No. 14956
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
JAY F. OWEN,
Petitioner and Respondent,
IDALENE OWEN, a/k/a
IDALENE L. OWEN,
Respondent and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Berger, Anderson,Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana
For Respondent :
William F. Meisburger, Forsyth, Montana
Submitted on briefs: February 27, 1980
Decided:
APR I - f9@
!jT!-
L C
5
.
- - ?.C!:?
*
Filed: P
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e
Rosebud County D i s t r i c t C o u r t , S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
d i s p o s i n g of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s .
The p a r t i e s h e r e i n w e r e m a r r i e d on November 30, 1948.
A t t h e t i m e of t h e m a r r i a g e t h e husband owned a r a n c h n e a r
Ashland, Montana. T h i s r a n c h was s o l d a f t e r t h e p a r t i e s '
m a r r i a g e and t h e p r o c e e d s used t o a c q u i r e t h e p a r t i e s ' c u r -
r e n t r a n c h p r o p e r t y from t h e w i f e ' s p a r e n t s . The r a n c h was
purchased i n t h e j o i n t names of t h e p a r t i e s i n 1949. During
t h e m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s worked t o g e t h e r on t h i s r a n c h . In
1952 a n a d d i t i o n a l 172 a c r e s was p u r c h a s e d a s a n a d d i t i o n t o
t h e ranch. A house was b u i l t on t h i s p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e
s a m e year.
I n March 1978 r e s p o n d e n t husband p e t i t i o n e d f o r d i s s o l u -
t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e . The d i s s o l u t i o n w a s g r a n t e d w i t h o u t
c o n t e s t , b u t t h e District Court i n i t s decree reserved t h e
property division f o r l a t e r adjudication. T r i a l was h e l d
on t h i s m a t t e r on A p r i l 1 6 , 1979. A f t e r making f i n d i n g s of
f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d
judgment on May 25, 1979, e f f e c t i v e l y r e n d e r i n g a 60/40
p e r c e n t s p l i t o f t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y between
t h e husband and w i f e . From t h i s judgment t h e w i f e a p p e a l s .
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r r e v i e w a r e a s
follows :
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n i t s f i n d i n g s and
c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e husband had c o n t r i b u t e d 60 p e r c e n t and
t h e w i f e 40 p e r c e n t t o t h e accumulated m a r i t a l a s s e t s ?
2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by n o t g i v i n g s u f f i c i e n t
w e i g h t t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of a p p e l l a n t ?
3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by a b u s i n g i t s d i s c r e -
t i o n i n c o n c l u d i n g , a s a m a t t e r o f law, t h e method o f p u r -
c h a s e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , o r i n f a i l i n g t o a l l o w a p p e l l a n t
t h e b e n e f i t of m e e t i n g a good f a i t h p a r t y p u r c h a s e o f f e r ?
4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r
r e s p o n d e n t ' s d i s s i p a t i o n of a s s e t s ?
5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o award a t -
torney f e e s t o appellant?
The s u b s t a n c e of t h i s a p p e a l i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l
estate.
" I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a d i s t r i c t
c o u r t has f a r reaching d i s c r e t i o n i n resolving
p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s and i t s judgment w i l l n o t
be a l t e r e d u n l e s s a c l e a r a b u s e o f t h a t d i s c r e -
t i o n i s shown. . . The c r i t e r i a f o r r e v i e w i n g
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i s : Did t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n
a c t a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment of c o n s c i e n -
t i o u s judgment, o r exceed t h e bounds of r e a s o n
i n view of a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " (Citations
omitted.) Z e l l v. Z e l l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 496,
570 P.2d 33, 35.
A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t i t w a s a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n
f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o n l y award h e r 4 0 p e r c e n t of t h e
m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y i n s t e a d of t h e o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t she sought.
She c o n t e n d s t h a t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a homemaker, a s w e l l
a s r a n c h hand and handy p e r s o n , when c o u p l e d w i t h r e s p o n -
d e n t ' s d i s s i p a t i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s , e n t i t l e h e r t o a 50
p e r c e n t s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y .
"Although t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y d i v i d e
t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t
mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. . . Section
40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and it v e s t s a good d e a l
of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ... We
have s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of
t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t e a c h c a s e must be looked a t
i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h a n e y e t o i t s u n i q u e circum-
stances. .. " ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) I n R e Mar-
r i a g e of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) r Mont. - 598
P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525.
The d u t y of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e
s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a and e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e m a r i t a l
assets. To a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , i t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e d u r a t i o n
of t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e a g e , o c c u p a t i o n , amount and s o u r c e s
o f income, v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , e m p l o y a b i l i t y , e s t a t e , and
t h e l i a b i l i t i e s and needs o f e a c h p a r t y . I n R e M a r r i a g e of
Aanenson, s u p r a , 598 P.2d a t 1123.
W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e r e properly followed
t h e d i c t a t e s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The f i n d i n g s of a
t r i a l judge w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l where t h e y a r e
based on s u b s t a n t i a l though c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , u n l e s s
t h e r e i s a c l e a r p r e p o n d e r a n c e of e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t such
findings. Cameron v . Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. , 587
P.2d 939, 35 S t - R e p . 1723. Here, t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s -
t r i c t C o u r t a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and t h e e v i -
dence d o e s n o t p r e p o n d e r a t e a g a i n s t them. The D i s t r i c t
Court, t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n apportion-
ing the marital estate.
Appellant's next contention e s s e n t i a l l y questions t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n and method of p u r c h a s e of t h e
m a r i t a l property. A p p e l l a n t s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e and m a i n t a i n
t h e f a m i l y r a n c h and s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s approved
t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f a l l o w i n g h e r t o do s o , most r e c e n t l y i n
I n R e M a r r i a g e of Jacobson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , ,
- Mont. - 600 P.2d
1183, 36 s t . ~ e p . 1773. She a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y and v a l u a t i o n t h e r e o f
p r e v e n t h e r from p u r c h a s i n g t h e r a n c h .
A c o u r t i n d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e m a r r i a g e
i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of a l l p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d
during t h e marriage. Kruse v . Kruse ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. I
586 P.2d 294, 298, 35 St.Rep. 1502. The ~ i s t r i c c o u r t d i d
t
p r e c i s e l y t h a t here. I t accepted testimony, a l b e i t c o n f l i c t -
i n g , a s t o t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y b e f o r e conclud-
i n g t h e p r o p e r t y was w o r t h $566,200. We find that this
procedure w a s not unreasonable.
A p p e l l a n t i s c o r r e c t t h a t Montana cases have a c c e p t e d
t h e p r e m i s e t h a t a r a n c h o r farm s h o u l d be k e p t i n t a c t and
operated a s a u n i t . This policy i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e follow-
i n g d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of farming and ranch-
i n g property: I n R e M a r r i a g e of J a c o b s o n , s u p r a ; I n Re Mar-
r i a g e of Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep.
1733; B i e g a l k e v. B i e g a l k e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d
987; Hunnewell v . Hunnewell ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 125, 500 P.2d
" I t must be remembered t h a t t h e p r i m a r y r i g h t
t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n d i s p o s i n g of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y
i s t h e r i g h t of e a c h p a r t y t o a n e q u i t a b l e appor-
t i o n m e n t o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . While i t i s
t h e p o l i c y o f t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e t o a v o i d
s p l i t t i n g up a r a n c h o r f o r c i n g i t s s a l e where
t h e r e i s any r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t p o l i c y ,
however commendable, c a n n o t be used t o o v e r r i d e
[a p a r t y ' s ] r i g h t t o an e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e
m a r i t a l property." I n R e M a r r i a g e of J a c o b s o n ,
s u p r a , 600 P.2d a t 1187-88.
I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e b o t h p a r t i e s were g i v e n t h e o p t i o n
t o buy t h e o t h e r ' s r e s p e c t i v e s h a r e of t h e r a n c h p r o v i d e d
t h a t t h e r i g h t be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n s i x months of t h e judgment.
O t h e r t h a n t h i s c o n d i t i o n , i t was l e f t up t o t h e p a r t i e s t o
r e a c h t h e i r own t e r m s on a p u r c h a s e . W e c a n f i n d no a b u s e
of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s methods.
The f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o award h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s .
S e c t i o n 40-4-110, MCA, provides:
"The c o u r t from t i m e t o t i m e , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g
t h e f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s of b o t h p a r t i e s , may
o r d e r a p a r t y t o pay a r e a s o n a b l e amount f o r
t h e c o s t t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y of m a i n t a i n i n g o r
defending any proceeding under Chapters 1 and 4
of this title and for attorney's fees, including
sums for legal services rendered and costs in-
curred prior to the commencement of the proceed-
ing or after entry of judgment .. ."
Here the District Court, after considering the financial
resources of both parties, determined that each should bear
their own legal costs. It was not an abuse of discretion to
do so.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justice db y -
We concur:
Chief ~usti%e
w
Q 0.
& Justices