No. 14714
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
DANIEL HERMAN LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
A. Michael Salvagni, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on briefs: October 4, 1979
Decided : .IFt: 2 .- -
Filed: f c,..
Mr. ~usticeGene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
his is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Daniel H.
Lopez, from a judgment of the District Court of the Eighteenth
Judicial District, Gallatin County, the Honorable W. W.
Lessley presiding, rendered upon a jury verdict convicting
him of aggravated assault and attempted theft.
The defendant was sentenced to the state prison for
twenty years on aggravated assault and ten years on attempted
theft, the sentences to run concurrently. The District
Court designated defendant a dangerous offender.
According to both defendant Lopez and the victim,
Steven A. Wiscombe, there was an early morning encounter
between the two men near the Durston Road, west of Bozeman,
Montana, on July 11, 1978. The testimony as to the circum-
stances of this encounter is contradictory.
Wiscombe testified that he arrived in Bozeman after
midnight and decided against staying in a motel. He, there-
fore, drove out of town, found an accommodating spot and
went to sleep in his sleeping bag.
Wiscombe was awakened by defendant shaking him, beating
him with a rock, swearing, and demanding Wiscombe's car
keys. A struggle ensued in which defendant Lopez lost his
glasses but obtained the car keys. Lopez attempted to drive
away in the car, but Wiscombe grabbed a door handle and
broke a side window, causing Lopez to swerve off the road.
The men scuffled over the car keys, and the confrontation
ended when Lopez fled. Wiscombe returned to his sleeping
spot where he picked up his belongings and Lopez's shaving
kit. He then drove to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital where he
was treated and hospitalized for three days with head and
face lacerations, a small fracture of the skull and possible
n e r v e damage. Defendant Lopez was l i n k e d t o t h e i n c i d e n t by
t h e f i n d i n g of h i s g l a s s e s and b i k e a t t h e s c e n e and by
f i n g e r p r i n t s on a t u b e o f t o o t h p a s t e from h i s s h a v i n g k i t
which Wiscombe had p i c k e d up.
Lopez, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t Wiscombe
a t t e m p t e d t o r u n him o f f t h e r o a d and t h a t h e f e l l i n t o a
d i t c h and l o s t h i s g l a s s e s . H e s t a t e d t h a t a s he was climb-
i n g o u t of t h e d i t c h t o t h e roadway, h e t h r e w a r o c k a t
Wiscombe t o s t o p him from advancing on t h e d e f e n d a n t . Lopez
c o n t e n d s h e d i d n o t i n t e n d t o h u r t Wiscombe b u t w a s o n l y
t r y i n g t o defend himself.
I n a n a t t e m p t t o g e t away, Lopez t e s t i f i e d he jumped
i n t o t h e c a r and t r i e d t o t a k e o f f . Wiscombe t h e n b r o k e t h e
s i d e window and c a u s e d Lopez t o d r i v e i n t o t h e d i t c h . Lopez
s t a t e d he c o u l d n o t g e t o u t on t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e b e c a u s e
Wiscombe had a r o c k i n h i s hand and had e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s
o f k i l l i n g Lopez. Lopez t h e n c r o s s e d t h e c o n s o l e , e x i t e d
t h r o u g h t h e p a s s e n g e r d o o r and f l e d a c r o s s a f i e l d . He was
a r r e s t e d near t h e scene of t h e i n c i d e n t a t approximately
7:20 a.m. t h e same morning.
Lopez a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n s of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and
a t t e m p t e d t h e f t c o n t e n d i n g t h a t h e was d e n i e d e f f e c t i v e
a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t complains t h a t
t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was based upon a
p r e j u d i c i a l p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and t h e r e f o r e w a s improper.
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s review:
1. Was d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e he d i d
n o t r e c e i v e a d e q u a t e and e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l ?
2. Was t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t
t
proper?
I n r e c e n t y e a r s t h i s Court has addressed t h e i s s u e of
a d e q u a t e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l o n a number o f o c c a s i o n s .
S e e S t a t e v. Maldonado ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 578 P.2d
296, 35 St.Rep. 420; S t a t e v . Miller ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Mont. -,
568 P.2d 130, 34 St.Rep. 838; S t a t e v . Brooks ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1
Mont. 45, 554 P.2d 753; S t a t e v. McElveen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont.
500, 544 P.2d 820. These c a s e s have c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d
t h e a c c u s e d ' s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a s r e q u i r e d by t h e S i x t h and
F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and
A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 24, o f t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l encompasses t h e
r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . S t a t e v . McElveen,
To d e t e r m i n e t h e adequacy o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l t h i s
C o u r t u s e s t h e " f a r c e and sham" t e s t . S t a t e v. N o l l e r
( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293, 294. This test s t a t e s :
". . . [To] p r e v a i l on a c l a i m o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
i n a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a d e f e n d a n t must m e e t
t h e burden o f proving h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance
was s o w o e f u l l y i n a d e q u a t e a s t o shock t h e con-
s c i e n c e o f t h e c o u r t and make t h e r e s u l t a n t p r o -
c e e d i n g a f a r c e and mockery o f j u s t i c e . " State
v . M i l l e r , 568 P.2d a t 132. (Citations omitted.)
I n applying t h e t e s t t h i s Court ruled:
"To d e t e r m i n e t h e adequacy o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
w e must l o o k a t t h e s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d by a p p o i n t e d
counsel i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e reasoning set f o r t h
by J u s t i c e J o h n C. H a r r i s o n i n S t a t e v . F o r s n e s s
159 Mont. 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 , 495 P.2d 1 7 6 , 178:
" ' C l a i m e d i n a d e q u a c y o f c o u n s e l must n o t be t e s t e d
by a g r e a t e r s o p h i s t i c a t i o n o f a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l ,
n o r by t h a t c o u n s e l ' s u n r i v a l e d o p p o r t u n i t y t o
s t u d y t h e r e c o r d a t l e i s u r e and c i t e d i f f e r e n t
t a c t i c s of p e r h a p s d o u b t f u l e f f i c a c y . Success
i s n o t the test of e f f i c i e n t counsel, frequently
n e i t h e r v i g o r , z e a l , n o r s k i l l c a n overcome t h e
t r u t h . "' S t a t e v . McElveen, 544 P.2d a t 822.
F u r t h e r , i n W i l l i a m s v . B e t o ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 354 F.2d 698,
706, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :
" .. . t h e f a c t t h a t some o t h e r lawyer f o l l o w e d
a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e i n a n o t h e r c a s e , o r would have
done d i f f e r e n t l y had he been a c t i n g a s c o u n s e l ,
i s no ground f o r b r a n d i n g t h e a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y
w i t h t h e opprobrium o f i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , o r i n -
f i d e l i t y , o r incompetency. The p r a c t i c e of law
i s a n a r t a s w e l l a s a s c i e n c e . A s no two men
c a n be e x a c t l y a l i k e i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e pro-
f e s s i o n , i t i s b a s i c a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e t o judge
a n a t t o r n e y by what a n o t h e r would have done, o r
s a y s he would have done, i n t h e b e t t e r l i g h t of
hindsight. .. " (Citations omitted. )
With t h e g u i d a n c e o f t h e s e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , w e
examine t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f d e f e n d a n t c o n c e r n i n g h i s coun-
s e l ' s ineffectiveness. Defendant c i t e s t h r e e a l l e g e d
m i s t a k e s by c o u n s e l and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t r i a l , t h e
c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f which he c o n t e n d s d e p r i v e d him of a
fair trial. W d i s c u s s t h e s e "mistakes" i n t h e o r d e r defen-
e
d a n t r a i s e s them on a p p e a l .
The f i r s t " m i s t a k e " w a s t h e f a i l u r e by t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t t o remove d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , L a r r y Moran, on d e f e n d a n t ' s
o b j e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e submission o f a n a f f i d a v i t by M r .
Moran on t h e morning o f t r i a l . This a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d i n
e f f e c t t h a t M r . Moran was g e t t i n g no c o o p e r a t i o n from d e f e n -
d a n t i n t e r m s of p r e p a r i n g a d e f e n s e and would be a b l e t o do
l i t t l e a t t r i a l o t h e r than s i t a t the counsel t a b l e . Despite
t h i s a f f i d a v i t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t proceeded t o t r i a l , and
M r . Moran c o n t i n u e d t o r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t . Defendant
c o n t e n d s i t was e r r o r n o t t o remove M r . Moran on d e f e n d a n t ' s
objection. W disagree.
e
It is true that Mr. Moran, by h i s a f f i d a v i t , s t a t e d he
would have d i f f i c u l t y i n r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t . Mr.
Moran, however, a l s o s t a t e d f o r t h e r e c o r d t h a t he would
". . . p r o c e e d a s f a r a s I am a b l e . I have n e v e r s h i r k e d my
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r duty as a public defender. I ' l l give
whatever I c a n on b e h a l f of M r . Lopez." By t h i s s t a t e m e n t ,
M r . Moran i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e would r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t t o t h e
b e s t of h i s a b i l i t y i n s p i t e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o
c o o p e r a t e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e . M r . Moran was
a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e weeks
before the t r i a l . A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s l a c k o f communication
e x i s t e d throughout t h i s period. Defendant, however, f a i l e d
t o r e q u e s t d i f f e r e n t c o u n s e l u n t i l t h e morning of t r i a l . He
c o n t i n u e d t o o b j e c t t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l t o having M r . Moran
r e p r e s e n t him.
"Although t h e a t t o r n e y c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s
o r d i n a r i l y a p r i v a t e matter, a defendant does
n o t have t h e u n b r i d l e d r i g h t t o d i s c h a r g e coun-
s e l on t h e e v e o f t r i a l . " S t a t e v. Miller,
s u p r a , 568 P.2d a t 132. (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore,
". . . while t h i s r i g h t t o counsel includes t h e
r i g h t of a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t t o have c o u n s e l
a p p o i n t e d f o r h i s b e n e f i t f r e e o f c h a r g e t o him
... i t n e v e r h a s been h e l d t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o
c o u n s e l a l s o comprehends a r i g h t o f a n i n d i g e n t
d e f e n d a n t t o have c o u n s e l o f h i s c h o i c e a p p o i n t e d
f o r him. Rather, it i s t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o
a p p o i n t c o u n s e l f o r t h e i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t , and
u n l e s s t h e r e i s good c a u s e shown why t h e a p p o i n t -
ment of a p a r t i c u l a r a t t o r n e y s h o u l d n o t have
been made, t h e d e f e n d a n t must a c c e p t t h e a t t o r n e y
s e l e c t e d by t h e c o u r t u n l e s s h e waives t h e r i g h t
t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n
o f l a w i s s u p p o r t e d by numerous c a s e s . " State
v. F o r s n e s s , s u p r a , 495 P.2d a t 179. (Citations
omitted ) .
Counsel h e r e d i d t h e b e s t h e c o u l d under t h e circum-
stances. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t on two o c c a s i o n s e x p r e s s e d
c o n f i d e n c e i n M r . Moran's a b i l i t i e s , and a c a r e f u l r e a d i n g
of t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e defense provided w a s
a d e q u a t e . A p p a r e n t l y M r . Moran f i l e d h i s a f f i d a v i t s o l e l y
because defendant r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n
of h i s defense. I t i s a g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a p a r t y who
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n o r c o n t r i b u t e s t o a n e r r o r c a n n o t complain
of it. S t a t e v. M i l l e r , 568 P.2d a t 132. W e f i n d no m e r i t
i n defendant' s a l l e g a t i o n .
The second " m i s t a k e " a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t was two-
fold. I t i n v o l v e d t h e i n f e r e n c e on two s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s
t h a t d e f e n d a n t may have had a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n on h i s r e c o r d
The f i r s t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e v o i r d i r e o f t h e j u r y when
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l Moran s t a t e d : ". . . T h e r e may be e v i d e n c e
i n t h i s c a s e of a p r i o r conviction of t h i s defendant. If
t h a t d o e s , i n f a c t , come i n t o e v i d e n c e , w i l l any o f you
assume g u i l t i n t h i s c a s e ? " The second o c c u r r e d when t h e
S t a t e was a t t e m p t i n g t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o e v i d e n c e d e f e n d a n t ' s
glasses. The f o l l o w i n g c o l l o q u y t o o k p l a c e :
-- WHITE:
"BY MR. (County A t t o r n e y )
"Q. And, may I have t h e g l a s s e s ? Can I borrow
them j u s t f o r a second? And, I hand you what
h a s been marked S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 6 . Can you
i d e n t i f y t h e s e ? A. Yes, these are the glasses
which I found i n t h e d i t c h , t h e n .
"Q. And, you t o o k them and p l a c e d them i n t h e
bag i n which t h e y w e r e c o n t a i n e d ? A. Yes, I
did.
"Q. T h a t would b e o n l y i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e
t h a t t i m e ? A. I m a i l e d them t o t h e S t a t e I d e n -
t i f i c a t i o n Bureau i n Helena where P h i l Conover
checked them f o r f i n g e r p r i n t s , and h e r e t u r n e d
them t o m e , and t h e n I m a i l e d them t o t h e S t a t e
P r i s o n where t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o i d e n t i f y them, and
t h e y r e t u r n e d them t o m e .
"MR. WHITE: I would o f f e r i n t o e v i d e n c e S t a t e ' s
6 , y o u r Honor.
"MR. MORAN: No o b j e c t i o n , y o u r Honor."
Although d e f e n d a n t c o n c e d e s t h a t no a c t u a l e v i d e n c e o f p r i o r
c o n v i c t i o n s w a s i n t r o d u c e d , h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e above r e f e r -
ences t o p r i o r convictions w e r e p r e j u d i c i a l .
While w e q u e s t i o n t h e p r o p r i e t y o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s
v o i r d i r e q u e s t i o n , t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e d o n o t i n d i c a t e
t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d . When t h i s q u e s t i o n was
asked, Judge L e s s l e y immediately s t a t e d : " T h e r e w i l l b e no
evidence of t h e p r i o r conviction i n t h i s cause." The r e c o r d
i n d i c a t e s no s u c h e v i d e n c e w a s i n t r o d u c e d .
The jury was instructed that they were to be governed
solely by the evidence introduced at trial and the law as
stated by the judge. There is nothing here to indicate that
the jury disregarded that instruction to defendant's preju-
dice.
Further, there is nothing in the chain of custody
colloquy which placed into the record evidence of a prior
conviction. The fact that a defendant admittedly has suf-
fered a prior felony conviction is not error. These vague
references then, if error, are not reversible error; how-
ever, we would condemn this kind of tactic in the future.
Finally, defendant argues that counsel's failure to
object to a self-defense instruction offered by the State
deprived him of a fair trial. The instruction stated:
"You are instructed that the defense of justifi-
able use of force or self-defense is an affirma-
tive defense and the defendant has the burden of
proving self-defense to raise a reasonable doubt
of his guilt."
Defendant submits that this instruction is a misstatement of
the law and is prejudicial because it appears to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant.
Recently, in State v. Cooper (1979), - Mont. I
589 P.2d 133, 36 St.Rep. 30, this Court reaffirmed the
general rule in Montana regarding jury instructions on self-
defense. Quoting State v. Grady (1975), 166 Mont. 168, 531
P.2d 681, we stated:
"'The law in Montana is that although the burden
of persuasion remains on the State, in order to
avail himself of the affirmative defense of self-
defense, the defendant has the burden of pro-
ducing sufficient evidence on the issue to raise
a reasonable doubt of his guilt.'" 589 P.2d at
136.
In Cooper we tacitly rejected an argument by the Mon-
tana County Attorneys Association that a defendant should be
r e q u i r e d t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e
of t h e evidence. Arguments s i m i l a r t o t h e one by d e f e n d a n t
h e r e w e r e r e j e c t e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Cooper. Although Cooper
d e a l t with a s l i g h t l y milder i n s t r u c t . i o n than t h e one pre-
s e n t e d h e r e , we r e a c h t h e s a m e r e s u l t .
A t f i r s t glance defendant appears t o raise a n i s s u e
s i m i l a r t o t h a t r a i s e d i n Sandstrom v . Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
U. S. , 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. This case,
however, i s e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Sandstrom w i t h t h e
h e l p o f two o t h e r U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c a s e s , P a t t e r -
s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U . S . 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53
L.Ed.2d 281, and Leland v . Oregon ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 343 U.S. 790, 72
P a t t e r s o n was concerned w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
under t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f b u r d e n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a
New York murder t r i a l w i t h p r o v i n g extreme e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r -
bance a s d e f i n e d by New York law. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme
Court r u l e d t h a t r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o prove h i s a f -
f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t
v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s and s t a t e d :
". . . t h e u n i v e r s a l r u l e i n t h i s c o u n t r y was
t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n must p r o v e g u i l t beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e long-
a c c e p t e d r u l e was t h a t i t was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
permissible t o provide t h a t various affirmative
d e f e n s e s w e r e t o be proved by t h e d e f e n d a n t .
T h i s d i d n o t l e a d t o s u c h a b u s e s o r t o such wide-
s p r e a d r e d e f i n i t i o n o f c r i m e and r e d u c t i o n of t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n ' s burden t h a t a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r u l e was r e q u i r e d ... Nor d o e s t h e f a c t t h a t a
m a j o r i t y o f t h e S t a t e s have now assumed t h e bur-
den o f d i s p r o v i n g a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s - - f o r what-
e v e r reasons--mean t h a t t h o s e S t a t e s t h a t s t r i k e
a d i f f e r e n t b a l a n c e a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Con-
stitution." P a t t e r s o n , 5 3 L.Ed.2d a t 292-93.
I n Leland t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e
o f i n s a n i t y which, by Oregon s t a t e s t a t u t e s , he w a s r e q u i r e d
t o prove. One of t h e s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n p r o v i d e d : "'When
t h e commission of t h e a c t c h a r g e d a s a c r i m e i s p r o v e n , and
t h e d e f e n s e s o u g h t t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h e i n s a n i t y o f t h e
d e f e n d a n t , t h e s a m e must be proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt'. . ." 343 U.S. a t 792. The d e f e n d a n t t h e r e a r g u e d
t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i n question, i n e f f e c t , required a defen-
d a n t p l e a d i n g i n s a n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h h i s i n n o c e n c e by d i s -
p r o v i n g beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t e l e m e n t s of t h e c r i m e
n e c e s s a r y t o a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and t h e r e f o r e v i o l a t e d due
p r o c e s s of law. To d e t e r m i n e t h e merits of t h i s c h a l l e n g e ,
t h e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must be viewed i n i t s
r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r r e l e v a n t Oregon l a w and i n i t s p l a c e i n
t h e t r i a l of t h e c a s e . On r e v i e w i n g a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n
t h e case, t h e C o u r t s t a t e d :
". . . Although a p l e a of i n s a n i t y was made, t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e beyond a r e a -
s o n a b l e d o u b t e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d ,
i n c l u d i n g , i n t h e c a s e of f i r s t d e g r e e murder,
p r e m e d i t a t i o n , d e l i b e r a t i o n , m a l i c e and i n t e n t .
The t r i a l c o u r t r e p e a t e d l y emphasized t h i s r e -
q u i r e m e n t i n i t s c h a r g e t o t h e jury'. . . These
and o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and t h e c h a r g e a s a
whole, make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e burden o f proof
o f g u i l t , and of a l l t h e n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s o f
g u i l t , w a s p l a c e d s q u a r e l y upon t h e S t a t e . A s
t h e j u r y was t o l d , t h i s burden d i d n o t s h i f t ,
b u t r e s t e d upon t h e S t a t e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l ,
j u s t a s , according t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t
was presumed t o be i n n o c e n t u n t i l t h e j u r y w a s
convinced beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t he was
g u i l t y . The j u r o r s were t o c o n s i d e r s e p a r a t e l y
t h e i s s u e of l e g a l s a n i t y p e r se--an i s s u e s e t
a p a r t from t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . . ." 343 U.S. a t
794-796.
A r e v i e w of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ,
i n l i g h t of t h e h o l d i n g s i n P a t t e r s o n and Leland, reveals
t h a t t h e burden o f proof d i d n o t s h i f t t o d e f e n d a n t . Time
and a g a i n t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s
presumed t o be i n n o c e n t and t h a t t h e S t a t e must p r o v e t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
The c o n t e s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n h e r e , w h i l e worded a l i t t l e
s t r o n g e r than t h e self-defense i n s t r u c t i o n t h i s Court favors,
d i d n o t have t h e e f f e c t o f s h i f t i n g t h e burden of proof from
t h e S t a t e t o t h e defendant. The u s e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n ,
t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t d e p r i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t o f a f a i r t r i a l and
f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e
representation, While t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t improper i n
l i g h t of t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case, w e r e a f f i r m our holding i n
S t a t e v . Cooper, s u p r a , and u r g e t h a t t h e s e l f - d e f e n s e
i n s t r u c t i o n approved i n t h a t c a s e be used i n a l l c r i m i n a l
cases involving an i s s u e of self-defense.
The second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i s whether t h e
s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was p r o p e r .
Defendant f i r s t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t
d o e s n o t comply w i t h a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t o r y law b e c a u s e i t
d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r t h e n e e d s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of t h e d e f e n -
d a n t , n o r d o e s i t c o n s i d e r any a s p e c t s o f r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .
T h i s c o m p l a i n t i s burdened w i t h t h e s i n s of o m i s s i o n
and d o e s n o t d e s e r v e d i s c u s s i o n . Judge L e s s l e y h e l d a d i s -
p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g and a t t h e o u t s e t t o l d d e f e n d a n t t h a t
t h e r e would be no r u l e s of e v i d e n c e , e t c . , u n l e s s d e f e n s e
o b j e c t e d s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d g e t i n a n y t h i n g t h e y wanted and
n o t be hampered by f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . Defendant had
c o p i e s o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t , p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e p o r t s , and
w a s a b l e t o cross-examine t h e a u t h o r of t h e p r e s e n t e n c e
report. There were many, many w i t n e s s e s - - l a y , d o c t o r , and
religious--who t e s t i f i e d f o r the defendant f o r a t o t a l
h e a r i n g of 8 4 pages of t r a n s c r i p t . W e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of any
way t h i s h e a r i n g c o u l d have been conducted more f a i r l y . See
S t a t e v . Metz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. -
1 - P.2d , 36
St.Rep. (Cause No. 14682, d e c i d e d December 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 ) .
Defendant further asserts that he has been convicted of
only one violent offense--rape in Missoula in 1969. It is
apparent that defendant failed to take into account that he
had also been convicted of the present offense--aggravated
assault. The District Court's finding was therefore not
erroneous.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
B
Justice d
We concur:
v4-u?~a,
Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:
I would reverse the.judgment and grant a new trial.
In doing so, I must state that I would first have to adopt
a different standard than the "farce or sham" test which is
the rule in this State. A defendant is not simply entitled
to counsel, he is entitled to competent counsel. A "farce
or sham" test seems to be judged in essence by the mere fact
that the defendant had counsel and that his performance did
not shock the conscience of the court.
The case must be approached from the special circumstances
existing here. The prosecuting witness Wiscombe testified
that the defendant assaulted him; the defendant testified that
he did not assault Wiscornbe, rather, Wiscombe assaulted him,
and that was acting in self defense. The remaining physical
evidence corroborated neither story. Thus, the jury was
presented with a clear question of credibility.
Needless to say, the fact that the defendant had been
previously convicted of a felony, even though the jury did
not know what that felony was, could have had a strong impact
on the jury. The voir dire question by defense counsel obviously
was meant to take the string out of any evidence introduced
establishing that defendant had been previously convicted of
a felony. And the trial judge's comment in relation to the
question by defense counsel served only to emphasize that the
defendant did in fact have a previous felony record. The
trial court immediately responded to the voir dire question
asked by defense counsel: "There will be no evidence of -
the
prior conviction in this cause." (Emphasis added.)
Surely the jury knew by this comment of the trial judge
that the defendant in fact had a previous conviction. And
-13-
when t h e w i t n e s s added t h a t t h e g l a s s e s , a l l e g e d t o b e ,
and e s t a b l i s h e d t o b e t h o s e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , w e r e s e n t t o
t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e j u r y had no d o u b t
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had a p r e v i o u s f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n f o r
which h e was s e n t t o p r i s o n . They c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h e r e f o r e
t h a t i t was most l i k e l y a s e r i o u s o f f e n s e . Under t h e s e
circumstances, defense counsel's question, i n conjunction
w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s p o n s e and t h e w i t n e s s ' s s t a t e m e n t .
; h a t he had s e n t t h e g l a s s e s t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n , c o u l d w e l l have been a n i m p o r t a n t and i n a p p r o p r i a t e
f a c t o r i n t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n t o b e l i e v e Wiscombe r a t h e r
t h a t t h e defendant.
I would, t h e r e f o r e , r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and g r a n t a
new t r i a l .