No. 82-188
I N THE SUPRENE COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F OTN
1982
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
VS .
MILO WARNICK,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f P a r k
Honorable J a c k Shanstrom, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Moses Law F i r m , B i l l i n g s , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
B r u c e E . B e c k e r , County A t t o r n e y , L i v i n g s t o n , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : November 5 , 1982
Decided: December 2 9 , 1982
DE$Z :?1982
Filed:
Mr. C h i e f J u s t l c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l delivered t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.
Defendant a p p e a l s f r o m h i s c o n v i c t i o n of aggravated
a s s a u l t and s e n t e n c e i n t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n
Park County. W affirm.
e
Initially, it i s a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t we aadress a few
r e m a r k s on t h e s u b j e c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l . Appellant has
" s h o t g u n n e d " s e v e n i s s u e s f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on a p p e a l ,
s e v e r a l of which a r e t o t a l l y d e v o i d o f m e r i t , a p p a r e n t l y i n
hopes of finding one o r two that will hit t h e mark and
c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . W w i l l confine
e
any b r e a d t h of d i s c u s s i o n t o t h o s e q u e s t i o n s r a i s i n g s u f f i -
c i e n t l y m e r i t o r i o u s c l a i m s t o w a r r a n t our in-depth review.
D e f e n d a n t p i c k e d up L i n d a , h i s f o r m e r w i f e ( w i t h whom
he was s h a r i n g a h o u s e i n L i v i n g s t o n ) , f r o m h e r work a t t h e
L i v i n g s t o n C o n v a l e s c e n t C e n t e r a t a b o u t 1 0 : 3 0 p.m. on J u l y
2 3 , 1981. They t r a v e l e d t o t h e i r home w h e r e s h e c h a n g e d h e r
c l o t h e s and t h e n p r o c e e d e d t o h e r s i s t e r ' s house t o v i s i t
a n o t h e r s i s t e r (Debby J e t t y ) who was i n town. Defendant d i d
n o t accompany h e r b u t w e n t t o b e d .
L i n d a r e t u r n e d home a b o u t f i f t e e n m i n u t e s a f t e r mid-
night and defendant woke up and asked her if she was
planning on returning to him after her upcoming trip to
North Dakota. She s a i d s h e was planning to do so, but
d e f e n d a n t g o t o u t o f bed and s t a r t e d a r g u i n g w i t h h e r . The
two a r g u e d a b o u t d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s f o r some t i m e a f t e r t h i s
and d u r i n g t h e a r g u m e n t L i n d a a s k e d t o l e a v e s e v e r a l times
but defendant refused t o l e t her. Defendant a l s o h e l d Linda
on t h e k i t c h e n f l o o r and h i t h e r h e a d a g a i n s t t h e f l o o r .
During t h e argument t h e phone r a n g . Defendant picked
u p t h e r e c e i v e r and t h e p e r s o n making t h e c a l l t h e n hung up.
A little later t h e phone r a n g a g a i n , and t h e p r o c e d u r e was
repeated. The phone l a t e r r a n g a t h i r d t i m e , a n d t h i s t i m e
the defendant recognized t h a t one of Linda's s i s t e r s was
calling. H e y e l l e d a n o b s c e n i t y i n t o t h e r e c e i v e r a n d hung
UP
After the third phone call defendant went to the
bedroom and retrieved his .22 caliber rifle. Defendant
testified that he had received previous beatings at the
h a n d s of L i n d a ' s r e l a t i v e s a n d was a f r a i d t h a t t h e y m i g h t be
coming t o h i s h o u s e t o d o t h i s a g a i n . Defendant requested
h i s w i f e t o c a l l h e r r e l a t i v e s a n d t e l l them n o t t o come,
but she refused, s a y i n g t h e y would not be coming to the
house. D e f e n d a n t t h e n f i r e d s e v e r a l r o u n d s which h i t t h e
bathroom d o o r . According to his testimony, defendant did
t h i s t o show L i n d a h e was s e r i o u s and what would h a p p e n i f
her relatives did pay a visit. At one point in the
argument, Linda was sitting on the couch and defendant
p u l l e d h e r o f f t h e c o u c h and t h r e w a n e a s y c h a i r a t h e r .
Unknown to defendant, Debby Jetty had called the
Livingston police dispatcher and t o l d the dispatcher that
defendant was beating his wife. Sgt. George Bryce and
O f f i c e r R o b e r t S t a n l e y responded t o t h e d i s p a t c h e r ' s message
and a p p r o a c h e d d e f e n d a n t ' s h o u s e . After e x i t i n g t h e i r auto-
m o b i l e s t h e y walked t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f r o n t d o o r and s t o o d on
each s i d e of t h e d o o r. S g t . B r y c e t h e n knocked o n t h e d o o r .
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d h e c o u l d s e e h e a d s a t the b o t t o m o f t h e
g l a s s i n t h e door.
Thinking t h e people o u t s i d e were L i n d a ' s relatives,
defendant f i r e d s i x s h o t s a t t h e t o p of t h e door t o s c a r e
them away. T h e l o w e s t b u l l e t h o l e was s e v e n f e e t a b o v e t h e
g r o u n d a n d t h e h i g h e s t was s e v e n f e e t t h r e e i n c h e s a b o v e t h e
ground. Sgt. B r y c e was s t r u c k by d e b r i s o n t h e r i g h t s i d e
of h i s face. The o f f i c e r s t h e n r e t r e a t e d t o s a f e r p o s i t i o n s
under cover.
Meanwhile defendant, not knowing the people he had
just f i r e d upon were p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e a n d
r e q u e s t e d t h e d i s p a t c h e r t o s e n d some o f f i c e r s t o h i s h o u s e .
The d i s p a t c h e r r e p l i e d t h a t someone had a l r e a d y c a l l e d a n d
t h a t o f f i c e r s were on t h e i r way. Sgt. Bryce a l s o n o t i f i e d
t h e d i s p a t c h e r t h a t t h e y had b e e n f i r e d upon and r e q u e s t e d
assistance.
The d i s p a t c h e r t h e n c a l l e d d e f e n d a n t and t o l d him t h a t
t h e o f f i c e r s w e r e a l r e a d y t h e r e and were t h e o n e s who had
been knocking on the door. The dispatcher informed
defendant t h a t h e was t o l e a v e h i s g u n s i n t h e h o u s e and
walk o u t s i d e w i t h h i s h a n d s i n t h e a i r w h i c h h e d i d .
On A u g u s t 11, 1 9 8 1 , t h e Deputy P a r k County A t t o r n e y
filed an information charging defendant with aggravated
a s s a u l t with t h e following language:
"On o r a b o u t J u l y 24, 1 9 8 1 , i n P a r k
C o u n t y , Montana, t h e d e f e n d a n t , a t a p -
p r o x i m a t e l y 1 2 : 4 2 A.M., d i d purposely or
knowingly f i r e a .22 c a l i b e r r i f l e
through a door which had j u s t been
knocked on by o f f i c e r s George B r y c e a n d
Robert Stanley. S a i d a c t was d o n e by t h e
defendant p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly and
caused reasonable apprehension or s e r i o u s
b o d i l y i n j u r y by u s e o f a weapon."
Following a t r i a l beginning February 4, 1982, defen-
d a n t was c o n v i c t e d a n d o n March 9 , 1 9 8 2 , was s e n t e n c e d t o
ten years in the Montana State Prison with eight years
suspended. D e f e n d a n t was a l s o s e n t e n c e d t o two y e a r s f o r
using a d a n g e r o u s weapon i n t h e commission of an offense
(section 46-18-221, MCA), to run consecutively with the
f i r s t sentence.
D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s and p r e s e n t s seven issues for our
review:
1. Was e v i d e n c e o f other crimes erroneously admitted
i n evidence?
2. Were c e r t a i n p i c t u r e s erroneously admitted in
evidence?
3 . Were t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c h a r g e a n d i n s t r u c t i o n s e r r o -
neous?
4. Is j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e i n s e l f - d e f e n s e an a f f i r m a t i v e
defense?
5. Did c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s b a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the
d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e ?
6 . Could r a t i o n a l t r i e r s o f f a c t f i n d beyond a r e a s o n -
a b l e doubt t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s were j u s t i f i e d ?
7. Does t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t t h e s e n t e n c e imposed?
In the f i r s t issue, d e f e n d a n t r e f e r s u s t o S t a t e v.
~ u s t i979),
( Mont . , 602 P.2d 9 5 7 , 36 S t . R e p . 1649,
w h e r e i n w e d i s c u s s e d how e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r crimes s h o u l d b e
"We f e e l t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s s h o u l d b e
s t a n d a r d i z e d i n c a s e s o f t h i s t y p e and
t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t t h e following proce-
d u r e s s h a l l be f o l l o w e d w i t h o u t r e t r o -
active application insofar a s they a r e
new:
" ( a ) E v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s may n o t b e
r e c e i v e d u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been n o t i c e t o
t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t s u c h e v i d e n c e i s t o be
introduced. The p r o c e d u r e s s e t f o r t h i n
s e c t i o n 46-18-503 MCA s h o u l d s e r v e a s
g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e form and c o n t e n t o f
such n o t i c e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e n o t i c e t o
the defendant s h a l l include a statement
a s t o t h e p u r p o s e s f o r which s u c h e v i -
dence is t o be a d m i t t e d .
"(b)At t h e t i m e of t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f
such evidence, the t r i a l court s h a l l
e x p l a i n t o t h e j u r y t h e p u r p o s e of s u c h
e v i d e n c e and s h a l l admonish i t t o weigh
t h e evidence only f o r such purposes.
" ( c ) In its f i n a l charge, the c o u r t
should i n s t r u c t the jury i n unequivocal
terms t h a t s u c h e v i d e n c e was r e c e i v e d
only for the limited purposes e a r l i e r
s t a t e d and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is n o t
b e i n g t r i e d a n d may n o t b e c o n v i c t e d f o r
any o f f e n s e e x c e p t t h a t c h a r g e d , warning
them t h a t t o c o n v i c t f o r o t h e r o f f e n s e s
may r e s u l t i n u n j u s t d o u b l e p u n i s h m e n t . "
Mont. a t , 602 P.2d a t 963-964,
36 S t . R e p . a t 1657-1658.
A p p e l l a n t c h a r g e s t h a t t h e J u s t s t a n d a r d was v i o l a t e d
on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s a t t r i a l - - t h e testimony regarding t h e
a s s a u l t on Linda, t h e S t a t e ' s o f f e r i n g a r e v o l v e r i n t o e v i -
d e n c e w h i c h was f o u n d o n d e f e n d a n t ' s p r e m i s e s , t h e t e s t i m o n y
a b o u t damage o c c u r r i n g t o t h e h o u s e a n d t h e t e s t i m o n y a s t o
a n a s s a u l t by d e f e n d a n t on h i s s t e p d a u g h t e r .
We initially note that the testimony regarding the
a s s a u l t on L i n d a and t h e damage o c c u r r i n g t o t h e h o u s e and
t h e r e v o l v e r w e r e n o t o b j e c t e d t o a t t r i a l which f o r e c l o s e s
our review on a p p e a l . S t a t e v. Patton (1979), Mont .
, 600 P.2d 1 9 4 , 36 S t . R e p . 1731. Additionally, we f a i l
t o see how p o s s e s s i o n of t h e r e v o l v e r o r d e f e n d a n t ' s c a u s i n g
damage t o h i s own i ~ o u s e c o n s t i t u t e a c r i m e , and d e f e n d a n t
f a i l s t o e n l i g h t e n u s on t h i s p o i n t i n h i s b r i e f . Appellant
a r g u e s i n h i s r e p l y b r i e f t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t was n o t
f a t a l because t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s p l a i n e r r o r . However, there
was n o e r r o r h e r e .
R e g a r d i n g t h e a s s a u l t by d e f e n d a n t o n h i s s t e p d a u g h t e r
t h e t r a n s c r i p t shows t h e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y by t h e d e f e n -
d a n t u n d e r q u e s t i o n i n g by t h e p r o s e c u t o r :
"A. Okay. T h a t day-- L e t ' s see-- We
had g o n e home and I was s p a n k i n g t h e g i r l
for lying t o me. And I d i d u s e a b e l t .
And w h i l e I was s p a n k i n g h e r o v e r my l a p ,
w e l l , of c o u r s e s h e was f i g h t i n g m e . And
she d i d g e t a black eye.
"Q. Were t h e r e c h a r g e s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t
you a s a r e s u l t o f t h a t ?
I1IJ1R. DOUGLASS [ D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ] :
Your Honor, O b j e c t t o q u e s t i o n s o f t h a t
nature.
"THE COURT: I w i l l sustain that as t o
charges. "
Later, before settling instructions, defendant's attorney
moved f o r a m i s t r i a l on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e a b o v e t e s t i m o n y
p l a n t e d t h e s e e d of d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r c r i m e s i n t h e j u r o r s '
m i n d s which c o u l d n o t be e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t a new t r i a l .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s m i s -
t r i a l motion. I t is e v i d e n t from t h e above p o r t i o n of the
t r a n s c r i p t t h a t defendant did not t e s t i f y about any p r i o r
crime because t h e q u e s t i o n regarding charges being brought
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t was n e v e r a n s w e r e d o r alluded t o again.
In Just, upon which defendant heavily relies, the victim
testified regarding several previous s e x u a l o f f e n s e s com-
m i t t e d a g a i n s t h e r by t h e d e f e n d a n t . Here, d e f e n d a n t never
d i d t e s t i f y a b o u t a n y p r e v i o u s c r i m e s a l l e g e d l y c o m m i t t e d by
him and t h u s t h e r e i s no p a r a l l e l b e t w e e n J u s t and t h i s c a s e
which would make t h e J u s t h o l d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e .
In the second issue defendant assigns a s e r r o r the
a d m i s s i o n o f s e v e n p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n by O f f i c e r S t a n l e y on
the night of the incident in question. S e v e r a l of these
photographs show where t h e s p e n t .22 shells fell and the
l o c a t i o n of t h e b u l l e t h o l e s i n t h e b a t h r o o m d o o r and f r o n t
door of t h e house. E x h i b i t No. 26 i s a v i e w of t h e e d g e o f
t h e b a t h r o o m d o o r showing how o n e b u l l e t n i c k e d t h e e d g e o f
the door.
On all but one of these pictures, Officer Stanley
c i r c l e d w i t h a black pen t h e l o c a t i o n of the bullet holes
and s p e n t c a r t r i d g e s and made n o t a t i o n s on t h e b a c k s o f a l l
o f them, i n d i c a t i n g w h a t e a c h showed. Defsndant o b j e c t s t o
these pictures because t h e y do n o t a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y t h e
scene at the time, i.e., the circles were drawn on the
pictures a t a later time. Defendant's objection t o Exhibit
No. 26, on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t d i d n o t show t h e d o o r i n t h e
same c o n d i t i o n a s i t was a t t h e t i m e o f the incident, is
a p p a r e n t l y b a s e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t :
"MR. DOUGLASS: Officer Stanley, refer-
r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t o 26, is t h a t t h e
p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e d o o r was i n when you
f i r s t entered t h e residence? A. I
r e a l l y d o n ' t - - I d o n ' t t h i n k s o , b u t I am
not sure. I can't r e c a l l now.
"MR. DOUGLASS: Would y o u r r e c o l l e c t i o n
b e t h a t i t was o p e n w i d e r t h a n t h a t ? A.
I b e l i e v e i t was, y e s .
"MR. DOUGLASS: I would o b j e c t t o 2 6 . I
t h i n k t h e same o b j e c t i o n , f i r s t , i t ' s
b e e n marked u p o n , t h a t I o b j e c t e d t o
before. Secondly, it does n o t a c c u r a t e l y
d e p i c t t h e s c e n e a s i t was f o u n d . "
These contentions border on t h e ludicrous. Officer
S t a n l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t w r i t i n g n o t a t i o n s on t h e b a c k o f the
photographs is s t a n d a r d p o l i c e procedure. A .22 b u l l e t d o e s
n o t l e a v e a v e r y l a r g e h o l e nor is t h e c a r t r i d g e v e r y b i g ,
and i f t h e c i r c l e s had n o t b e e n made, i t would b e d i f f i c u l t
i n d e e d t o d e t e r m i n e why t h e p i c t u r e s w e r e t a k e n . W e s e e no
r e a s o n why t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e p i c t u r e s h o w i n g t h e b a t h r o o m
d o o r c l o s e d more t h a n i t h a d b e e n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e p o l i c e
e n t r y i n t o t h e h o u s e p r e j u d i c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a n y way.
M o r e o v e r , t h e l a w i n t h e Montana i s t h a t t r i a l c o u r t s
have wide discretion in admitting photographs, Brown v.
N o r t h American Mfg. Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 9 8 , 576 P.2d 711.
See a l s o , S t a t e v. Hoffman ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 639 P.2d
507, 39 St.Rep. 79 ( p a t h o l o g i s t ' s c o l o r s l i d e s w e r e p r o p e r l y
admitted); and S t a t e v . Warrick ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 94, 446
P.2d 916 ( c o l o r p h o t o g r a p h s were p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d ) .
I n S t a t e v. Lang ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 197 Neb. 47, 246 N.W.2d 608,
investigating officers took a picture of two marks on a
liquor store wall which were probably caused by a rico-
cheting bullet, a f t e r a melee i n a parking l o t n e x t t o t h e
liquor store. The o f f i c e r s c i r c l e d t h e m a r k s on t h e p h o t o -
g r a p h and t h e Supreme C o u r t of N e b r a s k a found t h e p i c t u r e s
were p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l . W e s i m i l a r l y s o hold here.
I n t h e t h i r d i s s u e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s h e was d e n i e d a
unanimous jury verdict by t h e language of the information
and j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s w h i c h w e r e worded i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
by use of the word "or." Defendant f i r s t points to the
information which states that defendant "purposely or
knowingly" fired the rifle, that such act was done
" ~ u r p o s e l yo r k n o w i n g l y " and c a u s e d " r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n
or serious bodily injury. " The jury instructions which,
according to detendant, contain a similar fault are as
follows: No. 12 which stated in part, "[plurposely or
knowingly c a u s i n g r e a s o n a b l e apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y
i n j u r y is a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT";
No. 1 3 which stated in part, "[tlo sustain t h e c h a r g e of
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
MILO W A K N I C K , purposely or knowingly caused reasonable
a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s injury i n a n o t h e r human b e i n g w i t h a
weapon"; No. 1 4 which p r o v i d e d , " [ t l o s u s t a i n t h e charge of
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t each element
o f t h e o f f e n s e was d o n e p u r p o s e l y o r k n o w i n g l y " ; a n d No. 21
which p r o v i d e d i n p a r t , " [ a ] p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f
ASSAULT ~f he: (1) p u r p o s e l y or knowingly causes bodlly
I n j u r y t o another ; or ( 2 ) negligently causes bodily injury
to another with a weapon; or (3) purposely or knowinyly
c a u s e s r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n of b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r . "
For example, defendant states that Instruction No. 13
allowed t h e j u r y t o f i n d defendant g u i l t y i f only one-half
of the jurors found that he acted "purposely" while the
o t h e r h a l f found t h a t h e a c t e d "knowingly."
W disagree.
e I n i t i a l l y w e note t h a t defendant did not
object to Instruction Nos. 14 a n d 21 t h u s p r e s e r v i n g no
b a s i s f o r a p p e l l a t e review of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s . S t a t e v.
Powers et al. (1982), Mont. , 645 P.2d 1357, 39
3t.Rep. 989.
W a l s o n o t e t h a t w e h a v e r e j e c t e d t h i s unanimous j u r y
e
verdict c o n t e n t i o n on two p r e v i o u s occasions, McKenzie v .
Osborne (1981), Mon t . , 640 P.2d 368, 38 St.Kep.
1 7 4 5 , and F i t z p a t r i c k v . State (1981), - Mont. , 638
P.2d 1 0 0 2 , 38 S t . K e p . 1448. D e f e n d a n t h e r e c i t e s two c a s e s ,
S t a t e v. Green ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 94 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628, and
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. G i p s o n ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 5 5 3 F.2d 453, whose
application we rejected in McKenzie and Fitzpatrick and
whose a p p l i c a t i o n w e s i m i l a r l y r e j e c t here. In rejecting
the reasoning of Gipson and Green, the - cKenzie
M and
Fitzpatrick courts discussed two p i v o t a l issues: (1) t h a t
the jury had been instructed as to the requirement of a
unanimous v e r d i c t , and (2) that each a l t e r n a t i v e presented
t o t h e j u r y was s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . W hold
e
t h a t t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s were met h e r e .
In Instruction No. 30 t h e C o u r t admonished the jury
that a unanimous verdict was required with the following
words:
". . . a l l twelve ( 1 2 ) j u r o r s must a g r e e
i n o r d e r t o r e t u r n e i t h e r a v e r d i c t of
guilty or not guilty. To d o s o , i t i s
n e c e s s a r y t h a t you c o n s i d e r t h e crime o f
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, f i r s t , and t h a t a l l
t w e l v e of you f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t e i t h e r
g u i l t y or not g u i l t y of t h a t charge. . ."
Defendant p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e information h e r e i n s t a t e d t h a t
defendant caused "reasonable apprehension - s e r i o u s b o d i l y
or
i n j u r y by u s e o f a weapon." (Emphasis added. ) The s t a t u t e
cited in the information, section 45-5-202(1)(c), MCA,
reads, "reasonable apprehension - serious
of bodily injury
... by u s e o f a weapon." (Emphasis added.) A s shown by
I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 2 and 1 3 a b o v e , t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on
two different occasions that reasonable apprehension -
of
s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y was t h e e l e m e n t o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t
( I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 a l s o stated t h a t a person commits t h e
o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t i f he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly
causes reasonable apprehension - s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y
of in
a n o t h e r by u s e o f a w e a p o n ) .
Here the defendant shot six times at a door where
people (the tops of whose heads he had seen through the
g l a s s windows i n t h e d o o r ) had j u s t p r e v i o u s l y k n o c k e d . The
defendant testified that h e wanted to scare those people
away. W f i n d t h a t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support
e
t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s of p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly s e t f o r t h i n t h e
instructions. There is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t
it was defendant's conscious o b j e c t t o cause a reasonable
apprehension of serious bodily injury i n those outside t h e
door (thus f i t t i n g within t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "purposely"--
s e c t i o n 45-2-101(58), MCA) and d e f e n d a n t was a w a r e t h a t i t
was h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t t h i s r e s u l t would b e c a u s e d by h i s
conduct ( t h u s f i t t i n g w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "knowingly"--
s e c t i o n 45-2-101(33), MCA).
I n t h e f o u r t h i s s u e , d e f e n d a n t c i t e s s e c t i o n 45-3-115,
MCA, which p r o v i d e s :
"Affirmative defense. A d e f e n s e of jus-
t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e based on t h e p r o v i -
s i o n s of t h i s p a r t is an a f f i r m a t i v e
defense " .
Defendant then argues in rambling fashion that somehow
section 45-3-115, NCA, violates his due process rights
because defendant had the burden of proving he did not
commit t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . W have p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d t h a t
e
because j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e is an a f f i r m a t i v e defense,
there i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t p l a c i n g t h e
burden of proof on t h e defendant. S t a t e v. Graves (1981),
Mont . , 622 P.2d 2 0 3 , 38 S t . R e p . 9.
The j u r y h e r e was i n s t r u c t e d a s f o l l o w s :
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a d e f e n s e o f
j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e is a n a f f i r m a -
t i v e d e f e n s e and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s
t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t e v i -
dence on t h e i s s u e t o raise a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt of h i s g u i l t . "
T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h s e c t i o n 45-3-115, MCA,
a n d S t a t e v. G r a d y ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 1 6 8 , 5 3 1 P.2d 681.
D e f e n d a n t h a s had two chances, in his i n i t i a l brief
and i n h i s reply brief, t o put f o r t h some k i n d of under-
standable, c o h e r e n t argument w i t h s u p p o r t i n g c a s e law as t o
how d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s h e r e w e r e p r e j u d i c e d i n some m a n n e r .
Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o do t h i s , and w e r e f u s e t h e r e f o r e t o
consider t h i s matter further.
Defendant f a r e s no b e t t e r i n h i s f i f t h i s s u e . Defen-
d a n t c l a i m s t h a t c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were g i v e n f a i l e d
t o p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o f u l l y and p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e i s s u e
o f j u s t i f i e d u s e o f f o r c e by t h e d e f e n d a n t . Defendant then
states t h a t when the i n s t r u c t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d together
the jury could w e 1 1 have found i n defendant's favor as a
f a c t u a l i s s u e a n d f o u n d t h a t h e was f a c t u a l l y j u s t i f i e d in
h i s action but still, in referring to these instructions,
f i n d him g u i l t y .
Defendant does not set forth any reasoned effort
supporting these claims or i n c o r p o r a t e any language i n t h e
instructions i n t o an explanation of why d e f e n d a n t ' s claims
are justified. W a r e n o t a b o u t t o waste j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s
e
i n a t t e m p t i n g t o determine w h a t d e f e n d a n t i s d r i v i n g a t h e r e
when i t h a s n o t b e e n e x p r e s s e d c l e a r l y i n t h e b r i e f s .
In the s i x t h issue defendant takes t h e position t h a t a
r e v i e w of t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a u s e would show t h a t no
r a t i o n a l t r i e r s o f f a c t c o u l d h e r e h a v e f o u n d beyond a r e a -
s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s were n o t j u s t i f i e d as
a matter o f self-defense. I n support of this s t a n d a r d of
r e v i e w , d e f e n d a n t c i t e s J a c k s o n v. V i r g i n i a ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 443 U.S.
307, 99 S . C t . 2781, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 560, and P i l o n v. Borden-
k i r c h e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 444 U.S. 1, 1 0 0 S . C t . 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1.
However, neither of these cases is on p o i n t because
they deal with the standard of review that a federal
d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i l l a p p l y when a p r i s o n e r a p p l i e s f o r h a b e a s
c o r p u s r e l i e f from a s t a t e c o u r t d e c i s i o n . That t h i s is t h e
s c o p e o f t h e s e two c a s e s i s amply b o r n e o u t by t h e f o l l o w i n g
statements:
". . . The q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case i s w h a t
s t a n d a r d is t o be a p p l i e d i n a f e d e r a l
h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g when t h e c l a i m
is made t h a t a p e r s o n h a s b e e n c o n v i c t e d
i n a s t a t e c o u r t upon i n s u f f i c i e n t
evidence." J a c k s o n , 443 U.S. a t 3 0 9 , 99
S . C t . a t 2783, 6 1 L.Ed.2d a t 5 6 7 .
"We h o l d t h a t i n a c h a l l e n g e t o a s t a t e
c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n b r o u g h t u n d e r 28
U.S.C. 2254--if t h e s e t t l e d p r o c e d u r a l
p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r s u c h a claim have
o t h e r w i s e been s a t i s f i e d - - t h e applicant
is e n t i t l e d t o habeas c o r p u s r e l i e f i f it
i s f o u n d t h a t upon t h e r e c o r d e v i d e n c e
adduced a t t h e t r i a l no r a t i o n a l t r i e r of
f a c t could have found proof o f g u i l t
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " J a c k s o n , 443
U.S. a t 3 2 4 , 99 S . C t . a t 2791-2792, 61
L.Ed. 2d a t 576-577.
". . . An e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n h a d made c l e a r
t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f t h e F o u r -
t e e n t h Amendment p r o h i b i t s t h e c r i m i n a l
c o n v i c t i o n o f any p e r s o n e x c e p t upon
p r o o f o f g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
I n r e W i n s h i p , 397 U.S. 358 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . The
Court i n Jackson held t h a t t h i s constitu-
t i o n a l requirement can be e f f e c t u a t e d
only i f a f e d e r a l habeas corpus c o u r t , i n
assessing t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence
t o support a state-court conviction,
i n q u i r e s 'whether, a f t e r viewing t h e evi-
dence i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n , any r a t i o n a l t r i e r of f a c t
could have found t h e e s s e n t i a l elements
of t h e c r i m e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . '
443 U.S., a t 319 ( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) ."
P i l o n , 444 U . S . a t 2 , 1 0 0 S . C t . a t 8 , 62
L.E.2d a t 3.
Obviously t h e a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t from t h e D i s t r i c t
Court is n o t a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i n a
federal court t o question the validity of a state court
conviction. The c a s e s c i t e d and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e a r g u m e n t s
m a r s h a l l e d by a p p e l l a n t a r e i n a p p o s i t e t o t h i s c a s e , g i v e n
its p r e s e n t procedural s t a n c e .
In the final assignment of error, defendant takes
Issue with tne sentence imposed by the District Court.
D e f e n d a n t h e r e was s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s w i t h e i g h t y e a r s
s u s p e n d e d a n d t o two y e a r s f o r u s i n g a d a n g e r o u s weapon i n
t h e commission o f a n o f f e n s e , t o r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y w i t h t h e
first sentence. S e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, states t h a t a
p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s h a l l be imprisoned
f o r a minimum o f two y e a r s a n d a maximum o f t w e n t y y e a r s .
S e c t i o n 46-18-221(1), MCA, mandates that a p e r s o n who h a s
used a f i r e a r m d u r i n g t h e commission o f a n o f f e n s e s h a l l be
s e n t e n c e d t o a t l e a s t two more y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n .
Defendant does not question the legality of his
sentence but only its equity. Such concerns should be
a d d r e s s e d t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review D i v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 46-18-901
e t seq., MCA. See, S t a t e v. Hubbard (1982), Mont.
, 649 P.2d 1 3 3 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 1608.
kf f i r m e d .