would be a d e f e n s e which would c o m p l e t e l y i n s u l a t e a n i n d i -

v i d u a l from c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n . To have a s s e r t e d t h e

p r i v i l e g e p r o p e r l y , d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d have f o l l o w e d t h e

g u i d e l i n e s o f Wade and Johnson. The t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have

then i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury accordingly. Under t h e circum-

s t a n c e s i n which t h e p r i v i l e g e w a s a s s e r t e d h e r e , however,

w e cannot say t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d improperly.

Defendant a l s o s u b m i t s t h a t i t was e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t

t o deny s e v e r a l o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . Defendant s u b m i t t e d

approximately f o r t y - e i g h t i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e t r i a l court,

d e a l i n g w i t h e v e r y t h i n g from what he t h o u g h t t h e C o n s t i t u -

t i o n s a i d t o the a c t u a l d i r e c t i o n t o the jury t h a t they

c o u l d d i s r e g a r d t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s and a c q u i t him

d e s p i t e t h e law g i v e n . Many o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s proposed by

the i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e i r r e l e v a n t , and t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y

r e f u s e d them. Two i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t and i l l u s t r a t e

t h e problem p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t :

" D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 2 . You
a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of Inde-
pendence r e a d s i n p a r t : ' H e ( t h e King of Great
B r i t a i n ) h a s e r e c t e d a m u l t i t u d e of N e w O f f i c e s ,
and s e n t h i t h e r s w a r m s of O f f i c e r s t o h a r a s s
o u r p e o p l e and s e t o u t t h e i r s u b s t a n c e . '

" D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 3 . You
a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of Inde-
pendence r e a d s i n p a r t : ' H e ( t h e King of G r e a t
B r i t a i n ) h a s made J u d g e s d e p e n d e n t on h i s W i l l
a l o n e , f o r t h e t e n u r e o f t h e i r o f f i c e s , and t h e
amount and payment of t h e i r s a l a r i e s . ' "

Since the i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e i r r e l e v a n t o r d i d not
a c c u r a t e l y s t a t e t h e law, w e f i n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s

r e f u s a l of defendant's i n s t r u c t i o n s w a s proper.

The l a s t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i s whether d e f e n d a n t , i n

p r o c e e d i n g p r o se, i s e n t i t l e d t o have t h e r u l e s and p r o c e -
dures of law applied less strictly against him. To discuss
this issue in its full context, it is necessary to review
briefly the fact situation leading up to and throughout this
case. Defendant in this case chose to act as counsel on his
own behalf. Defendant was not at any time an indigent
person entitling him to court-appointed counsel. Throughout
the periods for which he was charged, he earned over $10,000
annually. He chose to represent and defend himself, with
the advice and help of other tax protestants and with the
knowledge that the State would be represented by skilled
counsel. The trial judge took numerous occasions to remind
him of the consequences of his decision, and the record is
replete with instances where the court gave him the benefit
of rulings that could well have been decided otherwise.
Defendant was further allowed full argument privileges and
broad cross-examination. Upon some occasions, defendant's
cross-examination became pure argument as to the theory of
his own defense. Until the case was closed, every effort
was made to assist defendant in submitting his case to the
jury .
Several recent opinions of the United States Supreme
Court have considered the issue and problems resulting from
pro se counsel. In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S.
806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, Mr. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the majority in a pro se case where the trial
court had forced appellant to take state-appointed counsel,
noted at 834:
"The right to defend is personal. The defendant,
and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of his conviction. It is
the defendant, therefore, who must be free per-
sonally to decide whether in his particular case
counsel is to his advantage. And although he
may conduct his own defense ultimately to his
 own d e t r i m e n t , h i s c h o i c e must be honored o u t
o f ' t h a t r e s p e c t f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l which i s
t h e l i f e b l o o d of t h e l a w . ' [Citation omitted.]

"When a n a c c u s e d manages h i s own d e f e n s e , he re-
l i n q u i s h e s , a s a p u r e l y f a c t u a l m a t t e r , many of
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t s associated with the
r i g h t t o counsel. For t h i s r e a s o n , i n o r d e r t o
r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f , t h e a c c u s e d must 'knowingly
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y f o r e g o t h o s e r e l i n q u i s h e d bene-
fits.' [Citation omitted.]"

J u s t i c e Blackman, n o t i n g t h a t , i n h i s o p i n i o n , no

amount of p r o se p l e a d i n g c a n c u r e t h e i n j u r y t o s o c i e t y of

an u n j u s t r e s u l t , b u t a " j u s t r e s u l t s h o u l d p r o v e t o be a n

e f f e c t i v e bomb f o r any f r u s t r a t e d p r o se d e f e n d a n t , " c l o s e d

h i s d i s s e n t a s follows:

" I f t h e r e i s any t r u t h t o t h e o l d p r o v e r b t h a t
' o n e who i s h i s own lawyer h a s a f o o l f o r a
c l i e n t ' t h e C o u r t by i t s o p i n i o n t o d a y now
bestows a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t on one t o make
a f o o l of h i m s e l f . " F a r e t t a , 422 U.S. a t 852.

W f i n d , a s i n F a r e t t a , t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who e l e c t s t o
e

r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f c a n n o t complain on a p p e a l t h a t t h e q u a l i t y

o f h i s own d e f e n s e a c t e d t o h i s d e t r i m e n t by n o t amounting

t o e f f e c t i v e counsel. H e r e , d e f e n d a n t knowingly and i n t e l -

l i g e n t l y r e l i n q u i s h e d h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l and proceeded

w i t h h i s d e f e n s e i n h i s own b e h a l f . He c a n n o t now complain

t h a t r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e s and law s h o u l d be a p p l i e d less

s t r i c t l y a g a i n s t him.

The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and

remanded f o r a new t r i a l .

W e concur:

9,%&M
n
E h i e f Justice