No. 80-228
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1981
NORTH CENTRAL SERVICES, I N C . ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-VS-
KENNETH M. HAFDAHL,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f H i l l , The H o n o r a b l e
B. W. Thomas, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
M o r r i s o n , E t t i e n a n d B a r r o n , H a v r e , Montana
C h r i s R. Young a r g u e d , H a v r e , Montana
For Respondent:
A r n o l d H. P e t e r s o n , Havre, Montana
D a n i e l R. C a r p e n t e r , H a v r e , Montana
F o r Amicus C u r i a e :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
Rick L a r s e n a n d J o h n Maynard a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y .
G e n e r a l s , H e l e n a , Montana
Submitted: January 12, 1981
Decided: March 11, 1981.
Filed: MAR 1 2 1988
Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k B . M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a D i s t r i c t C o u r t judgment which
upheld t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e small claims procedure,
T i t l e 25, Ch. 35, MCA. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a f t e r s u s t a i n i n g
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e a c t , e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r o f
t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r $678.25.
T h i s c a s e was o r i g i n a l l y t r i e d b e f o r e a j u s t i c e of t h e
peace, s i t t i n g without a jury. Both p a r t i e s were p r e s e n t ,
b u t n e i t h e r was r e p r e s e n t e d by l e g a l c o u n s e l . The j u s t i c e
o f t h e p e a c e found i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f , and d e f e n d a n t
appealed t o t h e District Court. Defendant attempted t o
a p p e a r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h r o u g h c o u n s e l b u t was d e n i e d
t h a t o p p o r t u n i t y by t h e t r i a l judge. A t r i a l d e novo i s
p r o h i b i t e d by t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e s m a l l c l a i m s p r o c e d u r e ;
and t h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t reviewed only q u e s t i o n s of
law. The judgment e n t e r e d i n j u s t i c e c o u r t was a f f i r m e d .
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e : (1) Whether t h e
small claims procedure i n j u s t i c e c o u r t , pursuant t o T i t l e
25, Ch. 35, MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y deprived defendant of
t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l ? ( 2 ) Whether t h e s m a l l c l a i m s p r o c e d u r e
i n j u s t i c e c o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o T i t l e 25, Ch. 35, MCA, uncon-
s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e p r i v e d d e f e n d a n t o f t h e r i g h t t o a t r i a l by
jury? ( 3 ) Whether t h e p r o v i s i o n t h a t a j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e
may a s s i s t a p a r t y i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s p l e a d i n g ,
p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-35-201 ( 2 ) , MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . l y
d e p r i v e s t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y of d u e p r o c e s s ? ( 4 ) Whether, i f
p a r t of t h e procedure i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e balance can
stand?
Part 1
The s m a l l c l a i m s p r o c e d u r e makes no p r o v i s i o n for a
jury t r i a l . S e c t i o n 25-35-105(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t a
p a r t y may n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d by a n a t t o r n e y u n l e s s a l l
p a r t i e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by a n a t t o r n e y . S e c t i o n 25-35-
403 ( 2 ) , MCA, p r o h i b i t s a t r i a l d e novo i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
and provides t h a t a p p e a l s s h a l l be l i m i t e d t o q u e s t i o n s of
law.
The e f f e c t o f t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , above r e f e r r e d
t o , i s t o deny a j u r y t r i a l and t o deny c o u n s e l a t a l l
s t a g e s of t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g process.
The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n i s s i l e n t o n r i g h t t o c o u n s e l
i n c i v i l c a s e s , b u t n e a r l y a l l c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t such
r i g h t i s i m p l i c i t i n due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s . F o r example
see P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. v . S m a l l C l a i m s C o u r t ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 76
Cal.App.2d 379, 1 7 3 P.2d 38; F o s t e r v . Walus ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 8 1
I d a h o 452, 347 P.2d 120. W e h o l d t h a t i n Montana t h e r i g h t
t o counsel i s i m p l i c i t within c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees of
d u e p r o c e s s , and t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l must e x i s t a t some
s t a g e i n t h e proceeding.
The q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l must b e
a f f o r d e d i n a s m a l l c l a i m s c o u r t was s p e c i f i c a l l y t r e a t e d by
t h e I d a h o Supreme C o u r t i n F o s t e r v. Walus, s u p r a . The
Idaho small claims procedure, u n l i k e t h e p r e s e n t procedure
i n Montana, a f f o r d e d a t r i a l d e novo w i t h c o u n s e l on a p p e a l .
I n answering t h e argument t h a t counsel c o u l d n o t be denied
i n t h e s m a l l c l a i m s c o u r t , t h e I d a h o Supreme C o u r t s a i d :
"A p l a i n t i f f i n t h e s m a l l c l a i m s c o u r t , by knowingly
commencing h i s a c t i o n t h e r e i n c a n n o t t h e r e a f t e r ob-
j e c t t o t h e d e n i a l o f c o u n s e l ; and a d e f e n d a n t ( a s
was a p p e l l a n t ) may a v a i l h i m s e l f o f t h e r i g h t t o
a p p e a l t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a t r i a l d e novo w i t h
a s s i s t a n c e of counsel t h e r e i n . Such s a t i s f i e s t h e
due process requirement." 347 P.2d a t 125.
The same r e s u l t was r e a c h e d i n P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. o f
America v . S m a l l C l a i m s C o u r t , s u p r a .
S e c t i o n 25-35-403(2), MCA, provides: "There s h a l l n o t
b e a t r i a l d e novo i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The a p p e a l s h a l l
b e l i m i t e d t o q u e s t i o n s o f law. "
S u b s e c t i o n 2 , above q u o t e d , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e
it e f f e c t i v e l y d e n i e s counsel a t a l l l e v e l s of f a c t u a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The r i g h t t o c o u n s e l c a n b e d e n i e d i n t h e
s m a l l c l a i m s p r o c e d u r e , a s l o n g a s t h e r i g h t i s p r o t e c t e d on
appeal. S i n c e w e have s t r u c k t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a
t r i a l d e novo i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w e f i n d s e c t i o n 25-35-
1 0 5 ( 2 ) , MCA, t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , i f t h e unconstitutional
provision can be severed.
Part 2
The q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a j u r y t r i a l i s r e q u i r e d i n
s m a l l c l a i m s c o u r t , p r o v i d e s a more d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n .
A r t i c l e 2 , S e c t i o n 26, t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i d e s :
" T r i a l by j u r y . The r i g h t o f t r i a l by j u r y i s s e c u r e d t o a l l
and s h a l l r e m a i n i n v i o l a t e . . ." This Court has t h e r i g h t
t o i n t e r p r e t i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n i n a manner which g r a n t s
g r e a t e r r i g h t s than a r e secured under t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n .
However, i t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t s t o u p h o l d t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e enactments i f such can be accomplished
by r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n . F o s t e r v . Walus, s u p r a . W e hold
t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y i s s a t i s f i e d
i f it i s granted a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court l e v e l , though d e n i e d
a t t h e small claims level.
T h i s q u e s t i o n was a d d r e s s e d by t h e U . S . Supreme C o u r t
i n L i v i n g s t o n v . Moore ( 1 8 3 3 ) . 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 8 L.Ed.
751. A r t i c l e X I , Ch. I , C o n s t i t u t i o n o f P e n n s y l v a n i a a d o p t e d
i n 1776, provided "That i n c o n t r o v e r s i e s r e s p e c t i n g p r o p e r t y ,
a n d i n s u i t s between man and man, t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a r i g h t
t o t r i a l by j u r y . which o u g h t t o b e h e l d s a c r e d . " In the
C o n s t i t u t i o n of P e n n s y l v a n i a a d o p t e d i n 1 7 9 0 , A r t i c l e I X ,
s e c t i o n 6 , d e c l a r e d " T h a t t r i a l by j u r y s h a l l be a s h e r e t o f o r e ,
and t h e r i g h t t h e r e o f remain i n v i o l a t e . "
The s t a t u t e s o f P e n n s y l v a n i a , from 1 7 8 2 , r e q u i r e d a l l
a c c o u n t s between t h e s t a t e and i t s o f f i c e r s t o b e s e t t l e d by
t h e c o m p t r o l l e r g e n e r a l and a p p r o v e d by a n e x e c u t i v e c o u n s e l .
I f a b a l a n c e was found t o b e due t h e s t a t e , the comptroller
g e n e r a l was a u t h o r i z e d t o d i r e c t t h e c l e r k o f t h e c o u n t y
where t h e o f f i c e r r e s i d e d t o i s s u e summary p r o c e s s t o c o l l e c t
t h e amount due. I t was f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e p e r s o n
a g g r i e v e d by t h e p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o have a t r i a l
o f t h e f a c t s by a j u r y t h r o u g h a p p e a l i n g from t h e s e t t l e m e n t
o f t h e c o m p t r o l l e r g e n e r a l t o t h e Supreme C o u r t o f t h e
state. The law f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y
enter s u f f i c i e n t surety a s a prerequisite t o the prosecution
of s u c h a p p e a l . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s was
a t t a c k e d a s b e i n g i n d e r o g a t i o n o f t h e " r i g h t t o t r i a l by
j u r y " s e c u r e d by t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n re-
s o l v i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e U. S. Supreme C o u r t s a i d : "As t o
t h e s i x t h s e c t i o n of t h e Pennsylvania b i l l of r i g h t s , w e can
see n o t h i n g i n t h e s e l a w s on which t o f a s t e n i m p u t a t i o n o f
t h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t o f t r i a l by j u r y ; since, i n
creating the l i e n attached t o the s e t t l e d accounts, t h e
r i g h t of an appeal t o a jury i s secured t o t h e d e b t o r ; . .
." T h i s c a s e was c i t e d by a p p r o v a l i n C a p i t a l ~ r a c t i o nCo.
v . Hoff ( 1 8 9 8 ) , 174 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct. 580, 43 L.Ed. 873.
W e hold t h a t s e c t i o n 25-35-403(2), MCA, i s unconstitutional.
b e c a u s e i t e f f e c t i v e l y d e n i e s t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y a t a l l
levels. W e f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y , as
s e c u r e d by t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , r e m a i n s i n v i o l a t e i f p r o -
vided on a p p e a l t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court.
Part 3
Appellant f u r t h e r a t t a c k s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
s e c t i o n 25-35-201(2), MCA, which p r o v i d e s : "The j u s t i c e
s h a l l a s s i s t any c l a i m a n t i n p r e p a r i n g h i s c o m p l a i n t o r
i n s t r u c t h i s c l e r k t o provide such a s s i s t a n c e . . ." Appellant
c o n t e n d s t h a t h e i s d e n i e d due p r o c e s s o f law by v i r t u e o f
t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e a s s i s t i n g o n e of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e
litigation. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . By g u a r -
a n t e e i n g a t r i a l d e novo o n a p p e a l t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,
a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s w i l l be s a t i s f i e d .
Part 4
The r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e
small claims procedure, s e c t i o n 25-35-101, MCA, t h r o u g h 25-
35-406, MCA, e x c l u s i v e of s e c t i o n 2 5 - 3 5 - 4 0 3 ( 2 ) , MCA, can
stand. The p r o c e d u r e c o n t a i n s t h e f o l l o w i n g s e v e r a b i l i t y
clause: " I f a p a r t of t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d , a l l valid p a r t s
t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d p a r t r e m a i n i n e f f e c t .
I f a p a r t o f t h i s a c t i s i n v a l i d i n o n e o r more of i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p a r t remains i n e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i -
c a t i o n s t h a t a r e s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s . "
Ch. 5 7 3 , S e c t i o n 21, Laws o f Montana (1.977).
W e must f i n d t h e procedure c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i f (1) s e v e r -
a n c e l e a v e s a n o t h e r w i s e c o m p l e t e p r o c e d u r e , and ( 2 ) w e c a n
accomplish severance while honoring l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t a s t o
t h e b a l a n c e of t h e a c t .
S e c t i o n 25-35-303, MCA, provides t h a t a l l c i v i l actions
t r i e d i n s m a l l c l a i m s c o u r t must b e e l e c t r o n i c a l l y o r s t e n o -
g r a p h i c a l l y recorded. S e c t i o n 25-35-404, MCA, provides t h e
e n t i r e r e c o r d of proceedings i n t h e small claims c o u r t s h a l l
be transmitted t o t h e District Court, including t h e recording
o r t r a n s c r i p t r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 25-35-303, MCA. These
two s e c t i o n s , which c o n s t i t u t e t h e h e a r t o f t h e a p p e a l
procedure provided, contemplate an appeal l i m i t e d t o
q u e s t i o n s o f law. S i n c e w e have s t r u c k t h e p r o h i b i t i o n
a g a i n s t a t r i a l d e novo, t h e a p p e a l p r o c e d u r e which r e m a i n s
i s incompatible with t h e appeal procedure required.
We are not able to ascertain legislative intent. The
l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o p r o h i b i t a t r i a l d e novo, and t h e
appeal procedure provided i s t a i l o r e d t o a review of l e g a l
questions only. F o r example, no m e n t i o n i s made o f a bond
r e q u i r e m e n t on a p p e a l . Yet, i n a n a p p e a l from j u s t i c e c o u r t
t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t , where a t r i a l d e novo i s r e q u i r e d , a bond
must b e p o s t e d , s e c t i o n 25-33-201, MCA, t h r o u g h s e c t i o n 25-
33-207, MCA.
Because t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a t r i a l d e novo i s un-
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e a r e l e f t w i t h o u t a n a p p r o p r i a t e appeal-
procedure. For t h e r e a s o n s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , an appeal
m u s t b e made a v a i l a b l e w i t h a t r i a l d e novo i n D i s t r i c t
Court. We, therefore, f i n d t h a t w e c a n n o t sever t h e uncon-
s t i t u t i o n a l prohibition, s e c t i o n 25-35-403(2), and h a v e a
complete a c t . N e i t h e r a r e w e a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e what t h e
l e g i s l a t o r s ' i n t e n t on a n a p p e a l p r o c e d u r e would h a v e b e e n
had t h e y known o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a t r i a l
d e novo i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
W e hold t h e small claims procedure i n j u s t i c e c o u r t ,
s e c t i o n 25-35-101, MCA, t h r o u g h s e c t i o n 25-35-406, MCA,
i n c l u s i v e , t o b e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and v o i d .
F u r t h e r m o r e , w e h o l d t h a t a judgment o b t a i n e d u n d e r
t h i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t i s n o t v o i d and t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n -
a l i t y o f t h e a c t d o e s n o t d e p r i v e t h e judgment o f i t s e f f e c t .
C h i c o t County D r a i n a g e D i s t . v . B a x t e r S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 4 0 ) ~308
U.S. 371, 6 0 S . C t . 317, 84 L.Ed 329.
This opinion i s e f f e c t i v e a s t o the l i t i g a n t s i n t h i s
c a s e and e f f e c t i v e a s t o judgments becoming f i n a l a f t e r t h e
d a t e hereof.
Part 5
W remand t h i s c a s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h d i r e c -
e
t i o n s t o v a c a t e t h e judgment. P l a i n t i f f may r e f i l e i n any
c o u r t having j u r i s d i c t i o n .
W e concur:
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy specially concurring:
I concur that the act establishing a small claims court
division in the justice courts, Ch. 572, Laws of 1957 (Title
25, Ch. 35, MCA) is unconstitutional because it makes no
provision for a jury trial, contrary to 1972 Mont. Const.,
Art. 11, § 26.
I disagree with the foregoing opinion, authored by
Justice Morrison, however, when it concludes that it is
constitutionally permissible under our state constitution to
deny a jury trial at the small claims court level in the
justice court if a trial de novo is afforded on appeal in
the District Court.
An unwelcome result of the reasoning of the foregoing
opinion is that it holds constitutionally invalid a provision
which is normally perfectly valid, namely, that an appeal
from the justice court is not to be by trial de novo. There
is nothing constitutionally impermissible in a legislature
providing that appeals from a justice court shall be only
on questions of law. Himovitz v. Justice's Court (1926)
77 Cal.App. 95, 246 P. 82. It would not be necessary in the
foregoing opinion to hold such a provision invalid if we
decided that to provide a jury trial at the first stage of
the small claims court procedure is a constitutional require-
ment.
The foregoing opinion posits that if a litigant has a
right to a jury trial on appeal through a trial de novo, his
jury right is preserved. The fact remains, however, that
the litigant must first pass through a trial in the small
claims court without a jury before he can get to the appeal
stage. He would be given no right to a jury trial in the
first layer of of the decisional system. The state con-
stitution says that "[tlhe right of trial by jury is secure
to all and shall remain inviolate." 1972 Mont. Const., Art.
11, § 26. The foregoing opinion, by holding the litigant's
right to a jury trial in an appeal de novo setting preserves
the right inviolate, violates it. The litigant is in truth
denied a jury trial until his appeal. The state constitution
is not thereby obeyed.
T further disagree with the foregoing opinion that
the right to counsel in the small claims court can be con-
stitutionally denied, if the right to counsel is guarantied
on appeal in a de novo procedure.
The right to counsel is implicit in the constitutional
guaranties of due process, and I insist that the right to
counsel must exist in the small claims court under the
present statutory scheme.
The opinion foregoing relies on the Idaho case of
Foster v. Walus (1959), 81 Idaho 452, 347 P.2d 120, and upon
the California case of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims
Court (1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 379, 173 P.2d 38. California,
however, in later cases, has had to modify its position
somewhat with respect to the right to counsel. In Mendoza
v. Small Claims Court of Los Angeles J.D. (1958), 49 Cal.2d
668, 321 P.2d 9, it was held that the denial of right to
counsel in unlawful detainer actions in a small claims court
was invalid since under the provisions there, a tenant for
month to month could be deprived of the possession of his
property after a hearing where the tenant was not represented
by counsel. Additionally, in Brooks v. Small C1. Ct., Downey
J.D., Los Angeles Cty. (1973), 8 Cal.3d 661, 504 P.2d 12431
the California court held that the requirement in the small
claims court statutes of an undertaking on appeal from a
judgment in a small claims court constituted a taking of
property prior to a due process hearing with a right to
counsel.
With the later California cases in mind, I direct
attention to our section 25-35-406, MCA, in the small claims
court procedure. That statute provides:
"Execution of judgment. Proceedings to
enforce or collect a judgment are governed
by the laws relating to execution upon
justice's court judgments."
Under section 25-31-1101, et seq., and section:25-13-
501, et s e q . , ~ ~ , t hholder of a judgment in a small claims
e
court under the present statutory scheme can procure execution
on the judgment debtor's property. Since the judgment debt~r
has been denied the right to counsel in the small claims
court procedure, any such execution would constitute a
taking of his property and a denial of due process because
the judgment-debtor is not given an opportunity to have
counsel before his property is levied upon. There is no
provision for a stay of execution under our present small
claims court procedure.
Because a judgment debtor in a small claims court
procedure may have his property executed upon, and because
of the provision that in the small claims court the claimant
can have the assistance of the justice in framing his complaint,
(section 25-35-201(2), MCA.) I would hold that the denial
of right to counsel in the small claims court is an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of due process to the litigants.
The constitutional defect of no right to counsel could
not be cured by using the severability clause to uphold the
remainder of the act. When a court holds that a law may be
upheld by severing invalid provisions, the remainder of the
law may be sustained as valid only - - - complete -
if it is in
itself - capable - being executed - accordance with the
and of in --
legislative - -
intent. Gullickson v. Mitchell (1942), 113
Mont. 359, 126 P.2d llC6. Furthermore, the appellate court
must be able to say that after the elimination of the invalid
portions, the remainder of the act would have been enacted
by the legislature. State v. Holmes (1935), 100 Mont. 256,
47 P.2d 624. I am judicially out of shape for such a long
jump .
Therefore, I would hold that such an act is uncon-
stitutional unless it provides a jury trial in the first
instance and right to counsel to all parties at all stages.
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I agree that the small claims procedure set up in Title
25, Ch. 35, MCA, is unconstitutional, and that the sever-
ability clause will not save the substance of this act. In
enacting this act, the legislature ignored the constitutional
right to jury trial guaranteed by 1972 Mont. Const., Art.
11, 5 26. The majority, however, holds that it is sufficient
if a new small claims procedure act guarantees the right to
jury trial by an appeal to District Court and a second trial
held there. I part with the majority here becanse I believe
that the right to jury trial must be guaranteed in the court
of original jurisdiction--the court that first conducts a
trial on the merits. A fsir reading of Art. 11, § 26,
requires this interpretation.
The majority seizes on the first sentence of Art. 11, §
25, "[tlhe right of trial by jury is secured to all and
shall remain inviolatew--but ignores the remaining language
of this section. It is not enough to quote the first sentence,
for the remaining language of section 26 shows without
question that the right to jury trial is guaranteed in each
of the trial courts of this state.
The 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, 5 26 provides:
"Trial by jury. The right of trial by jury
is secured to all and shall remain inviolate.
But upon default of appearance or by consent
of the parties expressed in such manner as the
law may provide, all cases may be tried without
a j l y or before fewer than the number of jurors
:r
provided by law. In all civil actions, two-thirds
of the jury may render a verdict, and a verdict so
rendered shall have the same force and effect as if
all had concurred therein. In all criminal actions,
the verdict shall be unanimous."
This section does not distinguish between levels of trial
courts.
The meaning of this section, when read in its entirety,
is crystal clear. The explicit guarantee is set out in the
first sentence: "the right of trial by jury is secured to
all and shall remain inviolate." Ey the second sentence,
trials in - Montana trial courts can be by less than the
all
required number of jurors if the parties agree, or if a
party defaults. By the third sentence, trial of a civil
case in - trial courts of this state, required the agree-
all
ment of two-thirds of the jury in order to reach a verdict.
By the fourth and last sentence, trial of a criminal case
in - trial courts of this state requires the unanimous
all
agreement of the jury in order to reach a verdict.
I don't know what could be more clear. However,
reference to the 1889 constitutional provision guaranteeing
the right to jury trial, shows the intent of the framers in
transforming the 1889 constitutional provision to the 1972
provision. The 1889 Mont. Const., Art. 111, 5 2 3 , provides:
"The right of trial by jury shall be secured
to all, and remain inviolate, but in all civil
cases and in all criminal cases not amounting to
felony, upon default of appearance, or by consent
of the parties expressed in such manner as the
law may prescribe, a trial by jury may be waived,
or a trial had by any less number of jurors than
the number provided by law. A jury in a justice's
court, both in civil cases and in cases of
criminal misdemeanor, shall consist of not more
than six persons. In all civil actions and in all
criminal cases not amounting to felony, two-thirds
in number of the jury may render a verdict, and
such verdict so rendered shall have the same
force and effect as if all such jury concurred
therein. "
A careful comparison of the 1889 provision with the
1972 provision, shows that there are only two substantial
changes--the other changes are style and drafting changes.
First, under the 1889 Constitution, a defendant could not
felony
waive a jury trial in a/criminal case, but under the 1972
Constitation, a defendant by agreement of the parties, can
w ~ i v e jury trial.
a Second, under the 1889 Constitution in
nonfelony cases, only two-thirds of the jury need agree to
reach a binding verdict; but under the 1972 provision, in
all criminal cases the verdict must be unanimous.
The Convention Notes on the right to jury trial show
that these were the only changes contemplated by the delegates.
The note to section 26 states:
"Revises 1889 constitution [Art. 111, sec. 231
by permitting a defendant to waive a jury trial
in felony cases as well as civil and misdemeanor
cases and by requiring all jurors [rather than
2/31 agree before a defendant may be convicted
of a misdemeanor."
No one would argue that a person did not have a right
to a jury trial in justice court under the old constitution;
and no one should argue that a person does not have a right
to a jury in justice court, police court, or a small claims
court under the 1972 constitution. The right is there--it
is "secured to all and shall remain inviolate." A.
& 11, 5
26.
For reasons I don't understand, the majority cites,
without explanation, two United States Supreme Court decisions:
Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff (1898), 174 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct.
580, 589, 43 L.Ed. 873; and Livingston v. Moore (18331, 32
1 . . (7 Pet.) 469, 8 L.Ed. 751.
JS Neither case is applicable
to the question raised here.
In Livingston v. Moore, suprz, a Pennsylvania case, the
procedures in that state set up an administrative method for
settling of accounts between the state and its officers. No
trial was involved at all. Once the comptroller authorized
the clerk to issue summary process to collect the amount he
decided was due, any aggrieved state officer could immediately
cut off that process by appealing to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and demanding a jury trial. Therefore, the right of
jury trial was guaranteed the moment the administrative
proceedings were completed and the comptroller reached a
decision.
Another reason Livingston does not apply here is that
the court interpreted constitutional provisions wholly
unlike the provision - Montana.
in The constitutional provisions
actually involved in Pennsylvania, stated:
"In controversies respecting property, and
in suits between man and man, the parties
have a right to trial by jury, which ought
to be held sacred." Art. 22, Const. of
Penn. adopted in 1776.
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and
the right thereof remain inviolate." Sec.
6, Bill of Rights, Const. of Pznn. adopted
in 1790.
These provisions cannot be compared at all with Montana's
constitutional provision, Art. 11, 5 26. I see no reason
why Livingston has any bearing on interpreting our own
constitutional provision.
Nor does Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff, supra, have any
bearing on the issue raised here under our own constitution.
That case involved issues not even involved in this case.
The first issue was whether the trial procedure in the
District of Columbia violated the right to a jury trial as
provided for in the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The second issue was whether the right to
jury trial based on law existing before the District of
Columbia became a ward of the United States Government,
applies after the district became a ward. These issues are
totally irrelevant to an interpretation of our own constitu-
tional provision on jury trials.
It is clezir that in holding that the right to jury
trial under 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, 5 26 can be preserved
by providing for a jury trial at a second trial on appeal,
the majority has totally ignored the provisions of our
constitution. It is not enough to base a decision only on
the first sentence of Art. 11, § 26.
As I have already stated, the majority got ahead of
itself in holding that the first trial can take place without
a jury, but that a second trial with a jury must be guaranteed.
It also appears by implication in the majority opinion that
the right to counsel in a civil trial before a jury, must be
guaranteed, and that the absence of counsel amounts to a
denial of due process of law. I don't agree.
I emphasize first that I would require a jury trial to
be held in any small claims proceedings if either one of the
parties demanded a jury trial. I also believe there are
benefits to a jury trial in a small claims court if it is
conducted without benefit of counsel.
One of the main objectives of a small claims procedure
is to have speedy and inexpensive justice. Although this
concept is illusory at best, it is still an objective of
which we should not lose sight. The presence of counsel at
a trial often makes it less speedy, and surely makes it more
expensive.
A jury trial without benefit of counsel can reach the
equities of a case. One of the objectives of a small claims
court is to simplify pleadings, to do away with the technical
rule6 of evidence, and to generally get to the heart of the
issue in order to reach an equitable solution. This can be
done only if the small claims court is more a court of
equity than it is a court of law.
Although I have no empirical evidence to back my state-
ment, I don't think I am going astray in stating that most
people in this country do not want to entrust the fate of a
case to the hands of one person. Most people would feel far
better about their trial if it was a jury of their fellow
citizens deciding their case. People in this country are
naturally suspicious of entrusting their fate to one person.
If a jury, zather than a judge, decides a small claims case,
I believe that a party on the receiving end of an adverse
jury verdict, will more readily abide by the jury's decision.
If so, he is less likely to take an appeal and the litigation
will be ecded.
A small claims court judqe who genuinely wants to see
the case fairly submitted to a jury, will do his best to see
that the jury has the whole story. If the proceedings are
to be effective, the jury should be invited to participate
in the trial by asking questions and generally getting to
the bottom of the case so that the equities can be felt.
Once those equities are felt, I believe the collective
judgment of a jury is more likely to reach an equitable
result than is the judgment of one person. A jury is the
cross-section of the community and a jury is the conscience
of the community. A judge is not.
I do not say that a jury decision in a small claims
court should in all cases be irrevocably final. Perhaps
there should be an appeal process, and in that appeal process
it might be best to let counsel participate. Nor do I say
that a jury system as I recommend would not have its abuses;
there is no system yet devised by man that has not been
abused. But if abuses do occur, surely the existing legal
remedies could be fashione2 to reach the abuses. If the
abuses were frequent and wide-ranging, I have no doubt that
the legislature would be asked to convert the small claims
court into a court of law, with all the forinal procedures.
Under Art. 11, 5 26 of our constitution, the right to
jury trial in a small claims court is "inviolate." But
if we have the faith in the jury system as'we all say we do
(and I am a true believer), we should let it operate in a
small claims court differently than in a strict court of
law. The results may be good, or they may be bad, but we
should give it a chance, for any abuses can be corrected.
There are several unhealthy implications of a decision
that permits a jury trial only at a second trial, after there
on the
has already been a nonjury trial/ merits In the court below.
The realities are that in nany if not most of the trials, a
jury trial waiver would be the result. We should not bury our
heads in the sand.
The legislature cannot help but be aware that the district
courts, are, for the most part, overburdened with cases to
try--both criminal and civil. There is more than a probability
that a case appealed from a small claims court will not have
as good a chance of getting on the jury trial calendar as
are the criminal cases and civil cases filed directly in district
court. The case on appeal from the small claims court may
well languish at the district court level for a long period
of time before it is ever tried. Nor can it be denied that
district judges are most reluctant to call in juries to try
civil appeals coming to them from a lower court. A district
court judge undoubtedly will directly or indirectly pressure
counsel or the parties to waive a jury trial. It is not
unheard of that district judges have their own way of convi~cing
counsel that it is best to waive a jury trisl, and that
message inevitably gets back to the client. Only a strong-
willed client can prevail upon his lawyer and the trial
judge in his insistence on a jury trial. These are not
theories; they are the realities. If the right to a jury
trial is to mean anything, this is not the way it should
be.
Even if there was no pressure from district judges and
lawyers to waive a jury trial in an appeal from a small
claims court, the undeniable fact is that it would take a
long time to get to trial, whether the trial is by jury, or
whether the trial is waived and a judge hears the case. If
the general purpose of a small claims court is to be served,
it is best to have the full trial on the merits, before a
jury, in the small claims court.
We have today declared the small claims act to be
unconstitutional. If the legislature decides to again
create a small claims court, I would suggest that its members
closely read the 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, S 26. I think
they would agree that they must provide for a jury trial in
the small claims court. That section does not distinguish
between district court trials and lower court trials when
guaranteeing the right to jury trial. But the majority has
erroneously done so here.
/F"\
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l , d i s s e n t i n g :
I would d e c l a r e s e c t i o n 25-35-403 ( 2 ) , MCA p r o h i b i t i n g
t r i a l d e novo i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and r e s t r i c t i n g a p p e a l s t o
q u e s t i o n s o f law u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , s e v e r it f r o m t h e r e s t of t h e
Act, and d e c l a r e t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e A c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
Accordingly, I would v a c a t e t h e judgment and remand t h e case t o
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a t r i a l de novo.
I a g r e e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n on a l l p o i n t s s a v e o n e .
I p a r t company w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y i n i t s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e e n t i r e
A c t is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because t h e a p p e a l p r o c e d u r e which
r e m a i n s a£ t e r e x c i s i n g s e c t i o n 25-35-403 ( 2 ) , MCA, I' i s incom-
p a t i b l e with the appeal procedure required;" t h a t "we a r e u n a b l e
t o a s c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t " w i t h r e g a r d to t h e a p p e a l
p r o c e d u r e ; and t h e r e f o r e t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e A c t i s i n c o m p l e t e
a n d c a n n o t be s e v e r e d .
I n my v i e w , l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t is c l e a r and u n m i s t a k a b l e
from t h e language of t h e A c t :
" S e c t i o n 21. Severability. I f a p a r t of t h i s
a c t is i n v a l i d , a l l v a l i d p a r t s t h a t are
s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d - p a r t remain i n
effect. I f a p a r t of t h i s act is i n v a l i d i n one
o r more o f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h e p a r t r e m a i n s i n
e f f e c t i n a l l v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t are
s e v e r a b l e from t h e i n v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n s . " Laws
o f Montana ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Ch. 572, 5 21.
I f i n d no d i f f i c u l t y i n s e v e r i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t
t r i a l d e novo i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and l i m i t i n g t h e a p p e a l t o
q u e s t i o n s o f law f r o m t h e r e s t of t h e A c t . The small claims p r o -
c e d u r e on a p p e a l remains complete because t h e s t a t u t e s governing
a p p e a l s from t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p l y .
S e c t i o n 25-33-101 e t seq., MCA. These s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e a proce-
d u r e f o r t h e f i l i n g of a n a p p e a l ( s e c t i o n s 25-33-101 t o 25-33-104
i n c l u s i v e , MCA), f o r a n u n d e r t a k i n g and s t a y o f e x e c u t i o n o n
a p p e a l ( s e c t i o n s 25-33-201 t o 25-33-207 i n c l u s i v e , MCA) , for a
t r i a l d e novo i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( s e c t i o n 25-33-301, MCA)
and f o r t h e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on a p p e a l ( s e c t i o n
25-33-301 t o 25-33-306 i n c l u s i v e , MCA). The p r o v i s i o n s of t h e
small claims p r o c e d u r e , a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e , c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r o -
v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g a p p e a l s from j u s t i c e c o u r t to t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t , a g e n e r a l s t a t u t e , o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t of any i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .
Martel C o n s t r . I n c . v . G l e a s o n E q u i p . Inc. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 479,
4 8 3 , 534 P.2d 8 8 3 , 885. F i c k e s v. M i s s o u l a County ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5
Mont. 258, 272, 470 P.2d 287, 294. I t m i g h t be a r g u e d t h a t t h e
p r o v i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t a p e s or t r a n s c r i p t s of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t
p r o c e e d i n g s ( s e c t i o n 25-35-404 and 25-35-405, MCA) a r e incom-
p a t i b l e w i t h a t r i a l d e novo i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , b u t t h e i r u t i l i t y
f o r impeachment o f w i t n e s s e s i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and
d i s c o u r a g i n g a l t e r a t i o n of t e s t i m o n y i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t are
v a l i d o b j e c t i v e s and r e m a i n u n d i m i n i s h e d .
A s I see i t , t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e A c t would h a v e b e e n
e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a £ t e r e x c i s i n g t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p a r t by r e a s o n of t h e s e v e r a b i l i t y p r o v i s i o n i n t h e A c t i t s e l f ,
a n d i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s i n G u l l i c k s o n v.
M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 3 5 9 , 375, 1 2 6 P.2d 1 1 0 6 , 1 1 1 5 , and
C i t y o f M i s s o u l a v. H o l m e s ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 1 0 0 Mont. 256, 291, 4 7 P.2d
6 2 4 , 636.
L i k e w i s e , t h e p r o v i s i o n s on a p p e a l p r o v i d e a complete a p p e a l pro-
c e d u r e by i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g s t a t u t e s g o v e r n i n g a p p e a l s
from j u s t i c e c o u r t to D i s t r i c t Court. Viewed i n t h i s way, I find
t h e A c t c o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f and o n e which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e would
h a v e i n t e n d e d t o be i n e f f e c t e v e n w i t h o u t s e c t i o n 2 5 - 3 5 - 4 0 3 ( 2 ) ,
MCA.
For the foregoing reasons, I d i s s e n t from t h e m a j o r i t y
h o l d i n g t h a t t h e e n t i r e S m a l l C l a i m s C o u r t Act is
unconstitutional.
\
Chief J u s t i c e