State v. Fife

No. 81-88
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
HAROLD mLVIN FIFE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone.
Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Stacey and Jarussi, Billings, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana

Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981
Decided: August 20, 1981
AUG 2 0 19%
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n
of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a c o n v i c t i o n of r o b b e r y . The

d e f e n d a n t w a s l l f i r s t t r i e d on t h e c h a r g e A p r i l 1 7 , 1979, and

convicted. T h a t c o n v i c t i o n was r e v e r s e d by t h i s C o u r t and

remanded f o r a new t r i a l . S t a t e v. F i f e (1980), -Mont. -I

608 P.2d 1069, 37 St.Rep. 600. The a p p e l l a n t was a c c u s e d of

t h e December 1 4 , 1978, r o b b e r y of M r . and M r s . Curtis

Workman. The f a c t s a r e s e t f o r t h i n t h e f i r s t o p i n i o n and

w i l l n o t be r e s t a t e d .
W e reversed t h e conviction, holding the D i s t r i c t Court

had abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion

f o r c o n t i n u a n c e , made s o t h a t a subpoenaed w i t n e s s , c r u c i a l

t o t h e d e f e n s e of t h e c a s e , c o u l d be compelled t o a t t e n d and

testify. R e m i t t i t u r was o r d e r e d A p r i l 1 0 , 1980. The S t a t e

took no f u r t h e r a c t i o n u n t i l September 11, 1980, when t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d a n o r d e r a u t h o r i z i n g t h e r e t u r n of

t h e d e f e n d a n t from t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , t o t h e Yell-ow-

s t o n e County j a i l . On October 8 , 1980, t h e a p p e l l a n t made

motions t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e s e i z e d from a p p e l l a n t ' s t r u c k

and t h e a p a r t m e n t t h e a p p e l l a n t s h a r e d w i t h two o t h e r p e r -

sons. The a p p e l l a n t a l s o moved t o d i s m i s s t h e c a s e on t h e

grounds t h e a p p e l l a n t had been d e n i e d b a i l f o l l o w i n g r e -

v e r s a l of h i s f i r s t c o n v i c t i o n . S e c t i o n 46-9-104, MCA.

B a i l had been o r i g i n a l l y s e t i n J a n u a r y 1979 a t $20,000.

Following a h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o s e t b a i l October 9 , t h e

c o u r t reduced b a i l t o $15,000. A p p e l l a n t c o u l d n o t p o s t t h e

reduced b a i l . The r e c o r d shows t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s been

continuously incarcerated since h i s a r r e s t .

The second t r i a l was s e t f o r October 2 1 , however,

b e f o r e t r i a l , on October 1 7 , t h e a p p e l l a n t made a second
motion t o d i s m i s s c o n t e n d i n g d e p r i v a t i o n of h i s r i g h t t o

speedy t r i a l . The motion w a s d e n i e d .

The second t r i a l l a s t e d t h r e e d a y s and i n c l u d e d t h e

t e s t i m o n y of t h e a b s e n t d e f e n s e w i t n e s s . The a p p e l l a n t

renewed h i s motion t o d i s m i s s f o r d e n i a l of h i s speedy t r i a l

r i g h t several t i m e s during the t r i a l . After deliberation,

t h e j u r y found t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y of r o b b e r y .

Following t r i a l , t h e a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion f o r

d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e judgment and a motion

f o r f u r t h e r h e a r i n g on t h e d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l m o t i o n s

earlier filed. A b r i e f h e a r i n g was h e l d November 25; b o t h

motions w e r e d e n i e d . On November 26, t h e a p p e l l a n t was

s e n t e n c e d t o 20 y e a r s and from t h a t judgment, the defendant

appeals.

Appellant r a i s e s the following i s s u e s :

I-. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by denying a p p e l -

l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s f o r f a i l u r e t o g r a n t a speedy

trial.

2 . Whether comment by a w i t n e s s r e v e a l i n g t h e f i r s t

t r i a l was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .

3 . Whether d e n i a l of t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s , which was

b a s e d upon t h e r e c o r d of t h e e a r l i e r t r i a l , w a s r e v e r s i b l e

error.

W e f i n d t h e f i r s t i s s u e d e t e r m i n a t i v e and c o n s e q u e n t l y

need n o t a d d r e s s t h e a d d i t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d .

The r i g h t of any d e f e n d a n t t o a speedy t r i a l i s guaran-

t e e d by t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . U.S. Const.,

Amend. V I ; 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, S 2 4 . When f a c e d w i t h

a c l a i m e d d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t , t h i s C o u r t h a s a p p l i e d t h e

f o u r p a r t s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w s t a t e d i n Barker v. Wingo

(1972) , 407 U . S . 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 3 3 L.Ed. 2d 1 0 1 . State
v. Larson (1981), -Mont. , 623 P.2d 954, 38 S t . R e p . 213;

S t a t e v. Bretz (1979), Mont. 605 P.2d 974, 36 St.Rep.

1037; S t a t e v . Harvey ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. 603 P.2d 661,

36 St.Rep. 2035; S t a t e v . Freeman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -Mont. , 599

P.2d 368, 36 St.Rep. 1622; S t a t e v. P u z i o ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -Mont. - I

595 P.2d 1 1 6 3 , 36 S t . R e p . 1004; S t a t e v . Tiedemann ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,

178 Mont. 394, 584 P. 2d 1284; S t a t e v . ~ o l l i n s( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8

Mont. 36, 582 P . 2d 1179.

The f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d a r e (1) l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y , (2)

reason f o r delay, ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ,

a n d ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t from d e l a y . Application

o f t h i s " b a l a n c i n g t e s t " of c o u r s e must b e made on a n - -
a d hoc

basis. B a r k e r v . Wingo, s u p r a , 407 U.S. 514, 530. W e have

r e v i e w e d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e c u l i a r t o t h i s c a s e and a f t e r

b a l a n c i n g many f a c t o r s , w e r e l u c t a n t l y m u s t o r d e r r e v e r s a l

and d i s m i s s a l of t h i s cause.

The f i r s t f a c t o r , l e n g t h of d e l a y , h a s been termed t h e

" t r i g g e r i n g mechanism" t o speedy t r i a l i n q u i r i e s . Barker,

407 U.S. a t 530-531. The d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e i s i n d e e d

s u f f i c i e n t t o trigger further inquiry.

A f t e r a c o n v i c t i o n h a s been r e v e r s e d and remanded f o r

r e t r i a l , t h e s p e e d y t r i a l t i m e c l o c k b e g i n s on t h e d a t e of

t h e r e m i t t i t u r and c o n t i n u e s u n t i l t r i a l . S t a t e v. Sanders

( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372. W e ordered r e m i t t i t u r

o f t h i s c a u s e A p r i l 1 0 , 1980. The a p p e l l a n t w a s t r i e d 194

d a y s l a t e r on O c t o b e r 21, 1980. W e find the State's total

i n a c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t f i v e months o f t h e d e l a y t o b e p a r -

t i c u l a r l y troublesome.

I n S a n d e r s , w e h e l d s i x months a n d 22 d a y s was s u f f i -

c i e n t t o trigger further inquiry. 516 P.2d a t 375. In

Freeman, w e h e l d 207 d a y s , a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e v e n months, m e t
t h i s threshold requirement. While w e a r e aware of t h e

p r a c t i c a l problems i n g r a d u a l l y r e d u c i n g t h e minimum number

o f d a y s r e q u i r e d t o s u p p o r t speedy t r i a l i n q u i r y , w e a r e

e q u a l l y aware of t h e fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t i n -

volved. The a p p e l l a n t h a s remained i n c a r c e r a t e d s i n c e h i s

a r r e s t on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979. W cannot d i r e c t l y consider the
e

p e r i o d from t h e i n i t i a l a r r e s t u n t i l r e m i t t i t u r f o r p u r p o s e s

of a p p e l l a n t ' s c l a i m of d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l , however, w e

note i n holding t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t has m e t t h e threshold

r e q u i r e m e n t of B a r k e r , t h a t t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e l a y under

s c r u t i n y t h e a p p e l l a n t was i n c a r c e r a t e d ; 154 days a t Montana

S t a t e P r i s o n and 4 0 d a y s i n t h e c o u n t y j a i l .

The a p p e l l a n t h a s t r i g g e r e d f u r t h e r r e v i e w of h i s

claim. "The l e n g t h of d e l a y t h u s s h i f t s t h e burden t o t h e

S t a t e of e x p l a i n i n g t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y - showing
and

absence - p r e j u d i c e - defendant.
of to " ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d and
emphasis a d d e d . ) Tiedemann, 584 P.2d 1288.

The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h e c a s e was j u s t i f i a b l y d e l a y e d be-

c a u s e of (1) i t s good f a i t h b e l i e f t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel-

i n t e n d e d t o n e g o t i a t e a p l e a b a r g a i n , and ( 2 ) t h e t i m e

consumed by t h e number of motions f i l e d , b r i e f e d , a r g u e d and

d e c i d e d between September 1 5 and October 2 1 . W e are not

persuaded. The S t a t e ' s argument i s , a t b e s t , that the

a p p e l l a n t somehow waived h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l .

F i r s t , we c a n n o t c o n c l u d e from t h i s r e c o r d t h a t t h e

a p p e l l a n t waived h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l .

B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 525-526. Second, t h e S t a t e h a s com-

p l e t e l y f a i l e d t o supply a p l a u s i b l e reason f o r i t s i n a c t i o n

f o r f i v e months y e t a r g u e s we s h o u l d d e c i d e t h e c a s e a s w e

d i d Freeman. I n Freeman, w e h e l d w e c o u l d n o t presume

p r e j u d i c e was a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e S t a t e where t h e p r o s e c u -
t i o n was d i l i g e n t and numerous time-consuming motions had

been made. Freeman, 599 P.2d a t 371. I n o u r view, t h i s

case i s clearly distinguishable. The S t a t e h a s n o t been

d i l i g e n t ; t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d of d e l a y must be charged t o t h e

State. Mere a l l u s i o n t o good f a i t h m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and

crowded c o u r t c a l e n d a r s i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n

where t h e S t a t e h a s n o t been d i l i g e n t and t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s

been u n a b l e t o p o s t b a i l from h i s i n i t i a l a r r e s t .

The t h i r d t e s t i s whether t h e r e h a s been a t i m e l y

a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t by d e f e n d a n t . A motion t o d i s m i s s

f o r d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l made by t h e d e f e n d a n t p r i o r t o

t h e commencement of t h e t r i a l i s a n " a p p r o p r i a t e motion"

which f u l f i l l s t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . S t a t e v . Steward ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,

168 Mont. 385, 390, 543 P.2d 178, 182. The a p p e l l a n t p r o p e r l y

a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t w i t h such a motion f o u r d a y s p r i o r t o

trial.

The S t a t e c o n t e n d s we should c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e a p p e l -

l a n t f a i l e d t o p u t t h e S t a t e on n o t i c e by e a r l i e r communi-

c a t i n g h i s d e s i r e f o r a speedy r e t r i a l . This i s not the

law. ". . .[ I ] t i s n o t t h e d u t y of d e f e n d a n t t o b r i n g

himself t o t r i a l . " Larson, 623 P.2d a t 958.

The l a s t i n q u i r y i n Barker i s whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s

been p r e j u d i c e d . The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t u n l e s s t h e a p p e l -

l a n t was s o p r e j u d i c e d a s t o deny him a f a i r t r i a l w e must

deny h i s c l a i m . W e do n o t a g r e e .

" P r e j u d i c e i n a speedy t r i a l c o n t e x t i s t o be a s -
s e s s e d i n l i g h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of d e f e n d a n t s
which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t w a s d e s i g n e d t o pro-
tect. I n t h i s r e g a r d , d e f e n d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t s have
been i d e n t i f i e d a s : ' ( i )t o p r e v e n t o p p r e s s i v e p r e -
t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; ( i i ) t o minimize a n x i e t y and
c o n c e r n of t h e a c c u s e d ; and (iii)t o l i m i t t h e pos-
s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e f e n s e w i l l be i m p a i r e d . ' Barker
v . Wingo, 407 U.S. a t 532." Larson, 623 P.2d a t 959.
 The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t i n Moore v . Arizona ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 4 U.S. 25, 26, 94

". . . Barker v . Wingo e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d t h e no-
t i o n t h a t a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e m o n s t r a t i o n of p r e j u -
d i c e was n e c e s s a r y t o prove a d e n i a l of t h e con-
s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l :

"'We r e g a r d none of t h e f o u r f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d
above [ l e n g t h of d e l a y , r e a s o n f o r d e l a y , de-
f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t and p r e j u d i c e t o
t h e defendant] a s e i t h e r a necessary o r s u f f i c i e n t
c o n d i t i o n t o f i n d i n g of a d e p r i v a t i o n of t h e r i g h t
of speedy t r i a l . Rather, they a r e r e l a t e d f a c t o r s
and must be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r w i t h s u c h o t h e r
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s may be r e l e v a n t . . .I 11

The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h e a p p e l l a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d be-

c a u s e two i m p o r t a n t w i t n e s s e s w e r e a l s o i n t h e S t a t e p r i s o n .

The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t p r o x i m i t y of t h e s e w i t n e s s e s gave t h e

appellant a greater opportunity t o a s s i s t i n the preparation

of h i s l e g a l d e f e n s e t h a n i f he were i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e

Yellowstone County j a i l . W e can h a r d l y a g r e e t h a t t h e

a p p e l l a n t had a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e p a r e h i s d e f e n s e i n

p r i s o n w i t h t h e h e l p of two f e l l o w p r i s o n e r s t h a n he would

w i t h t h e a i d of h i s r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l i n Yellowstone County.

W e h o l d t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s shown s u f f i c i e n t p r e j u d i c e

from t h e r e c o r d and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e case. The a p p e l -

l a n t t e s t i f i e d a t h i s s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g of a n x i e t y o v e r

n o t knowing whether t h e S t a t e would r e t r y h i s c a s e . The

r e c o r d of e x t e n d e d c o n f i n e m e n t i s c l e a r .

W f i n d ample e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o h o l d t h e d e l a y
e

i n t h i s case p r e j u d i c e d the a p p e l l a n t .

Having found t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t

t o speedy t r i a l , we must d i s m i s s t h e c a s e . Strunk v. United

S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 2 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed. 2d 56;

S t a t e v . K e l l e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 372, 553 P.2d 1013.
 I n summary, a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and

t h e f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h above, we h o l d t h a t e x c e s s i v e d e l a y

between r e m i t t i t u r of t h e f i r s t c o n v i c t i o n i n t h i s a c t i o n

and r e t r i a l of t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s o c c u r r e d ; t h a t the State

has f a i l e d t o adequately explain i t s t o t a l i n a c t i o n f o r

s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l of t h e d e l a y ; t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t t i m e l y

a s s e r t e d d e p r i v a t i o n of h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l ; t h a t

s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e of r e s u l t a n t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t

h a s been shown; t h a t t h e o n l y p r o p e r remedy i s d i s m i s s a l of

t h e case.

For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e c o n v i c t i o n i s r e v e r s e d

and d i s m i s s e d w i t h p r e j u d i c e .

W e concur: