Reece v. Pierce Flooring

No. 80-463
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

MICHAEL L. REECE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

PIERCE FLOORING,
a Montana Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone.
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Charles E. Snyder, Billings, Montana
For Respondent :
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings,
Montana

Submitted on briefs: June 17, 1981
B)CT
Decided: -. 1 3 1981
QG7 J
Filed :-
Mr. C h i e f ~ u s t i c eF r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e
Court.

I n an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t o f Yellowstone County g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r

o f d e f e n d a n t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s
case-in-chief . p l a i n t i f f M i c h a e l Reece a p p e a l s .

Reece, a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r w o r k i n g u n d e r t h e b u s i n e s s

name of M & R E n t e r p r i s e s , had b e e n a c u s t o m e r o f P i e r c e F l o o r i n g

s i n c e 1972. On A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece owed P i e r c e F l o o r i n g

$ l r 2 0 1 . 2 0 f o r c a r p e t i n s t a l l e d a t 807 S a d d l e rive and $ 1 , 3 7 2 . 8 0
f o r c a r p e t i n g i n s t a l l e d a t 134 Lantana Drive. Reece owed P i e r c e

F l o o r i n g a t o t a l o f $ 2 , 7 4 4 . 5 6 o n t h e two a c c o u n t s , i n c l u d i n g
interest.
B e f o r e Reece l e f t f o r v a c a t i o n on A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , h e
wrote a c h e c k to P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and a s k e d h i s m o t h e r t o d e l i v e r
i t f o r him. I n t e n d i n g t o p a y o n l y t h e amount owed o n t h e S a d d l e

D r i v e a c c o u n t b u t n o t r e c a l l i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a m o u n t , h e wrote
o u t a b l a n k c h e c k t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , n o t i n g as a m e m o "807
Saddle Drive." H e t h e n a s k e d h i s m o t h e r to f i n d o u t t h e amount

owed o n t h e S a d d l e D r i v e a c c o u n t , f i l l i n t h a t amount o n t h e
c h e c k , and g i v e it t o p i e r c e F l o o r i n g .
When R e e c e ' s m o t h e r went t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g , s h e t a l k e d t o
a n e m p l o y e e a t t h e f r o n t d e s k and a s k e d how much was owed o n t h e
Saddle Drive account. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Reece's
m o t h e r , s h e was t h e n t o l d t h a t s h e would h a v e t o p a y t h e e n t i r e
a m o u n t f o r b o t h t h e S a d d l e D r i v e and t h e L a n t a n a D r i v e a c c o u n t s

o r e l s e P i e r c e F l o o r i n g would p l a c e l i e n s o n t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s .
C o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e p o s s i b l e l i e n s , Reece's m o t h e r made t h e c h e c k
o u t f o r $2,744.56 t h e e n t i r e amount owed o n b o t h a c c o u n t s to
P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e amount owed o n t h e S a d d l e
Drive account.

The c h e c k was r e t u r n e d f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s . Reece's

mother t o l d h e r son about t h e circumstances surrounding h e r d e l i -
v e r y o f t h e c h e c k when h e r e t u r n e d from v a c a t i o n i n e a r l y

September. H e knew t h a t t h e c h e c k had n o t c l e a r e d when he

r e c e i v e d h i s b a n k s t a t e m e n t i n mid-September . From m i d - S e p t e m b e r
t o h i s a r r e s t on November 2 7 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece made no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t
w i t h P i e r c e F l o o r i n g and t o o k no a c t i o n t o p a y h i s a c c o u n t .

On S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 7 7 , P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f i l e d l i e n s o n b o t h
t h e S a d d l e D r i v e and t h e L a n t a n a D r i v e p r o p e r t i e s . In e a r l y

O c t o b e r t h e c h e c k was r u n t h r o u g h a s e c o n d t i m e and r e t u r n e d
a g a i n f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t funds. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g made s e v e r a l

a t t e m p t s t o c o n t a c t Reece b u t f a i l e d . R e e c e l s b u s i n e s s phone was
d i s c o n n e c t e d i n mid-October and h i s home phone was u n l i s t e d .
P i e r c e F l o o r i n g t h e n m a i l e d t o Reecels home a d d r e s s a c e r t i f i e d

l e t t e r n o t i f y i n g Reece t h a t c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n may be i n i t i a t e d
b y P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i f t h e c h e c k w a s n o t made good w i t h i n f i v e

d a y s , as p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 45-6-316, MCA. The r e g i s t e r e d

l e t t e r was r e t u r n e d t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g marked " r e f u s e d . " Reece

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e had n o t r e c e i v e d t h e r e g i s t e r e d l e t t e r s i n c e he

d i d n o t r e c e i v e h i s m a i l a t h i s house a d d r e s s b u t a t h i s p o s t

o f f i c e box.
On O c t o b e r 2 5 , Ron P i e r c e , g e n e r a l m a n a g e r o f P i e r c e
F l o o r i n g , s i g n e d a n " ~ n v e s t i g a t i v eForm f o r Bad C h e c k s and

F o r g e r i e s " w h i c h was t h e s t a n d a r d form u s e d b y t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e
C o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r or n o t t o p r o s e c u t e a
bad c h e c k c h a r g e . One q u e s t i o n a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e c h e c k was g i v e n

i n payment f o r a n e x i s t i n g d e b t , to which P i e r c e F l o o r i n g r e p l i e d
"yes." The d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y who s u b s e q u e n t l y d e c i d e d to

p r o s e c u t e t h e c a s e , t e s t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l t h a t h e would h a v e
r e j e c t e d and p r o b a b l y d i d r e j e c t t h e case a t t h a t t i m e b e c a u s e of
t h e a f f i r m a t i v e answer to t h e e x i s t i n g d e b t q u e s t i o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , o n November 1, a c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d i n t h e
J u s t i c e C o u r t o f Y e l l o w s t o n e County o n t h e c h a r g e o f i s s u i n g a

b a d c h e c k ( f e l o n y ) i n t h a t M i c h a e l R e e c e " w i t h t h e p u r p o s e to
s e c u r e p r o p e r t y , to w i t : l i e n w a i v e r s on real e s t a t e and
f i x t u r e s " i s s u e d t h e check. The r e c o r d is u n c l e a r a s to how t h e

d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y came to t h e b e l i e f t h a t l i e n w a i v e r s had
b e e n g i v e n i n e x c h a n g e f o r f u l l payment. The d e p u t y c o u n t y
a t t o r n e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d h a v e come from

e i t h e r l a w e n f o r c e m e n t p e r s o n n e l o r from a n e m p l o y e e o f p i e r c e
F l o o r i n g , b u t he c o u l d n o t remember why he t h o u g h t l i e n w a i v e r s
h a d b e e n g i v e n t o Reece.

On S u n d a y , November 2 7 , 1 9 7 7 , Reece w a s a r r e s t e d i n h i s
home. H e w a s booked and k e p t i n t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y j a i l

u n t i l he a r r a n g e d b a i l o f $2,800. On December 1, 1 9 7 7 , t h e

c o m p l a i n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y o n t h e
g r o u n d s t h a t new e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t it was n o t i n t h e
i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e to p r o s e c u t e .

T h e r e a f t e r Reece f i l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e -
cution against Pierce Flooring. I t came o n f o r t r i a l o n O c t o b e r

6 , 1980. A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief the
District Court granted P i e r c e F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d

v e r d i c t as f o l l o w s :

"THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e l l , g e n t l e m e n , o n t h e
a u t h o r i t y t h a t ' s b e e n c i t e d to m e , t h a t t h e
q u e s t i o n o f l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a q u e s t i o n
o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e Court--and t h a t
s p e c i f i c a l l y is Wendel v s . M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e
I n s u r a n c e Company, 8 3 Montana 252--I t h i n k t h e
C o u r t i s c o m p e l l e d t o g r a n t t h e m o t i o n and
d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t i n t h i s c a u s e , and i t is
SO o r d e r e d . "

P l a i n t i f f Reece a p p e a l s p r e s e n t i n g e s s e n t i a l l y t w o i s s u e s
f o r review:

(1) Is p r o b a b l e c a u s e a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d

by the Court?
(2) I f n o t , is t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t to c r e a t e a j u r y
i s s u e on p r o b a b l e c a u s e ?
In a c i v i l action f o r malicious prosecution, the p l a i n t i f f
m u s t a l l e g e and p r o v e (1) t h a t a j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g w a s com-

menced and p r o s e c u t e d a g a i n s t him, ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n st i g a t i n g , prosecuting o r continuing such
proceeding, ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e w a s l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e for

d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t s , ( 4 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c t u a t e d b y malice, ( 5 )
t h a t the j u d i c i a l proceeding terminated favorably f o r p l a i n t i f f ,

a n d ( 6 ) t h a t p l a i n t i f f s u f f e r e d damage and t h e amount t h e r e o f .
McGuire v. A r m i t a g e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t . I 6 0 3 P.2d 2 5 3 , 36

St.Rep. 2142; S t e p h e n s v. C o n l e y ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 3 5 2 , 1 3 8 P.
189. The i s s u e s i n t h i s a p p e a l c o n c e r n t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t l i s t e d
above.

I n t h i s case t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d t h a t l a c k o f p r o -
b a b l e c a u s e was a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t o be d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o u r t

o n t h e b a s i s o f o u r 1928 o p i n i o n i n Wendel v . M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e
I n s u r a n c e Co., 8 3 Mont. 2 5 2 , 272 P. 245. T h i s was e r r o r .
W e acknowledge t h e e x i s t e n c e of an i s o l a t e d g e n e r a l state-

m e n t i n Wendel t o t h a t e f f e c t :

"Therefore, i n actions for malicious
p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h e real c o n t r o v e r s y i s ,
g e n e r a l l y , upon t h e q u e s t i o n o f malice and w a n t
o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e . The b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h e s e
e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s rests upon t h e p l a i n t i f f , and
w h e t h e r t h e r e was a w a n t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is
p u r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f law."
Wendel i n v o l v e d a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n by a d i s c h a r g e d

employee a g a i n s t h i s former employer f o l l o w i n g d i s m i s s a l of a

l a r c e n y p r o s e c u t i o n i n s t i g a t e d by h i s former employer. A jury

v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f t h e d i s c h a r g e d e m p l o y e e was r e v e r s e d o n
a p p e a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e u n c o n t r o v e r t e d f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d
p r o b a b l e c a u s e as a matter o f law. I n t h a t c o n t e x t where t h e
f a c t s o f t h e l a r c e n y were u n d i s p u t e d and t h e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e was
d i s m i s s e d f o r f a i l u r e of t h e s t a t e to d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e t h e

same, t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o b a b l e c a u s e became a q u e s t i o n of l a w f o r
the court. W e e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e

g e n e r a l l y to a c t i o n s f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n h o l d i n g t h e r u l e
p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y w h e r e t h e r e is no c o n f l i c t i n t h e e v i -
d e n c e on t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e and s u c h u n c o n t r o v e r t e d

e v i d e n c e a d m i t s of o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n on t h a t i s s u e .

The c a s e s o f Orser v. S t a t e o f Montana ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont.
1 2 6 , 582 P.2d 1 2 2 7 , and 3-D Lumber C o . v . B e l g r a d e S t a t e ~ a n k

( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 4 8 1 , 487 P.2d 1 1 3 6 , a r e s i m i l a r to Wendel. In
b o t h cases t h e e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g to t h e p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of

p r o b a b l e c a u s e was u n d i s p u t e d and a d m i t t e d o f o n l y o n e

conclusion. Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e
became a q u e s t i o n o f l a w f o r t h e c o u r t . Any a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t

p r i n c i p l e t o cases i n v o l v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e o n t h e i s s u e of
p r o b a b l e c a u s e is e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d .

P u u t i o v. Roman ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 7 6 Mont. 1 0 5 , 2 4 5 P. 5 2 3

e x p r e s s e s t h e c o r r e c t r u l e i n m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n cases.
There t h i s Court reversed a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w i n t h i s language:

" I t is s e t t l e d i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n , and
elsewhere generally, t h a t a cause should never
b e w i t h d r a w n from t h e j u r y , u n l e s s t h e c o n c l u -
s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s , a s a matter o f l a w ,
t h a t a r e c o v e r y c a n n o t be had upon a n y v i e w
w h i c h c a n r e a s o n a b l y be t a k e n o f t h e f a c t s which
t h e evidence tends t o e s t a b l i s h . A motion f o r a
d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t is i n
e f f e c t a d e m u r r e r to t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s e v i d e n c e ;
i t a d m i t s as t r u e a l l m a t e r i a l f a c t s i n e v i d e n c e
w h i c h t e n d to e s t a b l i s h p l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e o f
a c t i o n , w h e t h e r s u c h f a c t s be p r o d u c e d b y t h e
p l a i n t i f f or t h e d e f e n d a n t . Such f a c t s , w i t h
e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e t h a t may be d r a w n
f r o m them, a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t
most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . The f a c t t h a t
t h e testimony i n behalf of the defense pleaded
is u n c o n t r a d i c t e d w i l l n o t j u s t i f y a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t i n favor of the defendant, i f the
i n f e r e n c e s to be drawn from it a r e o p e n t o d i f -
f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s b y r e a s o n a b l e men
( C i t a t i o n s omitted. )
."
The d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e j u d g e and j u r y f u n c t i o n was
r e c e n t l y s u c c i n c t l y e x p r e s s e d b y t h e G e o r g i a C o u r t of A p p e a l s

i n t h i s manner:
"Want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t
o f a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c a u s e of a c t i o n .
O r d i n a r i l y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e is a
q u e s t i o n of fact f o r j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Only
w h e r e t h e m a t e r i a l f a c t s are n o t i n d i s p u t e , o r
when o n l y r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e c a n be drawn from
t h e evidence, d o e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of probable
c a u s e become a n i s s u e o f l a w f o r t h e c o u r t to
resolve." K v i t e n v. Nash ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 5 0 Ga.App. 589,
258 S.E.2d 271.
We hold, therefore, that a directed verdict in a malicious
p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n is e r r o r where t h e e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g reaso-

n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s , is s u s c e p t i b l e t o d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s b y
r e a s o n a b l e men when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e

p a r t y opposing t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . W e f u r t h e r hold t h a t under

s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e i s s u e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e m u s t be s u b m i t t e d
t o t h e j u r y f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n and n o t be d e c i d e d b y t h e c o u r t as
a m a t t e r o f law.
W e now e x a m i n e t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to
t h e p l a i n t i f f to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t to

e s t a b l i s h a j u r y i s s u e on p r o b a b l e c a u s e . P r o b a b l e c a u s e means
"reasonable grounds f o r s u s p i c i o n , supported by circumstances

r e a s o n a b l y s t r o n g i n t h e m s e l v e s to w a r r a n t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t

a n d c a u t i o u s man i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e a c c u s e d is g u i l t y o f t h e
o f f e n s e w i t h w h i c h he is c h a r g e d . " C o r n n e r v. H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 6 2
Mont. 2 3 9 , 204 P. 4 8 9 , q u o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n Orser v. S t a t e o f

Montana, s u p r a . Moreover, s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s prosecu-
t i o n r u n s c o u n t e r to i m p o r t a n t l e g a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , s u c h as

e n c o u r a g i n g c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t t h o s e who a p p e a r g u i l t y

o f a crime, it is n o t f a v o r e d b y t h e l a w and t h e b u r d e n o n t h e
p l a i n t i f f is h e a v y . W e n d e l , s u p r a ; Orser, s u p r a .
The u n d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f Reece w a s

c h a r g e d o n t h e b a s i s o f a r e p o r t s i g n e d b y p i e r c e who i n s t i g a t e d
t h e criminal proceeding. T h e r e was no f u l l d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e
f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c h e c k to t h e p r o s e c u t o r t h e n or t h e r e a f t e r .

Pierce did not disclose the following f a c t s : (1) t h a t R e e s e t s

m o t h e r p a s s e d t h e c h e c k t o P i e r c e F l o o r i n g i n t h e i n c r e a s e d amount
a f t e r b e i n g a d v i s e d t h a t l i e n s would be f i l e d a g a i n s t b o t h p r o -
p e r t i e s i f t h e c h e c k were n o t made o u t f o r t h e f u l l a m o u n t , ( 2 )
t h a t l i e n s had b e e n f i l e d a g a i n s t b o t h p r o p e r t i e s , ( 3 ) t h a t t h e
r e p o r t was turned over t o the p o l i c e department a f t e r P i e r c e
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Reece was n o t g o i n g t o come i n and work o u t

s o m e t h i n g on t h e c h e c k .
A d d i t i o n a l l y an employee of P i e r c e F l o o r i n g t e s t i f i e d by
d e p o s i t i o n t h a t she k e p t P i e r c e informed of anything on t h e c a s e

t h a t came t o h e r a t t e n t i o n and d i s p u t e d many o f P i e r c e ' s s t a t e -
m e n t s i n d i c a t i n g h i s l a c k o f knowledge on d e v e l o p m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g
t h e p r o g r e s s of p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e . The b a s i s o f t h e cri-

m i n a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Reece was t h a t t h e c h e c k was g i v e n t o
s e c u r e l i e n w a i v e r s from p i e r c e on t h e two p r o p e r t i e s . When t h e

p r o s e c u t o r c o n t a c t e d P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f o r c o p i e s of t h e l i e n

w a i v e r s , t h i s employee d i d n o t t e l l him t h e r e were no l i e n
w a i v e r s b u t i n s t e a d wrote him a m e m o s t a t i n g :
" I c a n 9t f i n d a c o p y o f t h e l i e n w a i v e r . The
g i r l t h a t was h e r e b e f o r e m e would n o t a l w a y s
t a k e c o p i e s of t h e l i e n waivers."

T h i s memorandum was d a t e d November 4 , 1 9 7 7 , almost two m o n t h s
a f t e r l i e n s had b e e n f i l e d b y p i e r c e F l o o r i n g a g a i n s t b o t h

properties.
W e h o l d t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t to p r e -

s e n t a j u r y i s s u e on t h e p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e

f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Reece . The t o t a l e v i d e n c e
p r e s e n t s a b a s i s f o r d i f f e r i n g conclusions concerning whether

P i e r c e F l o o r i n g 9 s a c t i o n s were t h o s e t h a t would w a r r a n t a r e a s o -

n a b l y c a u t i o u s and p r u d e n t man to b e l i e v e t h a t Reece was g u i l t y
o f t h e o f f e n s e o f which he was c h a r g e d ; w h e t h e r t h e f a c t s

s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e and d e l i v e r y of t h e c h e c k were f a i r l y

p r e s e n t e d t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s ; w h e t h e r t h e c h a r g e was

f i l e d to collect a p r e e x i s t i n g d e b t w i t h n o t h i n g of v a l u e g i v e n

t o Reece; and w h e t h e r P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f a b r i c a t e d f a c t s to m o t i -
v a t e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Reece. These a r e i s s u e s f o r
d e t e r m i n a t i o n by a j u r y , n o t q u e s t i o n s of l a w t o be d e c i d e d b y
t h e Court. W e e x p r e s s no o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e u l t i m a t e d e t e r -

m i n a t i o n o f t h e s e i s s u e s , o n l y t h a t t h e y are p r o p e r l y t o be
r e s o l v e d by a j u r y .
The d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and judgment a r e v a c a t e d . This cause

i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a new t r i a l .
 Chief ~ u s t i c e

We concur:
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority here has allowed themselves the luxury
of becoming involved in a morass of Red Herrings about lien
waivers, etc., and uncontroverted evidence, and has totally
disregarded the authority that pertains when a citizen
proceeds through the county attorney rather than directly,
i.e., a justice court complaint.
On October 25, 1977, Ron Pierce, general manager of
Pierce Flooring, signed an "Investigative Form for Bad
Checks and Forgeries," the standard form used by the Yellow-
stone County Attorney's office to decide whether to
prosecute a bad check charge. - - -
- -
The form was filled out
properly, including-- -
one question which asked whether the
--
check was given in payment for an existinq debt,- which
- to- -
Pierce Floorinq replied "yes." The deputy county attorney
who subsequently decided to prosecute the case testified -
at
the trial that- would have-
------- he - rejected, and probably did
--
-
reject the case, at- --
that time because of the affirmative
answer to the existinq debt question.
Nevertheless, on November 1, a complaint was filed in
the Justice Court of Yellowstone County on the charge of
issuing a bad check (felony) in that Michael Reece "with the
purpose to secure property, to wit: lien waivers on real
estate and fixtures" issued the check. The record is unclear
as to how the deputy county attorney came to the belief that
lien waivers had been qiven in exchange for f u l l ~ 9 m e n t .
The deputy----
county-
attorney testified that such information
could have come from either law enforcement personnel--
---- or

---------- ~--o y e eo f P i e r c e F l o o r i n g--but
f r o m a n e m l ------------------ ,- he could not
- e- e r
-
rem mb why -e t h o u q h t l i e n - a i v e r-----------g -------
h- w s had been iven t o
Reece.
The c o u n t y attorney's office received a note from
P i e r c e F l o o r i n g on November 8 , 1 9 7 7 , s t a t i n g t h a t c o p i e s o f

a lien waiver could not be found. The d e p u t y c o u n t y

------- y-----------o u t
attorne who s w o r e t h e -f f i d a- t i n s u p p o r t o f t h -
a v i- e

c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t R e e c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h a d h e n o t b e e n --o
s
b u s y , h e would h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e a t t h a t t i m e o r would
h a v e c o n f i r m e d t h a t l i e n w a i v e r s c o u l d n o t be f o u n d a n d t h e n
would h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e .

On Sunday, November 2 7 , 1 9 7 7 , R e e c e was a r r e s t e d i n

h i s home. He was booked and k e p t i n t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y

j a i l u n t i l he arranged b a i l of $2,800. On December 1, 1 9 7 7 ,

t h e c o m p l a i n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y on
t h e g r o u n d s t h a t new e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t was n o t i n
t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e t o p r o s e c u t e .
Reece p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y one i s s u e f o r review:

Whether the District Court erred by granting Pierce
F l o o r i n g ' s motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t

Reece f a i l e d t o show want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e on t h e p a r t o f
Pierce Flooring.
Reece a r g u e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f want of probable
c a u s e s h o u l d n o t h a v e been d e c i d e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s

a matter of l a w because t h e record c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t proof

of probable cause to submit this issue t o the jury. He

a r g u e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t when t h e e v i d e n c e h e p r e s e n t e d is
viewed i n i t s most f a v o r a b l e l i g h t i t shows:
1. Pierce Flooring's a c t i o n s were n o t those of a

p r u d e n t , c a u t i o u s and r e a s o n a b l e man;
2. A l l f a c t s surrounding t h e c h e c k were n o t f a i r l y
and f u l l y r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s ;

3. The c h a r g e was filed to collect a preexisting

d e b t and n o t h i n g o f v a l u e was g i v e n t o R e e c e ;

4. P i e r c e F l o o r i n g f a i l e d t o make s u f f i c i e n t i n q u i r y

i n t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which t h e c h e c k was i s s u e d ; a n d

5. Pierce Flooring intentionally misled the law

enforcement officer and fabricated facts to motivate

c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Reece.

I t is t r u e t h a t upon a m o t i o n f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t

by a p a r t y , t h e e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d by t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y

m u s t be viewed i n i t s m o s t f a v o r a b l e l i g h t . See S i s t o c k v.

Northwestern Telephone Systems, Inc. (1980), Mont.

, 615 P.2d 176, 178, 37 S t . R e p . 1247, 1249, and c a s e s

cited therein. Nevertheless, s u c h a r u l e d o e s n o t mean t h a t

t h i s C o u r t c a n make numerous factual i n f e r e n c e s which are

n o t s u p p o r t e d by the record. Considering the evidence i n

t h e l i g h t most favorable t o Reece, I cannot say that the

D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its v e r d i c t .

F u r t h e r , it is a w e l l - s e t t l e d rule in this state that

it is the function of the court to determine whether

probable cause e x i s t s i n a malicious prosecution case; it is

a q u e s t i o n of law t o be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c o u r t . Orser v.

S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 1 2 6 , 582 P.2d 1227; 3-D Lumber Co.

v. B e l g r a d e S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 481, 488-489, 487

P.2d 1136, 1140; Wendel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

( 1 9 2 8 ) , 83 Mont. 252, 263, 272 P . 245, 249. The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t was t h e r e f o r e a c t i n g w i t h i n i t s p r e r o g a t i v e t o d e c i d e

t h i s c a s e on a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , if the

r e c o r d s u p p o r t s i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t

h i s p r i m a --- c i e
fa case of malicious prosecution and, in
particular, t h a t Reece f a i l e d t o show t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g

acted without probable cause by going to the Yellowstone

C o u n t y A t t o r n e y and f i l l i n g o u t a n i n f o r m a t i o n s h e e t on bad

checks .
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t want o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i s

t h e g i s t of an a c t i o n f o r malicious p r o s e c u t i o n . McGuire v .

Armitage ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 603 P.2d 253, 36 S t . R e p .

2142; W i l s o n v . G e h r i n g ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 221, 448 P.2d 678;

Fauver v. Wilkoske (1949), 1 2 3 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420;

Cornner v. Hamilton (1922), 62 Mont. 239, 204 P. 489.

P r o b a b l e c a u s e means " r e a s o n a b l e ground for suspicion,

s u p p o r t e d by c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g i n t h e m s e l v e s

to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious man in the

belief t h a t t h e a c c u s e d i s g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which

he i s c h a r g e d . " C o r n n e r , 62 Mont. a t 243, 204 P. a t 4 9 1 , a s

q u o t e d i n O r s e r , 1 7 8 Mont. a t 1 3 7 , 582 P.2d a t 1 2 3 3 . More-

o v e r , s i n c e an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n runs counter

t o i m p o r t a n t l e g a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , s u c h a s e n c o u r a g i n g

criminal proceedings against t h o s e who a p p e a r g u i l t y of a

crime, i t i s n o t f a v o r e d by t h e law and t h e b u r d e n on t h e

p l a i n t i f f i s heavy. S e e Wendel, 83 Mont. a t 262-263, 272 P.

a t 248; a c c o r d , O r s e r , 1 7 8 Mont. a t 1 3 5 , 582 P.2d a t 1 2 3 2 .

Reece, therefore, had a heavy burden to show that

P i e r c e F l o o r i n g a c t e d w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , and c l e a r l y h e

cannot meet that heavy burden by arguing only tenuous

inferences.

A l t h o u g h t h e r e may b e some q u e s t i o n a s t o a f u l l d i s -

c l o s u r e of a l l of t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e

check, i t i s c l e a r f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t P i e r c e F l o o r i n g was

r e l y i n g-p o n t h e d e c i s i o n s made -t - e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s
u a-t h
-
office concerniny what---
information----. was important and what
------
information was not important.
------- Pierce Flooring truthfully
and accurately filled out the county attorney's information
--
-
sheet on which the decision to prosecute was based.
Any confusion over the existence of lien waivers was
eradicated on November 8, when the county attorney's off ice
received the note from Pierce Flooring tnat there was no
record of any lien waivers. From November 8, 1977 to
November 27, when Reece was arrested, according to the
testimony of the deputy county attorney in charge of the
case, there was sufficient disclosure of information by
Pierce Flooring to warrant dismissal of the case.
As this Court noted in Halladay v. State Bank of
Fairfield et al. (1923), 66 Mont. 111, 117-118, 212 P. 861,

". . .The rule is that, where the prosecutinq
--
officer starts a criminal proceedinq upon a
full and fair statement of the facts from the
--------- he acts for- -
accuser, -
the state; and so he
does when he proceeds-upon- - -
his own personal
knowledqe . . .

"Generally, it may be said that a prosecuting
officer is charged with the duty of deter-
mining when to commence a particular prosecu-
tion, and when to discontinue it. He stands
upon a different footinq- - a defendant,
-
from
-
who goes to- T u -- n o f the peace, swears
a r
--------
out a warrant, and directs the prosecutinq
officer- see to its execution. The county
to
attorney in this-------------n l y--------
state, not o directs
under what conditions a criminal action shall
be commenced, but from the time-----e g ---
it b i n s
------
until it ends his supervision and control is
-
complete, limited only by such restrictions
as the law imposes. . .

". . . If, therefore, a prosecuting officer
incorrectly determines that certain facts
given to him constitute a crime and proceeds
to set o n foot necessary action, - the
 informant is not liable, because the fault is
not his, but -that of the officer. .
--
- ." B
(Emphasis supplied.)
In light of Pierce Flooring's reliance on the
expertise of the county attorney's office in terms of what
information was important and what was not, it cannot be
said that Pierce Flooring was not acting prudently and
cautiously and without probable cause. I would affirm the
District Court's directed verdict for Pierce Flooring.

Justice