State v. Close

No. 13522
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1980

THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ROBERT DEE CLOSE,
a/k/a BOBBY DEE CLOSE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowtone.
Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Terence M. Swift argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Sheri Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Charles Bradley argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings,
Montana

- -

Submitted: November 26, 1980
Decided: FEBgn?!#I

~iled: FEB 9 - 1981
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d on a j u r y

v e r d i c t i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone

County, Montana. On J u n e 3, 1976, t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t

g u i l t y of t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i m e s , a l l a r i s i n g o u t of one

incident: Count I , d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5-102,

MCA; Count 11, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , s e c t i o n 45-5-303, MCA;

and Count 111, r o b b e r y , s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA. On J u n e 1 0 ,

1976, t h e c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o one hundred y e a r s

p u r s u a n t t o t h e v e r d i c t i n Count I ; f o r t y y e a r s p u r s u a n t t o

Count 111; and d e a t h by hanging p u r s u a n t t o Count 11. In

a d d i t i o n , t h e s e n t e n c e s pronounced on Counts I and I11 were

o r d e r e d t o be s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y .

I n May 1979 t h i s C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o

r e s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t f o r h i s c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d -

napping (Count 11) f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o -

v i s i o n under t h a t s t a t u t e was found t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t complied and r e s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t , under

Count I1 o n l y , t o t h e t e r m of f i f t y y e a r s t o be s e r v e d

c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s s e n t e n c e s o f f o r t y y e a r s and

one hundred y e a r s .

On J u l y 7, 1974, a c a r n i v a l promoter named B i l l y J o e

H i l l d r o v e t o B i l l i n g s , Montana, i n a 1968 w h i t e - c o l o r e d ,

f o u r - d o o r C a d i l l a c sedan. A t t h e t i m e he was c a r r y i n g

between $1200 and $1400 i n c a s h .

H i l l was o b s e r v e d i n t h e Rainbow B a r from 9:30 a.m.

u n t i l 7:00 p.m. on J u l y 8, 1974, by Frank P i r t z , t h e owner

of t h e b a r . T h a t a f t e r n o o n he was o b s e r v e d w i t h s e v e r a l

I n d i a n s , a s h e e p h e r d e r and a younger, "cowboy-type" man.

H i l l k e p t f l a s h i n g a l a r g e r o l l of money and d i d s o t o such
a n e x t e n t t h a t P i r t z c a u t i o n e d him t o s t o p . H i l l l e f t the

Rainbow Bar by h i m s e l f a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:00 p.m. The

"cowboy-type" young man w i t h him a p p a r e n t l y had l e f t t h e

s a l o o n a b o u t 4:00 p.m.

Between 8:00 t o 9:00 p.m. on J u l y 8 , two men came i n t o

t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar. The b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e

o l d e r of t h e two men had on c r a n b e r r y - c o l o r e d t r o u s e r s and a

matching s h i r t . She i d e n t i f i e d a p i c t u r e of H i l l a s t h i s

man. The younger man's s h i r t was hanging o u t , h e looked

l i k e a cowboy and wore e i t h e r a b l a c k o r d a r k brown h a t .

The b a r t e n d e r i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t i n t h e courtroom a s t h e

younger man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e two men remained i n

t h e b a r f o r a b o u t two h o u r s and t h e n l e f t t o g e t h e r .

The b a r t e n d e r f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e younger man

made two t e l e p h o n e c a l l s w h i l e i n t h e b a r . The b a r t e n d e r

l a t e r f u r n i s h e d a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e younger man t o t h e

p o l i c e from which a composite drawing of t h e s u s p e c t e d

murderer w a s made by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r .

H i l l ' s c a r was o b s e r v e d by Deputy S h e r i f f Dean Mahlum

a t a b o u t 9:45 p.m. n e a r t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar w i t h two occu-

pants. Mahlum d e s c r i b e d t h e two o c c u p a n t s of t h e w h i t e

C a d i l l a c a s follows:

"The d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e was a p p r o x i m a t e l y
23 t o 24 y e a r s of a g e , 5 ' 1 0 " t o 5 ' 1 1 " t a l l ,
165 t o 170 pounds. H e was wearing a f e l t
t y p e cowboy h a t , e i t h e r d a r k brown o r b l a c k ,
t h e brim was r o l l e d i n on it. He had a l i g h t
c o l o r e d s h i r t which was unbuttoned down t h e
f r o n t and a l s o p u l l e d o u t o f h i s p a n t s . I
b e l i e v e he had on b l u e j e a n s and b o o t s . The
o t h e r s u b j e c t was a n o l d e r gentleman. I
d i d n ' t g e t a s good a l o o k a t t h i s gentleman.
H e had on a l i g h t c o l o r e d s h i r t , maroon p a n t s ,
b o o t s , and a l s o a w h i t e h a t , w e s t e r n t y p e . "

According t o t h e b a r t e n d e r , H i l l r e t u r n e d t o t h e S i l v e r

D o l l a r Bar a l o n e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:45 a.m. on J u l y 9. He
s t o o d a t t h e b a r and o r d e r e d a can of b e e r . He took o n l y
a b o u t t h r e e d r i n k s of t h e b e e r and walked o u t .

A t about 7:30 a.m. on J u l y 9 , R a n d a l l Groom d i s c o v e r e d

t h e body of a man l y i n g on t h e ground n e a r a w h i t e C a d i l l a c .

He walked c l o s e t o t h e body, t h e n g o t back i n t o h i s p i c k u p

and w e n t home where he c a l l e d t h e Yellowstone County s h e r i f f ' s

o f f i c e a t a b o u t 8:00 a.m. Groom w a i t e d a few m i n u t e s and

t h e n d r o v e back t o t h e s c e n e . When he a r r i v e d , a d e p u t y

s h e r i f f had a l r e a d y a r r i v e d .

The v i c t i m was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s B i l l y J o e H i l l . No

money was r e c o v e r e d from h i s p e r s o n a l p o s s e s s i o n .

R a n d a l l Groom t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i s c o v e r e d t h e body

w h i l e e x e r c i s i n g h i s dog. H e s t a t e d t h a t h e went t o t h i s

a r e a q u i t e o f t e n t o e x e r c i s e h i s dog, even though i t i s

a b o u t t h r e e m i l e s from h i s home. R a n d a l l Groom i s t h e

s t e p f a t h e r of Ed C l o s e , t h e S t a t e ' s main w i t n e s s . He ada-

mantly d e n i e d , however, t h a t h i s s t e p s o n had c a l l e d him t h a t

morning, even though Ed C l o s e l i v e d j u s t down t h e r o a d from

where t h e body was found. Groom s t a t e d t h a t i t was months

a f t e r t h e murder t h a t he f i r s t l e a r n e d t h a t h i s s t e p s o n knew

a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e crime. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s stepson's

knowledge of t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h i s o f f e n s e were f i r s t

d i s c o v e r e d by him a b o u t one month b e f o r e t r i a l .

An a u t o p s y was performed by D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s

pathologist. Dr. Cox t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d from
m u l t i p l e s e v e r e blows t o t h e head, b o t h f r o n t and back, w i t h

r e s u l t i n g b r a i n damage. H e t e s t i f i e d t h e wounds t o t h e

d e c e a s e d ' s head w e r e i n f l i c t e d , i n h i s o p i n i o n , by a l o n g ,

r e l a t i v e l y narrow, b l u n t o b j e c t .

Dr. Cox f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t from p h o t o g r a p h s , two of

which w e r e p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e d e c e a s e d ' s c a r t a k e n o u t s i d e
h i s p r e s e n c e , h e concluded t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was s i t t i n g i n

t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e o f t h e a u t o m o b i l e when t h e i n j u r i e s t o

t h e f r o n t o f t h e head w e r e i n f l i c t e d .

The t h r u s t of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e was t h a t B i l l y J o e H i l l

was robbed of t h e money h e was c a r r y i n g and l a t e r k i l l e d by

d e f e n d a n t , Bobby Dee C l o s e . The S t a t e ' s main w i t n e s s e s were

Ed C l o s e and h i s w i f e , J o y c e .

Ed C l o s e i s t h e s t e p s o n of R a n d a l l Groom and a c o u s i n

of d e f e n d a n t , The e s s e n c e of h i s t e s t i m o n y was t h a t he

a t t e n d e d a f a m i l y p i c n i c n e a r Big Timber, Montana, on J u l y

4, 1974. T h i s p i c n i c was a l s o a t t e n d e d by David C l o s e , t h e

second d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s m a t t e r and t h e u n c l e of Ed C l o s e

and t h e d e f e n d a n t , Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h i s p i c n i c , David

C l o s e used a p i c k t o a s s i s t a v e h i c l e a c r o s s a d r y c r e e k bed

and broke t h e h a n d l e n e a r t h e p i c k head. After breaking t h e

p i c k h a n d l e , David t o s s e d i t i n t o t h e back of a p i c k u p owned

and d r i v e n by Ed. Defendant Bobby C l o s e d i d n o t a t t e n d

t h i s picnic.

Upon r e t u r n i n g t o B i l l i n g s a f t e r t h e p i c n i c , Ed d r o v e

t o D a v i d ' s house and unloaded D a v i d ' s b e l o n g i n g s . Ed could

n o t remember i f t h e broken p i c k h a n d l e w a s unloaded a t

D a v i d ' s house; however, h e found t h e m e t a l p i c k head i n h i s

p i c k u p when he g o t home. H e removed i t from t h e t r u c k and

p u t i t i n a box of junk i n h i s g a r a g e . The p i c k head w a s

l a t e r d e l i v e r e d t o a u t h o r i t i e s i n F e b r u a r y 1976.

Ed C l o s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had c e r t a i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s

w i t h d e f e n d a n t r e g a r d i n g t h e d e a t h of H i l l . The f i r s t such

c o n v e r s a t i o n o c c u r r e d a t h i s house when d e f e n d a n t t o l d Ed

and h i s w i f e J o y c e a s f o l l o w s :

"A. Well, he t o l d m e t h a t he r u n a c r o s s t h i s
guy on t h e s o u t h s i d e , h e had a l o t of money,
throwing i t a r o u n d , buying everybody d r i n k s ,
 and t h a t h e had d e v i s e d some k i n d of a p l a n
w i t h Uncle Dave t o g e t h i s money. And t h e y ,
Bobby and t h e man, went t o d i f f e r e n t b a r s
around town d r i n k i n g and t h e y wound up down
by t h e r i v e r and t h a t Uncle Dave was t h e r e
and Uncle Dave g i v e him t h i s c l u b and s a y s ,
'Here, Bobby, t h i s i s your t r i c k , you do i t . '
Bobby t o l d m e h e h i t t h e man once and t h e man
woke up and wanted t o know what was g o i n g on
and Bobby g o t s c a r e d , Uncle Dave took t h e
c l u b and f i n i s h e d i t .

"Q. Did h e , and r e f e r r i n g t o M r . H i l l , d i d
he u s e any name o r job o c c u p a t i o n ? A . I
t h i n k he t a l k e d a b o u t him a s a c a r n i v a l
worker. "

Ed went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t a t a s u b s e q u e n t c o n v e r s a t i o n

d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d , " t h e y would n e v e r f i n d i t , " meaning t h e

c l u b which w a s used a s a murder weapon.

A second c o n v e r s a t i o n took p l a c e a t David C l o s e ' s

b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , 1974. Ed t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e

b i r t h d a y p a r t y a t D a v i d ' s home t h e c l u b was mentioned a g a i n .

According t o Ed C l o s e :

"A. W e l l , Bobby had q u i t e a b i t t o d r i n k and
h e had been o u t s i d e and he come i n w i t h a , I
d o n ' t know, a jug o r a b o t t l e of some k i n d and
b r o k e i t o v e r t h e t a b l e . Of c o u r s e g l a s s f l e w
e v e r y d i r e c t i o n and t h e w i f e and Sharon were
t r y i n g t o c l e a n i t up and Uncle Dave g o t mad
and went i n t h e bedroom and come o u t w i t h t h i s
p i e c e o f a c l u b and shook i t a t Bobby and asked
him i f he would l i k e some of t h i s ?

"Q. He a s k e d him i f h e would l i k e some of t h a t ,
and what d i d Bobby D e e s a y o r do? A . I don't
t h i n k Bobby s a i d a n y t h i n g . "

Ed C l o s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he managed t o g e t t h e c l u b from

David and took i t home w i t h him. H e burned i t t h e n e x t

morning b e c a u s e h e s u s p e c t e d t h a t i t w a s t h e c l u b used i n
t h e murder. A t t r i a l he compared t h e c l u b he took from

David t o two p i c k h a n d l e s , i n t r o d u c e d f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e

p u r p o s e s o n l y , and s t a t e d t h e y w e r e s i m i l a r e x c e p t t h e one

t a k e n from David was o l d e r and w e a t h e r b e a t e n .
 On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , Ed C l o s e a d m i t t e d t h a t he was

f i r s t i n t e r r o g a t e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s d u r i n g t h e

summer of 1974 and t o l d O f f i c e r S k i l l e n he knew n o t h i n g o f

the c r i m e . L a t e r , Ed was p u t under o a t h and sworn s t a t e -

ments w e r e g i v e n t o t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y .

J o y c e C l o s e , E d ' s w i f e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was f i r s t

q u e s t i o n e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t p e r s o n n e l i n F e b r u a r y 1976.

A t f i r s t , J o y c e d e n i e d s h e had any knowledge of t h e c r i m e

and s h e was q u e s t i o n e d s e p a r a t e l y from h e r husband. She was

l a t e r p l a c e d under o a t h and gave t h e s t a t e m e n t i n c r i m i n a t i n g

defendant.

J o y c e d e s c r i b e d t h e p i c n i c on t h e 4 t h of J u l y and h e r

o b s e r v a t i o n of a p i c k and p i c k h a n d l e . She a l s o t e s t i f i e d

t h a t s h e had a t t e n d e d t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , and

t h a t a c o n v e r s a t i o n , p r i o r t o t h e p a r t y , had o c c u r r e d . She

s t a t e d i n d e t a i l what w a s s a i d by d e f e n d a n t d u r i n g t h e

conversation a t t r i a l :

"Q. What d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t , Bobby Dee C l o s e , s a y
t o you a t t h a t time? A. He s a i d h e w a s i n t h e
S t a n d a r d Bar d r i n k i n g , and h e had r u n a c r o s s t h i s
man t h a t w a s a l s o i n t h e S t a n d a r d , and t h i s man
had a l o t of money, h e was buying t h e b a r d r i n k s .
I n f a c t he had a r o l l of money t h a t h e threw a t
a p r o s t i t u t e down t h e r e i n t h e S t a n d a r d . She
p i c k e d i t up and threw i t back a t him and s a i d
t h a t money i s g o i n g t o g e t your t h r o a t c u t . And
Bobby s a i d t h a t h e went t o t h e phone, c a l l e d h i s
u n c l e , David C l o s e , and t h a t h e had went w i t h
t h i s man t o a c o u p l e o t h e r b a r s , t h e C r y s t a l , I
b e l i e v e he mentioned, and t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r , and
t h e n went on o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s . When h e
w a s o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s , Dave was t h e r e .
Bobby h i t t h e man o v e r t h e e y e and t h e man woke
up, p u t h i s hands up l i k e , 'What's g o i n g o n ? '
and Bobby g o t s c a r e d and t h a t was when h i s u n c l e
took o v e r , Dave. W e l l , b e f o r e t h a t , when h e
went o u t t o t h e g r a v e l p i t s and Dave was t h e r e ,
Dave handed him a c l u b and s a i d , 'Bobby, t h i s
i s your t r i c k , do your t h i n g . ' And t h a t ' s when
Bobby h i t him o v e r t h e eye and t h e man had woke
up and t r i e d t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f and t h e n Bobby
g o t s c a r e d and t h a t ' s when Dave took o v e r .
 "Q. But h e d i d s a y he s t r u c k t h e man, r i g h t ?
A. Yes, h e h i t him o v e r t h e eye.

"Q. Did h e t e l l you how many t i m e s h e s t r u c k
him o v e r t h e eye? A. One t i m e . "

J o y c e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a n argument developed a t

t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y between David C l o s e and d e f e n d a n t .

During t h e argument David went i n t o t h e bedroom and came

back w i t h a c l u b , h e l d i t up, shook i t a t d e f e n d a n t , and

s a i d , "Do you want some of t h i s t o o ? " D a v i d ' s w i f e t o l d Ed

t o g e t t h e c l u b and do something w i t h it. Ed g o t t h e c l u b ,

t o o k i t o u t s i d e and p u t i t i n h i s p i c k u p t r u c k .

J o y c e went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t d e f e n d a n t a t t h e f i r s t

c o n v e r s a t i o n t o l d h e r t h a t David C l o s e had h i t t h e v i c t i m i n

t h e back of t h e head when h e " t o o k o v e r . "

Expert witnesses t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t defendant's

f i n g e r p r i n t s were found b o t h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e v i c t i m ' s

car. One of them, a p r i n t of d e f e n d a n t ' s l e f t thumb, was

found on t h e i n s i d e r e a r of t h e l e f t r e a r d o o r window o f t h e

victim's car. One of t h e f i n g e r p r i n t e x p e r t s t e s t i f i e d on

r e b u t t a l t h a t t h e p r i n t was of t h e i n s i d e o f t h e l e f t

thumb, toward t h e f i n g e r s . (Defendant i s l e f t handed.) The

d o o r on which t h a t p r i n t a p p e a r e d was p a r t i a l l y u n l a t c h e d

when t h e v i c t i m ' s body w a s found.

There w a s a l s o t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e -

ments t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s b e f o r e h e became a

s u s p e c t i n t h e case. About s i x weeks a f t e r t h e c r i m e , on

August 2 6 , 1974, h e spoke w i t h O f f i c e r S k i l l e n , who t e s t i -

fied:

"He s a i d t h a t h e had been i n t h e b a r s on t h e
s o u t h s i d e , h e t h o u g h t t h a t h e had s e e n t h e
person described a s t h e victim. H e mentioned
s e e i n g t h e v i c t i m w i t h a man w i t h a b e a r d and
h e s a i d t h e l a s t t i m e he saw him h e was i n t h e
company of some c o l o r e d p e o p l e . "
~ f t e h i s a r r e s t on F e b r u a r y 2 7 , 1976, d e f e n d a n t t o l d t h e
r

a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t h e had l e f t H i l l i n h i s c a r on t h e n i g h t of

t h e crime.

Defendant w a s t h e o n l y d e f e n s e w i t n e s s . He t e s t i f i e d

t h a t he had met H i l l f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a t a b o u t 3:00 o r

4:00 p.m., on J u l y 8 , 1974, i n t h e Rainbow Bar. Defendant

remained t h e r e f o r a b o u t t h i r t y - f i v e t o f o r t y minutes.

Defendant m e t H i l l a g a i n some t i m e l a t e r t h a t e v e n i n g i n a

b a r n e a r t h e Greyhound Bus Depot. H i l l came i n w i t h two

o t h e r men sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. H i l l remained

a t t h i s b a r f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y an h o u r , a p p a r e n t l y d r i n k i n g

b e e r and p l a y i n g p o o l . H i l l and d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h i s b a r

t o g e t h e r and went t o s e v e r a l o t h e r b a r s on t h e s o u t h s i d e of

Billings. They d r o v e t o t h e s e b a r s i n t h e d e c e a s e d ' s a u t o -

m o b i l e , w i t h d e f e n d a n t d r i v i n g and H i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e f r o n t

passenger s e a t . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t H i l l c o u l d walk,

b u t he was i n t o x i c a t e d .

According t o d e f e n d a n t t h e y remained a t t h e S t a n d a r d

Bar f o r two and one-half t o t h r e e hours. Defendant and H i l l

l e f t t h e S t a n d a r d Bar and d r o v e i n t h e d e c e a s e d ' s a u t o m o b i l e

t o the S i l v e r Dollar B a r . Defendant a g a i n d r o v e w i t h H i l l

s t i l l occupying t h e r i g h t f r o n t s e a t . The d e c e a s e d was a b l e

t o g e t i n t o t h e c a r by h i m s e l f .

They parked H i l l ' s c a r n e a r t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r Bar and

d r a n k b e e r t h e r e f o r one t o two h o u r s . A t this time, defen-

d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he ( d e f e n d a n t ) was " p r e t t y i n t o x i c a t e d . I'

When t h e y l e f t t h e S i l v e r D o l l a r B a r , d e f e n d a n t h e l p e d H i l l

i n t o h i s c a r by p l a c i n g him i n t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e . Defen-

d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s w a s t h e l a s t t i m e h e saw H i l l , who

a p p a r e n t l y had p a s s e d o u t i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of h i s c a r .
Defendant s t a t e d he d i d n o t d r i v e t o t h e g r a v e l p i t area

where H i l l ' s body was found and he d i d n o t r o b o r s t r i k e t h e

deceased.

Defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d i d n o t a t t e n d t h e 4 t h

of J u l y p i c n i c ; t h a t h e n e v e r saw a p i c k h a n d l e s u c h a s t h e

one t h a t was d e m o n s t r a t e d i n t h e courtroom. H e d e n i e d Ed

and J o y c e C l o s e ' s t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t s which

t h e y a l l e g e d he had made t o them r e g a r d i n g t h e homicide. He

d i d a d m i t a t t e n d i n g t h e b i r t h d a y p a r t y on J u l y 1 2 , 1974, and

f i g h t i n g w i t h h i s Uncle David. He s t a t e d t h a t David C l o s e

had t h r e a t e n e d him w i t h a h a n d l e from a bathroom p l u n g e r .

Claim f o r M i s t r i a l

The f i r s t i s s u e d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s i s whether t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n f i n d i n g t h a t a m i s t r i a l

was n o t m a n i f e s t l y n e c e s s a r y when a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s

f l a s h e d p h o t o g r a p h s b e f o r e t h e j u r y which were l a t e r n o t

admitted .
The S t a t e ' s f i r s t w i t n e s s was D r . Gordon Cox, a B i l l i n g s

pathologist. Dr. Cox performed t h e a u t o p s y on H i l l and

t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c a u s e of d e a t h . The S t a t e moved t o have

c e r t a i n p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e body a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e

d u r i n g D r . Cox's t e s t i m o n y , and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l v o i r d i r e d .

On v o i r d i r e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e S t a t e a s k e d D r . Cox t o

i d e n t i f y f o r t h e r e c o r d t h o s e p h o t o s which would a s s i s t t h e

j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y and f i n d i n g s . The p a t h o -

l o g i s t r e p l i e d , " [ t l h i s one I t h i n k , d e f i n i t e l y , " a t which

p o i n t defendant's counsel objected, s t a t i n g , ". . . I move

f o r m i s t r i a l on b e h a l f of t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r t h e s e p i c t u r e s

have been r e p e a t e d l y f l a s h e d b e f o r e t h e e y e s of t h e j u r y . . ."
The c o u r t o v e r r u l e d - t h i s motion and c o n t i n u e d t h e t r i a l .
 The c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d t h e motion f o r m i s t r i a l .

The t e s t f o r d e c l a r i n g a m i s t r i a l was s t a t e d by t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . P e r e z ( 1 8 2 4 ) , 22

U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580:

". . . t h e law h a s i n v e s t e d C o u r t s of j u s t i c e
w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d i s c h a r g e a j u r y from
g i v i n g any v e r d i c t , whenever, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n ,
taking a l l t h e circumstances i n t o consideration,
there i s a manifest necessity f o r the a c t , o r
t h e e n d s o f p u b l i c j u s t i c e would o t h e r w i s e be
defeated. They a r e t o e x e r c i s e a sound d i s c r e -
t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t ; and i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o
d e f i n e a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , which would r e n d e r
i t p r o p e r t o i n t e r f e r e . To be s u r e , t h e power
o u g h t t o be used w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t c a u t i o n ,
under u r g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and f o r v e r y p l a i n
and o b v i o u s c a u s e s ; . . ."
The t r i a l c o u r t judge i s i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o

d e t e r m i n e w i t h c e r t a i n t y whether t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s h a n d l i n g

of t h e e x h i b i t a c t u a l l y exposed i t t o t h e j u r y i n s u c h a

manner a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . Our f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l i s

t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n

i n not granting a mistrial. United S t a t e s v . J o r n ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,

4 0 0 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , having o b s e r v e d t h e e v e n t and t h e

r e a c t i o n of t h e j u r o r s , and b e i n g t h e judge most f a m i l i a r

w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e and t h e background of t h e c a s e ". . . i s
f a r more ' c o n v e r s a n t w i t h t h e f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r -

m i n a t i o n ' t h a n any r e v i e w i n g c o u r t c a n p o s s i b l y b e . "

Arizona v. Washington ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 4 3 4 U.S. 497, 514, 98 S.Ct.

P r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r was n o t shown. The p h o t o g r a p h s

i n v o l v e d a r e n o t l a r g e blow-ups; t h e y a r e normal s n a p s h o t s .

I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t s u c h b r i e f e x p o s u r e t o such s m a l l photo-

g r a p h s i n t h e hands of a w i t n e s s on t h e s t a n d c o u l d have

s u c h a n i m p a c t as t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l . A l s o , t h e photo-

g r a p h s a t i s s u e a r e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e
which w e r e a d m i t t e d . Furthermore, The judge gave t h e j u r y

appropriate cautionary instructions. See Arizona v . Washington,

supra.

There was no m a n i f e s t n e c e s s i t y t o o r d e r a m i s t r i a l ,

and t h e e n d s of p u b l i c j u s t i c e w e r e n o t d e f e a t e d by c a r r y i n g

the t r i a l t o a f i n a l verdict. W e f i n d no e r r o r .

E x p e r t Testimony

Next d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s

d i s c r e t i o n i n o v e r r u l i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t e s t i m o n y of t h e

p a t h o l o g i s t e x p r e s s i n g h i s o p i n i o n a s t o how t h e f a t a l blows

were a p p l i e d . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t

s u s t a i n i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n because t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s conclu-

s i o n was based on p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n o f t h e a u t o m o b i l e o u t -

s i d e t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s presence.

"This Court i s n o t obligated t o r e f u t e a l l . . . al-
l e g e d e r r o r s where t h e e r r o r s a r e b a l d a s s e r t i o n s , a b s e n t

any s p e c i f i c argument o r a u t h o r i t y . . ." McGuinn v . S t a t e

( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 215, 581 P.2d 417, 420, 35 St.Rep. 871.

Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., states:

"If scientific, technical, o r other specialized
knowledge w i l l a s s i s t t h e trier of f a c t t o
understand t h e evidence o r t o determine a f a c t
i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d a s a n e x p e r t by
knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r
e d u c a t i o n may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e form of
an opinion o r otherwise."

". . . The competency of a w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y a s a n e x p e r t

i s a question f o r the t r i a l court's discretion. . ." State

v . P a u l s o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339, 342-343.

The c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n .

A m e d i c a l d o c t o r h a s s p e c i a l knowledge r e g a r d i n g anatomy and

i n j u r i e s t o t h e human body t h a t q u a l i f i e s him o r h e r t o g i v e

a n o p i n i o n a s t o t h e c a u s e of t h e i n j u r i e s . S t a t e v . Camp-

b e l l (1965) , 146 Mont. 251, 405 P . 2d 978.
 Dr. Cox was exceptionally qualified to give such an
opinion. He was a pathologist, a specialist in the study of
cause of death. In twelve years as a pathologist, he had
performed about 600 autopsies, surgical procedures conducted
primarily to determine the cause of death. He had the
knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to
qualify him to express an opinion as to how the fatal blows
were inflicted on the victim from his actual observations,
photographs and other tests.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the pathologist to testify and express his opinion.

Witness Identification
The bartender at the Silver Dollar Bar testified on
behalf of the State. She stated that the victim and defen-
dant had spent a couple of hours in the bar on the evening
of the victim's death. Defendant objects, for the first
time on appeal, to the witness's in-court identification of
him.
Defendant's failure to object at trial precludes him
from now predicating error on the admission of this evidence.
Rule 103 (a)(1), Mont.R.Evid. ; State v. Sullivan (1979),
Mont. , 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. Further, upon
complete review of the record we find no plain error that
substantially affected the rights of defendant.

Counsel Misconduct During Trial
While cross-examining a prosecution witness, defense
counsel pursued the following line of questioning which
resulted in a colloquy between counsel:
 "Q. I don't ask this question in a critical vein,
Mr. Close, but you have been drinking before you
came here to testify this morning, isn't that
correct? A. No.
"Q. You haven't had a drink this morning? A.
Nothing other than coffee.
"Q. Would you care to walk over in front of the
Jurors and allow them to smell your breath? A.
Yes.
"Q. Would you do that please?
" (Witness complying.)
"Q. Would you breathe out in the presence of the
Jurors? A. Yes, I did.
"Q. Would you also go down by this end of the
jury box and breathe to the man sitting in the
end of the jury box?
"MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I am going to object
to this demonstration.
"THE COURT: Sustained.
"MR. WHALEN: In view of the answer, it goes to
the credibility of the witness and should be
allowed.
"MR. BRADLEY: Have you been drinking this
morning, Mr. Whalen?
"MR. WHALEN: I haven't, Mr. Bradley.

"MR. BRADLEY: Would you mind going up and
breathing to the Jury?
"MR. WHALEN: I will be glad to do so.
"THE COURT: Now, let's desist.
"MR. WHALEN: I have no further questions."
Defendant raises the issue of whether the District
Court properly handled this exchange, and, if there was any
irregularity, whether it affected defendant's substantial
rights.
Defendant contends the court erred in not cautioning
the jury with respect to alleged prejudicial comments of the
prosecuting attorney. He argues that this exchange of words
tended to reflect improperly upon defense counsel, his
methods, tact and procedure. This, in turn, inured to the
detriment of defendant. We disagree.
The prosecutor's questions were totally unrelated to
the defendant's guilt. They were merely a reaction to
defense counsel's persistent line of questioning and were
asked to demonstrate that defense counsel's questions could
have been personally humiliating to the witness. ". .. It
has generally been held that an appellant may not predicate
error upon the prosecuting attorney's actions where such was
induced or provoked by the appellant's counsel. . ." State
v. Gall (1959), 135 Mont. 131, 134, 337 P.2d 932.
Further, defense counsel failed to offer an appropriate
cautionary instruction as required by section 46-16-401(4)(a),
MCA, and the general instructions given to the jury were
sufficient to cure any possible prejudice.
The trial court properly handled the situation by
simply ending the exchange. Any irregularity in this event

did not affect defendant's substantial rights and must be
disregarded.

Chain - Evidence Rule
of
Defendant contends the District Court erred in admitting

into evidence fingerprints and fingerprint testimony which
allegedly was not secure from alteration or tampering prior
to and during the trial.
Defendant contends his conviction should be reversed
because there "could have been" a master key that "could
have been" used to obtain access to fingerprint evidence
that was locked in the desk of a deputy sheriff. He argues

the State failed to establish that the evidence had not been
tampered with.
 The general rule concerning chain of evidence founda-
tion is this:
"The State must identify the particular exhibit
as relevant to the criminal charge and must show
prima facie that no alteration or tampering with
the exhibit has occurred ... Once that has
been done, the burden - proving alteration
of
shifts - appellant.
to . ."State v. Burtchett
(1974), 165 Mont. 280, 28U, 530 P.2d 471, 475.
(Emphasis added.)
Burtchett is analogous to this case. There, the defen-
dant argued on appeal that the fact that several people had
access to a forensic laboratory destroyed the custodial
chain. This Court rejected that argument, finding the
testimony of one of the chemists in the lab, to the effect
that the evidence had been kept in the evidence room of the
lab, was sufficient to establish the state's prima facie
case. Similarly, in the present case, the deputy sheriff's
testimony was sufficient to meet the prima facie test, as
the record indicates. The burden shifted to defendant, who
failed to show in any respect that the evidence was altered
or tampered. No error.

Exclusion - Witnesses -- Courtroom
of from the
Defendant argues the District Court erred in allowing a
police officer to testify as a rebuttal witness after the
same police officer violated a rule excluding witnesses from
the courtroom and heard defendant's testimony.
Rebuttal witnesses are not within the rule governing
exclusion of sworn witnesses from the courtroom during
taking of testimony. Sutterfield v. State (Okl. 1971), 489

Demonstrative Evidence
Defendant contends the District Court abused its discre-

tion in permitting the admission of demonstrative evidence
into the trial.
-16-
 The S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d s i x i t e m s f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e pur-

p o s e s o n l y : two p i e c e s of a wooden h a n d l e and p a r t s o f a n

automobile--a c a r d o o r , a s t e e r i n g wheel on a d r i v e s h a f t , a

d o o r knob on t h e c a r d o o r , and a g e a r s h i f t knob on t h e

s t e e r i n g wheel.

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d (1) i n

a l l o w i n g t h e s e e x h i b i t s t o be a d m i t t e d ; (2) i n failing to

give a cautionary jury i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h i s evidence w a s

f o r d e m o n s t r a t i v e p u r p o s e s o n l y ; and ( 3 ) i n f a i l i n g t o

f u r t h e r p o i n t o u t i n d e t a i l a l l changes between t h e e x h i b i t s

and t h e o r i g i n a l i t e m s .

"Generally, allowing demonstrative evidence i s within

t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge, and i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i e w

o n l y upon a showing of a m a n i f e s t a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . . ."
Brown v . North Am. Mfg. Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d

711, 722.
An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s case shows no

a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . The t e s t i m o n y of w i t n e s s e s and com-

ments of b o t h a t t o r n e y s and t h e t r i a l judge made clear t o

t h e j u r y t h a t t h e i t e m s a d m i t t e d were d e m o n s t r a t i v e o n l y and

w e r e n o t t h e a c t u a l i t e m s used i n t h e commission of t h e
crime .
F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d no c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n

concerning t h e demonstrative evidence. H e cannot c l a i m

e r r o r on a p p e a l b e c a u s e none was g i v e n . See s e c t i o n 46-16-

4 0 1 ( 4 ) ( a ) , MCA. W e f i n d no e r r o r .

D o c t r i n e - Cumulative E r r o r
of
Defendant a l l e g e s s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s were committed by

t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and p r o c e -
dure during the t r i a l . These e r r o r s - t o t a l c o n s t i t u t e
in

c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r and have s e r i o u s l y p r e j u d i c e d d e f e n d a n t ,
according t o defendant.
 The " d o c t r i n e of c u m u l a t i v e e r r o r " e x i s t s i n Montana.

Cumulative e r r o r r e f e r s t o a number of e r r o r s which p r e j u -

dice defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v . McKenzie

( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759.

A f t e r a complete r e v i e w of t h e r e c o r d and a p p l y i n g t h e

d o c t r i n e , w e f i n d h e r e no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r a f f e c t i n g t h e

s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of d e f e n d a n t .

Merger - F e l o n i e s
of

Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r a g g r a -

v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and r o b b e r y must be v a c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e s e

o f f e n s e s w e r e merged f o r p u r p o s e s of punishment w i t h t h e

f e l o n y murder o f f e n s e . T h i s merger, t h e r e f o r e , v i o l a t e s t h e

d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e . W e f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n d e f e n -

d a n t ' s argument. The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s merely one of

statutory interpretation.

The d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t b o t h mul-

t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s and m u l t i p l e punishments imposed a t a

s i n g l e p r o s e c u t i o n f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . See North C a r o l i n a

v . P e a r c e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d

656. The t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e same

o f f e n s e d i f f e r s depending on whether t h e c a s e i n v o l v e s

m u l t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s o r m u l t i p l e punishments imposed a t a

s i n g l e prosecution. The s t a n d a r d i s b r o a d e r i n c a s e s i n v o l v -

ing multiple prosecutions. Two s t a t u t o r y crimes t h a t con-

s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r p u r p o s e s of m u l t i p l e p r o s e -

c u t i o n s do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r

p u r p o s e s of m u l t i p l e punishments. See Brown v . Ohio ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,

432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2 2 2 1 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187.

I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t was t r i e d a t a s i n g l e

p r o s e c u t i o n f o r a l l t h e s t a t u t o r y crimes i n q u e s t i o n . The
i s s u e , t h e n , i s n o t one o f m u l t i p l e p r o s e c u t i o n s b u t of mul-

t i p l e punishments. The i s s u e i s w h e t h e r , under Montana's

s t a t u t o r y scheme, a d e f e n d a n t may be p u n i s h e d f o r b o t h

f e l o n y homicide and t h e u n d e r l y i n g f e l o n y . The r e l e v a n t

crimes and s t a t u t e s a r e d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e c t i o n 45-5-

102, MCA; r o b b e r y , s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA; aggravated kid-

napping, s e c t i o n 45-5-303, MCA; and s e c t i o n s 46-11-501 and

-502, MCA, m u l . t i p l e c h a r g e s and p r o s e c u t i o n s s t a t u t e s .

A t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g whether two s t a t u -

t o r y c r i m e s c o n s t i t u t e " t h e same o f f e n s e " f o r p u r p o s e s of

m u l t i p l e punishments was s e t f o r t h i n Blockburger v. U n i t e d

S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.

". . . The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t where t h e
same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a -
t i o n of two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e
t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e
a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y one, i s whether e a c h
p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s proof o f a f a c t which t h e
o t h e r does not. . ."
I n Whalen v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct.

1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c l a r i -

f i e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s r u l e . The r u l e i s n o t always

d i s p o s i t i v e on q u e s t i o n s o f d o u b l e jeopardy f o r p u r p o s e s o f

m u l t i p l e punishments. The d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n i s whether

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e f o r m u l t i p l e punishments.

The Blockburger t e s t i s merely one r u l e of s t a t u t o r y con-

s t r u c t i o n t o a i d i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t .

The u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s one of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t .

Whalen, s u p r a . The d o u b l e jeopardy c l a u s e ". . . serves

p r i n c i p a l l y a s a r e s t r a i n t on c o u r t s and p r o s e c u t o r s . The

l e g i s l a t u r e remains f r e e under t h e Double J e o p a r d y C l a u s e t o

d e f i n e c r i m e s and f i x punishments; b u t once t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

h a s a c t e d c o u r t s may n o t impose more t h a n one punishment f o r

t h e same o f f e n s e . . ." Brown v . Ohio, 432 U.S. a t 165.
 Having determined that this case turns on the permissi-
bility of multiple punishments imposed at a single criminal
proceeding, we find that the dispositive issue is whether
the Montana legislature intended to allow a defendant to be
punished for both felony homicide under section 45-5-
102 (1)(b), MCA, for robbery under section 45-5-401 (1)(a),
MCA, and for aggravated kidnapping under section 45-5-
303(l) (b), MCA, where robbery and aggravated kidnapping were
the underlying felonies in the felony homicide,.
Specifically, the question confronting this Court is
whether the Montana legislature intended to authorize cumu-
lative punishments for aggravated kidnapping, robbery and
felony murder based on one of the other prior statutes.
This is a matter of statutory construction and does not
concern a constitutional question. Whalen, supra, (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). We find that the majority opinion in
Whalen does not apply to this case.
There are several bases for finding that the legisla-
ture did not intend to preclude punishment for both felony
homicide and, in this case, the underlying felonies of
robbery and aggravated kidnapping in enacting the felony
murder statute .
First, application of the Blockburger test to the stat-
utes involved does not result in the conclusion that the
offenses of robbery and aggravated kidnapping are the "same
offense" as felony homicide. Blockburger's analysis must
stand or fall on the working of the statutes alone, not on
the indictment. Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1448 (~ehnquist,
J.,

dissenting). Looking at the statutes, then, it is clear
that proof of felony homicide will not necessarily require
proof of either robbery or aggravated kidnapping. One can
commit felony homicide without committing robbery, or commit
aggravated kidnapping without committing felony homicide.
Thus, Blockburger does not require the conclusion that
felony homicide and the underlying felony merge.
Section 46-11-502, MCA, is merely a codification of
the Blockburger test. See State v. Coleman (1979),
Mont. 605 P.2d 1000, 1009-1010, 36 St.Rep. 1134, cert.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 2952.
The second basis for finding no merger is the history
and purpose of the felony homicide provision. The history
of the common law and the purpose behind laws are both
important tools to be used to determine legislative intent.
Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1449 (~ehnquist,
J., dissenting). The
analysis of then Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v.
Greene (1973), 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 44-45, 489 F.2d 1145,
1168-1169, is persuasive in this regard:
". . .
At common law, homicides were divided
into two categories, murder and manslaughter,
with murder requiring a showing of 'malice.'
Any homicide committed in the course of a
felony was considered murder because malice
could be implied from the commission of the
felony. When homicides were further subdivided
by statute into first degree murder, second
degree murder and manslaughter, the doctrine
of felony murder was preserved, and the under-
lying felony was viewed as providing the 'pre-
meditation' and 'deliberation' otherwise re-
quired for first degree murder, as well as
malice, where necessary.
"Given this rationale for the felony murder
doctrine, it strains credulity to hold that
the underlying felony merges into the felony
murder. The statute proscribing the underly-
ing felony--robbery, for example--is designed
to protect a wholly different societal inter-
est from the felony murder statute, which is
intended to protect against homicide. The
underlying felony is an essential element
of felony murder only because without it the
homicide might be second degree murder or
manslaughter. Clearly, neither manslaughter
nor second degree murder merges with any
other felony like robbery or assisting a
prisoner to escape."
 Third, the legislature found that the homicidal risk is
greater when there is a commission of a felony and that the
protection of the person from this increased risk warranted
additional sentences. The Criminal Law Commission Comment,
on which the legislature relied in enacting section 94-5-
102, R.C.M. 1947, now section 45-5-102, MCA, stated:
"Section [45-5-102, MCA] relates only to con-
duct which is done deliberately; that is, pur-
posely or knowingly. The enumerated offenses
in subsection (b) broaden the old law dealing
with felony-murders, R.C.M. 1947, section 94-
2503, to include any felony which involves
force or violence against an individual.
Since such offenses are usually coincident
with an extremely high homicidal risk, a homi-
cide which occurs during their commission can
be considered a deliberate homicide. The sec-
tion is intended to encompass most homicides
traditionally designated as second-degree mur-
der. Subsection (2) changes the punishment,
providing that a person 'shall be punished by
death ...or by imprisonment ...for any
term not to exceed one hundred (100) years,'
thus seeking to expand the sentencing latitude
of the judge."
Clearly, the legislature properly allowed and broadened
the law relating to cumulative sentencing in felony murder
cases. The enactment of the felony murder rule is supported
by appropriate references to legislative history, the trend
to encompass the felony murder rule and the desire of the
legislature to prevent the commission of these types of dan-
gerous crimes. The legislature allowed it, and the court
imposed it. There are no issues other than those.
If a defendant wants to commit a felony, he must pay a
price. If a defendant wants to commit murder in addition to
the felony or in the course of committing another felony, he
must pay a higher price. The legislature manifested a clear
intention to serve these two different interests in enacting
the statutes.
Errors Committed With Regard - Instructions
To
Defendant raises alleged errors committed by the Dis-
trict Court with respect to the instructions given and
refused.
Defendant did not raise any objection to amended In-
struction No. 1, nor objected either to the giving of In-
struction No. 1 insofar as it relates to the definition of
robbery nor to the refusal of State's offered Instruction
No. 26, defining "bodily injury." He cannot now object on
appeal. See sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA;
McGuinn v. State, supra.
Neither did defendant raise the issue of lack of suf-
ficient evidence of bodily injury inflicted in the course of
the theft. He is likewise precluded from now raising that
issue on appeal. See State v. Armstrong (1977), 172 Mont.
552, 562 P.2d 1129.
Further, testimony supports the conclusion that the in-
fliction of bodily injury was an integral part of carrying
out the plan to get the victim's money. It meets the re-
quired legal minimum evidence to support the jury's factual
finding, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
State.
Defendant failed to object to Instructions 2, 16 and 32,
and, in the case of No. 16 actually concurred in the request;
therefore, these instructions are not reviewable on appeal.

Further, review of these instructions fails to demonstrate
any error.
Defendant contends the court erred in giving Instruc-
tion 14 for it does not allow the jury to consider voluntary

intoxication in defendant's behalf and irresistible impulse
or diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication were
effectively removed from the jury's consideration*
 Instruction 14 does not, as defendant contends, "inform
the jury that the intoxication may not be considered if it

is voluntarily induced." It stated specifically: "An

intoxicated or drugged condition may be taken into consi-

deration in determining the existence of a mental state

which is an element of the offense." That sentence was
added to the offered instruction to meet defendant's objec-

tion that voluntary intoxication could eliminate criminal

responsibility if it rendered a defendant incapable of
forming a necessary mental state. We find no merit in
defendant's argument.

Next, Instruction 18 does not, as defendant contends,
"inform the jury that defendant, having voluntarily stopped
his efforts toward the commission of any of the charged

offenses, was under a duty to stop the uncle from perpe-
trating them." It merely states that - the law does impose
if
a duty which a person is capable of performing, failure to

carry out that duty may be a voluntary act. It does not

impose any duty.
Defendant challenges three instructions regarding proof

of knowledge and purpose on the basis of Sandstrom v. Montana

(1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed. 2d 39.
The challenge, even if it were reviewable, has no
merit. The same challenge was made about substantially the

same instuction in State v. Sunday (1980), Mont. I

609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, and was rejected.
Furthermore, this challenge was not made in the is-
trict Court so the issue is not reviewable on appeal. See
sections 46-16-401(4)(b) and 46-20-701, MCA; McGuinn v.
State, supra; State v. Armstrong, supra.
 Defendant c l a i m s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n

26, d e f i n i n g "knowingly," and I n s t r u c t i o n 27, d e f i n i n g

"purposely." The second s e n t e n c e of I n s t r u c t i o n 26 s t a t e s :

"When Knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r
f a c t i s an e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , s u c h Knowledge
i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n i s aware of a h i g h
p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . "

T h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o " h i g h proba-

b i l i t y " i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t v i o l a t e Sandstrom.

S t a t e v . Coleman, s u p r a .

D e f e n d a n t ' s c h a l l e n g e t o I n s t r u c t i o n 27 i s s i m i l a r t o

h i s c h a l l e n g e t o No. 26:

"A p e r s o n a c t s p u r p o s e l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s
c o n d u c t o r t o a r e s u l t which i s a n e l e m e n t of
t h e o f f e n s e when h e h a s t h e c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t
t o engage i n t h a t c o n d u c t o r t o c a u s e t h a t
result. "

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t a k e s t h e S t a t e ' s

burden of p r o o f , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , and r e d u c e s i t t o

something less t h a n proof by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e .

T h i s i s done by a s u b t l e v e r b a l m a n i p u l a t i o n u s i n g t h e words

" i n f e r , " " h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y , " and " c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t . "

Defendant f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and i s

p r e c l u d e d from r a i s i n g a n o b j e c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on

appeal. H i s o b j e c t i o n i s meritless i n any e v e n t . The same

r e a s o n i n g a d o p t e d by Coleman i n a p p r o v i n g t h e "knowingly"

i n s t r u c t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e "purposely" i n s t r u c t i o n . The

i n s t r u c t i o n merely d e f i n e s t h e e l e m e n t of p u r p o s e f u l n e s s

p u r s u a n t t o Montana l a w . That d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r r i n g t o a

defendant's "conscious o b j e c t , " i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with

modern c o n c e p t s of i n t e n t .

". . . i t i s now g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d t h a t a p e r -
s o n who a c t s ( o r o m i t s t o a c t ) i n t e n d s a r e s u l t
of h i s a c t ( o r o m i s s i o n ) . . .: when he con-
s c i o u s l y d e s i r e s t h a t r e s u l t , whatever t h e
l i k e l i h o o d of t h a t r e s u l t happening from h i s
conduct; . . ." Coleman, 605 P.2d a t 1056.
A l l e g e d E r r o r s - -e F a i l u r e - -
In th To Give I n s t r u c t i o n s

Defendant a r g u e s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e

d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 2 r e l a t i n g t o impeach-

ment.

~ e f e n d a n tc o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o t h e

j u r y were i n a d e q u a t e and t h a t a s t r o n g e r i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d

have been g i v e n b e c a u s e s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s of t h e S t a t e w e r e

former f e l o n s , w e r e r e l a t i v e s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , and had

a d m i t t e d l y i n g on p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t s .

R e f u s a l t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e same s u b j e c t i s n o t

prejudicial error. S t a t e v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont.
, 595 P.2d 372, 36 St.Rep. 936. There w e r e s e v e r a l

i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g impeachment of w i t n e s s e s and t h e

c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s . These i n s t r u c t i o n s were s u f f i -

c i e n t t o c a u t i o n t h e jury as t o t h e w i t n e s s e s ' testimony

d u r i n g t h e t r i a l and a s t o t h e law.

These i n s t r u c t i o n s , r e a d a s a whole a s t h e y must b e ,

f u l l y and f a i r l y c o v e r t h e s u b j e c t of t h e j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a -

t i o n of a w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y . See S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

Mont. , 591 P.2d 1125, 36 St.Rep. 514.

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e

d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 17. This i n s t r u c t i o n

would have t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t d e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t be h e l d

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c r i m e s charged i f someone else performed

t h e o f f e n s i v e conduct. The p l a i n l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 45-2-

302, MCA, i n d i c a t e s t h i s i s i n c o r r e c t .

The r u l e was p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y i n a n o t h e r

instruction. Defendant' s c o n t e n t i o n i s i d e n t i c a l t o one

p r e s e n t e d i n S t a t e v . Owens ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. 597

P.2d 72, 36 St.Rep. 1182. The same h o l d i n g i s a p p l i c a b l e i n

t h e present case. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was

properly refused.
 The judgment is affirmed.

We concur:
w- Justice

This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981.

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written
dissent later.