No. 82-166
I N THE SUPREMI3 COURT O THE STATE O F M N A A
F OTN
1982
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
VS .
GARRY HEN RICKS,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f S i l v e r Bow
H o n o r a b l e Mark S u l l i v a n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
J o h n G. Winston a r g u e d , B u t t e , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , I l e i e n a , Montana
R o b e r t M. McCarthy, County A t t o r n e y , B u t t e , Montana
P a t r i c k Fleming a r g u e d and R o s s R i c h a r d s o n a r g u e d ,
Deputy County A t t o r n e y s , B u t t e , Montana
S u b m i t t e d : Segtenber 1 7 , 1 9 8 2
Decided : Povei7ber 3 , 1982
Filed:
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Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
T h i s a p p e a l i s from t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r
the County o f S i l v e r Bow. The d e f e n d a n t , Garry Henricks, was
c o n v i c t e d on t h e c h a r g e of n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e . From t h a t c o n v i c -
t i o n he a p p e a l s .
On September 12, 1981, at approximately 11:30 p.m., the
Henricks vehicle, occupied by Garry and Lorraine Henricks,
struck and killed a pedestrian. The impact shattered the
windshield and sprayed glass particles through the interior.
Prior to the accident, Garry and Lorraine had been drinking
heavily. A t about 1 1 : O O p.m., t h e p a r t i e s l e f t t h e S c a n d i a Bar
w i t h a n o t h e r c o u p l e , P a u l and R a e l e n e C o l l i n s . The t w o c o u p l e s
t o o k t h e i r own c a r s and were to meet a t a r e s t a u r a n t . However,
t h e H e n r i c k s n e v e r showed up. Raelene C o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s
t h e y were w a l k i n g into the restaurant, t h e H e n r i c k s d r o v e by.
S h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t G a r r y was d r i v i n g a t t h a t t i m e .
G a r r y H e n r i c k s a d m i t t e d t h a t he was d r i v i n g when t h e y l e f t
the bar. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was d r i v i n g home b u t s t o p p e d t w o
o r three blocks short. L o r r a i n e had wanted to go b a c k to J e r r y ' s
C o r n e r Bar to f i n d h e r s h o e s and p u r s e . Garry t e s t i f i e d that
L o r r a i n e t h e n s t a r t e d d r i v i n g and he b e g a n t o d o z e . He does not
remember v e r y many details of the accident but does remember
hearing a thump or thud as the car hit the pedestrian.
Lorraine's version differs. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e d o e s n o t
remember much o f t h e e v e n i n g b e c a u s e s h e h a s b l a c k o u t s p e l l s when
she drinks excessively. However, s h e d o e s remember l e a v i n g t h e
S c a n d i a Bar and G a r r y was d r i v i n g . The n e x t t h i n g s h e remembers
is the car striking something, and at that time, Garry was
driving. T h e r e were s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s to t h e a c c i d e n t , y e t none
could p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f y the d r i v e r .
After the accident Garry and Lorraine agreed to "get rid
of the c a r " s i n c e t h e y b o t h had b e e n d r i n k i n g and they d i d n ' t
have insurance. They d r o v e b a c k to t h e S c a n d i a B a r . The b a r -
tender at the Scandia testified that Lorraine came in and
a p p e a r e d p a n i c k y and d e s p e r a t e . She was a s k i n g f o r P a u l C o l l i n s .
When s h e c o u l d n o t f i n d P a u l s h e a s k e d Kenny Moore t o go o u t s i d e
and t a l k with her. Outside, L o r r a i n e and Kenny Moore m e t P a u l
and Raelene Collins as they were driving up. The Collinses
f o l l o w e d them i n t o a n a l l e y w h e r e t h e h i t - a n d - r u n car was p a r k e d .
G a r r y t h e n d r o v e t h e i r car i n s e a r c h o f a p l a c e to a b a n d o n i t .
The C o l l i n s e s f o l l o w e d . The car was abandoned and t h e C o l l i n s e s
g a v e them a r i d e t o a n o t h e r c o u p l e t s h o u s e . The n e x t m o r n i n g ,
Lorraine reported t h e c a r as s t o l e n . L a t e r t h a t day t h e p o l i c e
found t h e hit-and-run vehicle.
B l o o d s t a i n s were f o u n d on t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e f l o o r mat and o n
t h e dashboard t o t h e l e f t of the s t e e r i n g wheel. The s a m p l e on
t h e dashboard matched G a r r y t s blood t y p e and t h e s a m p l e o n t h e
f l o o r matched L o r r a i n e ' s . L o r r a i n e w a s b a r e f o o t t h e e v e n i n g of
the accident, however, i t was not until the n e x t morning she
n o t i c e d t h a t s h e had c u t h e r f o o t ; a p p a r e n t l y from t h e s h a t t e r e d
w i n d s h i e l d g l a s s of t h e hit-and-run vehicle.
On O c t o b e r 9 , Lorraine contacted p o l i c e and a d m i t t e d being
t h e d r i v e r of the vehicle. The n e x t m o r n i n g s h e made a f o r m a l
s t a t e m e n t i n which s h e a g a i n a d m i t t e d b e i n g t h e d r i v e r . She w a s
t h e n c h a r g e d and j a i l e d . However, o n O c t o b e r 1 5 and 1 6 s h e made
s t a t e m e n t s which r e p u d i a t e d e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t s . She s a i d s h e was
not the driver. L o r r a i n e was e v e n t u a l l y r e l e a s e d and o n November
5, G a r r y H e n r i c k s w a s a r r e s t e d and c h a r g e d w i t h n e g l i g e n t homi-
cide.
The appellant raises the following issues for our
consideration: (1) w h e t h e r or n o t t h e t e s t i m o n y and t h e p h y s i -
cal evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict; (2)
whether witness identification of "a passenger with long h a i r "
was t a i n t e d by p o l i c e interviewing procedures; and ( 3) whether
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to allow l a y w i t n e s s o p i n i o n
testimony?
Our s t a n d a r d i n r e v i e w i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e is
clear. The t e s t is " w h e t h e r there is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to
s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n , v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e
State." S t a t e v. Lamb ( 1 9 8 2 ) , -. . - .-
- Mont . , 6 4 6 P.2d
5 1 6 , 5 1 8 , 39 S t . R e p . 1 0 2 1 , 1 0 2 4 ; see a l s o , S t a t e v. Cook ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,
- Mon t . , 6 4 5 P.2d 1 3 6 7 , 39 S t . R e p . 1026; S t a t e v. Wilson
(1981) -- Mont . - , 6 3 1 P.2d 1 2 7 3 , 38 S t . R e p . 1040.
W e stress t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e t e s t which m a n d a t e s r e v i e w " i n
t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e S t a t e . " A t the trial court the
p r o s e c u t i o n is o b l i g e d t o p r o v e e v e r y e l e m e n t o f t h e crime. Such
a r e q u i r e m e n t is obvious; i s s u i n g f r o m t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of inno-
cence. However, "on a p p e a l a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n t h e r u l e changes.
T h e n , i f t h e r e c o r d shows a n y s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
judgment, t h e presumption is i n f a v o r of such judgment." State
v . S t o d d a r d ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 4 0 2 , 4 0 8 , 4 1 2 P.2d 8 2 7 , 8 3 1 . A s we
s a i d i n S t a t e v . C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 4 1 4 , 422-423, 5 4 3 P.2d
389, 394, t h i s Court " w i l l assume t h e e x i s t e n c e of every f a c t
which t h e j u r y could have deduced from a l l t h e e v i d e n c e to r e a c h
its verdict."
I n t h i s case t h e r e is more t h a n s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o sup-
port the conviction. Lorraine Henricks stated unequivocally
that Garry was driving when the accident occurred. Raelene
Collins testified that she saw t h e defendant driving shortly
before the accident. A n o t h e r w i t n e s s , o n e who was a t t h e acci-
dent scene, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he g o t a g l i m p s e of a p a s s e n g e r w i t h
long h a i r . On t h e n i g h t i n q u e s t i o n G a r r y had s h o r t h a i r and
L o r r a i n e had long h a i r ; thus, allowing the jury to i n f e r t h a t
Lorraine was the passenger. S t i l l another witness, upon s e e i n g
t h e car s p e e d by s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , testified t h a t he
h a d t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e d r i v e r w a s a man. Finally, a medical
doctor who examined the glass cut injuries of b o t h G a r r y and
L o r r a i n e came t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t G a r r y ' s u p p e r body a l o n g t h e
l e f t s i d e w a s f u r t h e s t away f r o m t h e p o i n t of impact; t h u s , sup-
p o r t i n g a n i n f e r e n c e t h a t G a r r y was t h e d r i v e r .
Next, appellant contends a due process violation arising
t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y of M r . S t e v e n s who t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t
h e saw a p a s s e n g e r w i t h l o n g h a i r . I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e acci-
d e n t t h i s w i t n e s s made a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t . T h a t s t a t e m e n t made
no mention of a "passenger w i t h long h a i r ." Eight days later,
t h e w i t n e s s made a s i x - p a g e s t a t e m e n t a f t e r b e i n g shown t h e h i t -
and-run v e h i c l e and, it seems, a £ t e r he had b e e n shown a p i c t u r e
of Lorraine Henricks. According to a p p e l l a n t , the witness did
not:
" e v e n know t h e r e was a p a s s e n g e r u n t i l t h e
p i c t u r e was shown t o him. Thereafter, the
s t a t e ' s technique is clear. G e t somebody t o
s a y t h e r e is a p a s s e n g e r w i t h l o n g h a i r ; show
t h a t G a r r y H e n r i c k s d i d n ' t h a v e l o n g h a i r on
t h e n i g h t i n q u e s t i o n , and VIOLA! Garry
H e n r i c k s was t h e d r i v e r ."
The r e c o r d d o e s n o t c o n t a i n t h e s i x - p a g e s t a t e m e n t made by
the witness to the police eight days after the incident.
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e w h e t h e r or n o t
t h e w i t n e s s made t h e s t a t e m e n t a f t e r or b e f o r e s e e i n g a p h o t o -
graph of Lorraine Henricks. Nonetheless, if we assume
appellant's position, t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was shown a p h o t o g r a p h of
L o r r a i n e and t h e n made t h e w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t , p r e s u m a b l y s a y i n g ,
" t h e p a s s e n g e r had long h a i r , " t h e r e was no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l due
process violation.
I n s u p p o r t o f h i s a r g u m e n t t h e a p p e l l a n t c i t e s t h e cases of
Simmons v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 3 7 7 , 88 S . C t . 967, 19
L.Ed.2d 1 2 4 7 , and U n i t e d S t a t e s v . F o w l e r ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) , 439 F.2d 1 3 3 .
In - -
Simmons, s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s were i n d i v i d u a l l y shown s i x p h o t o -
graphs. The photographs were group pictures of Simmons and
others. All of t h e w i t n e s s e s p i c k e d Simmons o u t of the photos
and i d e n t i f i e d him a s o n e of t h e bank r o b b e r s . The p r o s e c u t i o n
d i d not introduce the p i c t u r e s i n t o evidence, r a t h e r they r e l i e d
on in-court i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s . On a p p e a l
to the United States Supreme Court, Simmons argued that the
p r e t r i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by means o f p h o t o g r a p h s was u n n e c e s s a r i l y
s u g g e s t i v e and c o n d u c i v e t o m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n so as to d e n y him
due p r o c e s s of law. However, t h e Supreme C o u r t found no s u c h
violation but stated the test: a c o n v i c t i o n based on a p h o t o
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i l l n o t he s e t a s i d e u n l e s s " t h e p r o c e d u r e w a s so
i m p e r m i s s i b l y s u g g e s t i v e a s t o g i v e rise t o a very s u b s t a n t i a l
l i k e l i h o o d of irreparable misidentification ." 390 U .S. a t 384.
I n Fowler, t h e a c c u s e d was c o n v i c t e d o f s m u g g l i n g mari j u a n a
f r o m Mexico t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Fowler contended t h a t t h e car
i n w h i c h t h e m a r i j u a n a was f o u n d was n o t h i s ; t h a t h e was m e r e l y
d r i v i n g t h e car t o L o s A n g e l e s f o r a f r i e n d . Detectives learned
that the car had been purchased two days earlier. The car
s a l e s m a n was found and shown two p h o t o g r a p h s of Fowler. The
salesman i d e n t i f i e d F o w l e r as t h e p e r s o n who had p u r c h a s e d the
car t w o d a y s e a r l i e r . A t t r i a l t h e p h o t o g r a p h s were shown to t h e
witness who testified concerning his pretrial identification.
The s a l e s m a n a l s o made a n i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of F o w l e r . The
9 t h C i r c u i t C o u r t , u s i n g t h e t e s t of - -
Simmons, found t h a t t h e pho-
tographic identification procedure violated due process.
The f a c t s i n t h e case b e f o r e u s a r e d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e in
Simmons and Fowler, however, a similar factual situation
o c c u r r e d i n S t a t e v. Pendergrass (1980), - Mont . ----- r 615
P.2d 201, 37 S t . R e p . 1 3 7 0 ( P e n d e r g r a s s 11). I n t h a t case t h e
d e f e n d a n t a l s o a l l e g e d a d u e p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from a
photographic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure. P e n d e r g r a s s was c o n v i c t e d
of a t t e m p t e d r o b b e r y and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . A
p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s s a w a man g e t o u t o f a p i c k u p t r u c k and w a l k
t o w a r d t h e s c e n e o f t h e crime. The w i t n e s s was shown s i x p i c t u r e s
of various individuals. The w i t n e s s identified the defendant's
p i c t u r e a s t h e p h o t o g r a p h which m o s t c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e d t h e man h e
saw g e t o u t o f t h e p i c k u p t r u c k and w a l k t o w a r d t h e crime s c e n e .
There was never a positive identification of the defendant.
Likewise, i n t h i s case, t h e r e was n e v e r a n y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . We
f o u n d n o d u e p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n i n -- n d e r g r a s s and w e f i n d n o n e
Pe
--
here. A s i n Pendergrass,
- " t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s remedy is i n e f f e c t i v e
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n q u e s t i o n t h e n becoming
one of weight to be determined by the jury and not one of
admissibility. " S t a t e v. P e n d e r g r a s s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 1 0 6 , 1 1 3 ,
586 P.2d 691, 695, (Pendergrass I), (citing State v. Miner
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 2 6 0 , 5 4 6 P.2d 252). "We are c o n t e n t t o r e l y
upon t h e good s e n s e and j u d g m e n t o f A m e r i c a n j u r i e s , f o r evidence
w i t h some e l e m e n t o f u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s is c u s t o m a r y g r i s t f o r t h e
jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot
measure i n t e l l i g e n t l y t h e w e i g h t of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y t h a t
h a s some q u e s t i o n a b l e f e a t u r e ." P e n d e r g r a s s 11, --- - - - - Mont. at
, 615 P.2d a t 204-205, 37 S t . R e p . a t 1 3 7 4 , ( c i t i n g Manson v .
B r a t h w a i t e ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 4 3 2 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2 2 4 3 , 5 3 L.Ed.2d 140).
Finally, appellant contends that two lay witnesses should
h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d t o s t a t e t h e i r o p i n i o n as t o whom t h e y t h o u g h t
was d r i v i n g t h e c a r . The t w o w i t n e s s e s d i d n o t a c t u a l l y see t h e
i n c i d e n t b u t were i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e p a r t i e s s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e
incident. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e w i t n e s s e s should have been
a l l o w e d t o g i v e t h e i r o p i n i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 7 0 1 , Mont.R.Evid.
The comments to R u l e 7 0 1 s t a t e t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of the
r u l e are n o t t o be c o n s i d e r e d as e x c e p t i o n s b u t as s a f e g u a r d s .
Thus, if t h e o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y is b a s e d upon p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Rule 6 0 2 , Mont .R. E v i d . , is r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d
upon the perception of the witness (ensuring t h a t the opinion
would o r d i n a r i l y be t h e r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n ) ; a n d ,
t h e o p i n i o n is h e l p f u l t o a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w i t n e s s e s f
testimony or the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a fact in issue, then the
o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be a l l o w e d .
W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e is of t h e kind
the rule i n t e n d s t o allow. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e comments t h e r u l e
"expresses the intention of the Federal drafters of I . . .
p u t t i n g t h e t r i e r of f a c t i n p o s s e s s i o n of a n a c c u r a t e r e p r o d u c -
t i o n of the event.' Advisory C o m m i t t e e s ' Note to F e d e r a l R u l e
7 0 1 , 56 F.R.D. 183, 281 (1972) ." Thus, t h e r u l e p r i m a r i l y envi-
s i o n s l a y w i t n e s s o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y from w i t n e s s e s who were i n a
p o s i t i o n to p e r c e i v e an e v e n t . The two w i t n e s s e s h e r e d i d n o t
see t h e a c c i d e n t . T h e i r o p i n i o n s were b a s e d upon t h e i r p e r c e p -
t i o n s af t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . Furthermore, the record i n d i c a t e s t h a t
a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e s e w i t n e s s e s would h a v e t e s t i f i e d c o n t r a r y to
s t a t e m e n t s given a t a p r e t r i a l i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoena proceeding .
C e r t a i n l y , t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s weigh i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y r u l i n g s
of the D i s t r i c t Court. W e f i n d no e r r o r .
The c o n v i c t i o n is a£ f i r m e d .
W e concur:
n