NO. 80-269
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1981
LEASEAMERICA CORPORATION O WISCONSIN,
F
P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
VS .
STATE OF MONTANA,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k .
H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a ,
Montana
Richard Larson argued, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General,
H e l e n a , Montana
For Respondents:
J a r d i n e , S t e p h e n s o n , B l e w e t t and Weaver, G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana
J a c k Lewis a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: February 1 7 , 1981
Decided : MAR 1 6 1989
Filed: MAR 1 6
9.
-
y 4 Clerk
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The State appeals a Lewis & Clark County District Court
decision awarding plaintiff, Leaseamerica, a summary judgment.
Leaseamerica cross-appeals for prejudgment and post-judgment
interest.
In 1967 the Legislature authorized the state attorney
general to establish a law enforcement teletypewriter communi-
cations system (LETS) and to acquire the necessary equipment
by'lease, purchase or other means. In March 1973, then
Attorney General Robert Woodahl entered into a lease arrange-
ment with Action Communications Systems, Leaseamerica's
assignor, whereby the State agreed to lease the necessary
equipment for a period of six years, paying $2,388 in 72
monthly payments. Immediately thereafter, Action assigned
the lease to Leaseamerica, together with all rights to the
lease payments. The State made the lease payments from May
1973 to May 1977, when Attorney General Mike Greely notified
Leaseamerica that it was unilaterally terminating the lease.
Notice of Action's sale, assignment, and transfer of all
interest in the lease to Leaseamerica was not filed with the
state auditor until shortly before this lawsuit was instituted.
At the end of the 72-month period, Leaseamerica took possession
of the equipment. On February 9, 1978, Leaseamerica commenced
an action seeking: (1) specific performance of the State's
obligation to pay under the lease; (2) attorney fees pursuant
to an indemnity provision in the lease; (3) prejudgment and
post- judgment interest.
The District Court entered judgment in favor of Leaseamerica
for the lease payments and attorney fees but denied ~easeamerica's
claim for interest.
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a p p e a l :
1. I s a s i x - y e a r l e a s e of a law e n f o r c e m e n t communica-
t i o n s system e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l of t h e
S t a t e of Montana i n March 1973 u n e n f o r c e a b l e a s a g a i n s t t h e
S t a t e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947,
which t h e n l i m i t e d t h e t e r m of t h o s e s t a t e c o n t r a c t s covered
by t h e s t a t u t e t o t h r e e y e a r s ?
2. Is a n a s s i g n e e of t h e l e s s o r of a law enforcement
communications system p r o h i b i t e d by s e c t i o n 1 7 - 8 - 2 1 1 ( 1 ) ,
MCA, from f i l i n g a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e f o r s p e c i f i c
performance of t h e l e a s e agreement where n o t i c e of t h e
a s s i g n m e n t of t h e l e s s o r ' s i n t e r e s t t o t h e a s s i g n e e was n o t
f i l e d with the s t a t e auditor u n t i l j u s t p r i o r t o the f i l i n g
of t h e action?
3. Is t h e S t a t e o b l i g a t e d t o pay a t t o r n e y f e e s where a
l e a s e p r o v i d e d f o r i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n of l e s s o r , and t h e l e s s o r ' s
s u c c e s s o r s , f o r f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o perform o r comply
w i t h any of t h e t e r m s of t h e agreement?
4. A f t e r a d o p t i o n of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , i s
t h e S t a t e o b l i g a t e d t o pay prejudgment and post-judgment
i n t e r e s t on l e a s e payments from t h e due d a t e of e a c h payment?
The l e a s e h e r e i n d i s p u t e was e x e c u t e d i n March of
1973. A t t h a t t i m e , Ch. 1 9 , of T i t l e 82, e n t i t l e d P u r c h a s i n g
Department and Agent, s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e d :
"Contracts limited t o three years. N contracts
o
s h a l l be made f o r a l o n g e r p e r i o d t h a n t h r e e ( 3 )
y e a r s -- c o n t r a c t s h a l l p r o v i d e f o r t h e
and s u c h
-
d e l i v e r y of such a r t i c l e s a t such t i m e s and i n
s u c h q u a n t i t i e s - - p u r c h a s i n g a g e n t may de-
a s the
termine." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
The s u b j e c t l e a s e was e x e c u t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l
p u r s u a n t t o power d e r i v e d from s e c t i o n s 44-2-301, MCA, and
44-2-302, MCA. The former a u t h o r i z e d e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a law
enforcement telecommunications system w h i l e t h e l a t t e r
a u t h o r i z e d t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o l e a s e equipment n e c e s s a r y
f o r accomplishing t h e o b j e c t i v e .
I n H o l t z v . Babcock ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 341, 389 P.2d
869, t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t l e a s e - - p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t s executed
by t h e s t a t e p u r c h a s i n g a g e n t were s u b j e c t t o c o m p e t i t i v e
b i d d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e s t a t e p u r c h a s i n g s t a t u t e s .
Here t h e i s s u e s a r e w h e t h e r t h o s e same s t a t u t e s and i n
p a r t i c u l a r , s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, l i m i t i n g c o n t r a c t s
t o t h r e e y e a r s , a p p l i e d (1) t o l e a s e s which h a v e no o p t i o n
,and
t o p u r c h a s e ( 2 ) t o l e a s e s e x e c u t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l .
The q u e s t i o n s have n o t p r e v i o u s l y been d e c i d e d by t h i s
Court.
Applicable r u l e s of construction a r e : (1) Both t h e con-
t e x t of a s t a t u t e and t h e p l a i n meaning o f i t s t e r m s c a n b e
considered i n determining l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . I n Matter of
A d o p t i o n o f Smigaj ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 537, 540, 560 P.2d 1 4 1 .
( 2 ) The t i t l e t o a n a c t may b e l o o k e d t o i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e
act. I n r e Coleman's E s t a t e ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 132 Mont. 339, 343, 317
P.2d 880. ( 3 ) Zn d e t e r m i n i n g l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t a c o u r t c a n
r e s o r t t o h i s t o r y of t h e s t a t u t e . Dept. o f Rev. v . P u g e t
Sound Power & Light (1978), Mont. , 587 P.2d 1282, 35
St.Rep. 1368.
When p a s s e d i n 1923, s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947,
l i m i t e d c o n t r a c t s t o one year. T h i s s t a t u t e was i n e f f e c t
when, i n 1967, s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n empowered t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l t o l e a s e telecommunications equipment. The o n e - y e a r
l i m i t a t i o n was changed t o t h r e e y e a r s by amendment i n 1971.
S e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, a s i t e x i s t e d when t h e
p r e s e n t l e a s e was e x e c u t e d , was s i l e n t r e g a r d i n g l e a s e s .
When t h e L e g i s l a t u r e g r a n t e d l e a s i n g power t o t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l , a l i m i t a t i o n of y e a r s was n o t p r o v i d e d e i t h e r by
reference t o the chapter covering purchasing agent o r l i m i t e d
i n Ch. 2, T i t l e 4 4 , which e s t a b l i s h e d t h e system. The
L e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 82-1918, i n 1971, f o u r y e a r s
a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l was a u t h o r i z e d t o l e a s e telecommuni-
c a t i o n s equipment; t h e r e was no l e g i s l a t i v e a t t e m p t t o a p p l y
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-1918 t o T i t l e 4 4 .
P r i o r t o t h e 1971 l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n , t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l had, on J u l y 1 4 , 1969, i s s u e d a f o r m a l o p i n i o n
s t a t i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, d i d
not apply t o s t a t e leases. The l e a s e i s s u e was b e i n g d i s c u s s e d
and was a s u b j e c t of a n a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s o p i n i o n when
s e c t i o n 82-1918 was amended i n 1971; y e t t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s
w e r e not applied t o leases.
W a r e persuaded by t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s :
e (1) S e c t i o n
82-1918, R.C.M. 1947, r e f e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e p u r c h a s i n g
a g e n t , b u t i t d o e s n o t r e f e r t o any o t h e r a g e n t s of s t a t e
government. ( 2 ) E e c t i o n 82-1918 i s a s e c t i o n under Ch. 1 9 ,
e n t i t l e d P u r c h a s i n g Department Agent. (3) T i t l e 44,
g i v i n g t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l power t o l e a s e t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
equipment, d o e s n o t l i m i t t h a t power a s t o t i m e . ( 4 ) Section
82-1918 was amended i n 1971, f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l w a s a u t h o r i z e d t o l e a s e w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n and two
y e a r s a f t e r t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l gave an o p i n i o n t h a t s e c t i o n
82-1918 d i d n o t a p p l y t o l e a s e s ; y e t no a t t e m p t was made by
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o a p p l y s e c t i o n 82-1918 t o t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l ' s l e a s i n g power.
W f i n d s e c t i o n 82-1918,
e R.C.M. 1947, n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o
l e a s e s e x e c u t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n
44-2-302, MCA.
The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t f a i l u r e of Leaseamerica o r i t s
a s s i g n o r t o record t h e l e a s e assignment with t h e s t a t e
a u d i t o r p r i o r t o F e b r u a r y of 1978 forecloses t h i s action
which was n o t i n s t i t u t e d u n t i l F e b r u a r y 9, 1978.
S e c t i o n 17-8-211 ( I ) , MCA, p r o v i d e s :
" A l l t r a n s f e r s and a s s i g n m e n t s made of any c l a i m
a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , o r any p a r t t h e r e o f o r i n t e r e s t
t h e r e o n , e x c e p t a s h e r e i n a f t e r p r o v i d e d , s h a l l be
a b s o l u t e l y n u l l and v o i d and u n e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t
t h e s t a t e unless the assignee thereof f i l e s w r i t t e n
n o t i c e of t h e a s s i g n m e n t on such forms a s may be
r e q u i r e d by t h e s t a t e a u d i t o r , t o g e t h e r w i t h a t r u e
copy of t h e i n s t r u m e n t of a s s i g n m e n t . " (Emphasis
supplied.)
P a r a g r a p h No. 1 3 of t h e s u b j e c t l e a s e s t a t e d : "Lessor
may, w i t h o u t l e s s e e ' s c o n s e n t , a s s i g n t h i s l e a s e o r any
i n t e r e s t therein." The S t a t e knew of t h e a s s i g n m e n t and
made payments t o t h e a s s i g n e e Leaseamerica f o r a p e r i o d of
four years.
The S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n must f a i l f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e
r e a s o n s . F i r s t , t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o a s s i g n m e n t s of " c l a i m "
r a t h e r t h a n a s s i g n m e n t s of c o n t r a c t . Anti-assignment s t a t u t e s
have h i s t o r i c a l l y been l i m i t e d t o l i q u i d a t e d d e b t s . Explosive
Chemical Co. v. William S . Gray & Co. ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 207 N.Y.Supp.
638. Secondly, t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e f i l i n g w i t h i n
a t i m e c e r t a i n and a f i l i n g was e v e n t u a l l y made w i t h t h e
a u d i t o r p r i o r t o i n s t i t u t i n g s u i t on F e b r u a r y 9 , 1978.
F i n a l l y , t h e S t a t e c a n c l a i m no p r e j u d i c e a s i t had a c t u a l
n o t i c e of t h e a s s i g n m e n t and made l e a s e payments t o Leaseamerica
f o r four years.
Leaseamerica c l a i m s a t t o r n e y f e e s p u r s u a n t t o a c o n t r a c t u a l
provision with the State. The S t a t e was t o indemnify t h e
l e s s o r f o r " l e g a l expenses'' i n c u r r e d a s t h e r e s u l t of any
d e f a u l t upon t h e p a r t of l e s s e e , S t a t e of Montana.
S e c t i o n 18-1-404, MCA, p r o v i d e s :
" L i a b i l i t y of state--1imi tation--costs. (1) The
S t a t e of Montana s h a l l be l i a b l e i n r e s p e c t t o
any c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o i n t h e same manner and
t o t h e same e x t e n t a s a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l under
l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e x c e p t t h e S t a t e of Montana
s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e f o r i n t e r e s t p r i o r t o o r a f t e r
judgment o r f o r p u n i t i v e damages.
" C 2 ) C o s t s may b e a l l o w e d a s p r o v i d e d i n 25-10-711.
I n a l l o t h e r c a s e s , c o s t s s h a l l be allowed i n a l l
c o u r t s t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l c l a i m a n t t o t h e same ex-
t e n t a s i f t h e s t a t e of Montana were a p r i v a t e
l i t i g a n t , e x c e p t t h a t such c o s t s s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e
attorney's fees."
S e c t i o n 25-10-711, MCA, r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e above-quoted
s t a t u t e , p r o v i d e s f o r a n award of r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s
i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s l i t i g a t i o n i s deemed t o be
f r i v o l o u s o r i s p u r s u e d i n bad f a i t h . N e i t h e r of t h o s e
f a c t o r s e x i s t here.
A r e a d i n g of t h e s e s t a t u t e s compels t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
l i a b i l i t y f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s can a r i s e from c o n t r a c t b u t
c a n n o t be awarded a s " c o s t s " a b s e n t bad f a i t h on t h e S t a t e ' s
part.
The S t a t e h a s r e l i e d on Tomten v . Thomas ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 125
Mont. 159, 232 P.2d 723, wherein t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e
word " e x p e n s e n w a s synonymous w i t h " c o s t s " . Therefore,
a r g u e s t h e S t a t e , " l e g a l expense" a s d e n o t e d i n t h e l e a s e
i s a c o s t and c a n n o t be awarded a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e u n l e s s t h e
S t a t e l i t i g a t e s i n bad f a i t h .
Tomten v. Thomas, s u p r a , was o v e r r u l e d by C a l l a n t v .
F e d e r a l Land Bank of Spokane ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 593 P.2d
1036, 36 St.Rep. 824. Legal " e x p e n s e s " a r e n o t synonymous
w i t h " c o s t s " b u t r a t h e r , when p r o v i d e d c o n t r a c t u a l l y , a r e
t r e a t e d a s a s p e c i a l damage r e c o v e r a b l e i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
p r i n c i p a l sum. Bovee v . Helland ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52 Mont. 151, 156
W e f i n d t h e S t a t e l i a b l e f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s under i t s
l e a s e indemnity p r o v i s i o n .
Leaseamerica a s s e r t s t h a t i t i s e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t on
i t s judgment d e s p i t e t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 1 8 - 1 - 4 0 4 ( 1 ) ,
MCA, q u o t e d above, which p r o h i b i t s an award of i n t e r e s t
against the State.
Leaseamerica a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 1 8 - 1 - 4 0 4 ( 1 ) , MCA, i s
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h A r t i c l e 2 , S e c t i o n 18 of t h e 1972 S t a t e
C o n s t i t u t i o n which p r o v i d e s t h a t a governmental e n t i t y s h a l l
have "no immunity from s u i t o r i n j u r y t o a p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y . "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t t h i s language was i n t e n d e d t o
apply t o t o r t but n o t c o n t r a c t actions.
W have reviewed t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e p r i o r t o t h e
e
a d o p t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n . The o r i g i n a l d r a f t of
S e c t i o n 1 8 , Non-immunity -- p r o v i d e d :
from S u i t , "The S t a t e and
i t s s u b d i v i s i o n s h a l l have no s p e c i a l immunity from s u i t . "
D e l e g a t e Habedank i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention moved t o
s u p p o r t a n amendment which would a d d , f o l l o w i n g t h e words
s u i t , t h e language " f o r i n j u r y t o a p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y . "
D e l e g a t e Habedank, t h e s p o n s o r of t h e amendment, r e v e a l e d
i t s i n t e n t i n t h e debate:
"Limited a s i t i s , f o r i n j u r y t o a person o r p r o p e r t y ,
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s s t i l l f r e e t o make i t more open
i f t h e y d e s i r e t o do s o i n t h e f u t u r e . B u t we a t
l e a s t have a s s u r e d t h e p e o p l e o f t h e S t a t e of Montana
t h a t they can sue f o r n e g l i g e n t i n j u r y . " Con.Con.
T r a n s c r i p t TR. P. 5430, l i n e s 10-14.
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l e g a t e s was t o l i m i t nonimmunity t o t o r t s
committed by t h e S t a t e .
W e find the statutory prohibition against i n t e r e s t i n
s e c t i o n 18-1-404(1), MCA, t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The S t a t e
of Montana i s n o t l i a b l e f o r prejudgment o r post-judgment
interest.
The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:
v
Justices
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea w i l l f i l e a s e p a r a t e o p i n i o n l a t e r .
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent. The r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e
m a j o r i t y may be a n e q u i t a b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n , b u t i n my v i e w it is
not the law.
A t the t i m e the six-year lease o f t h e e q u i p m e n t was
e n t e r e d i n t o b e t w e e n L e a s e a m e r i c a and t h e S t a t e of Montana, o u r
s t a t u t e provided:
"Contracts limited to three ( 3 ) years. No
c o n t r a c t s s h a l l be made f o r a p e r i o d l o n q e r t h a n
t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s , and s u c h c o n t k a c t s h a l l - p r o v i d e
f o r t h e d e l i v e r y o f s u c h a r t i c l e s a t s u c h times
a n d i n s u c h q u a n t i t i e s as t h e p u r c h a s i n g a g e n t
may d e t e r m i n e . " L a w s of Montana ( 1 9 7 1 ) , Ch. 3 0 1 , S 2.
A l e a s e is a c o n t r a c t . H e r e i t w a s made f o r a p e r i o d of
s i x years. Such a c o n t r a c t was p r o h i b i t e d by t h e c l e a r , unam-
b i g u o u s language of t h e s t a t u t e .
I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e , t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e
is controlling. S e c t i o n 1-2-102, MCA; H a k e r v. S o u t h w e s t e r n
R a i l w a y Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 364, 3 6 9 , 5 7 8 P.2d 7 2 4 , 7 2 7 , and
cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ; Dunphy v. Anaconda C o . ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 ,
8 0 , 438 P.2d 660, 6 6 2 , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . The i n t e n t i o n of
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e m u s t f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e p l a i n meaning
o f t h e w o r d s u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e , and i f t h e meaning o f t h e s t a -
t u t e c a n be so d e t e r m i n e d , c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y
a n y o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H a k e r , s u p r a , and cases c i t e d
t h e r e i n ; Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . Thus where t h e
l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e is p l a i n , u n a m b i g u o u s , d i r e c t and
c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e s p e a k s f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e is n o t h i n g l e f t
f o r the court t o construe. Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases c i t e d
therein. I n s u c h case, t h e f u n c t i o n of t h i s C o u r t is s i m p l y t o
a s c e r t a i n w h a t i n terms or i n s u b s t a n c e is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s t a -
t u t e and n o t t o i n s e r t w h a t h a s b e e n o m i t t e d . S e c t i o n 1-2-101,
MCA; S t a t e e x r e l . Z a n d e r v. District Court (1979), Mont .
, 5 9 1 P.2d 6 5 6 , 6 6 2 , 36 S t . Rep. 489, 496; Dunphy, s u p r a , and
cases cited therein. I n sum, it is s i m p l y t h e d u t y of t h e C o u r t
t o c o n s t r u e t h e l a w as it f i n d s i t . Dunphy, s u p r a , and cases
cited therein.
-10 -
Here t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c r e a t e d a n a m b i g u i t y i n t h e act by
r e f e r r i n g t o i t s t i t l e and t h e n p r o c e e d i n g to a p p l y a v a r i e t y o f
e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t
was n o t v o i d . T h i s it c a n n o t d o . The t i t l e o f a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t
c a n n o t be u s e d t o c r e a t e a n a m b i g u i t y i n t h e t e x t o f t h e a c t s o
a s t o a u t h o r i z e r e c o u r s e t o e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n .
S t a t e e x r e l . P a l a g i v. Regan ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 3 4 3 , 351-352, 126
P.2d 8 1 8 , 8 2 4 ; S t a t e e x r e l . J o n e s v. E r i k s o n ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 7 5 Mont.
4 2 9 , 453, 244 P. 2 8 7 , 296.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e c o u r s e to e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of
c o n s t r u c t i o n is b o t t o m e d o n i t s v i e w t h a t o t h e r w i s e t h e s c o p e of
t h e s t a t u t e would be " s t u p e n d o u s n and would o u t l a w a l l c o n t r a c t s
i n e x c e s s o f t h r e e y e a r s t h r o u g h o u t t h e s t a t e , which is n o t
rational. T h i s r a t i o n a l i t y a p p r o a c h is s i m p l y a n e x t r i n s i c a i d
t o c o n s t r u c t i o n a v a i l a b l e o n l y w h e r e t h e s t a t u t e is a m b i g u o u s . I t
c a n n o t be u s e d t o d e f e a t t h e p l a i n and unambiguous l a n g u a g e of
the statute. Our f u n c t i o n h e r e is n o t t o " i m p r o v e " t h e s t a t u t e
by r e s o r t to e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , b u t
s i m p l y t o d e c l a r e what i t s language p l a i n l y s t a t e s .
The m a j o r i t y a p p e a r s to h a v e t a k e n t h e same c o u r s e as t h e
District Court. They, t o o , h a v e g o n e beyond t h e p l a i n meaning of
t h e words i n t h e s t a t u t e . I n a t t e m p t i n g to a s c e r t a i n t h e i n t e n -
t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e m a j o r i t y p o i n t s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
s t a t u t e as it e x i s t e d a t t h e time t h e s t a t e lease was e x e c u t e d
was s i l e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o leases. Y e t t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r s to
"contracts," and t h e r e is no d i s p u t e t h a t a lease is a c o n t r a c t .
The s t a t u t o r y w o r d s c l e a r l y t e l l u s t h a t a lease is i n c l u d e d i n
the statutory prohibition.
N e x t t h e m a j o r i t y n o t e s t h a t when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e g a v e t h e
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l t h e power t o e s t a b l i s h t h e LETS s y s t e m by lease
o r p u r c h a s e of equipment, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t p r o v i d e a t i m e
l i m i t a t i o n f o r t h o s e c o n t r a c t s , n o r d i d it e x p l i c i t l y make t h e
t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s o f s e c t i o n 82-1918 a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e leases o r
purchases. I n m view,
y it is c l e a r why t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t
do this. S e c t i o n 82-1918 p r o v i d e s a t h r e e - y e a r l i m i t a t i o n on
- 11-
s t a t e c o n t r a c t s ; a n a d d i t i o n a l s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n was
unnecessary.
I n r e s o r t i n g t o these surmises about l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t ,
t h e m a j o r i t y is i g n o r i n g t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n as
s e t o u t i n D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue v. P u g e t Sound Power & Light
Co., supra. There we s a i d t h a t t h e c o u r t s should f i r s t a t t e m p t
t o d e t e r m i n e s t a t u t o r y m e a n i n g from t h e p l a i n words o f t h e
statute. F o l l o w i n g t h a t i n q u i r y , t h e c o u r t c a n resort t o t h e
legislative history. D e p t . o f Revenue, s u p r a , Mont. a t I
5 8 7 P.2d 1 2 8 7 , 35 S t . R e p . a t 1373. I n my v i e w , t h e r e is no need
t o resort t o l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y . The s t a t u t e is c l e a r o n i t s f a c e .
I would d e c l a r e t h e c o n t r a c t p r o h i b i t e d by t h e t h r e e - y e a r
l i m i t a t i o n and remand t h e case t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r r e f o r -
m a t i o n on a t h r e e - y e a r basis.
Chief J u s t i c e
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n c o n c u r r i n g :
I h e a r t i l y c o n c u r i n t h e above d i s s e n t .