No. 81-263
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1981
I N R THE MARRIAGE O
E F
MYRNA L. MARTENS,
P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent,
GENE P. MARTENS,
Respondent a n d A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l District,
I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n , The H o n o r a b l e
Robert H o l t e r , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Donald L. S h a f f e r , L i b b y , Montana
F o r Respondent :
David W. Harman, L i b b y , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : September 3 , 1981
Decided: a&@m
Filed : DEG 1 0 1981
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s an a p p e a l by t h e h u s b a n d , Gene P. Martens,
from a m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n d e c r e e i s s u e d by t h e
D i s t r i c t Co u rt of the Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County
o f L i n c o l n , on F e b r u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 8 1 , i n which t h e w i f e r e c e i v e d
two-thirds of the equity in the main m a r i t a l asset, the
residence, and t h e husband r e c e i v e d o n e - t h i r d . e affirm
the D i s t r i c t Court's decree.
Myrna and Gene M a r t e n s w e r e m a r r i e d for twenty-one
years. Myrna M a r t e n s i s t h i r t y - e i g h t y e a r s o l d and employed
a s a m i l l worker. Gene M a r t e n s i s t h i r t y - s e v e n years old
and p r e s e n t l y unemployed. The one c h i l d o f t h e m a r r i a g e h a s
a t t a i n e d t h e age of m a j o r i t y .
On A u g u s t 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , Myrna M a r t e n s filed a petition
f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e . A t r i a l was h e l d on t h e i s s u e
o f p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n on December 11, 1 9 8 0 . A l l of the
m a r i t a l a s s e t s e x c e p t f o r t h e r e s i d e n c e w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d by
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a g r e e m e n t s made by t h e
parties.
W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e main m a r i t a l
a s s e t , t h e r e s i d e n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made t h e f o l l o w i n g
f i n d i n g o f f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n o f law:
"That t h e marriage is of approximately 21
years duration; during t h a t period of time
b o t h P a r t i e s h a v e worked and c o n t r i b u t e d t o
the family welfare. In addition, the
P e t i t i o n e r h a s been t h e p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e f a m i l y home. That a t the present
t i m e t h e w i f e h a s a l a r g e r income; h o w e v e r ,
s h e h a s s u c h l a r g e r income b e c a u s e t h e
R e s p o n d e n t s i m p l y d o e s n o t w i s h t o work a t
h i s p r e v i o u s employment. The w i f e w i s h e s t o
k e e p a n d m a i n t a i n t h e f a m i l y home a s a
d w e l l i n g f o r h e r s e l f and i t would a p p e a r t h a t
t h i s is t h e most economical d i r e c t i o n i n
which t o p r o c e e d . W i f e d o e s h a v e a r e t i r e m e n t
p r o g r a m w i t h h e r employer b u t t h e same t y p e
o f employment was a v a i l a b l e t o R e s p o n d e n t
b e f o r e he q u i t . I n o r d e r f o r w i f e t o m a i n t a i n
something approaching her p r e v i o u s l i f e s t y l e
it is d e s i r a b l e t h a t she maintain t h e family
home; on t h e o t h e r h a n d , R e s p o n d e n t h a s i n d i -
c a t e d l i t t l e d e s i r a b i l i t y on h i s p a r t t o
m a i n t a i n s u c h s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g . " Finding
o f F a c t No. 5.
"That t h e equity i n the house, being
$24,222.77, s h o u l d be d i v i d e d 2/3 t o t h e
P e t i t i o n e r and 1 / 3 t o t h e R e s p o n d e n t . In the
event t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r should s e l l s a i d
house, remarry, a n d a n y way a s s i g n o r
a l i e n a t e her i n t e r e s t therein, within f i v e
y e a r s of t h i s d a t e , s h e s h a l l pay t o t h e
Respondent $8,074.36 p l u s i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n a t
t h e r a t e o f 6 % from t h i s d a t e t o s u c h d a t e ;
a t t h e end of f i v e y e a r s , and i n t h e e v e n t
none of t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n d i t i o n s happen, t h e n
t h e P e t i t i o n e r s h a l l pay t o t h e Respondent
h i s f u l l value of e q u i t y s e t f o r t h , afore-
g o i n g , p l u s i n t e r e s t upon s u c h amount f r o m
t h i s d a t e a t t h e r a t e o f 6 % p e r annum."
C o n c l u s i o n o f Law No. 2.
The h u s b a n d a p p e a l s t h e u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the
e q u i t y i n t h e h o u s e and p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w :
1. Whether t h e f i n d i n g o f f a c t s made w i t h r e s p e c t t o
t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house conform t o t h e
evidence presented a t t r i a l .
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d t o f o l l o w t h e
mandatory considerations of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, and
t h e r e b y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n .
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by a w a r d i n g 6 %
i n t e r e s t on t h e w i f e ' s payment of e q u i t y i n t h e h o u s e t o t h e
husband.
A p p e l l a n t was l a i d o f f work i n A u g u s t 1 9 8 0 . A t that
t i m e h e went t o e a s t e r n Montana and o b t a i n e d a j o b w o r k i n g
i n t h e o i l f i e l d s f o r about t h i r t y days. Appellant t e s t i -
f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he h a s had p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s knee t h a t
h a v e h i n d e r e d h i s a b i l i t y t o do p h y s i c a l work. Appellant
was r e c a l l e d t o h i s work a s a l i f t t r u c k d r i v e r a t a lumber
mill in St. Regis b u t testified that he cannot return to
this work because of knee problems.
Based on the above evidence, the District Court found
that appellant "simply does not wish to work at his previous
employment." Appellant contends such a finding is rever-
sible error since it is not supported by the record.
Appellant raises this contention of error in order to
contest the unequal distribution of the equity in the
residence. The question here, then, is whether the District
Court abused its discretion by distributing the equity in
the residence unequally, in light of the undisputed
testimony of the husband that his ability to do physical
work has been hindered by knee problems and in light of the
District Court finding that the husband simply does not wish
to work.
The criteria for reviewing the District Court's
discretion is: "Did the district court in the exercise of
its discretion act arbitrarily without employment of
conscientious judgment, or exceed the bounds of reason in
view of all circumstances." Owen v. Owen (1980), Mont.
In exercising its discretion to distribute the
marital property equitably, the District Court has the duty
to consider the following factors: the duration of the
marriage; the age, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, and estate of the parties;
and the liabilities and needs of the parties. Section 40-4-
202, MCA; In Re Marriage of Aanenson (1979), - Mont. - I
598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525; Owen, 609 P.2d at 294.
The appellant contends that under Vert v. Vert
(1980)I Mont . , 613 P.2d 1020, 37 St.Rep. 1282, the
District Court must conform its findings of facts to the
evidence. According to the appellant, the District Court
made no attempt to conform its findings of facts to the
evidence presented and thereby abused its discretion.
Appellant's contention is not supported by the record.
The finding that the appellant simply does not wish
to work conforms to the record in that appellant did receive
a recall notice to return to his work at the mill. The
District Court did not believe that the appellant's knee
problems were so great that he could not work.
The record supports the findings by the District
Court that the wife has been the person responsible for the
family home. She was solely responsible for the payments on
the home after the husband left for eastern Montana and made
all of the house payments from August 1980 to the time of
trial in December 1980. The wife testified at trial that
she wishes to keep and maintain the family home. The record
does not reflect such a desire on the part of the appellant.
The finding by the District Court that appellant did
not wish to work does not indicate that the District Court
arbitrarily or inequitably awarded an unequal distribution
of the equity in the house, since the finding has little, if
any, importance in determining how the equity in the
residence should be distributed. The distribution of the
equity in the house was based on the wife's acceptance of
responsibility for it in the months prior to trial, her
ability to continue this responsibility, and her desire to
continue to do so when the husband did not express such a
desire. In light of these considerations, we cannot say
that the District Court abused its discretion by dividing
t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house unequally.
Ivloreover, we have noted in a number of cases that
mere u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a r i t a l a s s e t s d o e s n o t s u g g e s t
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o
apply properly the f a c t o r s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. In
Owen, s u p r a , w e n o t e d :
' " A l t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may -- q ---- y
e uall
d i v i d e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , such a d i s t r i b u -
t i o n i s n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA
. . . S e c t i o n 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and i t
v e s t s a good d e a l o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e
D i s t r i c t Court . . . W have s t a t e d , b e f o r e
e
and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t
e a c h c a s e m u s t be l o o k e d a t i n d i v i d u a l l y ,
w i t h an eye t o its unique circumstances . .
. (Citations omitted.) I n Re M a r r i a g e o f
Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . , 598 P.2d
1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 3 , 36 S t . R e p . 1 5 2 5 . " 609 P.2d a t
294.
In l i g h t of the substantial evidence supporting t h e
unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the equity in the residence, the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n must s t a n d .
The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s n e x t t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
erred by allowing the wife to pay 6% i n t e r e s t on her
p a y m e n t s t o him f o r h i s s h a r e of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house.
The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, provides
t h a t i n t e r e s t on a judgment is p a y a b l e a t 1 0 % p e r annum and
t h a t W i l l i a m s v . Budke ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. , 606 P.2d 5 1 5 ,
37 S t . R e p . 228, allowed t h e 1 0 % r a t e where t h e d e c r e e was
s i l e n t on i n t e r e s t .
A l t h o u g h s e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, h a s been a p p l i e d t o
judgments a r i s i n g o u t of a m a r i t a l d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e , t h i s
section has been applied o n l y when t h e d e c r e e i s s i l e n t a s
t o interest.
Here t h e d e c r e e is not s i l e n t a s t o interest. In
W i l l i a m s , w e acknowledged t h a t c e r t a i n c a s e s may a r i s e w h e r e
it is equitable and within its discretion for the District
Court to expressly allow -
no interest on installment
payments. Clearly, Williams did not stand for the
proposition that a 10% interest rate must be paid on all
marital dissolution judgments. Where it is equitable for
the District Court to award a lower rate, it is within the
discretionary power to do so. Here, it cannot be said that
the District Court abused its discretion by setting the
interest rate at 6% per annum.
The wife has made a request for attorney fees under
Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., claiming the appeal here was
frivolous. Where there is a reasonable ground for appeal, a
respondent is not entitled to recover damages under Rule 32,
M.R.App.Civ.P. Erdman v. C & C Sales, Inc. (1978), 176
Mont. 177, 577 P.2d 55, 59. Here the question of the
District Court's abuse of discretion was reasonably in issue
and the respondent's request for attorney fees on appeal
must be denied.
Having found no abuse of discretion, the property
,5
distribution decree of the District ~ u r
$'t is af firmed.
l,
/
1r;./yt4
Justice
We concur: