No. 80-405
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
ROBERT CHARLES JACKSON,
D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n .
H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h B . Gary, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
D e n n i s Dunphy a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
Donald W h i t e , County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana
Filed: VQ.I
a,, a,.rY
h, -
M i c h a e l J . L i l l y a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y ,
Bozeman, Montana
F o r Respondent:
Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana
James Goetz a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana
3.
Submitted:
Decided:
February 1 9 , 1981
Novenber 2 , 1981
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The State appeals from an order of the Gallatin County
District Court which declared section 61-8-404, MCA uncon-
stitutional and suppressed all evidence of the defendant's
refusal to submit to a breathalyzer sobriety test after he
was arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicants.
The primary question on appeal is whether the refusal is
testimonial in nature so that the fact of refusal cannot be
admitted into evidence. We hold that such refusal is testimonial
in nature and that to admit evidence of the fact of refusal
would violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and would
further violate defendant's privilege as guaranteed by Art. 11,
B 25 of the Montana Constitution.
A second question raised, but which we do not reach
here because of our holding, is defendant's contention that
admission of evidence of his refusal to take the breathalyzer
test violates his right to due process because he was not
told the consequences of his refusal. Without specifically
setting forth the actual basis for its decision, the trial
court granted the motion in limine, and thus suppressed all
evidence of the defendant's refusal to take the breathalyzer
test.
Shortly after the defendant's arrest on June 6, 1980,
for driving while under the influence of alcohol, he was
taken to the Bozeman police station and asked to submit to a
breathalyzer test and to perform certain physical coordination
exercises. He performed the coordination exercises, but refused
to submit to the breathalyzer test. The police recorded all
of his activities on videotape, including his refusal to
take the breathalyzer test.
- 2-
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to
suppress all evidence of his refusal to submit to the breath-
alyzer test as well as any evidence of license suspension
resulting from that refusal. Section 61-8-404(2), MCA,
states that if one refuses to submit to a sobriety test, the
fact of refusal can be admitted into evidence against him.
However, section 61-8-402(3), MCA, permits a person to
refuse a sobriety test. Defendant argued that admitting evidence
of his refusal to take the sobriety test would violate his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to due
process. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in
limine .
Although the defendant concedes he has no federal
constitutional right to refuse a sobriety test (see Schmerber
v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d
908), he contends that section 61-8-404(2), MCA, in one
breath gives him a right to refuse the sobriety test, but in
the next breath permits the fact of refusal to be admitted as
evidence against him. This statutory right of refusal is
testimonial or communicative in nature, he argues, and was
compelled by the State. He further argues that evidence of
his refusal violates his privilege against being compelled
to testify against himself, and is equivalent to allowing
prosecutorial comment on his right to remain silent.
The State argues, on the other hand, that the refusal
is not testimonial or communicative in nature, and therefore
it is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
The State cites a line of cases which holds that the refusal
to take a sobriety test is conduct to be viewed as circumstantial
evidence of guilt, in the same way that escape, flight, and
false alibi are viewed. For example, see Commonwealth v.
Robinson (1974), 229 Pa. Super. 131, 324 A.2d 441 (refusal
is circumstantial evidence from which the jury can infer his
state of mind) ; People v. Sudduth (1966), 65 Cal.2d 543, 55
Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401, cert.denied (1967), 389 U.S. 850
(where refusal might operate to suppress rapidly-disappearing
evidence of intoxication, it should not be encouraged as a
device to escape prosecution and does not qualify for Fifth
Amendment protection); State v. Durrant (1963), 55 Del. 510,
188 A.2d 526 (evidence of refusal reflects defendant's attitude
toward the crime and is a matter of weight for the jury to
decide). The fact is, however, that this line of cases
fails to recognize that escape, flight, and false alibi are
not compelled by the State. Under section 61-8-404(2),
supra, the defendant is compelled to choose between providing
physical evidence against himself by submitting to the
sobriety test and providing testimonial evidence against
himself by refusing to submit to the sobriety test. That is
no choice at all.
The statute which recognizes the right to refuse the
test, section 61-8-404, MCA, also provides for the admissibility
of the fact of refusal:
"(1) Upon the trial of any criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been
committed by any person while driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, evidence of the
amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time
of the act alleged as shown by a chemical analysis of
his blood, breath, or urine is admissible.
" (2) If the person under arrest refused to submit to
the test as hereinabove provided, proof of refusal
shall be admissible in any criminal action or proceeding
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was driving or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor."
Many states have held that admitting evidence of a
defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test violates the
privilege against self-incrimination because the effect of
admitting evidence of the defendant's refusal is equivalent
to compelling the defendant to testify against himself.
See, for example, State v. Adams (W.Va 1978), 247 S.E.2d 475;
Dudley v. State (Tex.Cr.App.Ct. 1977), 548 S.W.2d 706; People
v. Rodriguez (1975), 80 Misc.2d 1060, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786;
Application of Baggett (Okla. 1974), 531 P.2d 1011; State v.
- 1 ,
(1974), 419 U.S. 881; Johnson v. State (1972), 125 Ga. 607,
188 S.E.2d 416; Gay v. City of Orlando (Fla. D.C.App. 1967),
202 So.2d 896, cert.denied (1968), 390 U.S. 956. We agree
with these decisions that not only does admission of such
evidence violate the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination, but also that the admission of such evidence
is not always reliable and is highly prejudicial to the
defendant, in effect forcing him to take the witness stand
to explain why he refused to take the test, or to bear the
consequences of not explaining.
Without question, the fact of refusal to take a sobriety
test will be considered as circumstantial evidence of the
defendant's belief that the test results would have been
incriminating, and without question that is the argument any
prosecutor would make to the jury. Effectively, the evidence
of refusal has substantially the same effect in the prosecution's
case as the evidence the prosecution sought to obtain through
the resisted examination. Evidence of a defendant's refusal,
whether expressed verbally or by physical resistance, is
relevant in its testimonial aspect as the equivalent of the
statement, "Because I fear that the test will produce evidence
of my guilt, I refuse to take the test." 78 Yale L. J.
1074, 1082-1085 (1969). And the likelihood is strong that
the jury will ascribe undue weight to the defendant's refusal.
We analogize this to a situation where the State
offers a defendant a polygraph examination, but the defendant
refuses it. Surely, the State would like to argue to the
jury that it had offered the defendant a polygraph examination,
but that he refused. And just as surely, we doubt that any
court would not find this to be an improper invasion into the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. In either
situation, the inference left for the jury is that the defendant
displayed consciousness of his guilt. Such evidence is
inadmissible if it is compelled by the State.
In addition, a defendant may have valid reasons for
refusing a breathalyzer test--reasons which do not reflect
his consciousness of guilt. Yet, if the fact of his refusal
is admitted into evidence, he will be compelled to either
take the witness stand to explain his refusal or to take the
chance that the jury will infer that he was in fact under
the influence of alcohol. Several cases illustrate situations
in which the defendant refused to submit to the test for
reasons other than fear that the test would yield evidence
of guilt: State ex rel. Baumert v. Municipal Court of
Phoenix (1978), 119 Ariz. 142, 579 P.2d 1112 (failure to
take test was due to defendant's asthma); State v. Adams
(W.Va. 1978), 247 S.E.2d 475 (defendant may fear the test
itself or may distrust the procedure or the competency of
the testers); State v. Paschal (1961), 253 N.C. 795, 117
S.E.2d 749 (defendant feared he would have to pay for the
test); Engler v. State (Okla. Crim. 1957), 316 P.2d 625 (bona
fide doubts as to reliability of test); and Columbus v. Mullins
(1954), 162 Ohio St. 419, 123 N.E.2d 422 (defendant desired
presence of a doctor.) In each of these cases, it was held
that admitting evidence of defendant's refusal to take the
test violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
The likelihood of prejudice to a defendant increases if
he had an innocent reason for refusing the test, but, for
other reasons, exercises his privilege not to take the
witness stand and testify why he did not submit to the test.
On one hand, the defendant would be entitled to an instruction
that the jury is not to make inferences against the defendant
because of his failure to take the witness stand. See, Griffin
v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d
106, reh.denied (1965), 381 U.S. 957. On the other hand, the
jury would be instructed that it could consider all circumstan-
tial evidence including the defendant's failure to submit
to the test, even though the defendant had the statutory right
to refuse the test. The effect, however, of the statutory right
to refuse the test is that it provides an unfair choice:
the defendant may either voluntarily submit to the test or
he may refuse, and, in the eyes of the jury, admit that he
could not successfully pass the test. It is manifestly
unfair to give an individual a right to refuse the test, and
then to impose substantially the same penalty for refusing
as that for submitting to the test.
The statutory right to refuse to take the test is perhaps
a legislative expression that citizens should be protected
from a distasteful struggle to forceably obtain physical evidence
from their bodies. In Schmerber, supra, the United States
Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
protects a defendant from being compelled to testify against
himself, or to otherwise provide evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature. The Court ruled, however, only that the
results of a blood test administered to a defendant despite his
objection were admissible because blood test results were
real, physical evidence, rather than evidence of a testimonial
nature.
The issue of whether a refusal to submit to a breath-
alyzer test could be admitted as evidence without violating
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege was also raised in
Schmerber, but the Court refused to rule on that issue because
the defendant had not preserved that issue for appeal. Even
so, the Court indicated in a now famous footnote that the issue
would be controlled by general Fifth Amendment principles rather
than on the narrow ground that prosecutorial comment on the
defendant's refusal amounted to comment on his choice to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege not to take the witness stand.
Schmerber, supra.
The issue is also controlled by Art. 11, 5 25 of our
own constitution, which provides that "No person shall be
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding."
The issue involves a communication that is testimonial in
nature, and we must resolve the issue by applying Art. 11, 5
25. Clearly, to permit evidence of defendant's refusal to
take the breathalyzer test would violate not only the United
States Constitution, but also our own constitution.
In State v. Finley (1977), 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d
1119, we held that a defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination was not violated by admitting into evidence a
videotape recording of his post-arrest words and actions.
We decided that the tape had not been introduced for the
incriminating content of the words uttered by the defendant,
but rather for the purpose of aiding the jury in understanding
the testimony of the witnesses who had observed the defendant's
unsteady walk and his slurred speech after his arrest. We
specifically noted that the videotape did not contain
incriminating responses to interrogation by the police. But
the same situation does not exist here. It is obvious that
defendant's refusal is inherently self-incriminating because
it carries a strong inference of guilt-the prosecutor would
surely argue that defendant's refusal to take the test was
prompted only by his knowledge that the test results would
reveal his intoxication, and therefore incriminate him.
We hold under our own constitution, that if a communication
of refusal, whether written, verbal, or otherwise, involves
the defendant's consciousness of the facts and the operation
of his mind in expressing it, the communication is testimonial
in nature. A defendant's silence or negative reply to an
officer's request which calls for an immediate reply is
clearly an overt communication of the defendant's thoughts in
response to the request. Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S.
610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91. It is the act of refusal
that is pertinent and suggestive of guilt, rather than the
way in which it is communicated. Under our constitution,
the privilege against self-incrimination forbids any compulsory
communication of an accused person's thoughts, whether by
acts or words spoken, and the fact that it does not extend
its protection to forbid the compulsory exhibition of physical
characteristics does not nullify the protection it does
provide.
In deciding this issue, we are mindful of a statement
of the United States Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor (1964), 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84
S.Ct. 1594, 1596-1597, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681, where the Court
cogently spelled out that the nature of our criminal justice
system reflects:
"[Olur preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government ... in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load,'
(citations omitted); our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life,' (citations omitted); . . . and our
realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter
to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.'"
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be liberally
construed in favor of the accused, Hoffman v. United States
(1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118,
1124, and we must also liberally construe Art. 11, 5 25,
of our own constitution.
We affirm the decision of the trial court suppressing
evidence of defendant's refusal to take the breathalyzer
test, and at his trial, we direct,that the prosecution shall
not directly or indirectly submit evidence to the jury that
the defendant was offered but refused to take a breathalyzer
test.
We Concur:
............................
............................
Justices
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent. I would h o l d t h e r e f u s a l o f the
d e f e n d a n t to submit t o a s o b r i e t y test a d m i s s i b l e i n evidence
a n d remand t h e case t o t h e ~ i s t r i c t o u r t o f G a l l a t i n C o u n t y f o r
C
trial. I n so d o i n g I f i n d no d e n i a l o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i -
lege against self-incrimination u n d e r e i t h e r t h e s t a t e or f e d e r a l
constitutions.
Montana's implied c o n s e n t l a w p r o v i d e s i n r e l e v a n t p a r t :
"Chemical b l o o d , b r e a t h , o r u r i n e t e s t s .
" ( 1 ) Any p e r s o n who o p e r a t e s a m o t o r v e h i c l e upon
t h e p u b l i c h i g h w a y s o f t h i s s t a t e s h a l l be
deemed t o h a v e g i v e n c o n s e n t ... to a chemical
t e s t of h i s blood, b r e a t h , or u r i n e f o r t h e pur-
p o s e o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a l c o h o l i c c o n t e n t of h i s
blood i f a r r e s t e d by a peace o f f i c e r f o r d r i v i n g
... a motor v e h i c l e while under t h e i n f l u e n c e
of intoxicating liquor ...
" ( 3 ) I f a p e r s o n u n d e r a r r e s t r e f u s e s upon t h e
r e q u e s t o f a p e a c e o f f i c e r t o s u b m i t to a chemi-
cal test ... n o n e s h a l l be g i v e n , b u t t h e
d i v i s i o n , upon t h e r e c e i p t o f a sworn r e p o r t o f t h e
p e a c e o f f i c e r t h a t h e had r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s t o
b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d p e r s o n had b e e n d r i v i n g ...
upon t h e p u b l i c h i g h w a y s o f t h i s s t a t e w h i l e
u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r and
t h a t t h e p e r s o n had r e f u s e d to s u b m i t t o t h e
t e s t upon t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e p e a c e o f f i c e r ,
s h a l l s u s p e n d t h e l i c e n s e or d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e
o f such person ... f o r a p e r i o d o f 60 d a y s ..
." S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA.
" Evidence a d m i s s i b l e .
" ( 2 ) I f t h e p e r s o n under arrest r e f u s e d t o sub-
m i t t o t h e t e s t as h e r e i n a b o v e p r o v i d e d , p r o o f
o f r e f u s a l s h a l l be a d m i s s i b l e i n a n y c r i m i n a l
a c t i o n o r proceeding a r i s i n g o u t of
a c t s a l l e g e d to have been committed w h i l e t h e
p e r s o n was d r i v i n g ... a m o t o r v e h i c l e upon t h e
p u b l i c highways w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of
intoxicating liquor. . ." S e c t i o n 61-8-404, MCA.
T h i s l a w was e n a c t e d b y t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1 9 7 1 .
The j o u r n a l o f t h e S e n a t e J u d i c i a r y Committee i n d i c a t e s t h a t a t
t h a t t i m e , Montana w a s o n e of o n l y f o u r s t a t e s w i t h o u t t h i s l a w .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e p r o v i s i o n
t h a t p r o o f o f r e f u s a l t o s u b m i t t o a s o b r i e t y t e s t was a d m i s s i b l e
i n e v i d e n c e "due t o t h e s p l i t o f a u t h o r i t y o f t h e v a r i o u s and
r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f
t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e statute!' I n so h o l d i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
d e n i e d t h e s t a t u t e t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y to which
the s t a t u t e was e n t i t l e d . M c C l a n a t h a n v. S m i t h ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont . , 606 P.2d 5 0 7 , 37 S t . R e p . 113.
I n i t i a l l y w e m u s t d e t e r m i n e i f e v i d e n c e of r e f u s a l to s u b -
m i t t o a c h e m i c a l t e s t f o r s o b r i e t y is r e l e v a n t , i . e . w h e t h e r
i t h a s s u f f i c i e n t p r o b a t i v e v a l u e on t h e i s s u e of i n t o x i c a t i o n t o
be admitted to evidence. I n my v i e w t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n e d d e c i s i o n s
h o l d t h a t r e f u s a l t o t a k e a c h e m i c a l t e s t f o r i n t o x i c a t i o n may
i n d i c a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f e a r o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e t e s t and h i s
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f g u i l t , and i f t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s some o t h e r
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e r e f u s a l , s u c h e x p l a n a t i o n c a n be c o n s i d e r e d
b y t h e j u r y i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e f u s a l is to be c o n s t r u e d
as consciousness of g u i l t . F o r e x a m p l e , see H i l l v . S t a t e
(1979)r Ala . 366 S0.2d 318; C a m p b e l l v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t
( 1 9 7 1 1 , 1 0 6 A r i z . 5 4 2 , 479 P.2d 685; People v. Conterno ( 1 9 5 9 ) ,
1 7 0 C.A.2d 8 1 7 , 339 P.2d 9 6 8 ; S t a t e v. D u r r a n t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 5 5 Del.
5 1 0 , 1 8 8 A.2d 5 2 6 ; S t a t e v. Bock ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 8 0 I d a h o 296, 328 p.2d
1 0 6 5 ; S t a t e v. Benson ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 230 Iowa 1 1 6 8 , 3 0 0 N.W. 275;
G a r d n e r v. Commonwealth ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 1 9 5 V a . 9 4 5 , 8 1 S.E.2d 614. It
would a p p e a r t o m e t h a t s u c h e v i d e n c e c o u l d s u p p o r t a n i n f e r e n c e
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f g u i l t and t h a t t h e j u r y is t h e p r o p e r b o d y t o
d e t e r m i n e w h a t w e i g h t s h o u l d be g i v e n s u c h e v i d e n c e .
T h e r e is y e t a n o t h e r r e a s o n why t h i s e v i d e n c e is r e l e v a n t .
The S t a t e is e n t i t l e d to show t h e j u r y why it p r o d u c e d n o s c i e n -
t i £ic evidence o f i n t o x i c a t i o n to c o u n t e r a c t t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t
t h e e v i d e n c e o f i n t o x i c a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d b y t h e S t a t e w a s weak. A
common j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n i n Montana r e a d s as f o l l o w s :
" You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t e v i d e n c e is t o be
c o n s i d e r e d n o t o n l y by i t s own i n t r i n s i c weight,
b u t a l s o a c c o r d i n g to t h e e v i d e n c e which i t is
i n t h e power o f o n e s i d e t o p r o d u c e , and of t h e
o t h e r t o c o n t r a d i c t ; and t h e r e f o r e , t h a t if
w e a k e r and less s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e i s
o f f e r e d , when it a p p e a r s t h a t s t r o n g e r and more
s a t i s f a c t o r y [ e v i d e n c e ] was w i t h i n t h e power o f
t h e party, the evidence offered should
b e viewed w i t h d i s t r u s t . " M J I G No. 1.06.
I n t h i s s e n s e e v i d e n c e o f r e f u s a l is r e l e v a n t , m a t e r i a l
a n d p r o b a t i v e on t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d b y t h e S t a t e ,
e n t i r e l y a p a r t from i t s r e l e v a n c e c o n c e r n i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
guilt.
Most o f t h e d e c i s i o n s d e n y i n g m a t e r i a l i t y and p r o b a t i v e
v a l u e t o a r e f u s a l t o t a k e a s o b r i e t y t e s t are b a s e d o n t h e
r e a s o n i n g t h a t a r e f u s a l may be d e p e n d e n t upon r e a s o n s o t h e r
t h a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f g u i l t and t h e r e f o r e is n o t p r o b a t i v e as to
intoxication. One case h a s e v e n h e l d t h a t e v i d e n c e o f r e f u s a l is
i n a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e s u c h e v i d e n c e s i m p l y is n o t p r o b a t i v e .
Duckworth v. S t a t e (0kla.Crim. 1 9 5 7 ) 309 P.2d 1 1 0 3 . I n my v i e w
e v i d e n c e o f r e f u s a l i s p r o b a t i v e and m a t e r i a l f o r t h e r e a s o n s
a b o v e s t a t e d and s h o u l d be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y f o r t h e i r con-
s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n e x c l u d e d from e v i d e n c e by t h e j u d g e a s a
matter of l a w . E v i d e n c e as to w h e t h e r a p e r s o n ' s r e f u s a l t o t a k e
t h e s o b r i e t y t e s t is d u e t o h i s a s t h m a , f e a r o f t h e t e s t i t s e l f ,
d i s t r u s t of t h e p r o c e d u r e , d i s t r u s t of t h e competency of t h e
t e s t e r s , f e a r t h a t h e would h a v e t o p a y f o r t h e t e s t , d o u b t s
a s t o t h e t e s t ' s r e l i a b i l i t y , or a d e s i r e t h a t h i s p e r s o n a l phy-
s i c i a n be p r e s e n t a t t h e t i m e t h e t e s t is c o n d u c t e d is b e t t e r
w e i g h e d by t h e j u r y r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g e x c l u d e d by t h e j u d g e as
not relevant or probative.
The F i f t h Amendment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o -
v i d e s t h a t "No p e r s o n . . . shall be c o m p e l l e d i n a n y c r i m i n a l
case t o be a w i t n e s s a g a i n s t h i m s e l f . . ." U.S. C o n s t . Amend. V.
T h i s p r o v i s i o n is a p p l i c a b l e i n s t a t e c o u r t c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s
t h r o u g h , t h e d u e p r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e pro-
t e c t s a d e f e n d a n t o n l y from b e i n g c o m p e l l e d t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t
h i m s e l f , or o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e t h e s t a t e w i t h e v i d e n c e of a testi-
m o n i a l or c o m m u n i c a t i v e n a t u r e . S c h m e r b e r v. C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,
384 U.S. 757. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n S c h m e r b e r went
o n to s a y :
" [ B l o t h f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o u r t s h a v e u s u a l l y h e l d
t h a t i t o f f e r s no p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t c o m p u l s i o n
t o submit to f i n g e r p r i n t i n g , p h o t o g r a p h i n g , or
m e a s u r e m e n t s , t o w r i t e or s p e a k f o r
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t o a p p e a r i n c o u r t , to s t a n d , to
a s s u m e a s t a n c e , t o w a l k , o r t o make a p a r -
t i c u l a r gesture." S c h m e r b e r , 384 U.S. a t 7 6 4 .
The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s : "No p e r s o n s h a l l be
compelled to t e s t i f y a g a i n s t himself i n a c r i m i n a l proceeding."
1972 Mont.Const., Art. I1 , 525. T h i s Court h a s p r e v i o u s l y held
t h a t t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f -
i n c r i m i n a t i o n is no g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e f e d e r a l
constitution .
" [TI h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e of t h e
p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n a f f o r d s no
b r o a d e r p r o t e c t i o n to a n accused t h a n d o e s t h e
F i f t h Amendment. S t a t e v. A r m s t r o n g , 1 7 0 Mont.
2 5 6 , 552 P.2d 616. The o p i n i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , t h e r e f o r e , d e l i n e a t e t h e
maximum b r e a d t h o f t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f -
i n c r i m i n a t i o n i n Montana." S t a t e v. F i n l e y
( 1 9 7 7 ) t 1 7 3 Mont. 1 6 2 , 164-1651 5 6 6 P.2d 1 1 1 9 ,
1121.
The m a j o r i t y h o l d i n g t h a t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f r e f u s a l ,
w h e t h e r w r i t t e n , v e r b a l , o r o t h e r w i s e i n v o l v i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t as
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e f a c t s and t h e o p e r a t i o n o f h i s mind i n
e x p r e s s i n g it is t e s t i m o n i a l i n n a t u r e and v i o l a t e s h i s p r i v i l e g e
against self-incrimination, e x t e n d s f a r beyond a n y p r o u n o u n c e m e n t
o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t to d a t e . It extends the
b r e a d t h o f Montanaa s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n beyond t h a t a f f o r d e d
b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and o v e r r u l e s s u b s i l e n t 0 t h i s
C o u r t a s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Montanaas c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e
against self-incrimination.
A t least t w o f e d e r a l c o u r t s of a p p e a l have h e l d t h a t
a l l o w i n g t h e a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e of proof t h a t d e f e n d a n t
r e f u s e d to t a k e a b r e a t h test does not v i o l a t e h i s p r i v i l e g e
against self-incrimination. Welch v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f V e r m o n t
Unit, Etc. (2d C i r . 1979) 594 F.2d 9 0 3 ; Newhouse v. M i s t e r l y
( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , 415 F.2d 514. The c o u r t s o f a t l e a s t 1 6 o t h e r
states have l i k e w i s e s o held: H i l l v. State (1979), Ala . I
366 So.2d 3 1 8 ; C a m p b e l l v. S u p e r i o r Court (1971), 106 Ariz. 542,
479 P.2d 6 8 5 ; P e o p l e v. Sudduth ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421
P.2d 401; S t a t e v . D u r r a n t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 5 5 Del. 5 1 0 , 1 8 8 A.2d 526;
S t a t e v . H o l t ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 2 6 1 Iowa 1 0 8 9 , 1 5 6 N.W.2d 884; S t a t e v.
Smith ( 1 9 7 8 ) , La. , 359 So.2d 1 5 7 ; P e o p l e v. T a y l o r
S
( 1 9 7 7 ) , 7 3 Mich.App. 1 3 9 , 250 N.W.2d 570; S t a t e v. MeintX
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 8 9 Neb. 2 6 4 , 202 N.W.2d 2 0 2 ; P e o p l e v. Thomas ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 46
N.Y.2d 1 0 0 , 385 N.E.2d 584,' S t a t e v. F l a n n e r y ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 3 1 N.C.App.
6 1 7 , 230 S.E.2d 6 0 3 ; C i t y o f W e s t e r v i l l e v . Cunningham ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5
Ohio St.2d 1 2 1 , 239 N.E.2d 40; Commonwealth v. R o b i n s o n ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,
229 P a . S u p e r . 1 3 1 , 324 A.2d 441; S t a t e v. S m i t h ( 1 9 5 6 ) r 230 S.C.
1 6 4 , 94 S.E.2d 8 8 6 ; G a r d n e r v. Commonwealth ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 1 9 5 V a . 9 4 5 ,
8 1 S.E.2d 6 1 4 ; S t a t e v. B r e a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 1 3 6 V t . 1 4 7 , 3 8 5 A.2d 1085;
S t a t e v. A l b r i g h t ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 98 Wis.2d 6 6 3 , 298 N.W.2d 196. At
l e a s t f i v e o t h e r s t a t e s w i t h s t a t u t e s t h e same o r s i m i l a r to
Montanas have been h e l d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , Robinson, H i l l , S m i t h ,
H o l t , and Thomas, s u p r a .
Wigmore i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f -
i n c r i m i n a t i o n d o e s n o t p r o h i b i t i n s p e c t i o n o r proof of b o d i l y
f e a t u r e s or c o n d i t i o n s b e c a u s e s u c h are n o n t e s t i m o n i a l i n n a t u r e
and l i s t t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e s o r c a t e g o r i e s of t h i s n o n p r o h i b i t e d
evidence :
1. F i n g e r p r i n t i n g , m e a s u r i n g and p h o t o g r a p h i n g a s u s p e c t ,
2. I m p r i n t i n g a f o o t o r s h o e mark f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;
3. Examination of a s u s p e c t ' s body f o r i d e n t i f y i n g
characteristics;
4. Examination of a s u s p e c t ' s p r i v a t e p a r t s f o r e v i d e n c e
o f d i s e a s e or crime;
5. E x t r a c t i o n o f a s u b s t a n c e from a s u s p e c t ' s b o d y s u c h
as u r i n e , a blood s a m p l e , o r b r e a t h ;
6. R e q u i r i n g a s u s p e c t t o p u t on a h a t , g l a s s e s , s h o e s or
c l o t h i n g f o r purposes of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;
7. R e q u i r i n g a s u s p e c t to s p e a k f o r v o i c e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;
8. Requiring a s u s p e c t t o write f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;
9. R e q u i r i n g a s u s p e c t t o a p p e a r i n c o u r t , s t a n d , assume
a s t a n c e , w a l k , or make a p a r t i c u l a r g e s t u r e ;
10. R e q u i r i n g a s u s p e c t to be examined f o r s a n i t y .
Wigmore on E v i d e n c e , V o l . 8 , s e c t i o n 2 2 6 5 , McNaughton
R e v i s i o n 1961.
A f e d e r a l c o u r t of appeal h a s held t h a t evidence of a
defendantm r e f u s a l t o cooperate i n giving a handwriting
s
e x e m p l a r , i n c l u d i n g h i s e f f o r t s to d i s g u i s e h i s h a n d w r i t i n g , w a s
a d m i s s i b l e a s a g a i n s t t h e claim t h a t t h e a c t of r e f u s a l w a s
i t s e l f testimonial in nature. U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W o l f i s h ( 2 d C i r .
1 9 7 5 ) , 5 2 5 F.2d 457, c e r t . d e n i e d ( 1 9 7 6 ) 423 U.S. 1 0 5 9 . The ana-
l o g y d r a w n by t h e m a j o r i t y w i t h r e f e r e n c e to p o l y g r a p h t e s t s is
i n a p p o s i t e i n a s m u c h as p o l y g r a p h t e s t s are n o t a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i -
d e n c e and t h e r e f o r e t h e r e f u s a l to t a k e t h e same would n o t be
probative. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e r e
i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o s u b m i t to a b l o o d t e s t ,
and t h e r e s u l t s of such t e s t taken a g a i n s t an accused I s w i l l are
a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l , Schmerber, supra.
The m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s c o n s i d e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n h a v e h e l d
t h a t a d m i s s i o n i n e v i d e n c e o f r e f u s a l t o s u b m i t to a c h e m i c a l
test f o r i n t o x i c a t i o n does not v i o l a t e the p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t
self-incrimination; t h i s r e s u l t is r e a c h e d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t a n
a c c u s e d h a s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o r e f u s e a che-
m i c a l t e s t , and s i n c e t h e r e s u l t s o f a t e s t t a k e n a g a i n s t h i s
w i l l a r e a d m i s s i b l e , e v i d e n c e o f r e f u s a l would a l s o be
admissible. S e e H i l l v. S t a t e , s u p r a . C o n v e r s e l y , most s t a t e s t h a t
r e c o g n i z e a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to r e f u s e a chemical t e s t do n o t
a l l o w e v i d e n c e of such r e f u s a l a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , e. g ., S t a t e v.
P a r k e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 Wash.App. 6 3 2 , 5 5 8 P.2d 1 3 6 1 ; S t a t e v. Adams
(1978)I W.Va. , 247 S.E.2d 475.
A r e f u s a l by i t s e l f is n o t a t e s t i m o n i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n
w i t h i n t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n
b u t r a t h e r it is t h e a c t o f r e f u s a l , i . e . , c o n d u c t , which g i v e s
r i s e t o i n f e r e n c e s t h a t a j u r y i s e n t i t l e d to c o n s i d e r . The
f o l l o w i n g language d e s c r i b e s t h e r e a s o n i n g behind t h i s conclu-
sion:
"Nor was d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o ' d i s p l a y h i s
v o i c e ' i t s e l f a t e s t i m o n i a l communication. It
was c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
g u i l t , and l i k e s i m i l a r e v i d e n c e , s u c h as e s c a p e
from c u s t o d y
.
... false alibi
s u p p r e s s i o n of e v i d e n c e ...
... flight
and f a i l u r e to
..
r e s p o n d t o a c c u s a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s when n o t i n
police custody ... its admission does not
violate the privilege. M o r e o v e r , as i n t h e
foregoing examples, t h e evidence d i d not r e s u l t
from a s i t u a t i o n c o n t r i v e d t o produce conduct
i n d i c a t i v e of g u i l t . .. By a c t i n g l i k e a g u i l t y
p e r s o n , a man d o e s n o t t e s t i f y to h i s g u i l t b u t
m e r e l y exposes himself t o t h e drawing of
i n f e r e n c e s from c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e of h i s
s t a t e o f mind." P e o p l e v. E l l i s ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 55
C a l . R p t r . 3 8 5 , 4 2 1 P.2d 3 9 3 , 397-398.
The m a j o r i t y p r o c e e d o n what I c o n s i d e r a f a l s e p r e m i s e - -
t h a t Montana's implied c o n s e n t s t a t u t e g r a n t s d e f e n d a n t a s t a t u -
t o r y r i g h t to r e f u s e t o t a k e t h e s o b r i e t y t e s t . The m a j o r i t y
make no a n a l y s i s o f t h e s t a t u t e o r t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y
construction.
I n my v i e w t h e p l a i n and unambiguous l a n g u a g e o f t h e sta-
tute belies t h i s construction. I f i n d no l a n g u a g e i n t h e
s t a t u t e , express o r implied, granting a person a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t
of refusal. The l a n g u a g e p l a i n l y s a y s t h a t a p e r s o n o p e r a t i n g a
m o t o r v e h i c l e on t h e p u b l i c highway g i v e s h i s c o n s e n t to a s o b r i e t y
t e s t i f a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g a v e h i c l e while under t h e in£ l u e n c e
o f i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r ; i f he r e f u s e s , n o t e s t s h a l l be g i v e n ,
b u t p r o o f o f s u c h r e f u s a l is a d m i s s i b l e i n a n y c r i m i n a l a c t i o n
a r i s i n g o u t of h i s a c t s a l l e g e d t o have been committed w h i l e
d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e . The m a j o r i t y f a i l to p o i n t o u t a n y
l a n g u a g e i n t h e s t a t u t e g r a n t i n g a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of r e f u s a l .
I t h a s l o n g b e e n t h e l a w i n Montana t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f the
~ e g i s l a t u r em u s t f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n meaning o f
t h e w o r d s u s e d , and i f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e c a n be s o
d e t e r m i n e d t h e c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y a n y o t h e r
means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S t a t e , ~ t c v.
. District Court, ~ t c .
(1979)I Mon t . , 5 9 1 P.2d 6 5 6 , 36 S t . R e p . 4 8 9 ; Dunphy v .
Anaconda Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d 6 6 0 , and cases
cited therein. Where t h e l a n g u a g e o f a s t a t u t e is p l a i n ,
u n a m b i g u o u s , d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e s p e a k s f o r i t s e l f
a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g l e f t f o r t h e C o u r t t o c o n s t r u e . State, Etc.
v . District Court, E t c . , supra; D o u l l v. W o h l s c h l a g e r ( 1 9 6 3 )
"75g
141 Mont. 3 5 4 , 377 P.2d Montana Chap., Nat. Elec. Con.
A s s ' n v . S t a t e Bd. o f E d . . ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 1 3 7 Mont. 3 8 2 , 3 5 2 P.2d 258.
The f u n c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t i s s i m p l y t o a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e w h a t
i n terms o r s u b s t a n c e is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s t a t u t e and n o t t o
i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d or o m i t what h a s been i n s e r t e d .
S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA.
M o n t a n a l a i m p l i e d c o n s e n t l a w a d o p t s a s t a t u t o r y scheme
w h e r e b y a p e r s o n u s i n g t h e p u b l i c highway i m p l i e d l y c o n s e n t s to a
c h e m i c a l t e s t i n g o f h i s b l o o d , b r e a t h or u r i n e when l a w f u l l y
a r r e s t e d f o r an o f f e n s e i n v o l v i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor
v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . The
A c t c o n t a i n s a s t a t u t o r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n of intoxication according
t o t h e p e r c e n t b y w e i g h t o f a l c o h o l found i n a p e r s o n ' s b l o o d .
The A c t p r o v i d e s p r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e s u s p e n s i o n of a p e r s o n ' s
d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e f o r 60 d a y s i n t h e e v e n t h e r e f u s e s t o s u b m i t t o
such test. The A c t e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e s f o r a d m i s s i o n i n e v i d e n c e
o f r e f u s a l to submit t o t h e test.
An a c t o f t h i s t y p e was f i r s t e n a c t e d i n N e w York i n 1 9 5 3
a n d arose o u t o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s p r o -
t e c t i n g a g a i n s t i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v e r s by e i t h e r making c h e m i c a l
t e s t s c o m p u l s o r y or r e q u i r i n g a c t u a l c o n s e n t i n t h e form of a
w r i t t e n w a i v e r made a t t h e t i m e o f a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d r i v e r ' s
license. The N e w York A c t was n o t i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e a r i g h t t o
r e f u s e a c h e m i c a l t e s t e v e n t h o u g h by t h e terms o f t h e a c t t h e
p o l i c e m u s t a c q u i e s c e i n a r e f u s a l and may n o t compel a p e r s o n t o
submit t o a test a g a i n s t h i s w i l l .
T h i s type of s t a t u t e provides f o r mandatory c o n s e n t with a
freedom o f r e f u s a l to p r e v e n t unseemly s t r u g g l e s t h a t are l i k e l y
t o a r i s e when p o l i c e and c i t i z e n s f a i l to a p p r e c i a t e t h e i m p o r t
o f a common p u r p o s e . An a c t o f t h i s t y p e d o e s n o t c o n t e m p l a t e a
p e se
-r- r i g h t o f r e f u s a l , b u t r a t h e r a n a c q u i e s c e n c e i n r e f u s a l i n
t h e posture of avoiding v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s . The N e w York c o u r t s
have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e a c t i n t h i s m a t t e r :
" [ T l h i s ' r i g h t ' o f r e f u s a l is n o t r e a l l y a r i g h t i n
t h e sense of a fundamental p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e ,
b u t , r a t h e r , was m e r e l y a n accommodation t o
avoid a d i s t a s t e f u l struggle t o f o r c i b l y take
blood." P e o p l e v . P a d d o c k ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 29 N.Y.2d
5 0 4 , 272 N.E.2d 486.
O t h e r c o u r t s h a v e r e a c h e d t h e same r e s u l t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g
s u b s t a n t i a l l y similar acts. C a m p b e l l , s u p r a ; Bush v. Bright
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 7 1 Cal.Rptr. 123. A c t s of t h i s type
d o n o t g r a n t a r i g h t of r e f u s a l s i n c e they e x a c t a p e n a l t y f o r
r e f u s a l i n t h e form o f s u s p e n s i o n o f t h e p e r s o n ' s d r i v e r ' s
l i c e n s e and i n some s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g M o n t a n a , t h e y e x t r a c t t h e
f u r t h e r p e n a l t y o f e x p r e s s l y a l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e of r e f u s a l t o be
admitted a t trial. Accordingly, I would n o t i n t e r p r e t M o n t a n a ' s
i m p l i e d c o n s e n t l a w as p r o v i d i n g a r i g h t o f r e f u s a l .
The c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may h a v e v a l i d r e a s o n s f o r
r e f u s i n g t o t a k e t h e t e s t which h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f g u i l t loses much o f i t s v i t a l i t y b e c a u s e s u c h
reasons, i f t h e y e x i s t i n f a c t , c a n e a s i l y be p r o v e n by t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f t h i r d p e r s o n s s u c h as t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , d o c t o r s ,
t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s on t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f s u c h t e s t s , and o t h e r
competent w i t n e s s e s w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y of t h e d e f e n d a n t t a k i n g
t h e s t a n d h i m s e l f i f he c h o o s e s n o t to d o so.
The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f M o n t a n a ' s implied c o n s e n t l a w to g r a n t
a d r i v e r t h e s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of r e f u s a l p r o v i d e s any d e f e n d a n t i n
s u c h a case w i t h a n u n c o n s c i o n a b l e a d v a n t a g e t a n t a m o u n t to
acquittal. It e n a b l e s a defendant t o p o i n t o u t t o t h e j u r y t h a t
t h e S t a t e ( w h i c h m u s t p r o v e h i s g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t )
h a s o n l y t h e w e a k e s t o f e v i d e n c e as no s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e o f
i n t o x i c a t i o n was p r o d u c e d ; a t t h e same t i m e it d e n i e s t h e S t a t e
t h e r i g h t t o show t h a t i t s f a i l u r e t o p r o d u c e s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e
w a s d u e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o s u b m i t to a s o b r i e t y t e s t .
W e h a v e many times g i v e n l i p s e r v i c e to t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e
o b j e c t o f a c r i m i n a l t r i a l is t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t r u t h , e . g . , State
v . P e t e r s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6 Mont. 1 8 8 , 4 0 5 P.2d 642. The m a j o r i t y
t o d a y h a v e made t h i s i m p o s s i b l e by p l a c i n g a premium o n non-
d i s c l o s u r e o f r e l e v a n t f a c t s to t h e j u r y .
F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , I would h o l d t h e e v i d e n c e of
r e f u s a l to submit t o a s o b r i e t y test a d m i s s i b l e without v i o l a t i o n
of t h e defendantt s p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n under t h e
f e d e r a l or s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s .
Chief J u s t i c e
W e c o n c u r i n t h e f o r g o i n g d i s s e n t of t h e Chief ~ u s t i c e .