No. 80-422
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1981
I N THE MATTER O THE ADOPTION
F
O T.G.K.
F and J.P.K.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f S i l v e r Bow.
H o n o r a b l e James F r e e b o u r n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
P a t r i c k F. F l a h e r t y , B o u l d e r , Montana
For Respondent:
J a r d i n e , McCarthy & Grauman, W h i t e h a l l , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : May 1 5 , 1 9 8 1
Decided :
Filed:
*
.Z C l e r k
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
On July 17, 1979, appellant filed a petition for the
adoption of his stepchildren, TGK, age 10, and JPK, age 9.
Upon filing the petition appellant also filed an affidavit
of his wife, the children's natural mother, attesting to her
marriage to the appellant in October 1974 and consenting to
the adoption.
Written consent to the adoption was not obtained from
the natural father, respondent herein, but appellant alleged
in his petition that it was not necessary by reason of the
fact that the father had failed to "provide for the support
of the children for the period of one year last past before
the filing of this petition, and that he has abandoned said
children." Respondent filed an objection to the petition
seeking its dismissal.
A hearing on the petition was held in the Silver Bow
County District Court, the Honorable James Freebourn
presiding, on July 1, 1980. During the hearing, testimony
was presented showing that the children's natural mother and
respondent had dissolved their marriage in April 1974. In
accordance with this dissolution the mother was awarded
custody of the two children and respondent was ordered to
pay $200 per month child support. Respondent has failed to
pay the court-ordered support since 1977 but has on occasion
bought clothes and toys for the children as well as giving
them small cash gifts. As a result of respondent's failure
to pay the child support, the natural mother has been
receiving aid to dependent children (ADC) assistance since
October 1977.
The record further shows that during 1977 respondent
was unemployed and receiving unemployment insurance.
Respondent supplemented this income by making and selling
wooden f u r n i t u r e . D u r i n g 1978 r e s p o n d e n t worked i n Wyoming
on a n o i l r i g f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y f o u r m o n t h s e a r n i n g $800 a
month. Respondent continued to make use of his
furniture-making a b i l i t i e s i n 1978 and 1979 a s a s o u r c e of
income w h i l e l i v i n g r e n t f r e e w i t h h i s g i r l f r i e n d . On J u n e
27, 1979, respondent began serving a ten-year sentence in
t h e Montana S t a - t e P r i s o n f o r armed r o b b e r y . While i n p r i s o n
r e s p o n d e n t e a r n s $1.00 a d a y .
Following the hearing on the matter, the District
Court entered an order on September 12, 1980, dismissing
appellant's petition. As grounds for the dismissal, the
t r i a l judge c o n c l u d e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t had f a i l e d t o o b t a i n a
w r i t t e n consent t o t h e a d o p t i o n by t h e n a t u r a l mother and
f a t h e r a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA.
Appellant appeals the order of the District Court
f i r s t c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t of h i s wife f i l e d with
h i s p e t i t i o n is s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the requirement t h a t
c o n s e n t t o t h e a d o p t i o n be o b t a i n e d from t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r .
Respondent, as well as this Court, agrees with this
a r g u m e n t , a n d , t h u s , w e need n o t d i s c u s s i t f u r t h e r .
Appellant next contends that the court erred in
r e q u i r i n g t h a t c o n s e n t be o b t a i n e d from t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r .
I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c o n t e n t i o n , a p p e l l a n t c i t e s s e c t i o n 40-8-
l l l ( l ) ( a ) ( v ) , MCA, which p r o v i d e s :
" C o n s e-- r e q u i r e d f o r a d o p t i o n .
nt ( 1 ) An
a d o p t i o n o f a c h i l d may be d e c r e e d when t h e r e
h a v e been f i l e d w r i t t e n c o n s e n t s t o a d o p t i o n
e x e c u t e d by:
" ( a ) both p a r e n t s , if living, or the
surviving p a r e n t of a c h i l d , provided t h a t
c o n s e n t is n o t r e q u i r e d from a f a t h e r o r
mother :
" ( v ) i f it is proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of
t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r or mother, i f a b l e ,
has n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e support of t h e
c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e
f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n ; "
The burden on the appellant under this statutory
exception t o consent is c l e a r . It is e s s e n t i a l he p r o v e
t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r was a b l e and f a i l e d t o g i v e s u p p o r t
during a period of -
one year before t h e f i l i n g of t h e
petition. I n Re A d o p t i o n o f Biery ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 353,
522 P.2d 1 3 7 7 . T h i s , we f i n d , a p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o d o .
A s i n d i c a t e d by t h e s t a t u t e , t h e p e r i o d of t i m e t o be
examined is t h e y e a r p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n and
n o t m e r e l y any o n e - y e a r period, a s s u b m i t t e d by a p p e l l a n t .
During this period, from July 1978 to July 1979, the
evidence indicates that the natural father's source of
income was t h e s e l l i n g of handmade wooden f u r n i t u r e . How
much o f an income was d e r i v e d from t h i s nature is a b s e n t
from t h e r e c o r d . The n a t u r a l f a t h e r was a l s o employed on a n
o i l r i g f o r f o u r months i n 1 9 7 8 . The r e c o r d , h o w e v e r , d o e s
n o t i n d i c a t e what f o u r months t h e f a t h e r worked. Thus, it
i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s employment was n o t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d
in question. For t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e p e r i o d , from J u n e 27
to July 17, 1979, the father was residing in the State
P r i s o n e a r n i n g $1.00 a day.
Upon r e v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e a s p r e s e n t e d , we f i n d i t
does not adequately establish respondent's ability to
provide support during t h e year p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of the
petition. W must,
e therefore, affirm the District Court's
rejection of appellant's application of this statutory
exception t o consent.
A s an a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r excusing t h e requirement
t h a t c o n s e n t t o t h e a d o p t i o n be o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e n a t u r a l
f a t h e r , a p p e l l a n t , i n h i s p e t i t i o n , a s s e r t e d abandonment by
the father. See section 0-8-lll(l)(a)(iii), MCA. An
examination of the record, however, reveals numerous
occasions when respondent exercised his visitation rights
with h i s children. As a result, it c a n n o t be said that
abandonment should p l a y a decisive role in resolving the
adequacy of a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n .
Appellant further argues that consent is not
necessary in this case pursuant to section 40-8-
l l l ( l ) ( a ) ( i i ) , MCA, b e c a u s e t h e f a t h e r h a s been g u i l t y o f
c r u e l t y and n e g l e c t . I n r e j e c t i n g t h i s c o n t e n t i o n we p o i n t
o u t t h a t t h e c i t e d s t a t u t o r y exception t o consent is only
applied to a parent "who h a s been j u d i c i a l l y deprived of
custody . . . on a c c o u n t o f c r u e l t y and n e g l e c t . " Here,
t h e r e h a s b e e n no showing t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r was d e n i e d
c u s t o d y of h i s c h i l d r e n , o r h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t e r m i n a t e d ,
for reasons of cruelty or neglect in a prior judicial
proceeding.
Appellant's f i n a l argument concerning t h e p r o p r i e t y
of the D i s t r i c t Court's order of dismissal for failing t o
o b t a i n t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r ' s c o n s e n t i s t h a t c o n s e n t is n o t
n e c e s s a r y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 4 0 - 8 - l l l ( l ) ( a ) ( i v ) , MCA. This
section provides t h a t consent t o adoption is not required of
a parent,
" ( i v ) who h a s c a u s e d t h e c h i l d t o b e
maintained by any public or private
c h i l d r e n ' s i n s t i t u t i o n , c h a r i t a b l e agency, or
any licensed adoption agency or the
d e p a r t m e n t o f s o c i a l and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n
s e r v i c e s o f t h e s t a t e o f Montana f o r a p e r i o d
of 1 y e a r w i t h o u t c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e s u p p o r t
of t h e c h i l d d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d , i f a b l e " .
W acknowledge
e t h i s contention but note t h a t i t was
not set forth in appellant's petition as grounds for
excusing the consent requirement. Consequently, although
some e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l c o n c e r n i n g t h e m a t t e r ,
t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e argument i n
resolving this dispute at the trial court level. If the
a p p e l l a n t wishes t o use t h i s s t a t u t o r y exception t o consent,
t h e p e t i t i o n s h o u l d be d r a f t e d on t h a t b a s i s and a s p e c i f i c
hearing held thereon t o determine its applicability. For
this reason we find no error by the District Court in
d i s m i s s i n g t h e p e t i t i o n a s f i l e d b u t m u s t r e s e r v e r u l i n g on
the merits of the above c o n t e n t i o n and conclude that the
decision herein is t o issue without prejudice to refiling
t h e p e t i t i o n on t h i s a s s e r t e d b a s i s .
Appellant a t t h e conclusion of h i s b r i e f argues t h a t
the District Court abused its discretion in failing to
interview the children in chambers to determine their
position as to the adoption. We summarily reject this
contention, f i n d i n g i t r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l .
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e f a c t t h a t a n i n t e r v i e w was n o t c o n d u c t e d i s
of no c o n s e q u e n c e t o t h i s a c t i o n which was d i s m i s s e d d u e t o
appellant's f a i l u r e t o obtain the natural f a t h e r ' s consent,
t h e r e b y p r e c l u d i n g d e c i s i o n on w h e t h e r t h e a d o p t i o n w i l l be
i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d r e n .
The order of the District Court dismissing the
p e t i t i o n is affirmed.
W concur:
e
%&dWU@
C h i d Justice