No. 80-464
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
DAWN M. HOCK,
Claimant and Respondent,
VS.
LIENCO CEDAR PRODUCTS, Employer,
and STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court
Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Roy Andes, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena,
Montana
J. David Slovak argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hoyt and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana
Terry N. Trieweiler argued, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted: June 12, 1981
Decided: September 28, 1.983.
Filed : SEP 2 9 19811
Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
Defendant S t a t e Compensation I n s u r a n c e Fund a p p e a l s
from t h e o r d e r o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t g r a n t i n g
c l a i m a n t Dawn Hock's p e t i t i o n f o r a lump sum award of b e n e f i t s .
The Fund p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s :
1. I n d i s p o s i n g of o r p r e j u d i c i n g t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s
of t h e s u r v i v i n g i n f a n t b e n e f i c i a r y , s h o u l d t h e c o u r t have made
t h e c h i l d a p a r t y and a p p o i n t e d a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m ?
2. Is i t p r o p e r f o r t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t o
e n t e r t a i n a p e t i t i o n f o r a $19,000 lump sum, where a $6,000
c l a i m was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n ?
3. Does a lump sum award of b e n e f i t s i n t h e amount of
$19,622.72 c o n s t i t u t e a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n i n l i g h t of
e v i d e n c e of e x p e n s e s a g g r e g a t i n g o n l y $14,039.25?
4. Does t h e f a i l u r e t o f i l e a n a t t o r n e y f e e agreement
prior to t r i a l f o r f e i t the r i g h t t o collect attorney fees?
W e a f f i r m t h e award of t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ,
b u t w i t h some i n s t r u c t i o n s t o be f o l l o w e d i n s i m i l a r c a s e s
i n the future.
Dawn Hock i s e i g h t e e n y e a r s o l d , and h a s a two-year-old
child. She i s n o t employed, having completed o n l y t h e t e n t h
g r a d e and having no p r o s p e c t s of employment. She p r e s e n t l y
draws $186.68 p e r week i n w o r k e r s r compensation payments by
r e a s o n of t h e d e a t h of h e r husband, Warren, which o c c u r r e d
on May 23, 1980, w h i l e he was working f o r d e f e n d a n t / e m p l o y e r ,
Lienco Cedar P r o d u c t s ( h i s g r o s s s a l a r y was $279 p e r w e e k ) .
She a l s o draws s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s , g i v i n g h e r a monthly,
t a x - f r e e income of more t h a n $1,100.
The employer was i n s u r e d under compensation p l a n no. 3,
by d e f e n d a n t S t a t e Compensation I n s u r a n c e Fund. Under t h e
s t a t u t e s , Dawn i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e biweekly payments f o r
t h e r e s t o f h e r l i f e ; however, i f s h e e v e r r e m a r r i e s , t h e n
s h e w i l l r e c e i v e a f i n a l , s i n g l e payment e q u a l t o t w o - y e a r s '
b e n e f i t s , and compensation w i l l t h e n be s t o p p e d . Section
39-71-721, MCA.
Dawn's d a u g h t e r , Dusty Rae, i s a l s o a b e n e f i c i a r y under
t h e w o r k e r s ' compensation s t a t u t e s . S e c t i o n 39-71-116 ( 2 ) ,
MCA. A l l payments a r e p r e s e n t l y made t o Dawn a l o n e , b u t i f
she should d i e o r remarry, then t h e c h i l d w i l l r e c e i v e t h e
same amount of b e n e f i t s u n t i l a g e 1 8 , o r a g e 25 i f a f u l l -
t i m e student. I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e lump s m award t o Dawn, w e
u
must d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e c h i l d ' s c o n t i n g e n t
f u t u r e r i g h t s a r e t o be p r o t e c t e d .
Dawn i n i t i a l l y r e q u e s t e d a $6,000 advance on h e r b e n e f i t s
from t h e D i v i s i o n of Workers' Compensation. She a l l e g e d
c e r t a i n d e b t s were c a u s i n g h a r d s h i p f o r h e r and t h e c h i l d .
The c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r t e n t a t i v e l y a g r e e d t o t h e advance,
upon t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e $6,000 t o be advanced be d e d u c t e d
from t h e payment Dawn would r e c e i v e i n t h e e v e n t s h e r e m a r r i e s .
When t h e c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r s u b m i t t e d t h e p l a n f o r a p p r o v a l
t o t h e d i v i s i o n administrator, it w a s r e j e c t e d . The a d m i n i s t r a t o r
r e q u i r e d " p o s i t i v e p r o t e c t i o n of r e c o v e r y " of t h e advance,
c i t i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t should Dawn n e v e r r e m a r r y , t h e n
t h e advance would n e v e r be r e c o v e r e d . The Fund o f f e r e d
a n o t h e r p l a n , which proposed t o d e d u c t $ 2 5 p e r week from
Dawn's b e n e f i t s u n t i l f u l l r e c o v e r y o r r e m a r r i a g e . The new
p l a n was r e j e c t e d by Dawn's a t t o r n e y .
Dawn p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t f o r an
emergency h e a r i n g on t h e lump sum d i s p u t e . I n her p e t i t i o n ,
s h e a s k e d , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , f o r a n advance of $19,622.72,
which amount i s e q u a l t o t h e two-years' worth of b e n e f i t s
s h e would r e c e i v e i n a s i n g l e payment upon r e m a r r i a g e . The
Fund moved t o s t r i k e t h e $19,000 f i g u r e and i n s e r t t h e
o r i g i n a l $6,000 f i g u r e , on t h e ground t h a t t h e l a r g e r sum
had n e v e r been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n and s o w a s n o t a
" d i s p u t e " t h e c o u r t c o u l d h e a r , c i t i n g s e c t i o n 39-71-2905,
MCA. The Fund p a i d t h e $6,000 sum t o t h e c l e r k of t h e
c o u r t , and f i l e d a n o f f e r of judgment which sets f o r t h t h e
F u n d ' s second p r o p o s a l f o r r e c o v e r y of t h e advance. The
motion t o s t r i k e was never r u l e d upon by t h e c o u r t .
I n i t s t r i a l b r i e f and i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r , t h e Fund
r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e t o t h e c h i l d ' s con-
tingent future r i g h t t o receive benefits. The Fund asked
t h e c o u r t t o j o i n t h e c h i l d a s a p a r t y and t o a p p o i n t a
g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s i n r e g a r d
t o any scheme t o r e c o v e r a lump sum advance. The c o u r t d i d
neither.
A t t r i a l , Dawn t e s t i f i e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g d e b t s which
t o t a l s l i g h t l y o v e r $14,000:
1. New Mobile Home $6,500
2 . Automobile $4,900
3. F u n e r a l Expenses $806
4 . Taxes $43.75
5. U t i l i t y I n s t a l l a t i o n $433
6. Balance Due on Old Mobile Home $780
7. Gambles Account $50
8. Medical B i l l s a p p r o x i m a t e l y $500.
With r e g a r d t o t h e s e d e b t s , Dawn t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r o l d
m o b i l e home was i n need of s u b s t a n t i a l r e p a i r , n e c e s s i t a t i n g
t h e p u r c h a s e of a new one. I n a s i m i l a r manner, s h e t e s t i f i e d
t h a t s h e had no u s a b l e a u t o m o b i l e and had a r r a n g e d t o p u r c h a s e
a s a t i s f a c t o r y used 1978 Plymouth. Dawn t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e
had no medical i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r h e r s e l f o r h e r d a u g h t e r .
The c h i l d i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o c o n v u l s i o n s .
Dawn a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e and h e r c h i l d c a n l i v e on
h e r $1,100 p e r month t a x - f r e e income, i f h e r d e b t s a r e p a i d .
The o n l y o t h e r w i t n e s s a t t r i a l was t h e c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r
f o r the division. He t e s t i f i e d t h e d i v i s i o n a c t e d i n good
f a i t h t h r o u g h o u t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t of
t h e c h i l d and t h e Fund from overpayment. He also stated
t h a t no a t t o r n e y f e e agreement had e v e r been f i l e d w i t h t h e
d i v i s i o n by Dawn's a t t o r n e y a s r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e , t h u s
l a y i n g t h e f o u n d a t i o n upon which t h e Fund a r g u e s t h a t Dawn
is not entitled t o receive attorney fees. H e s t a t e d t h a t no
c l a i m f o r $19,000 had e v e r been made t o t h e d i v i s i o n , o n l y a
c l a i m f o r $6,000, b u t t h a t t h e $19,000 c l a i m would have been
d e n i e d i n any e v e n t b e c a u s e t h e p o i n t of d i s p u t e concerned
n o t t h e amount of advance b u t t h e method of r e c o v e r i n g i t .
The Workers' Compensation C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t lump
sum payments a r e more d e s i r a b l e t h a n f o r m e r l y was t h e c a s e .
The c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t 1 0 4 weeks of c l a i m a n t ' s f u t u r e weekly
b e n e f i t s be c o n v e r t e d i n t o a lump s m of $19,622.72.
u The
o r d e r p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e Fund can r e c o v e r t h e amount o f t h i s
lump sum b e n e f i t by t e r m i n a t i n g payment of biweekly b e n e f i t s
t o t h e c l a i m a n t on t h e s i x t e e n t h b i r t h d a y of c l a i m a n t ' s
c h i l d , u n t i l an amount e q u a l t o t h e advance p r o v i d e d f o r h a s
been r e c o v e r e d . The o r d e r a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s
a t t o r n e y i s e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y f e e s and p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e
c o u r t would t a k e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e q u e s t i o n of whether
t h e d e f e n d a n t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f e e s and c o s t s .
A f e e agreement ( 1 / 3 of award) w a s f i l e d w i t h t h e
d i v i s i o n s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e h e a r i n g , b u t was o b j e c t e d t o a s
n o t timely.
Dawn's a t t o r n e y s u b s e q u e n t l y o f f e r e d t o s t i p u l a t e t o a
change i n t h e method of r e c o v e r y o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t . The
s t i p u l a t i o n would have c a l l e d f o r r e c o v e r y o f t h e advance
o u t of Dawn's r e m a r r i a g e b e n e f i t s o r , i f s h e d i d n o t r e m a r r y ,
o u t o f h e r weekly b e n e f i t s a f t e r t h e c h i l d c e a s e d t o be a
beneficiary. The Fund d i d n o t choose t o c o n s i d e r t h i s
s t i p u l a t i o n , p r e f e r r i n g t o proceed w i t h t h e a p p e a l .
I.
There c a n b e no q u e s t i o n t h a t an i n f a n t c h i l d of a
widow who draws compensation b e n e f i t s h a s a s e p a r a t e i n t e r e s t
t h e r e i n . S e c t i o n 39-71-116(2), MCA, defines "Beneficiary" a s
i n c l u d i n g ( a ) a s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , and ( b ) a n unmarried c h i l d
under 1 8 , o r under 25 i f a f u l l - t i m e s t u d e n t . S e c t i o n 39-
71-723, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t compensation due t o b e n e f i c i a r i e s
s h a l l b e p a i d t o t h e s u r v i v i n g spouse. This Court, i n
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e p r e d e c e s s o r of t h e above s e c t i o n , h a s
s t a t e d : " I t i s t r u e t h a t f o r t h e purpose of s a v i n g t r o u b l e
and e x p e n s e o f g u a r d i a n s h i p p r o c e e d i n g s t h e l a w p e r m i t s t h e
payment of t h e f u l l amount t o t h e widow . . . but an u n d i v i d e d
p o r t i o n t h e r e o f b e l o n g s a b s o l u t e l y t o t h e c h i l d and i s
dedicated t o i t s support." C o g d i l l v. Aetna L i f e I n s . Co.
( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 244, 257, 2 P.2d 292, 296. The c o u r t went
on t o h o l d t h a t c h i l d r e n r e c e i v e f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n under
t h e a c t , t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s must always be c a r e f u l l y
g u a r d e d , and t h a t " [ t l h e a c t g i v e s t o t h e c h i l d r e n s u c h a n
i n t e r e s t i n t h e compensation a s c a n be l a i d h o l d of by t h e
c o u r t s , and i t s u l t i m a t e d i s p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d ; p a r t i c u l a r l y
i s t h i s s o when such compensation assumes t h e s h a p e of a
commuted payment." ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) C o g d i l l v. Aetna L i f e
I n s . Co., supra. The Workers' Compensation s t a t u t e s have
undergone s u b s t a n t i a l amendment s i n c e 1931, b u t t h e above
quoted p r i n c i p l e s s t i l l apply because c h i l d r e n a r e s t i l l
named as s e p a r a t e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and payments a r e s t i l l made
only t o t h e surviving parent.
The c o u r t ' s o r d e r c o u l d r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n
i n b e n e f i t s t o t h e c h i l d because of t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of
payment of b e n e f i t s a t t h e t i m e t h e c h i l d r e a c h e s s i x t e e n
y e a r s of a g e . T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e
b e n e f i t t o t h e c h i l d of t h e p r e s e n t lump sum s e t t l e m e n t a s
compared t o t h e p r o s p e c t i v e l o s s of b e n e f i t s . There i s t h e
r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t may c o n f l i c t w i t h
t h e m o t h e r ' s a t t h a t p o i n t , and t h a t a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m
would be r e q u i r e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t .
The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t Rule 1 7 ( c ) , M . R . c ~ v . P . , i s t h e
o n l y p r e s e n t a u t h o r i t y i n Montana f o r a p p o i n t m e n t of a
g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m . The r u l e s of c i v i l p r o c e d u r e a r e n o t
d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ,
b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t i s e x p r e s s l y made s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s
of t h e Montana A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e Act ( s e c t i o n 39-71-
2903, MCA) and M P a l l o w s e a c h agency t o promulgate i t s own
AA
rules.
F e d e r a l Rule 17 ( c ) i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same a s Montana
Rule 1 7 ( c ) . The f e d e r a l r u l e h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g
discretionary, granting t o the federal d i s t r i c t court the
,
power t o choose whether o r n o t t o a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n ad
l i t e m , b u t t h e c o u r t s must f i n d t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e
minor a r e a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t e d . M.S. v. Wermers ( 8 t h C i r .
1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F. 2d 170, 174.
This c o u r t has adopted a s i m i l a r d i s c r e t i o n a r y approach
t o a p p o i n t m e n t of i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l i n d i v o r c e / c u s t o d y
cases. "[Tlhe c o u r t s h a l l appoint independent counsel f o r
t h e c h i l d [where c u s t o d y i s i n s e r i o u s d i s p u t e ] o r make a
f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s t h a t such a p p o i n t m e n t was u n n e c e s s a r y . "
( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) M a t t e r of G u a r d i a n s h i p of G u l l e t t e
( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 132, 1 4 0 , 566 P.2d 396, 400. See a l s o I n
re M a r r i a g e of Bartmess ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -Mont. - 631 P.2d 299, 300,
38 St.Rep. 1097, 1098.
The Workers' Compensation C o u r t s h o u l d have a p p o i n t e d a
g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m o r made a f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s why a n
appointment was u n n e c e s s a r y ; b u t b e c a u s e of t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d
i n t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e , we f i n d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o a p p o i n t
a guardian ad l i t e m does n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . In
t h i s c a s e t h e r e was a mutual b e n e f i t t o t h e c h i l d and t h e mother
i n t h e payment of t h e d e s c r i b e d d e b t s . I n a d d i t i o n , b e c a u s e of
t h e change of t h e method of repayment a s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s o p i n -
ion, t h e r e i s a very l i m i t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of f i n a n c i a l l o s s t o
the child. We, therefore, hold t h a t the f a i l u r e t o appoint a
g u a r d i a n was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
However, w e admonish t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t h a t
i n f u t u r e c a s e s , where a c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t may be e f f e c t e d by any
lump sum award, t h e c o u r t s h a l l a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m f o r
t h e c h i l d o r make a f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s t h a t s u c h a p p o i n t -
ment i s u n n e c e s s a r y .
The Fund a r g u e s t h a t no c l a i m f o r any amount o v e r
$6,000 s h o u l d have been h e a r d by t h e Workers' Compensation
C o u r t , b e c a u s e o n l y t h e $6,000 c l a i m was e v e r p r e s e n t e d t o
the division. The Fund a r g u e s (1) t h e r e i s no e s t a b l i s h e d
" d i s p u t e " a s t o t h e e x c e s s money t h a t c o u l d g i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n
t o t h e c o u r t under s e c t i o n 39-71-2905, MCA, and ( 2 ) t h e
c o u r t h e a r i n g c o n s t i t u t e s a n a p p e a l from a n agency, r e q u i r i n g
a c l a i m a n t t o r a i s e a l l i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e agency, t o e x h a u s t
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , b e f o r e he c a n be h e a r d i n c o u r t .
The c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e " d i s p u t e " d i d
n o t c o n c e r n t h e amount of t h e advance a s much a s t h e method
t o be used f o r r e c o v e r y . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e $19,000 c l a i m
would c e r t a i n l y have been d e n i e d i f p r e s e n t e d . Therefore, a
d i s p u t e a s t o method of repayment d i d e x i s t ; a l s o , b e c a u s e
" E t l h e law n e i t h e r d o e s n o r r e q u i r e s i d l e a c t s " , s e c t i o n 1-
3-223, MCA, Dawn s h o u l d n o t now be r e q u i r e d t o go back t o
t h e d i v i s i o n and b e g i n a g a i n o n l y t o have t h e same i s s u e s
arise.
Dawn h a s n o t f a i l e d t o e x h a u s t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
r e m e d i e s i n any e v e n t . The Workers' Compensation C o u r t i s
n o t a f u l l - b l o w n D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t i n g i n r e v i e w of a n
agency d e c i s i o n . I t i s a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law c o u r t , h a v i n g
limited jurisdiction t o decide disputes r e l a t i n g t o b e n e f i t s
i n a d e novo p r o c e e d i n g . See S t a t e e x r e l . Uninsured Employer's
Fund v . Hunt ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -Mont . -, 625 P.2d 539, 542, 38
St.Rep. 421, 424-425. I t s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t t o p r e s e n t
i s s u e s a t any time b e f o r e t h e d i v i s i o n o r t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n r e v i e w by t h i s C o u r t .
Such a n approach i s s u p p o r t e d by s e c t i o n 39-71-2903, MCA,
which s u b j e c t s t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s
of MAPA. The F u n d ' s c i t e d a u t h o r i t y f o r r e q u i r i n g p r i o r
presentation t o the division i s not persuasive. Its p r i n c i p a l
c a s e was handed down b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t
was e s t a b l i s h e d . A t t h e time of t h a t c a s e , t h e d i v i s i o n
conducted i t s own c o n t e s t e d c a s e h e a r i n g s l i k e a l l o t h e r
agencies. The i s s u e s t h e r e were n o t even p r e s e n t e d a t t h e
hearing. DeLeary v . Anaconda Aluminum Co. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont.
208, 541 P.2d 788.
By c l a i m a n t ' s r a i s i n g of a l l i s s u e s i n h e r o r i g i n a l
p e t i t i o n b e f o r e t h e Workers ' Compensation C o u r t , t h e Fund
was a£ f o r d e d a d e q u a t e n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e f e n d . The
Fund f e a r s a w a s t e of j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s i f a r e s o l v a b l e
controversy i s not f i r s t presented t o t h e d i v i s i o n , b u t
h e r e , by t h e d i v i s i o n ' s own a d m i s s i o n s , no r e s o l u t i o n c o u l d
have been had. Allowing c l a i m a n t t o p r e s e n t i s s u e s r a i s e d
f o r t h e f i r s t time a t t h e h e a r i n g i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h s e c t i o n
39-71-104, MCA: the act should be liberally construed to
effectuate its purposes.
111.
Dawn established debts of $14,039 at trial. The court
awarded her a $19,622 lump sum advance.
Lump sum settlements are granted in exceptional circum-
stances. Outstanding indebtedness, pressing need, or circum-
stances in which the best interests of the claimant, his
family and the general public are served justify such a
settlement. Willoughby v. Arthur G. McKee & Co. (1980), -
,
Mont.- 609 P.2d 700, 702, 37 St.Rep. 620, 623; Kuehn v.
National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. (1974), 164 Mont.
303, 307, 521 P.2d 921, 924. The decision to award or deny
a lump sum settlement will not be interfered with on appeal
unless there has been an abuse of discretion. The Workers1
Compensation Court will be presumed correct and affirmed if
supported by substantial evidence, and reversed only if the
evidence clearly preponderates against its findings. Willoughby,
609 P.2d at 702. Wide discretion will be afforded the
Workers' Compensation Court in its determinations. Willoughby,
609 P.2d at 704; Kuehn, 521 P.2d at 923.
In determining whether or not there is subtantial
evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Court's findings
and conclusions, the Supreme Court is required to look to
all of the evidence properly before the lower court. Hume
v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1980), - ,
Mont. - 608 P.2d 1063,
1066, 37 St.Rep. 378, 382.
Evidence before the court showed existing debts for the
purchase and maintenance of a home, living expenses, medical
expenses, potential future medical expenses for the child, and
the need for a fuel efficient car, in all of which the mutual
interests of Dawn and her child are intertwined. In addition,
we have the possibility of attorney fees being taken out of the
award pursuant to the fee agreement.
Considering all such factors, we find no abuse of discre-
tion by the court and affirm the award.
IV .
The Fund argues that Dawn's attorney failed to file his
fee agreement prior to the hearing, so has forfeited any
claim for attorney fees.
No statute or division rule prescribes the time for
filing fee agreements. Section 39-71-613, MCA, and Rule
24.29.3801, ARM, set maximum amounts of fees and simply
require such filing. In the absence of any specified time,
and in view of the court's call for a hearing on fees, the
division's asserted desire to regulate fees and to protect
the workman are not prevented. No rule has been violated
under section 39-71-613(3), MCA, justifying forfeiture. The
division and/or the court can certainly adopt their own
rules as to time of filing if the question is as important
as claimed.
Claimant urges the award of attorney fees in connection
with this appeal.
When an appeal is entirely unfounded and causes delay,
respondent is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees
under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. Carbon County v. Schwend
(1979) -Mont. ,
- 594 P.2d 1121, 1127, 36 St.Rep.
917, 924-925.
We find that the Fund in good faith raised significant
issues on appeal. We, therefore, do not award attorney fees
for the appellate proceedings.
VI .
We remand the case to the Workers' Compensation Court
for the following action:
(1) Modification of the order awarding lump sum advance
to provide that recovery of the amount of the advance shall
be repayable out of the advance to Dawn in the event of her
remarriage, or if she does not remarry, out of her biweekly
benefits received after her child ceases to be a beneficiary,
or in the event that the claimant dies, that recovery be
made out of the child's benefits commencing at her sixteenth
birthday; all as agreed to by claimant.
(2) Determination by the court of the amount of the
attorney fees to be awarded to claimant's attorney and the
party responsible for the payment of such fees and other
costs.
We Concur:
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24 Chief Justice