No. 81-118
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
. MARJORIE HARRY,
Plaintiff and Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,
BILL ELDERKIN and SANDY ELDERKIN,
Defendants and Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead
Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Warden, Christiansen, Johnson and Berg, Kalispell,
Montana
Stephen C. Berg argued, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell,
Montana
James C. Bartlett argued, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted: October 20, 1981
Decided : DEc i lD8l
Filed:
D EC 1 .. 198f
M r . C h i e f ~ u s t i c eF r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e
Court.
T h i s is a n a p p e a l from a n o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r
t h e E l e v e n t h ~ u d i c i a lD i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d C o u n t y , g r a n t i n g a new
t r i a l to t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n . The p l a i n -
ti f f cross-appeals from t h e c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n s t r u c t i o n s .
The p l a i n t i f f , Marjorie H a r r y , is t h e m o t h e r o f d e f e n d a n t
S a n d y E l d e r k i n , who was t h e w i f e o f d e f e n d a n t B i l l E l d e r k i n .
D u r i n g J u n e , 1 9 7 6 , Mrs. H a r r y was v i s i t i n g t h e E l d e r k i n s a t t h e i r
home i n K a l i s p e l l , Montana. A t t h e t i m e of h e r v i s i t , B i l l
E l d e r k i n was i n t h e p r o c e s s o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a c a b i n e t s h o p i n t h e
b a c k y a r d o f t h e E l d e r k i n home. A t r e n c h had b e e n dug a p p r o x i -
m a t e l y f o u r f e e t d e e p , and c e m e n t had b e e n p o u r e d i n t o plywood
forms constructed i n the trench. A g a r d e n was l o c a t e d n e x t t o
t h e c a b i n e t s h o p f o u n d a t i o n , and t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e b a c k y a r d
was c o v e r e d w i t h b l a c k p l a s t i c and g r a v e l .
On June 1 2 , 1 9 7 6 , S a n d y E l d e r k i n i n v i t e d h e r m o t h e r i n t o
t h e backyard to view t h e garden. Mrs. H a r r y had n o t b e e n i n t h e
b a c k y a r d s i n c e h e r a r r i v a l , b u t s h e was aware o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
project. B i l l E l d e r k i n w a s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f removing b r a c e s and
f o r m s from t h e f o u n d a t i o n . A s S a n d y E l d e r k i n and Mrs. H a r r y
w a l k e d a l o n g t h e p a t h w a y b e t w e e n t h e g a r d e n and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
s i t e , S a n d y b e n t down t o remove a b o a r d from t h e g a r d e n . Mrs.
H a r r y took a s t e p backwards w i t h h e r r i g h t f o o t towards t h e
t r e n c h , t h e g r o u n d g a v e way, and s h e f e l l i n t o t h e t r e n c h and
c a u g h t h e r l e f t a n k l e on a b r a c e . A s a r e s u l t of t h e a c c i d e n t ,
Mrs. H a r r y s u f f e r e d a s e v e r e l y b r o k e n l e f t a n k l e and r e c e i v e d
e x t e n s i v e medical t r e a t m e n t .
I n October, 1977, M r s . Harry w a s s t i l l experiencing
d i f f i c u l t i e s d u e t o s e v e r e d e g e n e r a t i v e a r t h r i t i s of t h e a n k l e
caused by t h e f r a c t u r e . Dr. L a i d l a w a d v i s e d Mrs. H a r r y t h a t s h e
would e v e n t u a l l y r e q u i r e a n a n k l e f u s i o n to a l l e v i a t e t h e p a i n
c a u s e d b y t h e r u b b i n g o f b o n e upon b o n e i n t h e a n k l e j o i n t . In
May, 1 9 7 8 , D r . L a i d l a w a g a i n a d v i s e d Mrs. H a r r y t h a t s h e was i n
need of an a n k l e f u s i o n . Mrs. H a r r y was a l s o s e e n by D r .
Maruyama, a n o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n i n C o l o r a d o , who a d v i s e d h e r i n
November, 1 9 7 8 , and i n November, 1 9 8 0 , t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e a n a n k l e
f u s i o n b u t t h a t s h e s h o u l d f i r s t lose f i f t y p o u n d s . A t the t i m e
o f t r i a l , Mrs. H a r r y was s c h e d u l e d t o h a v e t h e a n k l e f u s i o n b u t
h a d n o t y e t d o n e so.
Mrs. H a r r y b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e E l d e r k i n s f o r
damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e sum-
m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s o f b o t h p a r t i e s and a j u r y t r i a l commenced
o n December 1 5 1 1 9 8 0 . The j u r y r e n d e r e d a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t i n
w h i c h it f o u n d t h e p l a i n t i f f t o h a v e b e e n 8 5 % n e g l i g e n t and t h e
d e f e n d a n t s t o have been 15% n e g l i g e n t . The f u l l amount o f dama-
g e s s u s t a i n e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f was found to be $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t j u d g m e n t be e n t e r e d o n t h e v e r d i c t o n
b e h a l f o f d e f e n d a n t s and a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f .
The p l a i n t i f f moved f o r new t r i a l o n t h e g r o u n d s o f irre-
g u l a r i t y i n t h e j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s , m i s c o n d u c t o f t h e j u r y and
i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t . The m o t i o n
was s u p p o r t e d b y a n a f f i d a v i t o f t h e j u r y f o r e m a n , which s t a t e d :
" ... ( 2 ) That a t the t i m e the Special Verdict
Form was c o m p l e t e d , A f f i a n t and h i s f e l l o w
J u r o r s b e l i e v e d and t h e y i n t e n d e d t h a t Mrs.
H a r r y w a s awarded a Judgment i n t h e sum of
$15,000.00;
" ( 3 ) T h a t A f f i a n t and h i s f e l l o w J u r o r s a s s i g n e d
a p e r c e n t a g e o f 85% t o Marjorie H a r r y as j u s t i -
f i c a t i o n f o r t h e award o f $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o h e r ; and
t h a t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 8 5 % , A f f i a n t and h i s
fellow Jurors believed t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t
f a c t o r , b u t n o t t h e o n l y f a c t o r , was t h e f a i l u r e
of Marjorie H a r r y t o h a v e h e r a n k l e f u s e d when
f i r s t s u g g e s t e d b y h e r p h y s i c i a n s , and t h a t much
of h e r p r o b l e m s c o u l d h a v e b e e n a l l e v i a t e d had
t h e fusion taken place."
By a n o r d e r d a t e d J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l and found
that:
". . . t h e j u r o r s , o r some o f them, d i d n o t
understand t h e d o c t r i n e of comparative
n e g l i g e n c e , d i d n o t a p p l y t h e law c o r r e c t l y
r e l a t i v e t o c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , were incon-
s i s t e n t i n t h e i r a n s w e r s on t h e S p e c i a l V e r d i c t ,
and r e a c h e d a r e s u l t t h a t t h e y d i d n o t i n t e n d
when t h e C o u r t a p p l i e d t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f c o n t r i -
b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e t h e y a s c r i b e d to t h e
plaintiff."
The E l d e r k i n s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t m a n i f e s t l y
a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n g r a n t i n g Mrs. H a r r y a new t r i a l . They
a r g u e t h a t t h e r e w a s no i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h a t t h e
j u r y may n o t impeach i t s own v e r d i c t b a s e d upon a m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n
o f t h e law, and t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e
giving of the contributory negligence i n s t r u c t i o n . Mrs. H a r r y
c o n t e n d s s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l a s a m a t t e r o f l a w d u e t o
a n error i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. She f u r t h e r a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s
i s a p r o p e r case f o r d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u s o f
p e r s o n s i n j u r e d on r e a l p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be a b o l i s h e d .
W e d e c l i n e t o a d d r e s s t h e l a t t e r i s s u e as w e f i n d it i s
n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e us. The t r i a l o f t h i s case o c c u r r e d p r i o r
t o o u r d e c i s i o n i n C o r r i g a n v. J a n n e y ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mon t . I 626
P.2d 8 3 8 , 38 S t . R e p . 5 4 5 , i n which w e h e l d t h a t a l a n d l o r d is
u n d e r a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y care i n t h e management o f t h e
p r e m i s e s t o a v o i d e x p o s i n g p e r s o n s t h e r e o n to u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k
o f harm. Mrs. H a r r y a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s r u l e o f law i s s u e d w h i l e
h e r case was p e n d i n g o n a p p e a l s h o u l d be e x p a n d e d and a p p l i e d to
h e r case by v i r t u e o f t h e p l a i n e r r o r r u l e . T h i s is n o t a n
a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e f o r a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p l a i n e r r o r r u l e enun-
c i a t e d i n H a l l d o r s o n v. H a l l d o r s o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 1 7 0 , 5 7 3
P.2d 169. I t is o n l y when t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s c o m m i t t e d a n e r r o r
w h i c h r e s u l t s i n a d e n i a l o f s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e t h a t we c a n
r e v i e w a n error n o t o b j e c t e d t o a t t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel
i n d i c a t e d s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e s t a n d a r d of
l i a b i l i t y , and he may n o t now a r g u e t h e a c a d e m i c i s s u e t h a t t h e
l a w s h o u l d be c h a n g e d .
Mrs. H a r r y ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l was p r e m i s e d upon sec-
t i o n 25-11-102(1), ( 2 ) , and ( 6 ) , MCA. Although t h e District
C o u r t o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l d o e s n o t s p e c i f y t h e s u b s e c -
t i o n upon which it is b a s e d , it is c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u r t r e l i e d
upon t h e j u r y f o r e m a n ' s a f f i d a v i t and d e t e r m i n e d t h a t e i t h e r a n
i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s or m i s c o n d u c t of t h e j u r y
had o c c u r r e d .
J u r o r a f f i d a v i t s are n o t p e r m i s s i b l e i n s u p p o r t of a
m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l b a s e d upon a n i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e j u r y
p r o c e e d i n g s , s e c t i o n 25-11-102(1), MCA. Rasmussen v . S i b e r t
( 1 9 6 9 ) r 1 5 3 Mont. 2 8 6 , 456 P.2d 8 3 5 . Therefore, i f a motion f o r
new t r i a l was p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (1) a n i r r e g u -
l a r i t y i n t h e j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s m u s t h a v e e x i s t e d i n d e p e n d e n t of
a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e j u r y f o r e m a n 1s a f f i d a v i t . The ~ i s ti r t
c
C o u r t o r d e r makes r e f e r e n c e to a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e a n s w e r s o n
the special verdict. On i t s f a c e , h o w e v e r , t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t
d o e s not c o n t a i n any i n c o n s i s t e n t answers. B o t h p a r t i e s were
f o u n d t o h a v e b e e n n e g l i g e n t , a t o t a l amount o f damages was
a s s e s s e d and p e r c e n t a g e s o f n e g l i g e n c e were a s c r i b e d to e a c h
party. Absent c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e j u r o r a f f i d a v i t , we f i n d no
i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s r e q u i r i n g a new t r i a l u n d e r
s e c t i o n 25-11-102(1), MCA.
p l a i n t i f f f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t even though j u r o r a f f i d a v i t s
c a n n o t be used u n d e r s e c t i o n 2 5 - 1 1 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , the trial c o u r t could
h a v e found f r o m a n i n d e p e n d e n t r e v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e , w i t h o u t
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e j u r o r a f f i d a v i t , t h a t t h e r e s u l t reached by t h e
j u r o r s was n o t t h e r e s u l t i n t e n d e d b y them. The c o u r t may o n i t s
own i n i t i a t i v e o r d e r a new t r i a l f o r a n y r e a s o n f o r which it
m i g h t h a v e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l o n m o t i o n o f a p a r t y . Rule 5 9 ( e ) ,
M.R.Civ.P. T h i s d o e s n o t a l t e r t h e f a c t t h a t , a b s e n t con-
s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e j u r o r a £ f i d a v i t , t h e r e w a s no b a s i s f o r a new
t r i a l under s e c t i o n 25-11-102(1), MCA.
J u r y m i s c o n d u c t as a g r o u n d f o r new t r i a l may be shown b y
j u r o r a f f i d a v i t a c c o r d i n g to s e c t i o n 25-11-102( 2 ) , MCA. As jury
m i s c o n d u c t , t h e r e s p o n d e n t r e f e r s t o (1) t h e error o f t h e j u r o r s
i n c o n s i d e r i n g h e r f a i l u r e t o h a v e a n a n k l e f u s i o n as n e g l i g e n c e
and ( 2 ) s e t t i n g h e r t o t a l damages a s $ 1 5 r 0 0 0 and a s s i g n i n g 85%
n e g l i g e n c e to t h e r e s p o n d e n t . Montana l a w o n t h e u s e of j u r o r
t e s t i m o n y and a f f i d a v i t s upon a n i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e
v e r d i c t i s c o n c i s e l y summarized by R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) , Montana R u l e s of
E v i d e n c e as f o l l o w s :
" I n q u i r y i n t o v a l i d i t y o f v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t .
Upon a n i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f a v e r d i c t
o r i n d i c t m e n t , a j u r o r may n o t t e s t i f y as to a n y
matter o r statement occurring during the course
o f t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s or t o t h e e f f e c t of
a n y t h i n g upon h i s o r a n y o t h e r j u r o r ' s mind o r
e m o t i o n s as i n f l u e n c i n g him to a s s e n t o r d i s s e n t
f r o m t h e v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t or c o n c e r n i n g h i s
mental processes i n connect ion therewith. N o r
may h i s a f f i d a v i t or e v i d e n c e o f a n y s t a t e m e n t
b y him c o n c e r n i n g a matter a b o u t which h e would
b e p r e c l u d e d from t e s t i f y i n g be r e c e i v e d f o r
these purposes.
"However, as a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n , a
j u r o r may t e s t i f y and a n a f f i d a v i t o r e v i d e n c e
o f a n y k i n d b e r e c e i v e d as t o a n y m a t t e r or sta-
tement concerning o n l y the following questions,
whether o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e course of t h e
j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s or n o t : (1) w h e t h e r e x t r a -
n e o u s p r e j u d i c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n was i m p r o p e r l y
b r o u g h t to t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n ; or ( 2 ) w h e t h e r
a n y o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e was b r o u g h t to b e a r upon
a n y j u r o r ; or ( 3 ) whether any j u r o r h a s been
induced t o a s s e n t to any g e n e r a l or s p e c i a l
v e r d i c t , o r f i n d i n g on any q u e s t i o n s u b m i t t e d to
them b y t h e c o u r t , b y a r e s o r t to t h e d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n of chance " .
The cases on t h e u s e o f j u r o r a f f i d a v i t s f a l l i n t o two m a j o r
categories : 1) t h o s e i n v o l v i n g e x t e r n a l i n £ l u e n c e o n t h e j u r y ,
and 2 ) t h o s e i n v o l v i n g i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e on t h e j u r y . Where
e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e is e x e r t e d o n t h e j u r y or w h e r e e x t r a n e o u s
p r e j u d i c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n is b r o u g h t t o t h e j u r y ' s attention, j uror
a f f i d a v i t s c a n be t h e b a s i s f o r o v e r t u r n i n g t h e j u d g m e n t i f
e i t h e r p a r t y was t h e r e b y d e p r i v e d o f a f a i r t r i a l . Schmoyer v .
B o u r d e a u ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. 3 4 0 , 420 P.2d 316 ( j u r o r t e l e p h o n e d a
r e l a t i v e w i t h r e g a r d to p r e v i o u s l i t i g a t i o n by p l a i n t i f f ) ; Gof f
v . K i n z l e ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. 6 1 , 417 P.2d 1 0 5 ( j u r o r v i s i t e d s c e n e
o f a c c i d e n t , c o n d u c t e d e x p e r i m e n t s and t o l d j u r y of h i s
f i n d i n g s ) ; C l a r k v . Wenger ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 521,. 415 P.2d 7 2 3
( j u r o r had r e c e i v e d e v i d e n c e o u t s i d e o f c o u r t which made him a
w i t n e s s a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f ) ; P u t r o v. B a k e r ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont.
1 3 9 , 410 P.2d 717 ( j u r o r b r o u g h t n e w s p a p e r a r t i c l e i n t o j u r y roam
a n d showed i t t o j u r y ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , j u r o r a f f i d a v i t s may
n o t be u s e d t o impeach t h e v e r d i c t b a s e d upon i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s
on the jury, s u c h as a m i s t a k e o f e v i d e n c e or m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n o f
t h e law. G r o u n d w a t e r v. W r i g h t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 2 7 , 5 8 8 P.2d
1 0 0 3 , ( j u r y m i s u n d e r s t o o d t h e law) ; C h a r l i e v. Foos ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0
Mont. 4 0 3 , 5 0 3 P.2d 538 ( j u r y d e s i r e d t o be d i s c h a r g e d , d i d n o t
u n d e r s t a n d l a w o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e ) ; Rasmussen v. S i b e r t ,
s u p r a ( p l a i n t i f f s w i t n e s s r e f e r r e d to d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s u r a n c e ,
w h i c h was c o n s i d e r e d b y t h e j u r y ) ; J o h n s o n v . G r e e n ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3
Mont. 2 5 1 , 456 P.2d 290 ( p r e s i d i n g j u d g e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a n s w e r
j u r y q u e s t i o n o n i n s t r u c t i o n s b u t a n o t h e r j u d g e was a v a i l a b l e ).
Here, t h e j u r o r af f i d a v i t r e f l e c t s t h e f o r e m a n ' s b e l i e f
t h a t t h e j u r y d i d n o t understand t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e , c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e and m i t i g a t i o n o f damages.
T h i s case f a l l s i n t o t h e c a t e g o r y o f cases i n v o l v i n g i n t e r n a l
i n f l u e n c e s on t h e j u r y . W e h o l d t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c tC o u r t a b u s e d
i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l o n t h e b a s i s o f a j u r o r
a f f i d a v i t which p u r p o r t s to impeach t h e v e r d i c t by d e l v i n g i n t o
t h e t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s of t h e j u r o r s .
Nonetheless, M r s . H a r r y c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e is e n t i t l e d to a
new t r i a l b e c a u s e 1) t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o n c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e
a n d m i t i g a t i o n o f damages were e r r o n e o u s , and 2 ) t h e r e w a s i n s u f -
f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e g i v i n g of t h e c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i -
g e n c e i n s t r u c t i o n and t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t t h a t M r s . H a r r y was
85% n e g l i g e n t .
W e f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d to o b j e c t a t t r i a l o r i n
h e r m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l t o t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o n
c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and m i t i g a t i o n o f damages and t h a t t h e
i s s u e o f e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s is n o t b e f o r e u s . We further
f i n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e g i v i n g of
t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and to s u p p o r t t h e
f i n d i n g t h a t Mrs. H a r r y was 85% n e g l i g e n t . Mrs. H a r r y was
m a r r i e d t o a c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k e r w i t h whom s h e t r a v e l e d a r o u n d
t h e world t o v a r i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e s . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e
was aware o f some of t h e d a n g e r s i n h e r e n t i n a c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e
and acknowledged t h e d a n g e r of t h e ground g i v i n g way. The j u r y
c o u l d h a v e i n f e r r e d t h a t s h e knew o r s h o u l d h a v e known t h a t i f
s h e s t e p p e d t o o close t o t h e t r e n c h t h e ground m i g h t c a v e i n .
Mrs. H a r r y had p o o r v i s i o n i n h e r r i g h t e y e . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t
s h e p i v o t e d t o w a r d s t h e r i g h t and s t e p p e d a s c l o s e a s 1 2 i n c h e s
f r o m t h e e d g e o f t h e t r e n c h w i t h o u t l o o k i n g where s h e was
stepping. The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a l l p e r s o n s a r e r e q u i r e d
t o be o b s e r v a n t and t o t a k e s u c h m e a s u r e s a s are n e c e s s a r y to
p r o t e c t themselves. The e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t e d t h e g i v i n g o f t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e v e r d i c t .
The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l t o
t h e p l a i n t i f f is v a c a t e d . The judgment on t h e v e r d i c t s t a n d s .
Chief ~ u s t i c e
....................................
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting:
The majority opinion takes too narrow a view of our
duty on appeal from an order granting a new trial.
There are special rules which apply to an appeal from
an order granting a new trial. In section 3-2-204, PICA,
defining the power of the Supreme Court, it is stated:
"(3) In giving its decision, if a new trial
be granted, the court must pass upon and
determine all the questions of law involved
in the case presented upon such appeal and
necessary to the final determination of the
case. "
As far as I can find, the Montana Supreme Court has not
passed upon the extent of its power to review a grant of a
new trial. In California, however, under a similar rule,
the order granting a new trial must be affirmed if it should
have been granted upon any ground stated in the motion,
whether or not specified in the order or specification of
reasons. Treber v. Superior Court (Cal. 1968), 436 P.2d
330, 334. The court there quoted with approval from a statement
contained in a case as old as Kauffman v. Maier (1892), 94
Cal. 269, 276, 277, 29 P. 481, 482, to the following effect:
"A party has the right to move for a new trial
upon any or all of the grounds permitted by the
statute, and if the record on which his motion
is based discloses more than one ground for which
a new trial should be granted, the court cannot,
by stating in its order that the motion is granted
upon one ground only, and denied upon the others,
deprive the other party of the right to a review by
this Court of the entire record ...If there
be any grounds upon which its action can be
upheld, the order will be sustained irrespective
- the
of - particular ground given - -
by that court,
whether - - opinion - -by a statement - -
in an or - in the
order itself." (Emphasis added.)
Grounds upon which a party may move for a new trial are
contained in section 25-11-102, MCA. They include "irregularity
in the proceedings of the . .. jury", "misconduct of the
jury", "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict",
and that the verdict "is against law." In moving for a new
trial in this case, the plaintiff utilized all four of those
grounds. If she was entitled to a new trial on any one of
those grounds, under the statute, section 3-2-204 (3) , MCA,
and the rule enunciated in Treber, supra, the order of the
District Court in this case granting a new trial ought to be
sustained. The majority opinion ignores this elemental rule
of the extent of review on orders granting a new trial, to
the prejudice of the plaintiff.
The verdict in this case is against law because of an
inherent error in the instructions as submitted to the jury.
The trial court submitted a special verdict for a determination
of the comparative negligence issues, and at the same time
submitted an instruction which properly should be used only
with respect to a general verdict. The basic underlying
error here is not what the jury did, according to the affidavit
of one juror, in arriving at the verdict. I give no account
to that at all. Rather, the basic underlying error here is
that the jury, instructed with respect to the finding of a
general verdict, applied that rule in finding its special
verdict. That is the basic error which gives rise to the
propriety to the grant in this case of a new trial.
In fact I find no error in the instruction given
by the court for the minimizing of her personal injuries.
The court in that connection instructed the jury as follows:
"It is the duty of a person who has been injured
to use reasonable diligence in caring for her
injuries and reasonable means to prevent their
aggravation and accomplish healing.
"When one does not use reasonable diligence to
care for her injuries, and they are aggravated
as a result of such failure, the liability, if
any, of another whose act or omission was a
proximate cause of the original injury, must be
limited to the amount of damage that would have
been suffered if the injured person himself had
exercised the diligence required of her.
"From the mere fact that a competent physician
advised an injured person to submit to a course
of treatment or operation we are not justified
in inferring that the injured person was
negligent or unreasonable in declining such
treatment or operation. Other factors as they
confronted the injured person must be considered
in determining whether, although she refused to
follow the physician's advice, she nevertheless
exercised reasonable diligence in caring for herself
and her injuries." (Court's instruction no. 18.)
The foregoing instruction on minimization is an exact
copy of instruction no. 14.67 contained in BAJI (5th ed.
The error arose in this case because the District Court
submitted a special verdict, without an instruction telling
the jury how to use the special verdict. As filled out by
the jury the special verdict is as follows:
"We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to
us in this Special Verdict as follows:
"QUESTION No. 1. Were the Defendants guilty
of neqliqence which was the proximate cause
of the ciaimed damages? ANSWER: Yes X .
No
"If you have answered the above question "NO",
you will not answer the remaining questions but
will simply sign the verdict and call the
bailiff.
"If you have answered Question No. 1 "YES", then
you must answer Question No. 2.
"QUESTION No. 2. What is the full amount of
damages that you find sustained by the
Plaintiff? $15,000.00.
"QUESTION No. 3. Was the plaintiff guilty of
negligence which was the proximate cause of
the alleged damages? ANSWER: Yes X .
No
"If you have answered "NO" to Question No. 3,
then you will not answer Question No. 4, but will
simply sign the Verdict and call the bailiff,
"If you answered "YES" to Question No. 3, then
you must answer No. 4.
"QUESTION No. 4. Considering the negligence of
the plaintiff and the defendants that caused the
accident at a total of one hundred percent (loo%),
what percentage is attributable to:
"(a) the Plaintiff 85 %
"(b) the Defendants 15 %
9 11
"TOTAL 100 0
The problem in this case comes about because court's
instruction no. 10 instructed the jury as though it were to
return a general verdict after having determined all the
issues in the cause:
"You are instructed that the laws of the State
of Montana provide that contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, if such negligence was
not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom the recovery is sought, but any damage allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
the negligence attributable to the person recovering."
The court gave its instruction no. 27, which is usual
in form, but in this case helped to cause the error:
"Upon retiring to your jury room you will choose
one of your number foreman, who will sign your
verdict when you shall have agreed upon one. Eight
(8) or more of your number must agree in arriving
at a verdict. When you have arrived at a verdict
and the same has been signed by your foreman, you
will notify the bailiff who will return you into
court. "
Because the jury was given a special verdict to deter-
mine the issues, instruction no. 10 above should not have
been given at all. It directly conflicts with the directions
in the special verdict. The editors of BAJI also agree that
an instruction in the form of instruction no. 27 should
never be given with a special verdict. Form 15.15, BAJI
(5th ed. 1960), comment (1975 cum. pocket part).
Because the court in this case was submitting a special
verdict to the jury which would have the effect of deter-
mining the kind of general verdict that eventually would be
entered in the cause, it should have followed the example in
BAJI, and used form no. 15.15 as a concluding instruction to
the jury. That instruction should have been as follows:
"You shall now retire and select one of your
number to act as foreman who will preside over
your deliberations.
"In this case you will not return a general verdict
in favor of either party. Instead, it will be your
duty to return only a special verdict in the form
of written answers to such of the issues upon which
you have been directed to make findings as are
required according to the directions in the form
of special verdict which will be submitted to you.
"As soon as eight or more identical jurors have
agreed upon every answer required by such directions,
so that each of those eight or more may be able to
state truthfully that every answer is his or hers,
you shall have your verdict signed and dated by your
foreman and then shall return with it to this room."
Form 15.15, BAJI (5th ed. 1960) (1975 cum. pocket part).
By use of the foregoing concluding instruction, the
trial court would have avoided what is inherently possible
in this case, that the jury fixed the general damages as
though it were finding a general verdict, and it would be
certain that the verdict was the answer of an identical
eight jurors in the case.
Because we are commanded by statute to review all of
the record on an appeal from an order granting a new trial,
and because at least it fits in the "plain error" rule
enunciated in Halldorson v Halldorson (1977), 175 Mont.
.
170, 573 P.2d 169, this case should be affirmed, insofar as
it grants a new trial of all the issues in the cause.
If the majority had agreed to affirm the grant of a
new trial, I should also have discussed the "status" question
of an invitee under Montana law for the guidance of the
District Court in the new trial.
Justice
We concur in the foregoing dissent.
.............................
Justices
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . , d i s s e n t i n g :
I concur w i t h t h e remarks made by J u s t i c e Sheehy r e s p e c -
t i n g o u r power t o r e v i e w . I n t h i s case the p l a i n t i f f , i n
t h e motion f o r new t r i a l , s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i e d s t a t u t o r y
grounds which p e r m i t u s t o t r e a t t h e r e a l e r r o r i n t h i s
case.
The e r r o r committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t was i n g i v i n g
c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n No. 18 on m i t i g a t i o n of damage w i t h o u t
g i v i n g a n accompanying i n s t r u c t i o n which would p r o h i b i t t h e
j u r y from c o n s i d e r i n g f a i l u r e t o m i t i g a t e a s p a r t of t h e
l i a b i l i t y negligence assessed i n t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r y .
Any c o n d u c t of t h e p l a i n t i f f i n f a i l i n g t o m i t i g a t e
damages c a n o n l y r e d u c e t h e amount of damages t o be r e c o v e r e d .
Such f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e p l a i n t i f f c a n n e v e r be
c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i a b i l i t y p a r t of t h e c a s e . Here t h e
t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d because t h e t r i a l c o u r t permitted t h e jury
t o u s e p l a i n t i f f ' s a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e t o m i t i g a t e a s p a r t of
p l a i n t i f f ' s n e g l i g e n c e under t h e c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e
statute. I n t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t answer t o " q u e s t i o n No. 4 "
t h e j u r y found t h e p l a i n t i f f t o b e g u i l t y o f 85% of t h e
t o t a l negligence. Under t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r y
was p e r m i t t e d t o i n c l u d e , w i t h i n t h e 85% a s s i g n m e n t , c o n d u c t
of t h e p l a i n t i f f i n f a i l i n g t o m i t i g a t e damages. T h i s , of
c o u r s e , was e r r o r .
I a g r e e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t a j u r y v e r d i c t c a n n o t be
impeached by way of a f f i d a v i t , a s was done h e r e . The t r i a l
c o u r t g r a n t e d a new t r i a l f o r t h e wrong r e a s o n . However,
t h e r e i s c l e a r e r r o r i n r e c o r d which j u s t i f i e s t h e g r a n t i n g
of a new t r i a l . T h e r e f o r e , I would a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
a c t i o n and remand f o r p r o c e e d i n g s i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h i s
dissent.