No. 80-287
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
MELVIN K. PARRENT,
Claimant and Appellant,
MIDWAY TOYOTA, Employer and
UNIVERSAL WJDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO. ,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court
Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Conner, Baiz & Olsen, Great Falls, Montana
Tom Baiz argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondents:
Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones, Billings,
Montana
Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: March 26, 1981
Decided:
APR 1 6 1981
Filed: APP l$fff
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from the Workers' Compensation
Court's denial of claimant's petition to reopen a final
compromise settlement agreement entered into after claimant
injured himself in the course of his employment.
The issue raised on this appeal is whether the
Workers' Compensation Court erred in refusing to allow
claimant, who is a minor, to disaffirm the "petition for
final settlement" and reopen his workers' compensation case?
On August 18, 1975, claimant, who was then fifteen
years old, injured his lower back while in the employ of
Midway Toyota, Inc., of Great Falls, Montana. At the time
he was engaged in lifting heavy objects.
Notice was properly and timely given by all parties
in the dispute. Defendant accepted liability and paid
claimant the appropriate amount of biweekly temporary total
disability payments from August 18, 1975, through November
15, 1976, at the weekly rate of $53.36. On October 6, 1975,
a lumbar myelography was performed on claimant which
demonstrated a herniated disk at the L4-5 level. Claimant
underwent surgery in October 1975 performed by Dr. Robert
Chambers. The herniated disk was removed and the
posterolateral fusion from the fifth lumbar vertebrae to the
sacrum was performed.
On February 1977 claimant and defendant entered into
a final settlement of the claim for 150 weeks of permanent
partial disability benefits totaling $6,136.40, less credit
in the amount of $640.32 for the permanent partial payments
made after November 16, 1976.
Claimant has been employed in the oil fields of
Montana since his graduation from high school in June 1978.
In the per forrnance of his work, he occasionally experienced
low back pain when engaged in heavy lifting or straining,
but he has been able to perform all work.
Tom Mazurek, an adjuster, represented defendant in
the settlement negotiations. He negotiated with the
claimant's mother (natural guardian) and claimant directly.
The petition for final settlement, based on a 23 percent
impairment rating, was signed by claimant only- was
and -
witnessed by a friend. Claimant's mother was present at the
time he signed the agreement. She did not object to the
signing, nor did she or any other person of legal age or of
"legal guardian status" cosign the agreement. Later,
claimant and his mother requested that the money be paid in
a lump sum amount. The Workers' Compensation Division
denied the request.
Claimant later filed a petition to reopen his claim
pursuant to section 39-71-204, MCA. At the hearing, the
Workers' Compensation Court found no evidence to indicate
that there was any increase in claimant's disability from
the time of the final settlement to the date of this
hearing. The Workers ' Compensation Court found no evidence
of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by defendant in the
settlement.
The Workers' Compensation Court concluded:
"The claimant's guardian participated fully
in consideration of the offered final
settlement and though did not actually sign
the final settlement petition, she neverthe-
less ratified and approved it on behalf of
her ward, the claimant, to the same legal
effect as if she had actually signed the
petition . . ."
Claimant argues this conclusion is contrary to the
law.
Claimant was a minor at the time the final compromise
settlement agreement was entered into between the parties.
The petition for final settlement is a contract, and
contract principles, therefore, must be applied to determine
the petition's validity and enforceability. Kienas v.
Peterson (1981), Mont. , 624 P.2d 1, 37 St.Rep.
The pertinent statutes are:
Section 28-2-201, MCA:
"Who may contract. All persons are capable
of contracting except minors, persons of
unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil
rights. Minors and persons of unsound mind
have only such capacity as is defined by this
part, 28-10-104, and Title 41, chapter 1."
Section 28-10-104, MCA:
--__--
"Who m a y --E E o i n t a n aqent, who may be an
a -------I- --
-
agent. Any person having capacity to
contract, except a minor, may appoint an
agent, and any person may be an agent."
Section 41-1-302, MCA:
"Contracts of minors--disaffirmance. A minor
may make a conveyance or other contract in
the same manner as any other person, subject
only to his power of disaffirmance under the
provisions of this chapter and to the
provisions of Title 40, chapter 1."
Section 41-1-304, MCA:
- -
"When minors--may disaffirm. In all cases
other than those specified by 41-1-303,
41-1-305, and 41-1-306, the contract of a
minor may, upon restoring the consideration
to the party from whom it was received, be
disaffirmed by the minor himself, either
before his majority or within a reasonable
time afterwards, or in case of his death
within that period, by his heirs or personal
representatives."
Section 41-1-304, MCA, allows a minor to disaffirm
his contract. Because the sixteen-year-old claimant signed
the petition for final settlement in his own behalf, he
a l o n e was t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y .
Tom Mazurek c h o s e t o c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e c l a i m a n t ; h e
must, therefore, be prepared t o a c c e p t t h e consequences of
c l a i m a n t ' s d i s a f f i r m a n c e of the petition. The p e r s o n who
d e a l s w i t h a n i n f a n t d o e s s o a t h i s own p e r i l . Niemann v .
D e v e r i c h ( 1 9 5 0 ) 98 Cal.App.2d 787, 221 P.2d 1 7 8 .
Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h e mother, Hermoine P a r r e n t ,
was p r e s e n t a t a l l t i m e s d u r i n g t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e c o n t r a c t ;
t h a t t h e mother approved of t h e c o n t r a c t ; t h a t t h e r e was no
objection t o the contract; t h a t the adjuster negotiated with
t h e mother and t h e c l a i m a n t d u r i n g t h e weeks p r i o r t o the
signing of the contract and that after the contract was
s i g n e d , t h e m o t h e r was s t i l l a w a r e o f t h e c o n t r a c t r i g h t s o f
c l a i m a n t and d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e same. Because of this
c l o s e r e l a t i o n and c o n t i n u o u s a w a r e n e s s o f t h e mother, the
c o n t r a c t is e n f o r c e a b l e . W disagree.
e
It is immaterial that Hermoine Parrent may have
a d v i s e d and c o u n s e l e d c l a i m a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s w o r k e r s '
compensation claim. The m o t h e r is t h e n a t u r a l g u a r d i a n of
t h e minor c l a i m a n t , b u t t h i s r e l a t i o n o n l y a f f e c t s h e r r i g h t
t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e m i n o r and d o e s n o t e n l a r g e h e r r i g h t s
to the property of the minor. Claimant was the sole
contracting party. H e i s t h e o n l y p a r t y t h a t bound h i m s e l f
legally to the contract. As a minor, he is e n t i t l e d to
d i s a f f i r m and r e s c i n d t h e f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t .
C o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t i n t h i s a r e a i s Gage
v. Moore (Okla. 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 9 8 P.2d 395. I n Gage a f o u r t e e n -
year-old boy b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n t o r e s c i n d a c o n t r a c t . The
defendant refused, and suit was brought. The defendant
c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r had a c q u i e s c e d i n and
ratified the purchase and, for that reason, the contract
s h o u l d n o t be r e s c i n d e d and a v o i d e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f . In
rejecting this contention and finding for the
fourteen-year-old plaintiff, the court, quoting from
Bombardier v. Goodrich (1920), 94 V t . 208, 110 A . 11, 9
A.L.R. 1028, s t a t e d :
" ' T h e r i g h t o f an i n f a n t t o r e s c i n d h i s
c o n t r a c t is u n a f f e c t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t h i s
f a t h e r was p r e s e n t a d v i s i n g and a p p r o v i n g t h e
transaction. The a s s e n t o f t h e f a t h e r a d d s
n o t h i n g t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f an i n f a n t ' s
promise. . ." 1 9 8 P.2d a t 396.
I t is t h e p o l i c y of t h e law t o d i s c o u r a g e a d u l t s from
contracting with a minor. Tom Mazurek testified he knew
claimant was a minor at the time claimant signed the
petition for final settlement; yet, Mazurek was not
discouraged from o b t a i n i n g c l a i m a n t ' s s i g n a t u r e on the
petition.
The insurer, adjuster Mazurek and the Workers'
Compensation Division h a v e much greater expertise and
knowledge i n t h e a r e a o f w o r k e r s ' compensation law t h a n have
claimant and his mother. We are dismayed that these
knowledgeable parties overlooked simple contract law.
Defendant e r r e d in not requiring claimant's legal guardian
t o s i g n t h e p e t i t i o n f o r f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t on b e h a l f of and
i n p l a c e of claimant himself.
The f i n a l compromise s e t t l e m e n t i s s e t a s i d e , and w e
remand this case to the Workers' Compensation Court for
proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s Opinion.
We concur: