No. 14879
IN THE SUPREFIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
MALLORY D. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS .
CHRISTENE HARVEY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Larsen and Neill, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondents:
Thomas E. Boland, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on briefs: January 16, 1980
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Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
his i s an a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n of r e a l p r o p e r t y b r o u g h t
by M a l l o r y D. Lawrence. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e E i g h t h
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Judge H. William Coder p r e s i d i n g , d e n i e d
p l a i n t i f f ' s p r a y e r f o r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e i n a judgment d a t e d
June 1 2 , 1979. T h i s judgment o r d e r e d t h e p l a i n t i f f t o q u i t -
c l a i m h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l defen-
d a n t s upon t h e i r payment t o him o f $ 3 7 9 . 1 5 , t h e s m s e t by
u
t h e D i s t r i c t Court as representing h i s equity. The judgment
from which he now a p p e a l s f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d p l a i n t i f f M a l l o r y
D. Lawrence t o pay d e f e n d a n t s ' a t t o r n e y s f e e s and c o s t s .
The p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i s a s i n g l e f a m i l y r e s i d e n c e
l o c a t e d on a s t a n d a r d c i t y l o t i n G r e a t F a l l s . By agreement
of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e property i s n o t s u b j e c t t o a c t u a l p a r t i -
t i o n , and t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s prayed f o r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e and
a d i v i s i o n of t h e p r o c e e d s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n t e r e s t s d e t e r -
mined by t h e C o u r t . The d e f e n d a n t F i r s t F e d e r a l S a v i n g s and
Loan A s s o c i a t i o n h o l d s a f i r s t mortgage on t h e p r o p e r t y .
The p r i o r i t y of i t s l i e n i s conceded by a l l p a r t i e s a n d , by
s t i p u l a t i o n , it d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e s e proceedings.
The f i v e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e c h i l d r e n o f p l a i n t i f f
M a l l o r y D. Lawrence by h i s former w i f e , Mary K. Lawrence.
The a p p e l l a n t l e f t h i s f a m i l y and t h e f a m i l y home i n
August 1968 and t h e r e a f t e r r e s i d e d i n a n o t h e r Montana c i t y .
Mary K . Lawrence f i l e d a n a c t i o n f o r s e p a r a t e maintenance
and c h i l d s u p p o r t on August 5 , 1968, and a f t e r a show c a u s e
h e a r i n g on A p r i l 3 , 1969, a p p e l l a n t was o r d e r e d t o pay $225
p e r month c h i l d s u p p o r t t o t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t pending
e n t r y of a decree.
The p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o t h i s l i t i g a t i o n w a s t h e f a m i l y
home of M a l l o r y D. Lawrence and Mary K . Lawrence p r i o r t o
t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n and d i v o r c e . I n the divorce decree dated
August 6 , 1970, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge R . J . Nelson s e t
a s i d e t h e f a m i l y home, t o g e t h e r w i t h f u r n i s h i n g s and f i x -
t u r e s , f o r t h e u s e and b e n e f i t o f Mary K . Lawrence and t h e
minor c h i l d r e n " u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t . " In
a d d i t i o n t o awarding t h e u s e of t h e f a m i l y home t o Mary K .
Lawrence and t h e f o u r minor c h i l d r e n ( t h e e l d e s t c h i l d had
a l r e a d y a t t a i n e d t h e a g e of m a j o r i t y ) , t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e
o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t t o pay $225 p e r month t o t h e c l e r k o f
c o u r t " a s and f o r t h e s u p p o r t of t h e s a i d minor c h i l d r e n
A p p e l l a n t made t h e r e q u i r e d payments t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y
1975, when t h e y o u n g e s t o f t h e c h i l d r e n a t t a i n e d t h e a g e o f
majority. L a t e r , on December 11, 1975, he p e t i t i o n e d t h e
divorce c o u r t f o r an o r d e r determining t h e r e s p e c t i v e
i n t e r e s t s of h i m s e l f and h i s former s p o u s e i n t h e p r o p e r t y .
A h e a r i n g w a s h e l d on t h i s p e t i t i o n on J a n u a r y 8, 1976, b u t
t h e D i s t r i c t Judge made no d e c i s i o n on t h e p e t i t i o n , d e s p i t e
t h e e f f o r t s of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l t o o b t a i n a r u l i n g . Mary
K. Lawrence d i s c o v e r e d t h a t s h e had t e r m i n a l c a n c e r and
quitclaimed her i n t e r e s t i n the property equally t o t h e f i v e
c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e defendants-respondents i n t h i s
a c t i o n , i n a deed d a t e d and r e c o r d e d May 5 , 1976. She d i e d
i n 1977. D i s t r i c t Judge R . J . Nelson had l e f t t h e bench a t
t h e end o f 1976 w i t h o u t r u l i n g on a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n .
M a l l o r y D. Lawrence s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n f o r
a p a r t i t i o n of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y on F e b r u a r y 9 , 1978. The
m a t t e r w a s h e a r d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on A p r i l 20, 1979 and
t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law, and judg-
ment w e r e e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of t h e d e f e n d a n t s on J u n e 1 2 ,
1979.
The p r o p e r t y w a s o r i g i n a l l y a c q u i r e d i n 1958 by t h e ap-
p e l l a n t and Mary K. Lawrence as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h a r i g h t
of survivorship. The p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f $15,900 was s a t i s -
f i e d by t h e assumption of a n e x i s t i n g l o a n i n t h e amount o f
$11,750 and by a downpayment of $4,150. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
found t h e s o u r c e of t h a t downpayment t o be $3,029.91 i n
j o i n t e q u i t y from t h e s a l e o f a p r e v i o u s f a m i l y home i n
M i s s o u l a and a $2,500 l o a n from a p p e l l a n t ' s f a t h e r i n t h e
form of a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s i g n e d by b o t h a p p e l l a n t and Mary
K. Lawrence. An u n s p e c i f i e d p o r t i o n of t h i s n o t e w a s p a i d
and t h e remainder of t h e o b l i g a t i o n was c a n c e l l e d a f t e r t h e
1970 d i v o r c e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t made t h e f u r t h e r f i n d i n g
t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l amount of p r i n c i p a l owing on t h e mortgage
assumed by M a l l o r y D. Lawrence and Mary K . Lawrence had been
reduced by $3,608.30 a s of t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e . Based on
t h e foregoing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined a p p e l l a n t ' s
i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y t o be one-half o f t h e downpayment
p l u s one-half o f t h e e q u i t y accumulated d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e :
a t o t a l of $3,879.15. A p p e l l a n t was o r d e r e d t o q u i t c l a i m
h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property t o t h e individual defendants
upon t h e i r payment t o him o f t h a t sum.
Four i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s a p p e a l :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by
f a i l i n g t o order a p a r t i t i o n sale?
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by
f a i l i n g t o c r e d i t a p p e l l a n t with a contribution t o t h e
e q u i t y i n t h e home f o r t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments he made
a f t e r t h e d a t e of d i v o r c e ?
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by
f a i l i n g t o give the appellant c r e d i t f o r a pro-rata share of
t h e p r o p e r t y ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n i n v a l u e by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e
property a t i t s real market value?
4. Whether M a l l o r y D. Lawrence i s e s t o p p e d from a s -
s e r t i n g any i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y beyond t h a t i n t e r e s t
which he had as o f t h e d a t e o f t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e ?
I t i s a common p r a c t i c e i n cases i n v o l v i n g a d i s s o l u -
t i o n of marriage f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Courts t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e
f a m i l y home b e s e t a s i d e d u r i n g t h e m i n o r i t i e s of t h e c h i l -
d r e n f o r t h e i r u s e and b e n e f i t and f o r t h a t o f t h e i r mother
as well. It i s a l s o usual i n such c a s e s f o r t h e c o u r t s t o
make some p r o v i s i o n i n t h e d e c r e e f o r a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f
t h e h o u s e , which i s u s u a l l y t h e f a m i l y ' s o n l y major a s s e t ,
a f t e r t h e c h i l d r e n have r e a c h e d t h e i r m a j o r i t i e s and t h e
husband's o b l i g a t i o n t o support has ceased. The problem i n
t h i s c a s e arises because t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n f a i l e d t o
make a n u l t i m a t e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e f a m i l y home, and m e r e l y
s e t i t a s i d e f o r t h e u s e and b e n e f i t o f t h e minor c h i l d r e n
and t h e i r mother " u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t . " No
s u c h o r d e r was f o r t h c o m i n g p r i o r t o t h e judgment o f t h e
District Court i n t h e present action, although the a p p e l l a n t
had f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e d e c r e e o f
d i s s o l u t i o n on December 11, 1975, and r e p e a t e d l y a t t e m p t e d
t o o b t a i n a r u l i n g on t h a t p e t i t i o n .
S u b s e q u e n t l y , M a l l o r y D. Lawrence b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n
f o r a p a r t i t i o n of t h e real property, requesting a p a r t i t i o n
s a l e . The f i r s t i s s u e t o b e r e s o l v e d i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o o r d e r a
partition sale.
During p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d , on
agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , t h a t a s a m a t t e r o f law t h e e f f e c t
o f a q u i t c l a i m deed by one of two j o i n t t e n a n t s t o a t h i r d
p a r t y i s t o c r e a t e a t e n a n c y i n common between t h e j o i n t
t e n a n t who d i d n o t j o i n i n t h e deed and t h e t h i r d p a r t y .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t i t l e t o t h e resi-
dence was h e l d i n j o i n t t e n a n c y by h i m s e l f and h i s former
w i f e , s o t h a t when s h e e x e c u t e d a q u i t c l a i m deed t o t h e i r
f i v e c h i l d r e n , t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y was s e v e r e d and t h e a p p e l -
l a n t and h i s c h i l d r e n became t e n a n t s i n common. Under t h i s
t h e o r y , he r e t a i n e d a n u n d i v i d e d one-half i n t e r e s t i n the
p r o p e r t y w h i l e t h e y s h a r e d e q u a l l y i n t h e w i f e ' s h a l f and
t h e r e f o r e each received a n undivided one-tenth i n t e r e s t . In
response t o t h e defendants' contentions, a p p e l l a n t claimed
i n the alternative h i s contribution t o equity a s a basis for
determining h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e property.
"The primary o b j e c t o f a n a c t i o n o f p a r t i t i o n ...
[is] ... t o d i v i d e among t h e co-owners l a n d h e l d by them
e i t h e r a s j o i n t t e n a n t s o r a s t e n a n t s i n common a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e i r respective i n t e r e s t . . ." Emery v . Emery ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 122
Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251, 265. I n Montana, a n a c t i o n f o r
p a r t i t i o n i s a s p e c i a l s t a t u t o r y proceeding. Hurley v .
O'Neill ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 31 Mont. 595, 79 P. 242, 243. "We must
t h e r e f o r e look t o t h e s t a t u t e f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y t o b r i n g t h e
a c t i o n , and f o r t h e p r o c e d u r e t o be f o l l o w e d b o t h i n b r i n g i n g
t h e a c t i o n and a f t e r i t i s i n s t i t u t e d . " H u r l e y , s u p r a , 79
P. a t 243. Our s t a t u t e a u t h o r i z i n g a n a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n
i s s e c t i o n 70-29-101, MCA:
"When s e v e r a l c o t e n a n t s h o l d and a r e i n
possession of real property as j o i n t t e n a n t s
o r t e n a n t s i n common, i n which one o r more
of them have a n e s t a t e o r i n h e r i t a n c e o r f o r
l i f e o r l i v e s o r f o r y e a r s , - a c t i o n m a y be
an
b r o u g h t 9 -e- r more - s u c h p e r s o n s f o r
on o - - of
a p a r t i t i o n t h e r e o f , according t o t h e respec-
-
t i v e r i g h t s of t h e persons i n t e r e s t e d t h e r e i n ,
and f o r a s a l e o f such p r o p e r t y o r a p a r t
thereof i f i t appears t h a t a p a r t i t i o n cannot
be made w i t h o u t a g r e a t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e own-
ers." (EZnphasis a d d e d . )
Although h e i s a t e n a n t i n common h o l d i n g l e g a l t i t l e
t o a n e s t a t e of i n h e r i t a n c e , t h e a p p e l l a n t i n t h i s c a s e i s
n o t i n a c t u a l possession of t h e property because of t h e
d i v o r c e d e c r e e g r a n t i n g e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n t o h i s former
w i f e , now d e c e a s e d , and t h e i r t h e n minor c h i l d r e n . Actual
p h y s i c a l p o s s e s s i o n however h a s been h e l d n o t t o be e s s e n -
t i a l t o maintenance o f a n a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n under o u r
statute:
"The Montana s t a t u t e g i v e s t h e remedy o f
p a r t i t i o n t o c o - t e n a n t s 'who h o l d and a r e
i n possession of real property a s j o i n t
t e n a n t s o r t e n a n t s i n common,' e t c . Code
Civ. Proc. 5 1340 [now S 70-29-101, MCA].
W e t h i n k t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n which t h e
l a w imputes t o t h e holder of t h e l e g a l
t i t l e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o maintain p a r t i t i o n ,
under t h i s s t a t u t e . " Heinze v . B u t t e &
Boston C o n s o l i d a t e d Mining Co. ( 9 t h C i r .
1 9 0 3 ) , 126 F. 1, 3, c e r t . den. 195 U . S .
631.
Having m e t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e r e q u i s i t e s of s e c t i o n 70-
29-101, MCA, a p p e l l a n t was e n t i t l e d a s a m a t t e r o f r i g h t t o
m a i n t a i n h i s s u i t f o r p a r t i t i o n under t h a t s e c t i o n , which
provides: "an a c t i o n may b e b r o u g h t by o n e o r more o f s u c h
persons f o r a p a r t i t i o n . . ." This conclusion i s but-
t r e s s e d by t h e d i r e c t i v e i n s e c t i o n 70-29-202(1), MCArthat
w h i l e t h e c o u r t may o r d e r a p a r t i t i o n sale i n a p p r o p r i a t e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t must o t h e r w i s e o r d e r a n a c t u a l p a r t i t i o n
upon t h e r e q u i s i t e p r o o f s b e i n g made.
" I f i t be a l l e g e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t and
e s t a b l i s h e d by e v i d e n c e o r i f i t a p p e a r
by t h e e v i d e n c e w i t h o u t such a l l e g a t i o n
i n t h e c o m p l a i n t t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of
t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o r any p a r t
i s so s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i t i o n cannot
b e made w i t h o u t g r e a t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e
owners, t h e c o u r t may o r d e r a s a l e t h e r e -
o f ; o t h e r w i s e , upon t h e r e q u i s i t e p r o o f s
- i t must o r d e r a p a r t i t i o n
b e i n g made, - -
a c c o r d i n g - -e r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s of
t o th
t h e p a r t i e s a s a s c e r t a i n e d by t h e court
and a p p o i n t t h r e e r e f e r e e s t h e r e f o r and
must d e s i g n a t e t h e p o r t i o n t o remain un-
d i v i d e d f o r t h e owners whose i n t e r e s t s
remain unknown o r a r e n o t a s c e r t a i n e d . "
S e c t i o n 70-29-202(1), MCA. (Emphasis a d d e d . )
Although t h e r e a r e no Montana c a s e s d i r e c t l y on p o i n t ,
the general r u l e i s t h a t a cotenant is e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i t i o n
a s a matter o f r i g h t , and n o t merely as a m a t t e r of g r a c e
within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e court. While t h e r i g h t i s
sometimes s a i d t o be a b s o l u t e , p a r t i t i o n may be d e n i e d where
i t would be a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y o r l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e
p r i n c i p l e s , and t h e r i g h t may i n a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
be waived by agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s . 68 C.J.S. Partition
§ 21; 59 Am.Jur.2d P a r t i t i o n 530; 4 Thompson on Real P r o p e r t y
5 1822 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; 2 T i f f a n y on Real P r o p e r t y § 474 ( 3 r d e d .
1 9 3 9 ) ; 4A Powell on Real P r o p e r t y 5 611 ( 1 9 4 9 ) . California
has i n t e r p r e t e d i t s p a r t i t i o n s t a t u t e i n accordance w i t h
t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e . L a z z a r e v i c h v . L a z z a r e v i c h ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 39
Cal.2d 48, 244 P.2d 1, 2 ; DeRoulet v. M i t c h e l ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 70
Cal.App.2d 120, 160 P.2d 574, 576. S e c t i o n s 70-29-101 and
70-29-202(1), M C A , w e r e o r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d i n 1867 a s p a r t of
t h e Bannack S t a t u t e s ; t h e i r s o u r c e i s s e c t i o n s 752 and 763
o f t h e C a l i f o r n i a Code o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . Montana f o l l o w s
t h e r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t where a s t a t u t e i s
a d o p t e d from a s i s t e r s t a t e , i t i s o r d i n a r i l y presumed t h a t
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e borrows t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e d upon i t by
t h e h i g h e s t c o u r t of t h e s t a t e from which i t i s borrowed,
a l t h o u g h s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n i s n o t b i n d i n g upon t h i s C o u r t .
C o n t i n e n t a l O i l Co. v . Board of Labor Appeals ( 1 9 7 8 ) , -
Mont. 582 P.2d 1236, 1240, 35 St.Rep. 1153, 1156; J.T.
M i l l e r Co. v . Made1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. -1 575 P.2d 1321,
1322, 35 St.Rep. 263, 265; S t a t e v. Murphy ( 1 9 7 7 ) , - Mont.
, 570 P.2d 1103, 1105, 34 St.Rep. 1174, 1177; S t a t e e x
r e l . Mankin v . Wilson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Mont . 569 P.2d 922,
924, 34 St.Rep. 1075, 1078. T h e r e f o r e , i n view o f t h e
C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e s ,
which a r e b o t h s i m i l a r t o and t h e s o u r c e o f o u r own s t a t u t e s ,
w e a r e persuaded t o a d o p t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i n t h i s j u r i s d i c -
tion.
S i n c e p a r t i t i o n may b e d e n i e d where i t would be a g a i n s t
p r i n c i p l e s of l a w o r e q u i t y o r a g a i n s t p u b l i c policy, w e
must a s k whether any o f t h e s e r e a s o n s e x i s t f o r d e n y i n g
p a r t i t i o n i n t h i s case. The d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s b e c a u s e o f
t h e open d i v o r c e d e c r e e , which f a i l e d t o make a f i n a l d i s -
p o s i t i o n of t h e marital property, i.e. t h e house and l o t now
s o u g h t t o be p a r t i t i o n e d . C e r t a i n l y , i t would be a g a i n s t
p u b l i c p o l i c y and p r i n c i p l e s of l a w and e q u i t y t o a l l o w
p a r t i t i o n d u r i n g t h e m i n o r i t y of t h e c h i l d r e n w h i l e t h e
house w a s s e t a s i d e f o r t h e e x c l u s i v e u s e of t h e mother and
minor c h i l d r e n under a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n . In the
p r e s e n t c a s e , however, t h e former w i f e i s d e c e a s e d and a l l
o f t h e c h i l d r e n have a t t a i n e d t h e a g e of m a j o r i t y . They a r e
now t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s c o t e n a n t s , h a v i n g been deeded t h e
i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r mother by q u i t c l a i m deed p r i o r t o t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s a c t i o n f o r p a r t i t i o n . That being t h e
c a s e , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s -
c r e t i o n i n denying p a r t i t i o n . Our c o n c l u s i o n i s s u p p o r t e d
by t h e d e c i s i o n s i n s e v e r a l cases h o l d i n g t h a t a former
s p o u s e i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i t i o n a f t e r a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e .
T u l l i s v. T u l l i s ( F l a . 1 9 7 8 ) , 360 So.2d 375; B e s t v. ~ i l l i a m s
(19761, 260 Ark. 30, 537 S.W.2d 793; Squibb v . Squibb ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,
190 Cal.App.2d 766, 1 2 Gal-Rptr. 346; Barba v . Barba ( 1 9 5 1 ) ,
103 Cal.App.2d 395, 229 P.2d 465, 466; Deacon v. Deacon
( 1 9 2 9 ) , 1 0 1 Gal-App. 195, 281 P. 533, 535; Yax v. Yax ( 1 9 2 5 ) ,
240 N . Y . 590, 148 N.E. 717; Lang v. Lang ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 182 C a l .
765, 770, 190 P. 181.
The second i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s a p p e a l i s whether o r
n o t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o
c r e d i t appellant with a contribution t o the equity i n the
home f o r t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments he made a f t e r t h e d e c r e e
of d i v o r c e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t t o q u i t -
c l a i m h i s i n t e r e s t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n d e n t s upon t h e i r
payment t o him o f a s m r e p r e s e n t i n g one-half
u of t h e down-
payment made on t h e house p l u s one-half of t h e r e d u c t i o n i n
t h e p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e owing on t h e mortgage a s of t h e d a t e
of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e : a t o t a l o f $3,879.15. Thus, a p p e l -
l a n t complains he w a s n o t c r e d i t e d w i t h any i n c r e a s e i n
e q u i t y i n t h e p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e 1970 d e c r e e , a l t h o u g h he
made s u p p o r t payments o f $225 p e r month u n t i l h i s y o u n g e s t
c h i l d r e a c h e d m a j o r i t y i n 1975. The t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e
house payments, i n c l u d i n g t a x e s and i n s u r a n c e , were a p p r o x i -
m a t e l y $130 p e r month.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t from March 1969 t o t h e
p r e s e n t t i m e , Mary K. Lawrence and h e r c h i l d r e n have made
a l l o f t h e monthly mortgage payments and p a i d a l l t a x e s and
i n s u r a n c e on t h e p r o p e r t y , w h i l e a p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o
make any such payments. The payments which a p p e l l a n t was
o r d e r e d t o make f o r t h e " s u p p o r t " o f h i s minor c h i l d r e n W e r e
i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e common n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e . I£
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had i n t e n d e d t h a t a p a r t o f t h e s u p p o r t
payment was r e t u r n a b l e t o t h e f a t h e r i n t h e form o f a n
e q u i t y i n t h e house a f t e r t h e c h i l d r e n w e r e emancipated, i t
s h o u l d have been c l e a r l y s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e d i v o r c e judg-
ment. I t w a s not. A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t Judge N e l s o n ' s
remarks t o a p p e l l a n t a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e A p r i l 3 , 1969
show c a u s e h e a r i n g d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t h e i n t e n d e d t h e $ 2 2 5
monthly c h i l d s u p p o r t payments t o c o v e r t h e house mortgage
payments. H i s remarks may a p p e a r t o i n d i c a t e t h i s b u t a g a i n
t h e y may n o t . T h i s i s t h e r e a s o n t h a t a r e f u n d of t h i s k i n d
must a p p e a r i n t h e judgment. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y
d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t c r e d i t f o r any i n c r e a s e i n e q u i t y i n t h e
house on a c c o u n t of t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments he made a f t e r
t h e d e c r e e of d i v o r c e .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n
by f a i l i n g t o c r e d i t a p p e l l a n t w i t h a p r o - r a t a s h a r e of t h e
property's appreciation i n value. A p p e l l a n t remained a
c o t e n a n t a f t e r t h e 1970 d i v o r c e d e c r e e , and a s such he was
e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e of t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n i n p r o p o r t i o n t o h i s
i n t e r e s t i n the property. By l i m i t i n g h i s i n t e r e s t t o one-
h a l f of t h e 1958 downpayment and one-half o f t h e amount by
which t h e p r i n c i p a l owing on t h e mortgage was reduced d u r i n g
t h e marriage, t h e D i s t r i c t Court completely denied a p p e l l a n t
t h e b e n e f i t of t h e p r o p e r t y ' s i n c r e a s e i n v a l u e o v e r t h e
p a s t twenty-odd y e a r s . A p p e l l a n t w a s e n t i t l e d t o h i s pro-
p o r t i o n a t e share of t h a t appreciation a s a cotenant.
T h a t i s n o t t o s a y t h a t a p a r t i t i o n c o u r t may n o t make
an e q u i t a b l e adjustment of t h e cotenants' i n t e r e s t s . On t h e
c o n t r a r y , t h e r u l e i s t h a t " [ t l h e c o u r t can a d j u s t a l l t h e
e q u i t i e s of the p a r t i e s t o a p a r t i t i o n s u i t , i f they a r e
l i m i t e d t o such a s a r i s e from t h e p a r t i t i o n of t h e l a n d . . ."
4 ~ h o m p s o non R e a l P r o p e r t y § § 1829, 1830 a t 331 ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
See a l s o 4A Powell on Real P r o p e r t y S 611 a t 646-647 (1949);
68 C.J.S. Partition § 135; Demetris v . D e m e t r i s ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 125
C a l . ~ p p . 2 d 440, 270 P.2d 891, 894; W i t h i n g t o n v. C o l l i n s
( 1 9 4 3 ) , 60 Cal.App.2d 110, 1 4 0 P.2d 493, 495. Our p a r t i t i o n
s t a t u t e provides t h a t " [ t l h e r i g h t of t h e s e v e r a l p a r t i e s ,
p l a i n t i f f a s w e l l a s d e f e n d a n t , may be p u t i n i s s u e , t r i e d ,
and d e t e r m i n e d i n s u c h a c t i o n . " S e c t i o n 70-29-201, MCA.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t c e a s e d making
house payments a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e w a s g r a n t e d , and a l l house
payments a f t e r t h a t t i m e w e r e made by t h e r e s p o n d e n t s and
t h e i r mother. " I n t h e f i n a l a c c o u n t i n g between t h e co-
t e n a n t s i n c i d e n t t o p a r t i t i o n , a c o t e n a n t w i l l be c h a r g e d
with . . . payments i n d i s c h a r g e of p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t
on mortgages and o t h e r l i e n s . . ." 2 American Law o f
Property § 6.26 a t 117 ( 1 9 5 2 ) . See a l s o B a i l e y v . Mormino
( 1 9 5 8 ) , 6 App.Div.2d 993, 175 N.Y.S.2d 993; Fundaburk v .
Cody ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 261 Ala. 25, 72 So.2d 710; Hermance v . Weisner
( 1 9 3 8 ) , 228 W i s . 501, 279 N.W. 608, 610. Thus, r e s p o n d e n t s
s h o u l d be c r e d i t e d w i t h payments i n e x c e s s of t h e i r s h a r e
expended by them a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e f o r p r i n c i p a l and i n -
t e r e s t p l u s i n s u r a n c e and t a x e s on t h e p r o p e r t y . Appellant
i s not e n t i t l e d t o an o f f s e t against t h i s c r e d i t f o r the
r e a s o n a b l e r e n t a l v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of
t i m e before t h i s action. Even though t h e r e s p o n d e n t s re-
mained i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a
c o t e n a n t i n p o s s e s s i o n i s n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e u s e and occu-
p a t i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s . 68 C.J.S. Partition § 138(b), That
i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h i s c a s e where r e s p o n d e n t s e n j o y e d
t h e b e n e f i t s of p o s s e s s i o n under a c o u r t d e c r e e . he re-
s p o n d e n t s , however, must a c c o u n t f o r t h e v a l u e of t h e i r u s e
and occupation i n e x c e s s of t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e a f t e r
t h e a p p e l l a n t demanded t h e e q u i v a l e n t of j o i n t p o s s e s s i o n i n
F e b r u a r y 1978 by i n i t i a t i n g t h i s a c t i o n f o r a p a r t i t i o n
sale. E l d r i d g e v . Wolf ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 129 Misc.Rep. 617, 221
N.Y.S. 508, 511.
The f i n a l i s s u e f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s w h e t h e r o r n o t
M a l l o r y D. Lawrence i s e s t o p p e d from a s s e r t i n g a n y i n t e r e s t
i n t h e p r o p e r t y beyond t h a t which h e had a s o f t h e d a t e o f
t h e divorce decree. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t h e was s o
e s t o p p e d f o r two r e a s o n s : (1) b e c a u s e h e a l l e g e d l y changed
h i s p u r p o s e t o t h e i n j u r y o f t h e d e f e n d a n t by f i r s t c l a i m i n g
t o have made c h i l d s u p p o r t payments u n d e r t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e
a n d t h e n a s s e r t i n g t h a t h e h a s been making house payments
a l l t h e s e y e a r s ; and ( 2 ) b e c a u s e h e a l l e g e d l y a t t e m p t e d t o
t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f h i s own "wrong" by f a i l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e
t o t h e a c c u m u l a t e d e q u i t y i n t h e p r o p e r t y and by now s e e k i n g
a n award o f p a r t o f t h a t e q u i t y .
I t i s unnecessary f o r u s t o consider t h e f i r s t f i n d i n g
b e c a u s e w e have c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y
d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t c r e d i t f o r any i n c r e a s e i n e q u i t y i n t h e
h o u s e on a c c o u n t o f t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments h e made a f t e r
t h e divorce decree. W e disagree with the District Court's
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t was e s t o p p e d from a s s e r t i n g a n y
i n t e r e s t i n the property's appreciation i n value a f t e r the
divorce f o r reasons s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s opinion r e l a t i n g
t o h i s r i g h t s a s a cotenant. F u r t h e r m o r e , a p p e l l a n t com-
m i t t e d no "wrong" by f a i l i n g t o make h o u s e payments a f t e r
t h e d i v o r c e , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t h e i s
e s t o p p e d t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f h i s own a l l e g e d "wrong" i s
erroneous.
I n summary, t h e r e was no s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s as t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e
p r o p e r t y , and t h e s e f i n d i n g s must be s e t a s i d e . "Where
t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i n d i n g s
and i f a c l e a r and s a t i s f a c t o r y showing i s n o t made t o
support t h e findings, t h i s Court w i l l set such f i n d i n g s
aside." Swanson v. S t . J o h n ' s L u t h e r a n H o s p i t a l ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
Mont. , 597 P.2d 702, 708, 36 St.Rep. 1075. See
a l s o Johnson v. Johnson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 150, 560 P.2d
1331, 1333.
The c a u s e i s a f f i r m e d i n p a r t and r e v e r s e d i n p a r t and
remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a p a r t i t i o n s a l e and t o
a d j u s t the p a r t i e s ' e q u i t i e s i n conformity with t h i s opinion.
Justice
W e concur:
%&JPZ'~-
Chief J u s t i c e
-a. Justices