NO. 80-284
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN
1981
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
VS.
JOSEPH R B N BUCKMAN,
U E
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e .
H o n o r a b l e J o h n McCarvel, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
M a r c i a B i r k e n b u e l , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
J. F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : A p r i l 8 , 1 9 8 1
Decided: JUL 2
mLa
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PL/ g-. PC l/e r ki 4
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Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.
Buckman a p p e a l s C a s c a d e C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t
convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated
assault .
D u r i n g t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s o f O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1979,
d e f e n d a n t Buckman was o b s e r v e d i n t h e p a r k i n g a r e a o f the
Heritage Inn i n Great F a l l s , Montana. A Walker Security
patrolman stopped and questioned defendant, whereupon
d e f e n d a n t drew a handgun o u t of h i s p o c k e t and f i r e d a s h o t
i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e patrolman.
During this incident a milk truck, driven by L y l e
Mahon, approached the security patrolman's car. A s Mahon
g o t o u t of the truck, he encountered Buckman. Defendant
f o r c e d Mahon into the security car holding the pistol to
Mahon ' s h e a d .
Soon thereafter another Walker Security officer
appeared on the scene, as did several Great F a l l s police
officers. Defendant Buckman ordered Mahon to tell the
o f f i c e r s n o t t o a p p r o a c h t h e s e c u r i t y c a r o r h e would k i l l
him. For twenty minutes, d e f e n d a n t h e l d Mahon c a . p t i v e i n
the security car. He t h e n s u r r e n d e r e d and was t a k e n i n t o
custody.
Defendant Buckman raises three issues for this
C o u r t ' s review:
1. Was d e f e n d a n t c o n v i c t e d o f , and s e n t e n c e d f o r ,
two separate offenses arising out of a single act in
v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA?
2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y
r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA?
3. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t
t h e j u r y of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a d e f e n d a n t who is a c q u i t t e d
by r e a s o n o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ?
S e c t i o n 46-11-502(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t a p e r s o n may
n o t be c o n v i c t e d o f two o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e p a r t o f t h e same
transaction if one o f f e n s e is included in the other. An
"included offense" i s d e f i n e d a s o n e which " i s e s t a b l i s h e d
by p r o o f of t h e same o r l e s s t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o
e s t a b l i s h t h e commission o f the offense charged." Section
4 6 - 1 1 - 5 0 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) , MCA.
Buckman a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e same f a c t
used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c h a r g e is a l s o used
to establish the restraint by use, or threat to use,
physical force element of aggravated kidnapping. An
additional fact is necessary to prove the aggravated
kidnapping charge--that is, t h e purpose t o hold t h e v i c t i m
as a shield or hostage. Therefore, he concludes, the
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c h a r g e i s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e same o r l e s s
than all the facts required to prove the aggravated
kidnapping charge, and i t must be considered an included
o f f e n s e a s charged i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e .
The question of when an offense is included in
another under t h e t e r m s of a statutory prohibition against
multiple convictions or punishments for the same act has
been c o n s i d e r e d and e v a l u a t e d u n d e r two b a s i c t e s t s c i t e d by
defendant, but the State properly takes issue with
defendant's reliance on case law from Arizona, Oregon,
C a l i f o r n i a and I l l i n o i s . W h i l e t h e s e d e c i s i o n s may be a n
a c c u r a t e r e c i t a l of the law in those jurisdictions, under
c u r r e n t Montana s t a t u t e s and c a s e l a w , t h e t r i a l judge d i d
not err in imposing sentences against defendant on both
c h a r g e s o f which he was c o n v i c t e d .
I n S t a t e v. Close (1981), Mont . , 623 P.2d
940, 38 S t . R e p . 1 7 7 , 1 8 9 , we f o u n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-11-502,
MCA, is m e r e l y a c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a n d a r d e n u n c i a t e d i n
B l o c k b u r g e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S . C t .
1 8 0 , 76 L.Ed. 306. See a l s o S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
Mont. , 605 P.2d 1 0 0 0 , 1009-1010, 36 S t . R e p . 1134. In
Blockburger, t h e Court ruled:
"The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t where t h e same
a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of
two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t
t o be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e
two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y o n e , i s w h e t h e r e a c h
p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f a f a c t which t h e
o t h e r does not." 284 U.S. a t 304. (Emphasis
added. )
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e Blockburger analysis t o the
s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n h e r e make i t c l e a r t h a t d e f e n d a n t c o u l d
properly be convicted and sentenced for both offenses
charged. As defined in section 45-5-202(1)(c), MCA, a
conviction for aggravated assault requires proof that a
person (1) p u r p o s e l y or knowingly (2) caused reasonable
a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r ( 3 ) by u s e
of a weapon. As applicable in this case, aggravated
kidnapping requires proof that the person charged (1)
knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority (2)
r e s t r a i n e d a n o t h e r p e r s o n (3.) by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e
p h y s i c a l f o r c e ( 4 ) with t h e purpose of holding t h e v i c t i m a s
a s h i e l d or hostage. S e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 3 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA.
Under t h e s e s t a t u t e s t h e c h a r g e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t
may be p r o v e d w i t h o u t a showing o f r e s t r a i n t or the intent
to hold another as a hostage or shield. Similarly, the
offense of aggravated kidnapping does not entail the
victim's apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o r use of a
weapon by t h e a c c u s e d . Thus, e a c h c h a r g e r e q u i r e s proof of
f a c t s which t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t ; therefore, neither offense
merges w i t h or is included in the other under Blockburger
and s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA.
Buckman also maintains that section 46-11-502(4),
MCA, prohibits c o n v i c t i o n of both offenses in the present
case. It provides that when more than one offense is
established by the same t r a n s a c t i o n , a p e r s o n may n o t be
c o n v i c t e d o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f "the offenses differ
o n l y i n t h a t one i s d e f i n e d t o p r o h i b i t a d e s i g n a t e d k i n d o f
conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific
i n s t a n c e of such conduct. " Buckman a r g u e s t h a t a g g r a v a t e d
a s s a u l t p r o h i b i t s t h e u s e o f f o r c e g e n e r a l l y and a g g r a v a t e d
kidnapping is defined to prohibit the use of such force
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o r e s t r a i n a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s of a h o s t a g e
or shield. H i s conclusion is t h a t s i n c e t h e a s s a u l t charge
prohibits a general behavior and the kidnapping charge
prohibits the same behavior specifically, o n l y one c h a r g e
c a n be s u s t a i n e d . W disagree.
e
The conduct prohibited by the aggravated assault
section pertinent to this case is causing a reasonable
a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r by u s e o f a
weapon. Section 45-5-202(1)(c), MCA. The conduct
prohibited by the aggravated kidnapping statute is
r e s t r a i n i n g a n o t h e r by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e f o r c e o f
any kind. Section 45-5-303(1)(a), MCA. Aggravated
k i d n a p p i n g i s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t m e r e l y a more s p e c i f i c f o r m o f
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , b u t an e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e c r i m e , w i t h i t s
own s p e c i f i c e l e m e n t s d i f f e r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h o s e i n
the aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e .
Buckman n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 4 6 -
14-202, MCA, mandates e i t h e r t h e appointment of a specific
p s y c h i a t r i s t o r t h e r e q u e s t t o h a v e o n e d e s i g n a t e d by Warm
S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l whenever t h e r e is reason t o doubt a
defendant's fitness to proceed or reason to believe that
mental disease or defect of a defendant will otherwise
become a n i s s u e i n t h e c a s e .
S e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA, provides:
"When there is reason to doubt the
d e f e n d a n t ' s f i t n e s s t o proceed o r reason t o
b e l i e v e t h a t m e nt a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t of t h e
d e f e n d a n t w i l l o t h e r w i s e become a n i s s u e i n
t h e cause, the court s h a l l appoint a t l e a s t
one q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t o r s h a l l r e q u e s t
t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Warm S p r i n g s s t a t e
h o s p i t a l t o d e s i g n a t e a t l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d
p s y c h i a t r i s t , which d e s i g n a t i o n may be o r
i n c l u d e h i m s e l f , t o examine and r e p o r t upon
t h e mental c o n d i t i o n of t h e defendant."
In the present case defendant filed a notice of
i n t e n t t o r e l y on t h e d e f e n s e o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t t o
p r o v e t h a t he d i d n o t h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind which
i s an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e s charged. He a l s o
presented the testimony of Charles Jones, Clinical
P s y c h o l o g i s t w i t h t h e N o r t h C e n t r a l Montana Community M e n t a l
Health Center. J o n e s s t a t e d t h a t h i s m e e t i n g s w i t h Buckman
r e v e a l e d v a r i o u s symptoms which g a v e him r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e
Buckman was s u f f e r i n g f r o m a m e n t a l i l l n e s s .
D e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y and t h e n o t i c e
gave the court reason to believe that mental disease or
d e f e c t would be a n i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . I n Buckman's v i e w t h e
c o u r t had o n l y two o p t i o n s u n d e r t h e mandatory language of
section 46-14-202, MCA, neither of which were chosen.
Therefore, defendant concludes, the court erred in its
denial of his motion for examination pursuant to the
requirements of section 46-14-202, MCA.
As a preliminary matter we note that section 46-14-
202(2), MCA, goes on to provide that the court may order a
defendant to be committed to a hospital or "other suitable
facility" for psychological examination. This Court is not
persuaded that the District Court failed to fulfill any
judicial function or directive in sending Buckman to the
state prison for examination. Buckman presents no evidence
that the prison facility is unsuitable for such a purpose.
We find the argument that the court's order was
deficient because it failed to name a particular
psychiatrist an exaltation of form over substance. There is
no question that defendant was examined by a qualified
psychiatrist, who, along with a psychologist, filed a
detailed report of defendant's mental condition.
This issue closely resembles that posed in State v.
Kyle (1980), Mont. , P.2d , 37 St.Rep.
1447, in which the defendant attacked the legitimacy of a
report from Warm Springs on the ground that the order of the
court appointed the superintendent to examine him, but some
of the tests were actually conducted by others on the staff.
This Court rejected the defendant's technical attack on the
report. 37 St.Rep. at 1449-1450.
We find Kyle persuasive here. The spirit of the
statute is to have a qualified professional examine a
defendant for the purposes of evaluation. Where that spirit
is substantially fulfilled, as here, we can find no
substantial interference with a defendant's rights and,
thus, no reversible error. Section 46-20-701, MCA. See
also State v. Olsen (1980), Mont. , 614 P.2d 1061,
F u r t h e r , w e t a k e n o t e of the f a c t that, a t the time
the motion regarding mental examination was denied, the
District Court had received the report of a qualified
p s y c h i a t r i s t and p s y c h o l o g i s t i n d i c a t i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was
n o t s u f f e r i n g from a m e n t a l disease or d e f e c t a t the time
t h e c r i m e s were committed. A t t h a t p o i n t t h e judge had no
"reason to doubt" defendant's competence or sanity. To
r a i s e such a doubt, defendant presented t h e testimony of a
p s y c h o l o g i s t who s t a t e d t h a t h e d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h some o f
t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e r e p o r t b u t who a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had
n o t p e r s o n a l l y examined d e f e n d a n t . Based on t h e o r d e r t h a t
followed, it is clear that the judge, who had the
o p p o r t u n i t y t o review t h e report and personally listen to
the witness, did not accept this testimony a s c a l l i n g the
original report into question.
Defendant's f i n a l issue a t t a c k s the D i s t r i c t Court's
r e f u s a l o f a p r o p o s e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which r e a d :
"When a d e f e n d a n t i s a c q u i t t e d on t h e g r o u n d
t h a t due t o a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t he
c o u l d n o t h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind
t h a t is a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e
c h a r g e d , t h e c o u r t s h a l l o r d e r him c o m m i t t e d
t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Warm
S p r i n g s s t a t e h o s p i t a l t o be p l a c e d i n an
appropriate i n s t i t u t i o n for custody, care,
and t r e a t m e n t . " ( S e e s e c t i o n 46-14-301,
MCA) .
The S t a t e objected to this instruction, relying on
S t a t e v. French ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 196, 5 3 1 P.2d 373. The
o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d , and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r e f u s e d .
This Court, in French, determined that it was not
error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury
that a person acquitted by reason of mental disease or
defect shall be committed to the State Hospital at Warm
Springs. The C o u r t ' s r a t i o n a l e was s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s :
"The j u r y ' s f u n c t i o n i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o g u i l t o r innocence. It
should n o t concern i t s e l f with a l t e r n a t i v e s
available to the court following the
verdict." 1 6 6 Mont. a t 205.
Buckman begins his argument by pointing out that
F r e n c h was d e c i d e d i n 1 9 7 5 b e f o r e t h e c h a n g e s i n t h e m e n t a l
competency c h a p t e r of t h e Montana C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e Code,
enacted i n 1979. Under t h e o l d law, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c o u l d be made i n e i t h e r o f two ways.
Section 46-14-211, MCA, provided for a summary-type
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n which t h e c o u r t c o u l d e n t e r a judgment o f
acquittal on the ground of mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility without holding a trial. The
s e c o n d method was to have the issue of mental d i s e a s e or
d e f e c t decided a t t r i a l along with t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e s of t h e
case.
The 1979 law repealed the summary determination
provided i n s e c t i o n 46-14-211, MCA. The i s s u e m u s t now be
decided a t t r i a l i n every case. Therefore, the jury's role
i n determination of t h i s i s s u e is g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d .
For that reason, Buckman asserts that the rule of
Lyles v. United S t a t e s (D.C. C i r . 1 9 5 7 ) , 254 F.2d 7 2 5 , which
was r e j e c t e d i n F r e n c h , s h o u l d be r e v i e w e d . In Lyles, the
court believed t h a t t h e j u r y h a s a r i g h t t o know, as part
and p a r c e l of their fact-finding role, t h e meaning of an
a c q u i t t a l v e r d i c t b a s e d on a n i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e . S e e a l s o 11
A.L.R.3d 737.
Buckman f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o instruct
a s t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e n o t g u i l t y by r e a s o n o f m e n t a l
d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t v e r d i c t was p a r t i c u l a r y p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h e
present case. In the prosecuting attorney's closing
argument, he t o l d t h e j u r y :
" I s u g g e s t t h a t you must a l s o b e a b l e t o l i v e
w i t h t h e a c q u i t t a l b a s e d upon what you know
t h i s man d i d , i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him
l o o s e , you m u s t a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h
that." (Emphasis d e f e n d a n t ' s . )
Defendant argues that this s t a t e m e n t compounds the
jury's misunderstanding of the not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect verdict and that this
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n o n l y b e p r e v e n t e d by i n s t r u c t i o n a s t o
the statutory provision for commitment following such a
verdict.
W do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e L y l e s r u l e i s c o n s i s t e n t
e
w i t h Montana law o r made c o n s i s t e n t by v i r t u e o f t h e 1979
amendments t o t h e m e n t a l competency law. Nor do w e f i n d
that the State's comments i n t h i s c a s e make it specially
susceptible t o a Lyles analysis.
We have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t the function of the
jury i n t h i s S t a t e is t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o
g u i l t o r innocence. S t a t e v. French, supra. Accord, S t a t e
v . C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 414, 426, 543 P.2d 3 8 9 , 396.
W e reaffirm that the jury's p u r p o s e and d u t y g o no
f u r t h e r and s h o u l d n o t be i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f
t h e v e r d i c t they a r e charged t o render. Although, according
t o defendant, t h e r e i s no l o n g e r a provision allowing t h e
judge to determine the existence of a mental disease or
d e f e c t w i t h o u t a t r i a l , t h e s t a t u t o r y c h a n g e s have i n c r e a s e d
the jury's r o l e on t h i s i s s u e . This contention overlooks
t h e f a c t t h a t b o t h F r e n c h and C a r y l involved jury t r i a l s ,
n o t summary d i s p o s i t i o n s by t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e . Therefore,
t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e c i t e d a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e s t a t u t e s h a s
no e f f e c t w h a t s o e v e r on t h e e a r l i e r h o l d i n g s of t h i s Court
on t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n .
Our review of the record reveals that during the
d e f e n s e summation, defendant's lawyer stressed t o the jury
the theory that defendant was suffering from a mental
d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t and t h a t h e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be g i v e n a n
opportunity f o r treatment, r a t h e r than being convicted. She
also pointed out s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the jury t h a t t h e y would
have t o l i v e w i t h a c o n v i c t i o n .
Thus, taken in context, it is clear that the
prosecutor's remark was nothing more than a legitimate
response t o the e a r l i e r exhortations of defense counsel. In
l i g h t of t h a t f a c t , any e r r o r c a u s e d by t h e S t a t e ' s comment
is made harmless when the record is considered in its
entirety.
Affirmed.
We c o n c u r : \ I
%&d'* k &
C
- ef J u s t i c e
Justices
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , c o n c u r r i n g :
I concur i n t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y . How-
ever, I t a k e exception t o t h a t language i n t h e m a j o r i t y
o p i n i o n which g i v e s s a n c t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ' s
c l o s i n g argument.
A s pointed o u t i n t h e majority opinion, the prosecutor
t o l d t h e jury:
" I s u g g e s t t h a t you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h
a c q u i t t a l based upon what you know t h i s man d i d ,
i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him l o o s e , you must a l s o
be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h t h a t . "
T h i s s t a t e m e n t was made i n r e s p o n s e t o a d e f e n s e a r g u -
ment t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r
treatment. The m a j o r i t y f i n d s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t t o
be a l e g i t i m a t e r e s p o n s e t o t h e d e f e n s e argument.
I f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t was made i n r e s p o n s e t o a
d e f e n s e argument r e g a r d i n g t h e consequences o f a c q u i t t a l
based upon mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s
argument was improper. Although t h e d e f e n s e went o u t s i d e t h e
record, t h e d e f e n s e a c c u r a t e l y informed t h e j u r y a b o u t t h e
consequence of a m e n t a l d i s e a s e a c q u i t t a l . I f the prosecutor
was r e s p o n d i n g t o s u c h a n argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r f a l s e l y
informed t h e j u r y t h a t such an a c q u i t t a l would r e s u l t i n t h e
defendant being turned loose. Though b o t h comments went o u t -
s i d e t h e r e c o r d , t h e d e f e n s e s t a t e m e n t was t r u e w h i l e t h e
p r o s e c u t o r ' s was f a l s e .
I r e a l i z e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t made by t h e p r o s e c u t i n g
a t t o r n e y c a n be j u s t i f i e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t a n o u t r i g h t
a c q u i t t a l of t h e d e f e n d a n t would have t h e e f f e c t of f r e e i n g
t h e defendant. Nevertheless, t h e statement i s misleading,
and when made i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e d e f e n s e argument r e g a r d i n g
m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , would t e n d t o c r e a t e a f a l s e impres-
s i o n i n t h e minds of t h e j u r o r s .
A prosecuting a t t o r n e y has a f a r d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l
r o l e than an a t t o r n e y prosecuting a c i v i l a c t i o n . The p r o s e -
c u t i n g a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t s t h e p e o p l e and s h o u l d always s t r i v e
t o present the case objectively. The p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g
argument i n t h i s c a s e i s improper when viewed i n c o n t e x t of
t h e o b l i g a t i o n owed.
Defense c o u n s e l d i d n o t move f o r a m i s t r i a l and o n l y
a r g u e s err i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on
t h e consequences of a n a c q u i t t a l based upon m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r
defect. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I concur w i t h t h e a f f i r m -
ing verdict. However, I do hereby i n t e n d t o e x p r e s s s t r o n g
s e n t i m e n t a g a i n s t improper j u r y argument and, i f t h e p r o p e r
r e c o r d i s made, w i l l t e n d t o view p r e j u d i c i a l arguments a s
reversible error.
I concur w i t h M r . J u s t i c e Morrison.