Mt. Automobile Association v. Greel

No. 81-45 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1981 MONTANA AUTOMOBILE A S S O C I A T I O N , BUFFALO MACHINERY COMPANY e t a l . , and MONTANA CHAMBER O F COMMERCE, P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s , MIKE GREELY, ATTORNEY GENERAL O F THE STATE O F MONTANA, and PEG K R I V E C , COMMISSIONER O F P O L I T I C A L P R A C T I C E S , D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t s : Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a R i c h a r d L a r s o n argued and M a r y B. T r o l a n d argued, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana $f-c..k &DL-: ".cCe0-, ~ T L ~ For spondents : D o n a l d g a r r i t y argued, H e l e n a , Montana For A m i c u s C u r i a e : J a m e s G o e t z , R.C.L.U.), Bozeman, Montana James W. . Zion, (A. C L L ~ U). Hklana , M o n t a n a K e l l y A l a n J e n k i n s , (Common C a u s e ) H e l e n a , M o n t a n a - -- Submitted: March 27, 1981 Decided: J u l y 30, 1 9 8 1 Filed : . a L S O 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . I n i t i a t i v e No. 85'-, Lobbyist Disclosure, (herein called "1-85" o r " t h e I n i t i a t i v e " ) was h e l d t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . D e f e n d a n t s , t h e s t a t e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s of t h e S t a t e of Montana, w e r e perman- e n t l y e n j o i n e d from enforcement of 1-85. Defendants appeal- from t h e judgment. W hold t h a t t h e I n i t i a t i v e i n p a r t i s e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and v o i d , and t h a t t h e b a l a n c e of 1-85 i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c a r r y o u t t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e Act a n d , t h e r e f o r e , remains i n e f f e c t . T h i s o p i n i o n d o e s n o t r u l e upon t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of 1-85 t o l a w y e r s , which w i l l b e d e c i d e d i n a s e p a r a t e o p i n i o n , S t a t e Bar of Montana v . K r i v e c , Supreme C o u r t Docket No. 81-35. C h a p t e r 157, L a w s of Montana ( 1 9 5 9 ) , e n t i t l e d "Lobbying", w a s e n a c t e d i n 1959 and c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 43-801, e t seq., R.C.M., 1947, now C h a p t e r 7, T i t l e 5, MCA. The Lobbying Act was e n a c t e d " t o promote a h i g h s t a n d a r d of e t h i c s i n t h e p r a c t i c e of l o b b y i n g , t o p r e v e n t u n f a i r and u n e t h i c a l l o b b y i n g p r a c t i c e s , and t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g of l o b b y i s t s and t h e s u s p e n s i o n o r r e v o c a t i o n of t h e l i c e n s e s . " S e c t i o n 5-7- 1 0 1 , MCA. L e g i s l a t i v e amendments i n 1965 and 1977 made minor changes i n t h e l o b b y i n g law b u t d i d n o t a l t e r i t s scope. S e c t i o n 3 , Ch. 248, Laws of Montana (1965) ; s e c t i o n s 1 9 , 2 0 and 21, Ch. 309, Laws of Montana ( 1 9 7 7 ) . House ill 49 and S e n a t e B i l l 233, d e s i g n e d t o expand t h e Act t o r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e amounts of money s p e n t f o r l o b b y i n g , were i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g t h e 1979 l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n , b u t were killed prior to transmittal. House J o u r n a l , 46th ~ e g i s l a t u r e l ~ e Appendix "A". e (~ontana 1979) ; S e n a t e J o u r n a l , 4 6 t h L e g i s l a t u r e (Montana 1979). I n 1980, a s u c c e s s f u l p e t i t i o n e f f o r t r e s u l t e d i n t h e placement of 1-85 on t h e s t a t e w i d e November b a l l o t . The I n i t i a t i v e s o u g h t t o add 1 3 new s e c t i o n s and t o make numerous amendments t o t h e e x i s t i n g l o b b y i n g r e g u l a t i o n a c t . It also g r e a t l y expanded t h e " D e f i n i t i o n s " s e c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l law i n a n a t t e m p t t o c l a r i f y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e law a s expanded and amended. Most of t h e 1959 law and a l l of t h e changes proposed by 1-85 were p r i n t e d i n t h e V o t e r I n f o r m a t i o n Pamphlet f o r t h e November 4 , 1980, g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . The o f - f i c a l v o t e on 1-85 was 259,698 " f o r " and 76,358 " a g a i n s t " . On November 2 4 , 1980, a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n w a s brought i n t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . The p l a i n t i f f s a r e a s s o c i a t i o n s which employ l o b b y i s t s , s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s , and one s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ; and t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e a t - t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s of Montana. An a t t e m p t by d e f e n d a n t s t o remove t h e a c t i o n t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t was u n s u c c e s s f u l . On J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1981, a f t e r submission of b r i e f s and a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c r e e d t h a t " I n i t i a t i v e No. 85 i s uncon- s t i t u t i o n a l , n u l l , and v o i d , and t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a r e permanently e n j o i n e d from e n f o r c i n g i t s p r o v i s i o n s . " The f i n d i n g of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y was based upon t h e I n i t i a t i v e ' s i m p a c t on numerous r i g h t s : p r i v a c y , freedom of s p e e c h , freedom of t h e p r e s s , freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n , freedom t o p e t i t i o n t h e government, e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws, and freedom from compelled s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . The I n i t i a t i v e was a l s o h e l d t o be v o i d f o r vagueness. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t t h e S t a t e had n o t m e t i t s burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o m p e l l i n g i n t e r e s t t h a t j u s t i f i e d t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t s mentioned above, o r t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t c o u l d be a c h i e v e d through less r e s t r i c t i v e means. F i n a l l y , the D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o f f e n s i v e p o r t i o n s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e could n o t be severed because " t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e e n t i r e m e a s u r e d e p e n d s upon t h e showing of a c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t s u c h i n t e r e s t may n o t b e s a t i s f i e d by l e g i s l a t i o n more n a r r o w l y drawn." W e a g r e e w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t 1-85 c o n f l i c t s w i t h v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u t i - o n a l r i g h t s o f t h o s e a f f e c t e d by i t s provisions. However, w e d o n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n a f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t f o r t h e p a s s a g e o f 1-85. While w e f i n d t h a t c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e I n i t i a t i v e a r e beyond r e d e m p t i o n , t h e s t r i k i n g o f t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s d o e s n o t r e s u l t i n a law t h a t i s i n c o m p l e t e o r i n c a p a b l e of f u l f i l l i n g i t s s t a t e d p u r p o s e . Whether e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r c r e a t e d by t h e p e o p l e t h r o u g h i n i t i a t i v e , a l l s t a t u t e s c a r r y w i t h them a p r e s u m p t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . S t a t e v . Erickson (1926) , 75 Mont. 429, 438, 244 P. 287, 290. When a s t a t u t e i s challenged a s being unconstitutional, t h e c h a l l e n g e r must show t h a t i t d o e s i n f a c t i n f r i n g e upon a r i g h t g u a r a n t e e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . N.A.A.C.P. v . Alabama ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 449, 78 S . C t . 1 1 6 3 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. When i t h a s b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a s t a t u t e i n f r i n g e s upon F i r s t Amendment f r e e d o m s , a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y i s no l o n g e r available. United S t a t e s v. C.I.O. ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 335 U.S. 106, 1 4 0 , 68 S.Ct. 1 3 4 9 , 1366, 92 L.Ed. 1849, 1870-71, (Rutledge, J., concurring). N e v e r t h e l e s s , r e s t r i c t i o n s of F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s may b e a l l o w e d i f t h e s t a t e c a n show t h a t t h e c h a l - lenged s t a t u t e f u r t h e r s a compelling governmental i n t e r e s t . United S t a t e s v. O'Brien ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S . C t . 1673, 1678-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 679-80. Appellants agree t h a t c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s of 1-85 h a v e a n i m p a c t upon t h e fundamental r i g h t s o f t h o s e t o whom t h e law a p p l i e s . How- ever, they argue t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t no c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t had been d e m o n s t r a t e d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t " [tlhe Initiative itself d o e s n o t r e c i t e any ' c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t ' i n ... disclosure ... Defendants o f f e r e d no proof t o e s t a b l i s h such a need." The c o u r t a l s o found t h a t t h e "Montana L e g i s - l a t u r e has i n v e s t i g a t i v e o r ' f a c t - f i n d i n g ' capabilities w h i l e t h e Montana i n i t i a t i v e p r o c e s s h a s no such a b i l i t y . " The mere r e c i t a t i o n of a c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e A c t i t s e l f would n o t be c o n c l u s i v e . While t h e a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t p r e s e n t evidence t o e s t a b l i s h a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t , t h e i r b r i e f s a t t h e h e a r i n g below c i t e d a u t h o r i t y from numerous j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n which a c o m p e l l i n g i n t e r e s t f o r s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n had been found t o b e p r e s e n t . Laws r e g u l a t i n g o r m o n i t o r i n g t h e r a i s i n g and s p e n d i n g of money i n t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a have been e n a c t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y a s w e l l a s by t h e Congress. When t h e s e laws have been c h a l l e n g e d , t h e c o u r t s have n o t had d i f f i c u l t y f i n d i n g a c o m p e l l i n g i n t e r e s t a s a b a s i s f o r enactment. United S t a t e s v . Harriss ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 816, 98 L.Ed. 989, 1 0 0 1 , ( m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y of a b a s i c governmental p r o c e s s ) ; Young Americans f o r Freedom, I n c . v. Gorton ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 83 Wash.2d 728, 522 P.2d 189, 192, ( i n f o r m i n g p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and t h e e l e c t o r a t e of t h e spon- s o r s of e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e governmental d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ) ; P l a n t e v . Gonzalez ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 575 F.2d 1119, 1135, cert.den., ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1047, 59 ~ . ~ d . 2 d 90, ( p r o t e c t i n g c i t i z e n s from abuse of t h e t r u s t p l a c e d i n t h e hands of e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s ) ; Montgomery County v . Walsh / <-_, 'A C ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 274 Md. .4% 3 3 6 A.2d 97, 106, a p p e a l d i s m i s s e d ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 4 2 4 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 1 0 9 1 , 47 L.Ed.2d 306, (fostering a c l i m a t e of h o n e s t y p e r c e p t i b l e by t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e ) . P o l i t i c a l c o r r u p t i o n i s a m a t t e r of common p o p u l a r p e r c e p t i o n , which may o r may n o t r e f l e c t t h e a c t u a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l life. J u d i c i a l n o t i c e may be t a k e n of t h e c o m p e l l i n g need f o r d i s c l o s u r e laws which have a s t h e i r p u r p o s e t h e d e t e r r e n c e of a c t u a l c o r r u p t i o n and t h e a v o i d a n c e of a p p e a r a n c e s of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. 1, 67, 96 S.Ct. 612, 657, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 715. The a b s e n c e of f a c t - f i n d i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e p r o c e s s i s n o t proof of t h e a b s e n c e of a c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e e n a c t m e n t of 1-85. To s o h o l d would r e s u l t i n t h e e m a s c u l a t i o n of t h e i n i t i a t i v e p r o c e s s i n Montana w i t h a r e s u l t t h a t no i n i t i a t i v e c o u l d w i t h s t a n d a F i r s t Amendment c h a l l e n g e . W find that e t h e s t a t e w i d e v o t e on 1-85 i s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of a c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e enactment of 1-85. In addition, the c o m p e l l i n g need f o r t h i s t y p e of l e g i s l a t i o n i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by b o t h common u n d e r s t a n d i n g and j u d i c i a l p r e c e d e n t , s o no a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e need be p r e s e n t e d . Because w e f i n d t h a t a c o m p e l l i n g need f o r d i s c l o s u r e h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d , w e c a n n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t 1-85 must f a l l i n its entirety. W e w i l l now proceed t o a p p l y t h e s e v e r a b i l i t y c l a u s e of t h e ~ n i t i a t i v et o t h e end t h a t " a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t [may] remain i n effect." S e c t i o n 2 1 , 1-85. EXCEPTIONS F R I N D I V I D U A L MONTANA CITIZENS O S e c t i o n l(2) of 1-85 p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ n l o t h i n g i n t h i s c h a p t e r s u b j e c t s any Montana c i t i z e n l o b b y i n g on h i s / h e r own b e h a l f t o any r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s nor d e p r i v e s any s u c h c i t i z e n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate w i t h public official-s." S e c t i o n 2 ( 5 ) ( b ) ( i )s t a t e s t h a t " ' [ l l o b b y - i s t ' d o e s n o t i n c l u d e ( i )any i n d i v i d u a l Montana c i t i z e n a c t i n g s o l e l y on h i s / h e r own b e h a l f . . ." W find the e exemption p r o v i d e d f o r Montana c i t i z e n s cons t i t u t i o n a l l y impermissible. "The c i t i z e n s of e a c h s t a t e s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o a l l p r i v i l e g e s and immunities of c i t i z e n s i n t h e s e v e r a l states." U.S. Const., a r t . IV, 5 2 , c l . 1. W can d i s c e r n e no b a s i s f o r c r e a t i n g an e x c e p t i o n s o l e l y f o r i n d i v i d u a l Montana c i t i z e n s . A c i t i z e n of North Dakota o r New J e r s e y may have a n i n t e r e s t i n some o f f i c i a l a c t i o n i n Montana t h a t w a r r a n t s h i s e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome of t h a t a c t i o n . I f t h e i n d i v i d u a l Montana c i t i z e n l o b b y i n g i n h i s own b e h a l f i s immune from t h e r e a c h of t h e I n i t i a t i v e , s o t o o i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n of a s i s t e r s t a t e . J u s t a s the privileges and immunities c l a u s e p r o t e c t s p e r s o n s who e n t e r o t h e r s t a t e s t o e a r n a l i v i n g , Toomer v. Witsell ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460; Gordon v . Committee on C h a r a c t e r and F i t n e s s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 4 2 2 N.Y.S.2d 641, i t must p r o t e c t p e r s o n s who e n t e r t h i s s t a t e t o a s s e r t o r protect t h e i r i n t e r e s t s before public officials. The word "Montana" i s v o i d and w i t h o u t e f f e c t i n both sections. DEFINITIONS O "UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT" F S e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) of 1-85 d e f i n e s " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t " . A s amended and expanded by 1-85, "unprofessional conduct" now i n c l u d e s t h e f o l l o w i n g : " ( 7 ) ' U n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t ' means: " ( a ) a v i o l a t i o n of any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s chapter ; " ( b ) i n s t i g a t i n g a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l f o r t h e purpose of o b t a i n i n g employment i n o p p o s i - tion thereto ; " (c) a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e t h e a c t i o n of any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by " ( i ) t h e promise o f s u p p o r t o r o p p o s i t i o n a t any f u - ture election, " ( i i ) promise of f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t " (iii)making p u b l i c any u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d c h a r g e s of improper c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of any o t h e r l o b b y i s t , any p r i n c i p a l , o r any l e g i s l a t o r , " ( i v ) any improper economic r e p r i s a l o r o t h e r un- l a w f u l r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , o r " ( v ) any means o t h e r t h a n argument on t h e m e r i t s thereof ; " ( d ) a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a h e a r i n g examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r i n any c o n t e s t e d c a s e p r o c e e d i n g under P a r t 6, C h a p t e r 4 , T i t l e 2 , MCA e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d t h e r e i n ; " ( e ) a t t e m p t i n g t o knowingly d e c e i v e any p u b l i c o f f i - c i a l w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s of a n o f f i c i a l m a t t e r o r a t t e m p t t o knowingly m i s r e p r e s e n t p e r t i n e n t f a c t s of a n o f f i c i a l m a t t e r t o any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l ; o r " ( f ) engaging i n p r a c t i c e s which r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t on t h e p r a c t i c e of l o b b y i n g l e g i s l a t u r e . " S e c t i o n 5-7-305, MCA 2 , makes i t a misdemeanor t o v i o l a t e t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l o b b y i n g law. The punishment i s i m - p r i s o n m e n t i n t h e c o u n t y j a i l f o r n o t more t h a n s i x months o r a f i n e up t o $200, o r b o t h . N person should be held o c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n d u c t which he c o u l d n o t r e a s o n - ably understand t o be proscribed. Palmer v . C i t y of E u c l i d , Ohio ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 4 0 2 U . S . 544, 546, 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564, 29 L.Ed.2d 98, 1 0 0 . A s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague when i t f a i l s t o g i v e a p e r s o n of o r d i n a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s c o n t e m p l a t e d a c t i v i t y i s f o r b i d d e n by t h e statute. United S t a t e s v . Dupree ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 544 F. 2d 1050, 1051. A number of t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct" f a i l t o overcome t h i s b a s i c h u r d l e . Sections 2 ( 7 ) ( c ) ( i v ) and ( v ) p r o h i b i t a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l t h r o u g h improper economic r e p r i s a l , 2~ee Appendix " B " . u n l a w f u l r e t a l i a t i o n , o r any means o t h e r t h a n argument on the m e r i t s . Is t h e r e a form of " p r o p e r " economic r e p r i s a l ? How d o e s a l o b b y i s t d e t e r m i n e when he may r e t a l i a t e l a w f u l l y against a public o f f i c i a l ? And, i n s u b s e c t i o n ( v ) , can c o n d u c t which i s p o t e n t i a l l y c r i m i n a l be d e f i n e d a s "any means o t h e r t h a n " t h e s i n g l e , p e r m i t t e d means of argument on the merits? S e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) (£1 p r o h i b i t s "engaging i n p r a c t i c e s which r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t on t h e p r a c t i c e of l o b b y i n g l e g i s l a t u r e [sic]". W need n o t d e a l w i t h t h e a p p a r e n t e r r o r i n amendment. e The words " o r t h e " w e r e f o r m e r l y p l a c e d between " l o b b y i n g " and " l e g i s l a t u r e " . W simply h o l d t h a t t o " r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t " e i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e t o g i v e a p e r s o n of o r d i n a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s conduct i s forbidden. S e c t i o n s 2 ( 7 ) ( c ) ( i v ) and ( v ) and s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( f ) a r e impermis- s i b l y vague, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e , v o i d . S e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( c ) ( i )d e f i n e s " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t " a s " a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e t h e a c t i o n of any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by ( i ) t h e promise o f s u p p o r t o r o p p o s i t i o n a t any f u t u r e e l e c t i o n . " A s we r e a d t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e p r o h i b i t e d c o n d u c t i s n o t h i n g more t h a n a s t a n d a r d and a c c e p t e d means of involvement i n t h e po- l i t i c a l process. The o n l y r e a l i n f l u e n c e t h a t most v o t e r s c a n e x e r t upon e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i s t o g i v e o r w i t h h o l d t h e i r vote. When a n i s s u e comes b e f o r e a n e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l , it i s c e r t a i n l y permissible f o r the o f f i c i a l ' s constituents t o express t h e i r d e s i r e s a s t o t h a t issue. I f the issue is i m p o r t a n t enough t o a v o t e r , t h e o f f i c i a l may be t o l d t h a t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n on t h e measure would c r e a t e such d i s a f f e c t i o n t h a t t h e v o t e r c o u l d n o t , i n good c o n s c i e n c e , s u p p o r t t h a t o f f i c i a l i n any f u t u r e e l e c t i o n . This i s not a t h r e a t . I t i s a f r e e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e o n l y r e a l power a n e l e c t o r possesses. C r i t i c i s m of government i s a t t h e v e r y c e n t e r of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of f r e e speech. Therefore, c r i t i c i s m of t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r government o p e r a t i o n s must be f r e e , l e s t c r i t i c i s m of government i t s e l f be p e n a l i z e d . R o s e n b l a t t v . Baer ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 1 5 L.Ed.2d 597, 605. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t y of f r e e speech provides f o r t h e opportunity t o persuade t o a c t i o n , n o t merely t o d e s c r i b e f a c t s . Thomas v . C o l l i n s ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 326, 89 L.Ed. 430, 444. I t i s a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r f r e e p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n h a s a s i t s end t h a t government may be r e s p o n s i v e t o t h e w i l l of t h e people. N e w York T i m e s Co. v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 686, 700, motion d e n i e d , 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1130, 1 2 L.Ed.2d 83. N law c o u l d s t a n d which would p r e v e n t a n e l e c t o r from o v o t i n g f o r o r a g a i n s t a n incumbent. L i k e w i s e , no law can s t a n d which would p r e v e n t a v o t e r from e x p r e s s i n g t o a n e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l an i n t e n t i o n t o vote f o r o r a g a i n s t t h a t o f f i c i a l i f c e r t a i n a c t i o n i s o r i s n o t taken. Such a r e s t r a i n t i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e under b o t h t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n and a r t i c l e 11, S7 of t h e Montana Constitution. The r e s t r i c t i o n i s no l e s s o f f e n s i v e b e c a u s e , under 1-85, i t a p p l i e s t o " p r i n c i p a l s " and t h e i r a d v o c a t e s , "lobbyists". The F i r s t Amendment a p p l i e s t o a s s o c i a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s i n d i v i d u a l s , and p r o t e c t s t h e r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n s t o engage i n advocacy on b e h a l f of t h e i r members. smith v. Arkansas S t a t e Highway Employees ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 4 1 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 60 L.Ed. 2d 360. S e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( c ) ( i )i s a n u n c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l i n f r i n g e m e n t of t h e r i g h t of f r e e speech and i s , t h e r e f o r e , void. W t u r n now t o t h e f i n a l problems p r e s e n t e d by t h e "un- e p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct" s e c t i o n s of t h e l a w . W e note t h a t " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t " embraces " a v i o l a t i o n of any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r . " S e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( a ) , 1-85. The c h a p t e r , however, e s t a b l i s h e s c e r t a i n r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s a s w e l l a s f o r l o b b y i s t s and p r i n c i p a l s . The law w a s , and s t i l l i s , a measure d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y t o r e g u l a t e t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e l o b b y i n g p r o f e s s i o n . The c o n d u c t p r o h i b i t e d by s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) i s c o n d u c t t h a t c o u l d be engaged i n by l o b b y i s t s and p o s s i b l y by p r i n c i p a l s , b u t w e do n o t f i n d t h a t t h e a c t i o n s of e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s w e r e i n t e n d e d t o be c o v e r e d by t h i s s u b s e c t i o n . We, t h e r e f o r e , construe s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( a ) t o l i m i t "unprofessional conduct" t o v i o l a t i o n s o f any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e c h a p t e r by a lobbyist or principal. T h i s b r i n g s u s back t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e s c o p e of a c t i v i t i e s which may b e found t o be " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l . " A " l o b b y i s t " i s "any p e r s o n who engages i n t h e p r a c t i c e of lobbying f o r h i r e . " S e c t i o n 2 ( 5 ) ( a ) , 1-85. "Lobbying includes: ... ( b ) t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . . ." Section 2 ( 4 ) ( b ) , 1-85. " ' P u b l i c o f f i c i a l ' means any i n d i v i d u a l , elected o r appointed, a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity f o r t h e s t a t e o r l o c a l government o r any p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n t h e r e o f , ---t i n c l u d e t h o s e a c t i n g - - j u d i c i a l - b u t does n o in a or quasi-judicial capacity." Section 2 ( 3 ) , 1-85. (Emphasis added. ) So, i n a n a c t e n t i t l e d "Lobbying", and d r a f t e d w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n of l o b b y i n g i n mind, w e have a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t l o b b y i n g d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r o p p o s i n g o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a j u d i c i a l o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l public official. Despite t h i s c l e a r exception, s e c t i o n 2 ( 7 ) ( d ) makes i t a c r i m e t o a t t e m p t " t o i n f l u e n c e a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a h e a r i n g examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r i n any c o n t e s t e d c a s e p r o c e e d i n g under P a r t 6 , C h a p t e r 4 , T i t l e 2 , MCA, except a s provided t h e r e i n . " I f possible, subsec- t i o n s o f a s t a t u t e shou1.d be c o n s t r u e d i n a manner t h a t w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o them a l l . S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont. 328, 384 P.2d 501; S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA. T h i s C o u r t must r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s and make them o p e r a t i v e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , i n s o f a r a s i t i s p o s s i b l e t o do so. S t a t e e x r e l . Bennick v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e 1 3 t h J . D. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 389, 391, 538 P.2d 1369, 1370. It i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of a law e n a c t e d t o r e g u l a t e l o b b y i n g t o a l s o r e g u l a t e c o n d u c t t h a t i s , by t h e t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e , n o t lobbying. Criminal s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d . Shipman v. Todd ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 365, 368, 310 P.2d 300, 302. W e c o n s t r u e 1-85, a s it a p p l i e s t o p r i n c i p a l s and l o b b y i s t s , t o r e g u l a t e o n l y t h a t c o n d u c t which f a l l s under t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f l o b b y i n g . Because " a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e a d e c i s i o n o r v o t e by a h e a r i n g examiner o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r " i s e x p r e s s l y e x c l u d e d from t h e d e f i n i t i o n of l o b b y i n g a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , i t i s i r r e c o n c i l a b l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e Act. I t cannot be "unprofessional conduct", and no p e n a l t y may a t t a c h t o s u c h c o n d u c t by a p p l i c a t i o n o f 1-85. Section 2 ( 7 ) (d) i s void. DEFINITION O "PRINCIPAL" F W e n e x t t u r n t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " p r i n c i p a l " a s con- t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n s 2 ( 8 ) ( a ) and ( b ) . "Principal" i s defined i n s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) a s a n y p e r s o n who makes payments i n e x c e s s of $1,000 p e r c a l e n d a r y e a r t o engage a l o b b y i s t . No q u e s t i o n i s r a i s e d with regard t o subsection ( a ) . "Principal" is f u r t h e r d e f i n e d a s any p e r s o n who makes t h o s e payments: " ( b ) i n t h e c a s e of a p e r s o n o t h e r t h a n a n i n d i v i - d u a l , t o s o l i c i t , d i r e c t l y , i n d i r e c t l y o r by an ad- v e r t i s i n g campaign, t h e l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s of a n o t h e r person. " S u b s e c t i o n ( b ) i s a t t a c k e d f o r vagueness and i n f r i n g e - ment upon F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s under t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and a r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 6 , of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , by which t h e p e o p l e a r e g i v e n t h e r i g h t t o p e a c e a b l y p r o t e s t governmental a c t i o n , and t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n 7 which p r o v i d e s t h a t no law s h a l l be p a s s e d i m p a i r - i n g t h e freedom of s p e e c h o r e x p r e s s i o n . It is difficult to d e t e r m i n e what p e r s o n o r g r o u p s of p e r s o n s w e r e i n t e n d e d t o be i n c l u d e d under s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) a s " p r i n c i p a l s " . Following a r e f i v e examples of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i o n s which m e e t t h e subsection (b) d e f i n i t i o n of " p r i n c i p a l " : (1) A c t i o n by union o f f i c e r s a s k i n g u n i o n members t o s u p p o r t o r oppose a r i g h t - t o - w o r k law. ( 2 ) M a i l i n g of n e w s l e t t e r s by an o r g a n i z e d c h u r c h t o members and nonmembers e n c o u r a g i n g t h e r e a d e r t o c o n t a c t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l on a n a b o r t i o n law. ( 3 ) A c t i v i t y by a farm group which s u g g e s t s t o f a r m e r s t h a t t h e y should c o n t a c t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s i n o r d e r t o improve grain o r c a t t l e prices. ( 4 ) A c t i o n by any b u s i n e s s , l a b o r , farm, r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l o r o t h e r group requesting people t o c o n t a c t t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s t o a s s i s t i n p a s s a g e o r r e p e a l of a law. ( 5 ) P u b l i c a t i o n o r b r o a d c a s t by anyone, o t h e r t h a n a n i n d i v i d u a l , of a newspaper, pamphlet, n e w s l e t t e r , t e l e v i s i o n program, o r r a d i o program which e n c o u r a g e s r e a d e r s o r l i s t e n - e r s t o contact a legislator or s t a t e o f f i c i a l . I n examples (1) t o ( 4 ) , subsection (b) i s challenged a s b e i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague and o v e r b r o a d . W have n o t e been a b l e t o c o n s t r u e s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) i n a manner t h a t meets these challenges. I n United S t a t e s v . H a r r i s s , s u p r a , 347 U.S. 612, t h e Supreme C o u r t was a b l e t o n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n o f Lobbying Act a n d , t h e r e f o r e , f i n d i t t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . T h i s was done t o e l i m i n a t e t h e vagueness i n t h e Act. I n substance, t h e Court n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e d t h e words " [ t l o i n f l u e n c e , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , t h e p a s s a g e o r d e f e a t of any l e g i s l a t i o n by t h e Congress of t h e United S t a t e s " t o be l i m i t e d "direct communication w i t h members of Congress on pending o r proposed federal legislation." United S t a t e s v . H a r r i s s , s u p r a , 347 U.S. a t 620. I n d o i n g s o , t h e Supreme C o u r t r e l i e d upon United S t a t e s v . Rumely ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770. I n t h e Rumely c a s e , t h e Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : " S u r e l y i t c a n n o t be d e n i e d t h a t g i v i n g t h e s c o p e t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n f o r which t h e Government c o n t e n d s , t h a t i s , d e r i v i n g from i t t h e power t o i n q u i r e i n t o a l l e f f o r t s of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s t o i n f l u e n c e pub- l i c o p i n i o n t h r o u g h books and p e r i o d i c a l s , however remote t h e r a d i a t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e which t h e y may e x e r t upon t h e u l t i m a t e l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s , r a i s e s d o u b t s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y i n view of t h e p r o h i b i - t i o n of t h e F i r s t Amendment." United S t a t e s v. Rumely, s u p r a , 345 U.S. a t 46. The C o u r t t h e n c o n s t r u e d " l o b b y i n g a c t i v i t i e s " a s b e i n g l i m i t e d t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made d i r e c t l y t o t h e C o n g r e s s , i t s members, o r i t s committees. S u b s e c t i o n ( b ) c o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u e d i n t h i s manner, a s i t s p e c i f i c a l l y c o v e r s s o l i c i t a - t i o n by a p e r s o n s e e k i n g l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s by o t h e r s . The f o r e g o i n g example ( 5 ) f o c u s e s on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) t o a newspaper, t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n , r a d i o s t a t i o n , pamphleteer o r o t h e r p u b l i s h e r s . Such a n a p p l i c a - t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r i n g e m e n t of t h e freedom of t h e p r e s s . A s s t a t e d by t h e Supreme C o u r t i n M i l l s v . Alabama ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S 214, 218-20, 86 S . C t . 1434, "Whatever d i f f e r e n c e s may e x i s t a b o u t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e F i r s t Amendment, t h e r e i s p r a c t i c a l l y u n i v e r s a l agreement t h a t a major p u r p o s e of t h a t Amendment was t o p r o t e c t t h e f r e e d i s c u s s i o n of go- vernmental a f f a i r s . T h i s of c o u r s e i n c l u d e s d i s - c u s s i o n s of c a n d i d a t e s , s t r u c t u r e s and forms of go- vernment, t h e manner i n which government i s o p e r a t e d o r s h o u l d be o p e r a t e d , and a l l such m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s . The C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y s e l e c t e d t h e p r e s s , which i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y news- p a p e r s , books, and magazines, b u t a l s o humble l e a f - l e t s and c i r c u l a r s , [ c i - t a t i o n ] t o p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p u b l i c a f f a i r s . Thus t h e p r e s s s e r v e s and was d e s i g n e d t o s e r v e a s a powerful a n t i d o t e t o any a b u s e s of power by governmental o f f i - c i a l s and a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y chosen means f o r keep- i n g o f f i c i a l s e l e c t e d by t h e p e o p l e r e s p o n s i b l e t o a l l t h e p e o p l e whom t h e y were s e l e c t e d t o s e r v e . S u p p r e s s i o n of t h e r i g h t of t h e p r e s s t o p r a i s e o r c r i t i c i z e governmental a g e n t s and t o clamor and con- t e n d f o r o r a g a i n s t change, which i s a l l t h a t t h i s e d i t o r i a l d i d , muzzles one of t h e v e r y a g e n c i e s t h e Framers of o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n t h o u g h t f u l l y and d e l i b e r - a t e l y s e l e c t e d t o improve o u r s o c i e t y and keep i t free. ". . . W e h o l d t h a t no t e s t of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s c a n s a v e a s t a t e law from i n v a l i d a t i o n a s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e F i r s t Amendment when t h a t law makes i t a c r i m e f o r a newspaper e d i t o r t o do no more t h a n u r g e p e o p l e t o v o t e one way o r a n o t h e r i n a p u b l i c l y h e l d e l e c t i o n . " Even newspaper e d i t o r i a l s , a s r e f e r r e d t o i n M i l l s v . Alabama, s u p r a , would c o n s ti t u t e l o b b y i n g a c t i v i t y under subsection ( b ) . F a c i a l l y , s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) c o n s t i t u t e s a more d r a s t i c i n f r i n g e m e n t on freedom of t h e p r e s s and freedom of s p e e c h t h a n was p r e s e n t i n M i l l s v . Alabama, s u p r a . Because s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) i n f r i n g e s on F i r s t Amendment freedoms, i t w i l l be s u b j e c t t o c l o s e j u d i c i a l e x a m i n a t i o n . Such s i g n i - f i c a n t i n t e r f e r e n c e s w i t h t h o s e r i g h t s may be a l l o w e d o n l y i f a c o m p e l l i n g governmental i n t e r e s t i s shown. United S t a t e s v . O I B r i e n , s u p r a , 391 U.S. 367. W e a r e u n a b l e t o f i n d any c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t which r e q u i r e s t h e i n c l u s i o n of s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) i n t h e I n i t i - ative. The fundamental p u r p o s e s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e a r e accomplished by i n c l u d i n g , a s a p r i n c i p a l , t h e p e r s o n who hires a lobbyist. W e f i n d a l l of s e c t i o n 2 ( 8 ) ( b ) t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and a r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n s 6 and 7 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . I t is, therefore, void. PROHIBITED COMPENSATION S e c t i o n 5-7-302, MCA, was amended by s e c t i o n 9 of t h e I n i t i a t i v e t o read: "No p e r s o n may be employed a s a l o b b y i s t f o r a compensation d e p e n d e n t i n any manner upon t h e p a s s a g e o r d e f e a t of any proposed o r pending o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r upon any o t h e r c o n t i n g e n c y connected w i t h such a c t i o n . " I n t h e p a s t , c o n t i n g e n t f e e agreements f o r l o b b y i n g s e r v i c e s w e r e s e e n as i n v i t i n g and i n d u c i n g improper s o l i c i t a t i o n s of Congress. Hazelton v . S h e c k e l l s (1906) , 202 U.S. 71, 79, 26 S.Ct. 567, 568, 50 L.Ed. 939, 941. A c o n t i n g e n t f e e agreement w a s c o n s i d e r e d s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t improper means would be used. C. Sands, 1 S t a t u t e s and S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n 513.20 (4th Ed. 1 9 7 3 ) . W s u r m i s e t h a t t h i s was t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y e behind t h e o r i g i n a l i n c l u s i o n of s e c t i o n 5-7-302 i n the Lobbying A c t , and t h e r e a s o n f o r i t s r e t e n t i o n and amendment by t h e I n i t i a t i v e . There i s , of c o u r s e , no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d improper l o b b y i n g a c t i v i t i e s , and t h e S t a t e may a t t e m p t t o r e g u l a t e and p u n i s h any i m p r o p r i e t i e s . However, even when t h e S t a t e h a s t h e power t o r e g u l a t e a n a c t i v i t y , t h e power "must be s o e x e r c i s e d a s n o t , i n a t t a i n - i n g a p e r m i s s i b l e end, unduly t o i n f r i n g e [ a ] p r o t e c t e d freedom." C a n t w e l l v . C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 4 0 ) r 3 1 0 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218. The b l a n k e t p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t c o n t i n g e n t compensation of l o b b y i s t s p r o v i d e d by s e c t i o n 9 i s o v e r b r o a d b e c a u s e i t p r e c l u d e s c o n t i n g e n t f e e agreements t h a t a r e p r o p e r l y m o t i v a t e d a s w e l l a s those t h a t a r e improperly motivated. Section 9 t h e r e b y v i o l a t e s t h e r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n t h e government i n - c l u d e d i n t h e F i r s t Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u - t i o n and i n a r t i c l e 11, 56 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o f u l l y e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n t h e government may be s e v e r e l y c u r t a i l e d by t h i s broad p r o h i b i t i o n . W e find that section 9 unduly i n f r i n g e s t h e r i g h t s of t h o s e who, w h i l e c o n t e m p l a t i n g n e i t h e r i l l e g a l n o r u n e t h i c a l c o n d u c t , need o r d e s i r e t o employ a l o b b y i s t on a c o n t i n g e n t f e e b a s i s i n o r d e r t o advance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s b e f o r e a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . The S t a t e may n o t impose s o broad a l i m i t a t i o n on t h e r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n . The o b j e c t i o n a b l e q u a l i t y of o v e r b r e a d t h depends upon t h e danger of t o l e r a t i n g , i n t h e a r e a of F i r s t Amendment freedoms, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p e n a l s t a t u t e s u s c e p t i b l e of sweeping and improper a p p l i c a t i o n . N.A.A.C.P. v . B u t t o n ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 418. s e c t i o n 5- 7-302, MCA, a s amended by s e c t i o n 9 of t h e ~ n i t i a t i v e s i void. ACCOUNTINGS I n o r d e r t o accomplish i t s p u r p o s e of r e v e a l i n g money s p e n t t o i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n s of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s , t h e I n i t i a t i v e r e q u i r e s p r i n c i p a l s t o f i l e a c c o u n t i n g s which d e t a i l payments made t o i n f l u e n c e o f f i c i a l a c t i o n and payments f o r l o b b y i n g . S e c t i o n 11, 1-85. A number of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e a c c o u n t i n g s e c t i o n g i v e r i s e t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l con£ l i c t s which c a n o n l y be r e s o l v e d by o u r e l i m i n a t i o n of c e r t a i n of t h e a c c o u n t i n g requirements. Section 1 (5) d i c t a t e s that: 1 " ( 5 ) Each a c c o u n t i n g f i l e d under t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l : " ( a ) l i s t a l l payments f o r l o b b y i n g i n e a c h of t h e f o l - lowing c a t e g o r i e s : " ( i )o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e r e s e a r c h ( f o r which t h e c o s t may be e s t i m a t e d i f n e c e s s a r y ) done t o s u p p o r t I a lobbying argument o r p r e s e n t a t i o n : " ( i i ) p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of e a c h p u b l i c a - t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t t h e c o s t of a n e w s l e t t e r o r l e a f l e t d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e membership of a p r i n c i p a l need n o t be r e p o r t e d u n l e s s o v e r one-half of t h a t n e w s l e t t e r o r l e a f l e t i s devoted t o lobbying m a t t e r s ; ... I' ( i v ) news media; " A s we have n o t e d , t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s a penal s t a t u t e . I t s p r o v i s i o n s must be s u f f i c i e n t l y d e f i n i t e t o g i v e a p e r s o n of o r d i n a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i r n o t i c e t h a t h i s c o n d u c t i s forbidden. W e f i n d t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of r e p o r t i n g payments f o r " o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e r e s e a r c h " i s t o o i n d e f i n i t e f o r a p r i n c i p a l t o e v e r be a s s u r e d t h a t he o r s h e h a s f u l l y complied w i t h t h e s e c t i o n . The i n d e f i n i t e n e s s of /section 1 1 ( S ) ( a ) ( i ) i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o s t of r e s e a r c h "may be e s t i m a t e d i f n e c e s s a r y . " There a r e s o many a s p e c t s t o t h e g a t h e r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r u s e i n a l o b b y i n g e f f o r t t h a t i t would be i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e when r e s e a r c h i s b e i n g done and what i t s c o s t i s . Is t h e t i m e s p e n t making a phone c a l l t o an agency t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n "research"? Is i t o r i g i n a l and d e r i v a t i v e ? I f an estimate f o r r e s e a r c h c o s t s i s g i v e n , when i s t h a t e s t i m a t e s o i n a c - c u r a t e a s t o give rise t o criminal l i a b i l i t y ? W believe e t h a t a p r i n c i p a l c a n n o t know f o r c e r t a i n i f he h a s complied w i t h s e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i . ) , and i t i s , t h e r e f o r e , v o i d f o r vagueness. The same i s t r u e of s e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i v ) , which r e q u i r e s r e p o r t i n g of payments f o r "news media". Publication o f n e w s l e t t e r s and l e a f l e t s , " o t h e r " p r i n t i n g , and a d v e r t i s i n g , including production c o s t s , a r e covered elsewhere i n s e c t i o n l l ( 5 )(a). W e a r e u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e what a d d i t i o n a l informa- t i o n o u g h t t o be d i s c l o s e d under t h e subheading of "news media." I f a c t i v i t i e s of a p r i n c i p a l o r l o b b y i s t a r e news- w o r t h y , would t h e p r i n c i p a l be r e q u i r e d t o r e p o r t t h e c o s t of t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s ? W e t h i n k n o t , b u t w e c a n n o t be c e r t a i n ; n e i t h e r c o u l d a p r i n c i p a l be c e r t a i n . S e c t i o n 11( 5 ) ( a ) ( i v ) i s , therefore, void. S e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i i )r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p a l t o l i s t a l l 1 payments f o r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of p u b l i c a t i o n s o v e r o n e h a l f of which a r e d e v o t e d t o l o b b y i n g m a t t e r s . T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t s e r i o u s l y i n f r i n g e s freedom of t h e p r e s s . U.S. C o n s t . amend. I ; Mont. Const. a r t . 11, s e c t i o n 7. "The C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y s e l e c t e d t h e p r e s s , which i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y newspapers, books, and magazines, b u t a l s o humble l e a f l e t s and c i r c u l a r s , [ c i t a t i o n ] , t o play an important r o l e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p u b l i c a f f a i r s . " Mills v. Alabama, s u p r a , 384 U.S. a t 219. "[Albove a l l e l s e , t h e F i r s t Amendment means t h a t government h a s no power t o r e s t r i c t e x p r e s s i o n b e c a u s e of i t s message, i t s i d e a s , i t s s u b j e c t matter, o r i t s content." P o l i c e Department of Chicago v . Mosley ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, 216. The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t o n l y p u b l i c a t i o n s which d e v o t e more t h a n one h a l f of t h e i r s p a c e t o l o b b y i n g m a t t e r s need b e i n c l u d e d i n a c c o u n t i n g s i s r e g u l a t i o n based upon c o n t e n t . I t i s t r u e t h a t i t i s r e g u l a t i o n which d o e s n o t amount t o d i r e c t censorship. N e v e r t h e l e s s , e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d below t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l burden of r e p o r t i n g c o u l d c a u s e c e r t a i n of t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o c e a s e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e i r newsletters. W e find this potential for indirect limitation of freedom of t h e p r e s s i s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i i ) 1 . The f a c t t h a t advocacy may p e r s u a d e t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s h a r d l y a reason t o s u p p r e s s it. F i r s t (1978) N a t i o n a l Bank of Boston v. el lot ti/ 435 U . S . 765, 790, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1423, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, 727. The f a c t t h a t 51 p e r c e n t of one p u b l i c a t i o n b u t o n l y 50 p e r c e n t of a n o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n may p e r s u a d e t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s no r e a s o n t o burden t h e former b u t n o t t h e l a t t e r . S e c t i o n l l ( 5 ) ( a ) (ii) i s void. S e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) (c) 1 requires principals t o include i n t h e i r a c c o u n t i n g s "each c o n t r i b u t i o n and membership f e e which amounts t o $250 o r more when a g g r e g a t e d o v e r t h e p e r - i o d of one c a l e n d a r y e a r p a i d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l , r e g a r d l e s s o f whether i t was p a i d s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of l o b b y i n g , w i t h t h e f u l l a d d r e s s of e a c h p a y e r and t h e i s s u e a r e a , i f a n y , f o r which s u c h payment was earmarked." Required d i s - c l o s u r e of t h i s t y p e of i n f o r m a t i o n d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y render a s t a t u t e unconstitutional. See Young Americans f o r Freedom, I n c . v. Gorton, s u p r a . However, t h e words " r e g a r d - l e s s of whether i t was p a i d s o l e l y " c a u s e s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) (c) 1 t o a p p l y s o b r o a d l y a s t o be v i o l a t i v e of t h e F i r s t Amendment r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n , which e x i s t s a s a n e c e s s a r y c o r o l l a r y t o t h e freedoms of s p e e c h and assembly. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, s u p r a , 357 U.S. a t 460. " [ E l v e n though t h e govern- m e n t a l p u r p o s e b e l e g i t i m a t e and s u b s t a n t i a l , t h a t p u r p o s e c a n n o t be pursued by means t h a t b r o a d l y s t i f l e fundamental p e r s o n a l l i b e r t i e s when t h e end c a n be more n a r r o w l y a c h i e v e d . " S h e l t o n v. Tucker ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 364 U.S. 479, 488, 8 1 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237. The f o r c e d d i s c l o s u r e of c o n t r i b u - t i o n s and membership f e e s , " r e g a r d l e s s of whether . . . paid s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of l o b b y i n g " , compels r e v e l a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t h a s no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e e n d s t h a t t h e Lobbying Act and t h e I n i t i a t i v e s e e k t o a c h i e v e . Lobbying i s what t h e S t a t e means t o r e g u l a t e . This regulation i s n o t more c o m p l e t e l y accomplished by r e q u i r i n g a n o r g a n i z a t i o n which engages i n l o b b y i n g t o d i v u l g e t h e names of t h o s e c o n t r i b u t o r s and members whose monies were n e v e r i n t e n d e d t o be s p e n t on s p e c i f i c l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s . T h a t t h o s e monies a r e i n f a c t s p e n t f o r l o b b y i n g d o e s n o t l e s s e n t h e repug- nance of s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) 1 . The f o r c e d d i s c l o s u r e of t h e name of a n i n d i v i d u a l who c o n t r i b u t e d $250, even though t h e i n d i v i d u a l had no s p e c i f i c d e s i r e t h a t t h e money be s p e n t t o i n f l u e n c e o f f i c i a l a c t i o n , r e a c h e s t o o b r o a d l y and t o o b l i n d l y i n t o a n a r e a t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e e x e r c i s e of o u r most b a s i c freedoms. "[Clompelled d i s c l o s u r e of a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h g r o u p s engaged i n advocacy may c o n s t i t u t e [ a n ] e f f e c t i v e . . . restraint on freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n .. . I n v i o l a b i l i t y of p r i v a c y i n group a s s o c i a t i o n may i n many c i r c u m s t a n c e s be i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o p r e s e r v a t i o n of freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y where a group e s p o u s e s d i s s i d e n t b e l i e f s . " N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, s u p r a , 357 U.S. a t 462. Unless a compelling i n t e r e s t e x i s t s , t h e S t a t e may n o t p u t a p e r s o n i n t h e p o s i t i o n of having t o r e v e a l o r e x p l a i n h i s a s s o c i a t i o n a l t i e s . A c o m p e l l i n g i n t e r e s t e x i s t s under t h e I n i t i a t i v e when money i s c o n t r i b u t e d " f o r t h e purpose of l o b b y i n g . " Absent t h a t p u r p o s e , t h e S t a t e may n o t , by t h e I n i t i a t i v e , c a u s e a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s a f f i l i a t i o n s t o be made p u b l i c . The words " r e g a r d l e s s of whether i t was p a i d s o l e l y " a s used i n s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) a r e void. 1 The f i n a l a c c o u n t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t w i t h which w e w i l l c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s i s s e c t i o n 1 1 ( 5 ) ( d ) , which r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p a l to: " l i s t e a c h p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , i n c l u d i n g any- t h i n g of v a l u e , p a i d t o any c a n d i d a t e f o r e l e c t i v e p u b l i c o f f i c e , t o any committee e s t a b l i s h e d t o s u p p o r t o r oppose a c a n d i d a t e f o r e l e c t i v e p u b l i c o f f i c e , o r t o any committee t o s u p p o r t o r oppose any i n i t i a t i v e , referendum, o r o t h e r b a l l o t i s s u e , whether such payment i s made d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y by t h e p r i n c i p a l o r any l o b b y i s t who r e c e i v e d com- p e n s a t i o n o r reimbursement f o r such payment from t h e principal. " The t i t l e of t h e I n i t i a t i v e a s p r i n t e d i n t h e V o t e r I n f o r m a t i o n Pamphlet, r e a d a s f o l l o w s : "THIS PROPOSED INITIATIVE REQUIRES PUBLIC DISCLOSURE O MONEY SPENT TO INFLUENCE ACTION O A PUBLIC OFFI- F F CIAL. ALL INDIVIDUALS OR BUSINESSES WHO E P O LOBBY- ML Y ISTS AND SPEND MORE THAN $1000 A YEAR TO P O O E OR R M T OPPOSE OFFICIAL ACTION O A PUBLIC OFFICIAL M S G I V E F UT A COMPLETE ACCOUNTING O A L MONEY SPENT. F L THE PROPOSAL DOES NOT APPLY TO INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS LOBBYING ON THEIR OWN BEHALF. ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE REQUIRED TO PUBLICLY DISCLOSE T H E I R BUSINESS INTERESTS. C R I M I N A L AND C I V I L PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED F R VIOLATIONS O THE O F PROVISIONS O THIS INITIATIVE." F "Each b i l l , e x c e p t g e n e r a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l s and b i l l s f o r t h e c o d i f i c a t i o n and g e n e r a l r e v i s i o n o f t h e l a w s , s h a l l c o n t a i n o n l y one s u b j e c t , c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n i t s t i t l e . I f any s u b j e c t i s embraced i n any a c t and i s n o t e x p r e s s e d i n t h e t i t l e , o n l y s o much of t h e a c t n o t s o e x p r e s s e d i s void." Mont. C o n s t . a r t . V , 811, c l . 3. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a law s h o u l d c o n t a i n o n l y o n e s u b j e c t h a s been s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d . S t a t e v. J o y l a n d Club ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 2 4 Mont. 122, 143, 2 2 0 P.2d 988, 998. The p u r p o s e o f r e q u i r i n g s i n g l e n e s s o f s u b j e c t i s t o p r e v e n t t h e p r a c t i c e o f embracing i n t h e same b i l l i n c o n g r u o u s m a t t e r s which have no r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r o r t o t h e s u b j e c t s p e c i f i e d i n t h e t i t l e , s o t h a t measures may n o t b e a d o p t e d w i t h o u t a t t r a c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o them. Rosebud County v. F l i n n ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 109 Mont. 537, 543-44, 98 P.2d 330, 334; J o b b v. Meagher County ( 1 8 9 8 ) , 2 0 Mont. 4 2 4 , 437, 51 P. 1034, 1038. The "one s u b j e c t " l i m i t a t i o n h a s been a p p l i e d t o i n i t i a t i v e s a s w e l l as laws p a s s e d by the Legislature. M a r t i n v. S t a t e Highway Commission (1939) , 107 Mont. 603, 88 P.2d 4 1 . The t e s t under t h i s p r o v i s i o n o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n i s s i m p l y w h e t h e r t h e t i t l e i s o f such character a s t o mislead the p u b l i c a s t o the s u b j e c t s embraced. C i t y of Helena v . Omholt ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 212, W f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( d ) of t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s n o t e 1 embraced i n t h e t i t l e of t h e I n i t i a t i v e . Contributions t o s u p p o r t o r oppose c a n d i d a t e s , i n i t i a t i v e s , r e f e r e n d a o r o t h e r b a l l o t i s s u e s , which must be r e p o r t e d under s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( d ) , a r e n o t t h e payments made t o " i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n of 1 a public official" referred t o i n the title. The f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s covered by s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( d ) a r e monies 1 s p e n t i n an attempt t o achieve p o l i t i c a l influence i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s t o c r e a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e t i t l e and t h e s e c t i o n . The I n i t i a t i v e i s a n amendment and e x p a n s i o n of t h e Lobbying Act. I t i s c l e a r from t h e t i t l e of t h e I n i t i a t i v e t h a t t h e Lobbying Act was n o t b e i n g t r a n s - formed i n t o a g e n e r a l campaign f i n a n c e s a c t . W e h o l d , t h e r e - f o r e , t h a t s e c t i o n 1 (5) (d) i s void. 1 CONCLUSION I f a n i n v a l i d p a r t of a s t a t u t e i s s e v e r a b l e from t h e r e s t , t h e p o r t i o n which i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l may s t a n d w h i l e t h a t which i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s t r i c k e n o u t and r e j e c t e d . S t a t e v. F i r e Department R e l i e f A s s o c i a t i o n , E t c . (1960) 138 Mont. 172, 178, 355 P.2d 670, 673. A s t a t u t e " i s n o t destroyed i n t o t o b e c a u s e of a n improper p r o v i s i o n , u n l e s s such p r o v i s i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e s t a t u t e o r was t h e inducement t o i t s e n a c t m e n t . " H i l l v. Rae ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52 Mont. 378, 389-90, 158 P. 826, 831. I f , when a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o r t i o n of a n a c t i s e l i m i n a t e d , t h e remainder i s complete i n i t s e l f and c a p a b l e of b e i n g e x e c u t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e a p p a r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , i t must b e s u s t a i n e d . G u l l i c k s o n v. M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 113 Mont. 359, 375, 126 ~ . 2 d 1106, 1 1 1 4 . The i n c l u s i o n of a s e v e r a b i l i t y c l a u s e i n t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t s d r a f t e r s and t h e v o t e r s d e s i r e d t h i s j u d i c i a l policy t o be applied t o t h e ~ n i t i a t i v e . " I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d , a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t remain i n e f f e c t . 1f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d i n one o r more of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p a r t remains i n e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s . " Section 21, 1-85. While o u r a p p l i c a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s h a s l i m i t e d t h e I n i t i a t i v e i n a number of a r e a s , none of t h e p r o v i s i o n s which w e have voided a r e n e c e s s a r y t o t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e s t a t u t e and t h e y w e r e n o t t h e inducement t o i t s enactment. The I n i t i a t i v e , w h i l e b e i n g l e n g t h y , i s b a s i c a l l y amendatory i n n a t u r e . I t s purpose was t o expand C h a p t e r 7, T i t l e 5, of Montana's Lobbying A c t , t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e d i s c l o s u r e of money s p e n t t o i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and t o r e q u i r e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e i r business i n t e r e s t s . T h i s purpose i s n o t f r u s t r a t e d by o u r l i m i t a t i o n of t h e I n i t i a t i v e . Even a f t e r o u r e x c i s i o n s , C h a p t e r 7, T i t l e 5 , a s amended by t h e I n i t i a t i v e i s complete i n i t s e l f and c a p a b l e of b e i n g e x e c u t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p e o p l e of Montana. W r e v e r s e t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and d i s - e s o l v e t h e i n j u n c t i o n i s s u e d a g a i n s t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e commissioner of p o l k t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . W e hold t h a t those p o r t i o n s of t h e I n i t i a t i v e which we have d e c l a r e d v o i d i n t h i s o p i n i o n 3 have no f u r t h e r e f f e c t . With t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h o s e v o i d p o r t i o n s , we h o l d t h a t I n i t i a t i v e No. 85 s h a l l remain i n e f f e c t . 3~ee Appendix "C". APPENDIX A THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PORTIONS O I N I T I A T I V E NO. F 85 WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THIS DECISION. W E HAVE LINED OUT THOSE PARTS WHICH ARE V O I D . S e c t i o n 1. S5-7-101, MCA. i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-101. Purposes of c h a p t e r . (1) The p u r p o s e s o f t h i s c h a p t e r a r e t o promote a h i g h s t a n d a r d o f e t h i c s i n t h e p r a c t i c e of l o b b y i n g , t o p r e v e n t u n f a i r and u n e t h i c a l l o b b y i n g p r a c t i c e s , t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g of l o b b y i s t s and t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f r e v o c a t i o n o f t h e l i c e n s e s , t o r e q u i r e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t o make p u b l i c t h e i r b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s , and t o r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e amounts o f money s p e n t f o r l o b b y i n g . ( 2 ) Nothing i n t h i s c h a p t e r s u b j e c t s any Mentafia c i t i z e n l o b b y i n g on h i s / h e r own b e h a l f t o any r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s n o r d e p r i v e s any s u c h c i t i z e n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate w i t h p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . S e c t i o n 2. 85-7-102, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-102. Definitions. The f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n s a p p l y i n t h i s chapter : (1) " I n d i v i d u a l " means a human b e i n g . ( 2 ) " P e r s o n " means a n i n d i v i d u a l , c o r p o r a t i o n , a s s o c i a t i o n , firm, partnership, s t a t e o r l o c a l government o r s u b d i v i s i o n t h e r e o f , o r o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n o r g r o u p of p e r s o n s . ( 3 ) " P u b l i c o f f i c i a l " means any i n d i v i d u a l , e l e c t e d o r ap- pointed, acting i n h i s o f f i c i a l capacity f o r the state o r l o c a l government o r any p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n t h e r e o f , b u t does n o t include those a c t i n g i n a j u d i c i a l o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l capacity . ( 4 ) "Lobbying" i n c l u d e s : ( a ) t h e p r a c t i c e o f promoting o r o p p o s i n g t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o r e n a c t m e n t of ] . e g i s l a t i o n be£o r e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r t h e members t h e r e o f by any p e r s o n o t h e r t h a n a member of t h e legislature or a public o f f i c i a l acting i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y ; and ( b ) t h e p r a c t i c e of promoting o r opposing o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l i n t h e e v e n t t h e p e r s o n engaged i n s u c h p r a c t i c e expends $1,000 p e r c a l e n d a r y e a r o r more e x c l u s i v e of p e r s o n a l t r a v e l and l i v i n g e x p e n s e s . ( 5 ) ( a ) " L o b b y i s t " means any p e r s o n who engages i n t h e p r a c t i c e of l o b b y i n g f o r h i r e . (b) "Lobbyist" does n o t include ( i )any i n d i v i d u a l Mentana c i t i z e n a c t i n g s o l e l y on h i s / h e r own b e h a l f , o r ( i i )any i n d i v i d u a l working f o r t h e same p r i n c i p a l a s a l i c e n s e d l o b b y i s t , such i n d i v i d u a l having no p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t w i t h any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l on b e h a l f of h i s / h e r p r i n c i p a l . ( c ) Nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n d e p r i v e s any c i t i z e n n o t l o b b y i n g f o r h i r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o communicate with public o f f i c i a l s . ( 6 ) "Lobbying f o r h i r e " i n c l u d e s a c t i v i t i e s of any o f f i c e r s , a g e n t s , a t t o r n e y s , o r employees of any p r i n c i p a l who a r e p a i d , r e i m b u r s e d , o r r e t a i n e d by such p r i n c i p a l and whose d u t i e s include lobbying. When a n i n d i v i d u a l i s r e i m b u r s e d o n l y f o r h i s p e r s o n a l l i v i n g and t r a v e l e x p e n s e s , which t o g e t h e r do n o t exceed $1,000 p e r c a l e n d a r y e a r , t h a t i n - d i v i d u a l s h a l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d t o be l o b b y i n g f o r h i r e . ( 7 ) " U n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t " means: ( a ) a v i o l a t i o n of any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r ; ( b ) i n s t i g a t i n g a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l f o r t h e p u r p o s e of o b t a i n i n g employment i n o p p o s i t i o n t h e r e t o ; ( c ) a t t e m p t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e t h e a c t i o n of any p u b l i c o f f i - c i a l on any measure pending o r t o be proposed by f~+-t~e-premise-e+-3uppert-er-epp83itien-~t-~~~-~~t~~e eaeetien. (ii) promise of financial support, (iii) making public any unsubstantiated charges of improper conduct on the part of any other lobbyist, any principal, or any legislator, fiv+-any-imprege~-eeenemie-~eprisa&-e~-ether-un&aw~u3 rete3iutien-against-any-p~b3ie-e~~ieiu3~-er fv~-a~y-means-ether-than-argment-en-the-merits-theree~~ fd+-ettempting-te-i~~~uenee-e-deeisien-er-vete-by-a-hearin~ examiner-er-qaasi-~uditer~&-e~fPee~-in-uny-eentested-e~se-pre- eeedinq-ander-Part-6T-€hupter-4T-~it3e-27-~€~-exeept-us-pre- aided-therein? (e) attempting to knowingly deceive any public official with regard to the pertinent facts of an official matter or attempt to knowingly misrepresent pertinent facts of an official matter to any public official; or f~+-engagPng-in-praetiees-wkieh-re~3eet-di~eredit-en-the praetiee-eS-3ebbying-3eqis&ature~ (8) "Principal" means any person who makes payments in excess of $1,000 per calendar year for any of the following (a) to engage a lobbyist, or fb+-in-the-ease-e~-e-persen-etker-tkan-an-individu~3~-te ~e3ieit~-direet3~~-indi~eet~y-e~-by-an-adverti3inq-eampaiqn the-&ebbyL~g-effgerts-ef-anether-persen7 (9) "~ocket"means the register and reports of lobbyists and principals maintained by the commissioner pursuant to 5- 7-201. (10) "Payment" means distribution, transfer, loan, advance, deposit, gift, or other rendering made or to be made of money, property, or anything of value. (11) "Payment to influence official action" means any of the following types of payment: ( a ) d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t payment t o a l o b b y i s t by a p r i n c i p a l , a s s a l a r y , f e e , o r compensation f o r e x p e n s e s o r f o r any o t h e r purpose; ( b ) payment i n s u p p o r t of o r a s s i s t a n c e t o a l o b b y i s t o r lobbying a c t i v i t i e s , including, b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , t h e d i r e c t payment of e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d a t t h e r e q u e s t o r sugges- t i o n of t h e l o b b y i s t . ( 1 2 ) " B u s i n e s s " means any h o l d i n g o r i n t e r e s t whose f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e i s g r e a t e r t h a n $1,000, i n any c o r p o r a t i o n , partnership, sole proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, a s s o c i a t i o n , self-employed i n d i v i d u a l , h o l d i n g company, j o i n t s t o c k company, r e c e i v e r s h i p , t r u s t o r o t h e r e n t i t y o r p r o p e r t y h e l d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of p r o f i t , b u t d o e s n o t i n c l u d e non-profit organizations. ( 1 3 ) "Commissioner" means t h e commissioner of campaign f i - nances and p r a c t i c e s , c r e a t e d by 13-37-102, renamed i n [ S e c t i o n 191 t h e commissioner of p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . ( 1 4 ) " E l e c t e d o f f i c i a l " means a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l h o l d i n g a s t a t e o f f i c e f i l l e d by a s t a t e w i d e v o t e of a l l t h e e l e c t o r s o f Montana o r a s t a t e d i s t r i c t o f f i c e , i n c l u d i n g , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o l e g i s l a t o r s , p u b l i c s e r v i c e commissioners and d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges. The t e r m " o f f i c i a l - e l e c t " shall also a p p l y o n l y t o such o f f i c e s . S e c t i o n 3. 85-7-103, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-103. ~icenses--fees--eligibility. (1) Any a d u l t of good moral c h a r a c t e r who i s a c i t i z e n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and who i s o t h e r w i s e q u a l i f i e d under t h i s c h a p t e r may be l i c e n s e d a s a l o b b y i s t . The commissioner s h a l l p r o v i d e a l i c e n s e a p p l i c a t i o n form. The a p p l i c a t i o n form may be o b t a i n e d i n t h e o f f i c e of t h e commissioner and f i l e d therein. Upon a p p r o v a l of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e [Commissioner] and r e c e i p t of t h e l i c e n s e f e e of $10 by t h e commissioner, a l i c e n s e s h a l l be i s s u e d which e n t i t l e s t h e l i c e n s e e t o p r a c t i c e l o b b y i n g on b e h a l f of one o r more enumerated p r i n c i p a l s . Each l i c e n s e s h a l l e x p i r e on December 31 of e a c h even-numbered y e a r o r may be t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e l o b b y i s t . ( 2 ) N a p p l i c a t i o n may be d i s a p p r o v e d w i t h o u t a f f o r d i n g o t h e a p p l i c a n t a hearing. The h e a r i n g s h a l l be h e l d and t h e d e c i s i o n e n t e r e d w i t h i n 1 0 d a y s of t h e d a t e of t h e f i l i n g o f the application. ( 3 ) The f i n e s and l i c e n s e f e e s c o l l e c t e d under t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l be d e p o s i t e d i n t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r y . Section 4. 85-7-105, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-105. Suspension of l o b b y i n g p r i v i l e g e s . N lobbyist o whose l i c e n s e h a s been suspended and no p e r s o n who h a s been adjudged g u i l t y of a v i o l a t i o n of any p r o v i s i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r may engage i n l o b b y i n g f o r h i r e u n t i l t h a t p e r s o n h a s been r e i n s t a t e d t o t h e p r a c t i c e and d u l y l i c e n s e d . S e c t i o n 5. 85-7-201, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-201. Docket--contents. The commissioner s h a l l make a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p u b l i c t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d by t h i s c h a p t e r , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e name and b u s i n e s s a d d r e s s of e a c h l o b b y i s t , t h e name and b u s i n e s s a d d r e s s of h i s / h e r p r i n c i p a l , and t h e s u b j e c t o r s u b j e c t s t o which t h e employment r e l a t e s o r a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e employment r e l a t e s t o a l l m a t t e r s i n which t h e p r i n c i p a l h a s a n i n t e r e s t . The docket e n t r y f o r each p r i n c i p a l s h a l l a l s o i n d i c a t e the p r i n c i p a l ' s r e q u i r e d r e p o r t s of payments t o i n f l u e n c e o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . Section 6. 85-7-202, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-202. ~ocket--public record. Such d o c k e t s h a l l be a p u b l i c r e c o r d and open t o t h e i n s p e c t i o n of any i n d i v i d u a l upon demand a t any t i m e d u r i n g t h e r e g u l a r b u s i n e s s h o u r s of t h e o f f i c e o f t h e commissioner. S e c t i o n 7. 85-7-207, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-207. Report t o l e g i s l a t u r e . Beginning w i t h t h e f i r s t Tuesday f o l l o w i n g t h e b e g i n n i n g of any r e g u l a r o r s p e c i a l s e s s i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and on t h e f i r s t Tuesday of e v e r y month t h e r e a f t e r d u r i n g which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s i n s e s s i o n , t h e commissioner s h a l l from h i s / h e r r e c o r d s r e p o r t t o e a c h member of e a c h house of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t h e names of l o b b y i s t s r e g i s t e r e d under t h i s c h a p t e r , n o t p r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d , t h e names of t h e p r i n c i p a l s whom t h e y r e p r e s e n t a s l o b b y i s t s and t h e s u b j e c t s of l e g i s l a t i o n i n which e a c h p r i n c i p a l i s interested. S e c t i o n 8. 55-7-301, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-7-301. P r o h i b i t i o n of p r a c t i c e w i t h o u t l i c e n s e and r e g i s t r a - tion. (1) N i n d i v i d u a l may p r a c t i c e a s a l o b b y i s t u n l e s s t h a t o i n d i v i d u a l h a s been l i c e n s e d under 5-7-103 and l i s t e d on t h e d o c k e t a s employed i n r e s p e c t t o a l l t h e m a t t e r s he/she i s promoting o r opposing. ( 2 ) No p r i n c i p a l may d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y a u t h o r i z e o r p e r m i t any l o b b y i s t employed by t h a t p r i n c i p a l t o p r a c t i c e l o b b y i n g u n t i l t h e l o b b y i s t i s d u l y l i c e n s e d and t h e names of t h e l o b b y i s t and t h e p r i n c i p a l a r e d u l y e n t e r e d on t h e docket . Section 9. 55-7-302, MCA i s amended t o r e a d : 5-?-382s-P~ekibited-eempe~satiens--We-ge~sen-may-be-emp%eyed es-a-%ebbyist-~er-a-eempe~satien-de~en+-in-any-manne~-upen tke-pessaqe-er-de~eat-e~-e~y-p~~epesed-er-pendinq-e~Sieiu%-aetie~ by-a-pab%ie-eGfieia%-e~-upen-any-etkeP-eentinqeney-eenneeted with-saek-aetiens Section 10. E t h i c a l conduct. No l o b b y i s t o r p r i n c i p a l s h a l l engage i n , o r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y a u t h o r i z e , any unprofessional conduct. Section 11. Principals to file accountings. (1) A principal subject to this chapter shall file with the commissioner an accounting of payments made to influence the official action of a public official. (2) If such payments are made solely to influence legisla- tive action, such accounting shall be made: (a) before February 16th of any year the legislature is in session and shall include all payments made in that calendar year prior to February 1st; (b) before the 16th day of the calendar month following any calendar month in which the principal spent $5,000 or more and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar month; and (c) within 60 days following adjournment of such session and shall include all payments made during such session, except as has previously been reported. (3) If such payments are made to influence any other official action by a public offical or made to influence such other action and legislative action, such accounting shall be made: (a) before February 16th of the calendar year following such payments and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar year; and (b) before the 16th day of the calendar month following any calendar month in which the principal spent $5,000 or more and shall include all payments made during the prior calendar month. (4) If no such payments are made during the reporting periods provided in subsections (2)(a), (2)(c)I and (3)(a) above, the principal shall file a report stating such. ( 5 ) Each a c c o u n t i n g f i l e d under t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l : ( a ) l i s t a l l payments f o r l o b b y i n g i n e a c h of t h e f o l l o w i n g categories: fij-epig&na$-and-derPvetive-researek-f~er-whieh-the-eest may-be-est~mated-i~-neeessar~~-de~e-te-suppe~t-~-~ebby~n~ erqment-er-presentatienf f~~~-pub&~eat&en-and-d&str~b~~&en-e~-eae~-pub&~eat&en~-e~e tkat-tke-eest-e~-a-ne~s~etter-er-%ea~&et-d&st~&buted-te-t~e mcmbe~sh~p-e~-a-p~&~ei~a&-need-net-be-~eperted-un&ess-eve~-ene- ka~~-e~-that-news&ette~-e~-&e2tf&et-&s-deveted-te-&ebby&~q-met~ers (iii)o t h e r p r i n t i n g ; fivj-news-mediet (v) a d v e r t i s i n g , including production c o s t s ; ( v i ) postage; ( v i i ) t r a v e l and p e r s o n a l l i v i n g e x p e n s e s ; ( v i i i ) s a l a r i e s and f e e s , i n c l u d i n g a l l o w a n c e s , rewards and c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s ; ( i x ) e n t e r t a i n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a l l f o o d s and r e f r e s h m e n t s ; ( x ) t e l e p h o n e and t e l e g r a p h ; and ( x i ) o t h e r o f f i c e expenses; ( b ) i t e m i z e , i d e n t i f y i n g t h e payee and t h e b e n e f i c i a r y , ( i ) e a c h s e p a r a t e payment c o n f e r r i n g $10 o r more b e n e f i t t o any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l and ( i i ) e a c h s e p a r a t e payment c o n f e r r i n g $100 o r more b e n e f i t t o more t h a n one p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , r e g a r d l e s s of i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i t , except t h a t i n regard t o a dinner o r other function t o which a l l s e n a t o r s o r a l l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have been i n v i t e d , t h e b e n e f i c i a r y may be l i s t e d a s a l l members of t h a t group w i t h o u t l i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y e a c h p e r s o n who a t t e n d e d ; ( c ) l i s t e a c h c o n t r i b u t i o n and membership f e e which amounts t o $250 o r more when a g g r e g a t e d o v e r t h e p e r i o d of one c a l e n d a r y e a r p a i d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l , regard3ess-eS-whether it-was-paid-se3e3y f o r t h e purpose of l o b b y i n g , w i t h t h e f u l l a d d r e s s of e a c h p a y e r and t h e i s s u e a r e a , i f any, f o r which such payment was earmarked; $d)-3ist-eaeh-pe3itiea%-eent~ibutien~-i~e3uding-un~thin~-eS va3ue~-peid-te-any-eendidete-5e~-e3eetiue-pub3&e-eSS&ee~-te any-eemittee-estab3ished-te-~uppert-er-eppese-a-eandidute-~er e3eetive-pub3&e-eSSieeT-er-te-uny-eemittee-te-suppert-er eppese-eny-initietiveT-re~e~e~dumT-er-ether-ba33et-&ssuei wkether-saeh-payment-Ps-m~de-direet3y-er-&ndi~eet3y-by-the prineipa3-er-any-3ebbyist-whe-reeeeived-eempensatien-er-reim- bursement-~er-saeh-pa~me~t-5rem-the-pr&ne~pa~~ ( e ) l i s t e a c h o f f i c i a l a c t i o n which t h e p r i n c i p a l o r h i s a g e n t s e x e r t e d a major e f f e c t t o s u p p o r t , oppose, o r modify, t o g e t h e r w i t h a s t a t e m e n t of t h e p r i n c i p a l ' s p o s i t i o n f o r o r a g a i n s t such a c t i o n ; and ( f ) be k e p t by t h e commissioner f o r a p e r i o d of t e n y e a r s . Section 1 2 . P r i n c i p a l s required t o report--penalty for fail-ure t o r e p o r t o r f o r f a l s e statement. A p r i n c i p a l may n o t make payments t o i n f l u e n c e o f f i c i a l a c t i o n by any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l unless t h a t principal f i l e s the reports required under t h i s c h a p t e r . A p r i n c i p a l who f a i l s t o f i l e a r e q u i r e d r e p o r t i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d i n 5-7-305 a s well a s any c i v i l a c t i o n p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . A princi- p a l who knowingly f i l e s a f a l s e , e r r o n e o u s , o r i n c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t commits t h e o f f e n s e of unsworn f a 1 . s i f i c a t i o n t o authorities. S e c t i o n 13. Reimbursement. Whenever a l o b b y i s t i n v i t e s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l t o a t t e n d a f u n c t i o n which t h e l o b b y i s t o r h i s / h e r p r i n c i p a l have f u l l y o r p a r t i a l l y funded o r s p o n s o r e d , o r whenever a l o b b y i s t o f f e r s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l a g i f t , t h e l o b b y i s t must, upon r e q u e s t , s u p p l y t h e r e c i p i e n t p u b l i c o f f i c i a l w i t h t h e b e n e f i t ' s t r u e o r e s t i m a t e d c o s t and a l l o w t h e p u b l i c o f f i c i a l t o reimburse. Such e x p e n d i t u r e s must be i t e m i z e d i n t h e p r i n c i p a l ' s r e p o r t s w i t h a n o t a t i o n "reim- b u r s e d by b e n e f a c t e e " . Section 1 4 . Governmental R e p o r t i n g . Budget p r e p a r a t i o n o r r e s p o n s e t o r e q u e s t s of a house o r committee of t h e l e g i s l a - t u r e by any governmental e n t i t y s h a l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d l o b - bying payments f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s c h a p t e r . S e c t i o n 1 5 . A u d i t of f i n a l a c c o u n t i n g s t a t e m e n t s . The commissioner s h a l l examine and may a u d i t t h e a c c o u n t i n g s f i l e d under [ S e c t i o n 1 1 1 and s h a l l i n v e s t i g a t e any i r r e g u l a r i - t i e s and r e p o r t any a p p a r e n t v i o l a t i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r t o t h e a t t o r n e y s having a u t h o r i t y t o p r o s e c u t e . The l o b b y i s t i s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v i d e and t h e p r i n c i p a l i s r e q u i r e d t o o b t a i n and keep f o r a p e r i o d of s e v e n y e a r s from t h e d a t e of f i l i n g a l l r e c o r d s s u p p o r t i n g t h e a c c o u n t i n g s f i l e d under [Section 111 . A l l s u c h r e c o r d s s h a l l be open t o i n s p e c t i o n on r e q u e s t of t h e commissioner o r a n a t t o r n e y having a u t h o r i t y t o p r o s e c u t e v i o l a t i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r . The commissioner and s u c h a t t o r n e y s are g i v e n t h e power t o subpoena and compel a t t e n d a n c e ; i s s u e e n f o r c e a b l e c i v i l i n v e s t i g a t i v e demands; t a k e e v i d e n c e ; and r e q u i r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n of any books, c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , memoranda, bank a c c o u n t s t a t e m e n t s , o r o t h e r r e c o r d s which a r e r e l e v a n t o r m a t e r i a l f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n d u c t i n g any i n v e s t i g a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s chapter . Section 16. D i s c l o s u r e by e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s . (1) P r i o r t o December 1 5 of e a c h even-numbered y e a r , e a c h elected o f f i c i a l o r o f f i c i a l - e l e c t s h a l l f i l e with the commissioner a b u s i n e s s d i s c l o s u r e s t a t e m e n t on a form p r o v i d e d by t h e commissioner. The s t a t e m e n t s h a l l p r o v i d e the following information: The name, address, and type of business of such individual and each member of such in- dividual's immediate family. For this purpose "immediate family" includes the individual's spouse and minor children only. (2) No such individual may assume or continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office to which that individual has been elected or appointed until such statement has been filed. ( 3 ) The commissioner shall make such business disclosure statements available to any individual upon request. Section 17. Commissioner to make rules--statements of intent. (1) The commissioner shall promulgate and publish rules necessary to carry out the provisions of [this act] in con- formance with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and, in particular, shall provide rules necessary to allocate salary, expenses, and any other payments between lobbying activities and other activities not connected with lobbying for any person whose activities are not solely limited to lobbying. (2) Such rules shall be designed to effect and promote the purposes of this act, express or implied. Such rules shall be as simple and easily complied with as possible. Section 18. Civil penalties and enforcement. (1) Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to civil penalties of not less than $250 and not more than $7,500 according to the discretion of the district court, as court of original jurisdiction. A lobbyist who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall have his/her license suspended or revoked according to t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . Any p u b l i c o f f i c i a l h o l d i n g e l e c t i v e o f f i c e adjudged i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s a c t i s a d d i t i o n a l l y s u b j e c t t o r e c a l l under Montana R e c a l l A c t , 52-16-601, MCA e t s e q , and such v i o l a t i o n s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a n a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r r e c a l l t o t h o s e mentioned i n 52-16-603 ( 3 ) , MCA. ( 2 ) The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , commissioner, o r t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y o f t h e c o u n t y i n which t h e v i o l a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e may b r i n g c r i m i n a l o r c i v i l a c t i o n i n t h e name of t h e s t a t e f o r any a p p r o p r i a t e c r i m i n a l o r c i v i l remedy. ( 3 ) I f a p r o s e c u t i o n i s u n d e r t a k e n by t h e commissioner o r any c o u n t y a t t o r n e y , a l l c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s h a l l be p a i d by t h e s t a t e of Montana. ( 4 ) ( a ) Any i n d i v i d u a l who h a s n o t i f i e d t h e commissioner, t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i n w r i t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t some p o r t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r i s b e i n g v i o l a t e d may h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f bring i n t h e name of t h e s t a t e a n a c t i o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n ) a u t h o r i z e d under t h i s c h a p t e r i f : ( i ) t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y have f a i l e d t o commence a n a c t i o n h e r e u n d e r w i t h i n 40 d a y s a f t e r such n o t i c e , and ( i i ) s a i d a t t o r n e y s t h e n f a i l t o commence a n a c t i o n w i t h i n 1 0 d a y s a f t e r a w r i t t e n n o t i c e d e l i v e r e d t o them a d v i s i n g them t h a t a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n w i l l b e b r o u g h t i f t h e y do n o t bring an a c t i o n . ( b ) Each n o t i f i c a t i o n s h a l l t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e u n t i l t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e w a i t i n g p e r i o d . ( c ) I f t h e i n d i v i d u a l who b r i n g s t h e c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n p r e - v a i l s , he/she s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o be reimbursed by t h e s t a t e of Montana f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i n c u r r e d : P r o v i d e d t h a t i n t h e c a s e of a c i t i z e n ' s a c t i o n which i s d i s m i s s e d and which t h e c o u r t a l s o f i n d s was b r o u g h t w i t h o u t r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e , t h e c o u r t may o r d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l commencing t h e a c t i o n t o pay a l l c o s t s of t r i a l and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i n c u r r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . ( 5 ) N c i v i l a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t under t h i s s e c t i o n more o t h a n seven y e a r s a f t e r t h e o c c u r r e n c e of t h e f a c t s which g i v e rise t o the action. ( 6 ) A l l c i v i l p e n a l t i e s imposed p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be d e p o s i t e d i n t h e s t a t e g e n e r a l fund. ( 7 ) A h e a r i n g under t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l be h e l d by t h e c o u r t u n l e s s t h e d e f e n d a n t - l i c e n s e e demands a j u r y t r i a l . The t r i a l s h a l l be h e l d a s soon a s p o s s i b l e b u t a t l e a s t 20 d a y s a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e c h a r g e s and s h a l l t a k e p r e c e d e n c e o v e r a l l o t h e r m a t t e r s pending b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . (8) I f the court finds f o r the p l a i n t i f f , judgment s h a l l be r e n d e r e d r e v o k i n g o r suspending t h e l i c e n s e and t h e c l e r k of c o u r t s h a l l f i l e a c e r t i f i e d copy of t h e judgment w i t h t h e comrnissioner. S e c t i o n 19. R e c o d i f i c a t i o n . The o f f i c e of t h e commissioner of campaign f i n a n c e s and p r a c t i c e s , c r e a t e d by 13-37-102, s h a l l be known a s t h e o f f i c e of t h e comrnissioner of p o l i t i c a l practices. Section 20. Repealer. S e c t i o n s 5-7-104, 5-7-205, 5-7-206, 5-7-303, and 5-7-304, MCA a r e r e p e a l e d . Section 21. Severability. I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d , a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t re- main i n e f f e c t . I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d i n one o r more of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p a r t remains i n e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d applications. Section 22. E f f e c t i v e d a t e . T h i s a c t s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e upon p a s s a g e and a p p r o v a l by t h e v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e of Montana. APPENDIX B P e n a l t y . Any p e r s o n v i o l a t i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l be deemed g u i l t y of a misdemeanor and upon c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e o f s h a l l be punished by imprisonment i n t h e c o u n t y j a i l n o t more t h a n 6 months o r by a f i n e n o t exceed- i n g $200, o r b o t h . ( S e c t i o n 5-7-305, MCA.) APPENDIX C The word "Montana" i s v o i d i n s e c t i o n l ( 2 ) and i n s e c t i o n 2 ( 5 ) ( b ) ( i ) . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s a r e void i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y : , 2 (7) ( c ) (i) 2 (7) ( c ) ( i v ) , 2 (7)( c ) ( v ) , 2 ( 7 ) (dl , 2 ( 7 ) ( f ) , 2 ( 8 ) ( b ) I , 1 , 1 9 , 1 ( 5 ) (a) ( i ) 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i i ) 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) ( i v ) I 1 1 ( 5 ) (61). 1 The words " r e g a r d l e s s of whether i t was p a i d s o l e l y " a r e v o i d i n s e c t i o n 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) 1 . W e concur: Chief ~ u s t i c e \ Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: I concur with the opinion of the Court, even though I feel that we have strained considerably to uphold many of its provisions. But, as long as what we have done does not fly in the face of any constitutional provisions, I believe that we should give more leeway to initiatives passed by the electorate of this state. In addition, I feel it necessary to comment on the findings and conclusions adopted by the trial court. The plaintiff proposed eleven findings of fact and the trial court adopted verbatim all eleven of them. The trial court, did, however, add finding twelve. The plaintiff proposed nine conclusions of law and the trial court adopted verbatim all nine of them. This is hardly an indication that the trial court carefully studied the constitutional issues involved and carefully entered into the decision-making process. , In Tomaskie v. Tomaskie (1981), - Mont. - 625 P.2d 536, 38 St.Rep. 416, this Court disapproved of the practice of adopting verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions of the prevailing party. In Jensen v. Jensen (Decided July 17, 1981, Cause No. 80-389), I set out in detail the reasons why no trial court should adopt verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions presented by the prevailing party. It is sad that in such an important case as this, that the trial court has chosen to rubber-stamp the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by the plaintiffs in this case. This is particularly so when the preliminary orders of the court, made final by the trial court's decision, declared all of Initiative 85 to be unconstitutional. Matters of such importance are certainly deserving of more attention than was obviously given here by the trial court.