No. 81-270
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
JACKIE KEENE,
Claimant and Respondent,
VS .
THE ANACONDA COMPANY,
Employer, Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court
Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Utick & Grosfield, Helena, Montana
Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Bernard Everett argued, Anaconda, Montana
-
Submitted: September 14, 1982
Decided: October 13, 1982
Filed: 0K 13 1982
T
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
Claimant-respondent petitioned the Workers ' Compensation
C o u r t f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and
a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to p a y
b e n e f i t s , i n J u l y , 1980. The Workers Compensation Court e n t e r e d
judgment for the c l a i m a n t on a l l i s s u e s . Defendant-appellant,
Anaconda Company appeals the judgment of the Workers
Compensation C o u r t .
C l a i m a n t was employed w i t h t h e Anaconda Company a s a b o i l e r -
m a k e r a t t h e B e r k l e y P i t i n B u t t e , Montana. On A u g u s t 2 3 , 1 9 7 8 ,
claimant was riding in a two and one-half ton truck in the
B e r k l e y P i t when t h e t r u c k c a u g h t f i r e . C l a i m a n t jumped o u t of
t h e t r u c k w i t h a f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r i n h i s hand and l a n d e d o n h i s
l e f t leg. C l a i m a n t i m m e d i a t e l y f e l t p a i n i n h i s lower b a c k and
l e f t leg.
On A u g u s t 2 4 , 1 9 7 8 , c l a i m a n t went t o see D r . J a m e s P . Murphy,
an orthopedic surgeon i n Butte, Montana, f o r treatment of his
lower b a c k and l e g p a i n . Dr. Murphy recommended c l a i m a n t u n d e r g o
a myelogram b u t c l a i m a n t r e f u s e d t o c o n s e n t to a myelogram and
asked f o r a second o p i n i o n . Dr. Murphy r e f e r r e d c l a i m a n t t o D r .
Johnson, a neurosurgeon , who examined c l a i m a n t on S e p t e m b e r 1 3 ,
1978. Dr. J o h n s o n found c l a i m a n t had s u f f e r e d a " l o w b a c k and
lower leg muscular ligamentous" injury but found no "neural
component" to c l a i m a n t s p a i n . Dr. Murphy t h e n r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t
and claimant was treated by Dr. Phillip A. Blom, D.C., a
chiropractor in Butte, Montana. Dr. Blom t r e a t e d c l a i m a n t from
S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 7 8 , u n t i l November 3 , 1 9 7 8 , f o r a " l u m b a r s a c r a l
strain with accompanying myofacitis and grade I1 radiculitis
left." On November 3 , 1 9 7 8 , D r . B l o m r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t to r e t u r n
t o work.
When claimant continued to complain of pain, Dr. Blom
r e f e r r e d him t o D r . David P . J a c o b s o n , a n o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n i n
M i s s o u l a , Montana. Dr. J a c o b s o n examined c l a i m a n t on November 7 ,
1 9 7 8 , and recommended c l a i m a n t r e t u r n t o f u l l y a c t i v e employment.
Claimant returned t o work as a boilermaker with the Anaconda
Company o n November 9 , 1 9 7 8 . C l a i m a n t t e s t i f i e d he had t o q u i t
a f t e r w o r k i n g o n l y f o u r h o u r s b e c a u s e of p a i n .
On November 1 0 , 1 9 7 8 , c l a i m a n t saw D r . Ladd D . R u t h e r f o r d , a n
orthopedic surgeon, in Bozeman, Montana. Claimant saw Dr.
Rutherford on two o c c a s i o n s a f t e r which D r . Rutherford advised
c l a i m a n t t h a t h e would n o t d o a n y damage t o h i m s e l f by r e t u r n i n g
to work but that he may have periodic back pain. Claimant
r e t u r n e d t o work w i t h t h e Anaconda Company as a b o i l e r m a k e r on or
a b o u t December 1, 1 9 7 8 . C l a i m a n t c o n t i n u e d w o r k i n g u n t i l March
1 9 7 9 , when c l a i m a n t q u i t b e c a u s e of p a i n .
On April 19, 1979, claimant went to work f o r Union Tank
Works, Inc., i n Missoula, Montana, as a b o i l e r m a k e r . Claimant
quit work a t Union Tank Works, Inc., on S e p t e m b e r 11, 1 9 7 9 .
S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , c l a i m a n t worked a t Weiss C o n s t r u c t i o n Company
f o r a p e r i o d o f e i g h t d a y s and q u i t when t h e j o b w a s f i n i s h e d .
On O c t o b e r 7, 1979, c l a i m a n t began working for Refractory
Construction, Inc. as a boilermaker. Claimant q u i t work on
O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1 9 7 9 , b e c a u s e of l o w b a c k p a i n . On O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 ,
claimant returned to Dr. Blom for treatment. Dr. Blom treated
c l a i m a n t on f o u r o c c a s i o n s .
On April 22, 1980, claimant went to work for Combustion
Engineering Company. Claimant was fired on April 29, 1980,
because of a p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f i c t with h i s employer. On December
1 3 , 1979, c l a i m a n t w a s examined b y D r . Arnold G . Peterson, an
o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n i n Missoula , Montana. Dr. Peterson s t a t e d ,
" [ h ] is h i s t o r y , [claimant's] , p h y s i c a l f i n d i n g s and x - r a y s [sic]
a r e a l l f a i r l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a musculoskeletal etiology for
his back pain and I s t r o n g l y doubt that it has a neurogenic
origin." Dr. P e t e r s o n s u g g e s t e d c l a i m a n t s h o u l d s e e k work t h a t
i s less l a b o r i n t e n s i v e .
When c l a i m a n t s u b m i t t e d D r . P e t e r s o n ' s r e p o r t to t h e Anaconda
Company's a d j u s t e r , it was r e q u e s t e d t h a t he be examined b y D r .
John H. Avery, an orthopedic surgeon i n Great F a l l s , Montana.
Dr. A v e r y s t a t e d c l a i m a n t had s u s t a i n e d a " s o f t t i s s u e i n j u r y to
the lumbosacral spine as a r e s u l t of his a c c i d e n t of August,
1978." Dr. Avery a d v i s e d c l a i m a n t f i n d work i n an occupation
w h i c h would n o t i n v o l v e e x c e s s i v e bending of h i s b a c k or h e a v y
lifting. However, the Anaconda Company still refused to pay
workers c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t or c l a i m a n t ' s m e d i c a l
expenses. Claimant t e s t i f i e d due to Anaconda's refusal t o pay
benefits or medical expenses, claimant exhausted all of his
s a v i n g s w h i c h amounted to o v e r $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 and l o s t h i s home and t w o
trucks.
I n J u l y 1980, claimant petitioned t h e Workers1 Compensation
C o u r t f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and
a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay
benefits. The Workers C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t found c l a i m a n t is p e r -
manently totally disabled, ordered the Anaconda Company pay
claimant's r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s and h e l d c l a i m a n t
was e n t i t l e d t o a 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n award f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e
delay and refusal to pay claimant permanent total disability
benefits. D e f e n d a n t , Anaconda Company, a p p e a l s t h e r u l i n g o f t h e
lower c o u r t .
The i s s u e s r a i s e d o n a p p e a l are a s f o l l o w s :
1. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the
claimant is p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y disabled because he could not
r e t u r n t o h i s f o r m e r o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r .
2. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the
lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t could not engage i n h i s
former occupation as a boilermaker since August 23, 1978.
3. W h e t h e r t h e l o w e r c o u r t e r r e d i n a w a r d i n g c l a i m a n t t h e 20
p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to p a y bene-
f i t s u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-2907 , MCA.
The Anaconda Company contends the lower court erred in
f i n d i n g c l a i m a n t t o be p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d b e c a u s e t h e
court did not apply the s t a t u t e properly. The s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g
permanent total d i s a b i l i t y is s e c t i o n 3 9 - 7 1 - 1 1 6 ( 1 3 ) , MCA, which
states:
" 'Permanent total disability means a con-
d i t i o n r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r y as d e f i n e d i n
t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t r e s u l t s i n t h e loss o f
a c t u a l earnings o r earning capacity t h a t
e x i s t s a f t e r t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r i s as f a r
r e s t o r e d a s t h e p e r m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r of t h e
i n j u r i e s w i l l p e r m i t and w h i c h r e s u l t s - -e
in th
w o r k e r -h a v i n g - -s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t o f f i n -
- no r e a
d i n g r e g u l a r employment o f a n y k i n d - t h e
-- h
n o r m a l l a b o r - a r k e t . ~ i s a F i 1 - s m b<-s-up-
m-
ported by a preponderance
- -
of medical
evidence. "- ( ~ m ~ h a s supplied. )
is
The Anaconda Company a r g u e s h e r e t h e l o w e r c o u r t made no f i n d i n g
that claimant had no reasonable prospect of finding regular
employment o f a n y k i n d i n t h e n o r m a l l a b o r m a r k e t and t h u s was i n
error. Instead, t h e lower c o u r t found c l a i m a n t " i s p e r m a n e n t l y
totally disabled from engaging in his normal occupation as a
boilermaker. "
A l t h o u g h c l a i m a n t may n o t be able to engage i n h i s normal
occupation a s a boilermaker, t h a t d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t
c l a i m a n t h a s a permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s
t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t h a v e no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r
employment of any kind in the normal l a b o r market before the
c o u r t can f i n d permanent total d i s a b i l i t y . I n Dunphy v . Anaconda
Co. (1968) 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d 660, t h i s Court h e l d , " [ t l h e
i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e m u s t f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e
p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, and if i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
s t a t u t e may be so d e t e r m i n e d , t h e c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and
a p p l y a n y o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ."
Claimant cites Brurud v. Judge Moving and Storage Co. &
Trans. I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 2 4 9 , 5 6 3 P.2d 5 5 8 , w h e r e t h i s
Court held:
"The s t a t u t e d o e s r e q u i r e t h a t h e h a v e no
reasonable prospect of finding regular
employment i n t h e n o r m a l l a b o r m a r k e t ; b u t it
d o e s n o t s e t o u t t h a t h e m u s t h a v e made a
r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t to s e c u r e s u c h employment.
I n some c a s e s , t h i s C o u r t c a n f o r e s e e t h e
f u t i l i t y of such an e f f o r t . " 1 7 2 Mont. a t
2 5 3 , 563 P.2d a t 560.
A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Brurud, s u p r a , i n some cases it would be
futile for a claimant t o e v e n a t t e m p t to f i n d employment. In
Brurud, supra, c l a i m a n t was a g e f i f t y - e i g h t a t t h e t i m e of the
i n j u r y and had r e a c h e d s i x t y - t w o by t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g . He
had been involved i n h e a v y l a b o r a l l of his life. The m e d i c a l
reports stated claimant was too old f o r h i s back i n j u r y t o be
fused or greatly improved. However, in the present case,
c l a i m a n t was a g e t h i r t y - t w o when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d and had
been trained as a mechanic and welder prior t o working as a
boilermaker. Here, t h e lower c o u r t made a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t
c o u l d n o t r e t u r n t o h i s n o r m a l o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . The
lower c o u r t d i d n o t make a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t had no r e a s o -
n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of a n y k i n d i n t h e
normal l a b o r market. T h u s , w e h o l d t h e lower c o u r t d i d n o t p r o -
perly apply section 39-71-116(13), MCA, and we remand to the
l o w e r c o u r t to make a f i n d i n g o f w h e t h e r c l a i m a n t h a s no r e a s o n -
a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment o f any k i n d i n the
normal l a b o r market.
The Anaconda Company n e x t a r g u e s t h e r e was n o t substantial
credible evidence to support the lower court's finding that
c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t e n g a g e i n h i s f o r m e r o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r -
maker. I n S t e f f e s v. 9 3 L e a s i n g C o . , Inc. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 8 3 ,
580 P.2d 450, t h i s Court stated: " [w] e c a n n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r
j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h e w e i g h t of t h e e v i -
d e n c e on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . Where t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e
t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e W o r k e r s 1 C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t , t h i s
Court cannot overturn the decision." Here, t h e g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s
of the d o c t o r s who examined c l a i m a n t was that he should find
l i g h t e r work i f he c o u l d n o t be c o m f o r t a b l e w h i l e w o r k i n g a s a
boilermaker. This Court will not reverse the lower court's
f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t r e t u r n t o work as a b o i l e r m a k e r ,
but again we note, t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a l o n e does not s u p p o r t a
f i n d i n g of permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y .
The n e x t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n a w a r d i n g
c l a i m a n t t h e 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u -
s a l t o p a y b e n e f i t s u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA. This section
states:
"--- r e a s e - award -- u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y o r
I n-c in -p
for -
r e f u s a l - -- .
to pay When payment of c o m p e n s a t i o n
h a s b e e n u n r e a s o n a b l y d e l a y e d o r r e f u s e d by a n
i n s u r e r , e i t h e r p r i o r or s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e
i s s u a n c e o f a n o r d e r by t h e w o r k e r s ' compen-
s a t i o n judge g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t compensation
b e n e f i t s , t h e f u l l amount o f t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n
b e n e f i t s d u e a c l a i m a n t , b e t w e e n t h e t i m e com-
p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s were d e l a y e d or r e f u s e d and
t h e d a t e o f t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t com-
p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s , may be i n c r e a s e d by t h e
."
w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e by 2 0 %
From and after the receipt by Anaconda of Dr. Peterson's
report, buttressed b y t h e r e p o r t of Dr. Avery, Anaconda should
have e n t e r t a i n e d no doubt t h a t c l a i m a n t w a s d i s a b l e d , even though
it questioned t h e t o t a l e x t e n t of h i s d i s a b i l i t y . C l a i m a n t was
entitled to compensation payments when the d o c t o r fs report
showed a d i s a b i l i t y . S e c t i o n 39-71-709, MCA. R e f u s a l to make
compensation payments to claimant by Anaconda in the circum-
s t a n c e s h e r e was u n r e a s o n a b l e , and t h e p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d i n sec-
t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA, may be a p p l i e d by t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e to
w h a t e v e r amount o f d i s a b i l i t y is e v e n t u a l l y awarded t o c l a i m a n t .
Claimant is likewise entitled to costs and attorney fees
u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-611 , MCA.
R e v e r s e d and remanded f o r f i n d i n g s and judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e
herewith.
(- - -
--' I
- s t i c=
-
Ju e %-
We concur:
Justices
- 7 -
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber specially concurring:
I agree with the holding of the majority opinion remanding
the cause to the Workers' Compensation Court to make a
finding on the absence of a reasonable prospect of finding
regular employment of any kind in the normal labor market;
and also agree with the majority conclusion that we will
not reverse the lower court's finding that claimant could
not return to work as a boilermaker.
I do not agree with the holding of the majority that
the twenty percent penalty allowed in section 39-71-2907,
MCA, necessarily should be applied. This conclusion appears
to me to be premature. We are sending the case back for
determination by the court as to the extent of the disability,
and do not know whether it will turn out to be permanent or
temporary, partial or full. Under those circumstances, I do
not believe it is appropriate to suggest that the reports
of Drs. Peterson and Avery are sufficient to warrant applica-
tion of the maximum penalty at this time. That appears
particularly true in the present case where we find a large
number of qualified medical experts who concluded that
claimant in fact did not have a disability and was free to
go back to work as a boilermaker.
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority opinion that a finding by the
Workers' Compensation Court that claimant was disabled from
performing work as a boilermaker is not sufficient to support
a finding of permanent total disability. However, there is
substantial credible evidence in the record to uphold the
finding of the Workers' Compensation Court that this claimant
did suffer from a total disability.
The majority correctly quotes section 39-71-116(13),
MCA, which sets forth the definition of permanent total
disability for workers' compensation purposes. That statute
requires that claimant show he has no reasonable prospect of
regular employment in the normal labor market.
Evidence was provided by claimant at the hearing in
this matter, that claimant was unable to hold any kind of
regular job due to the pain experienced by claimant. Claimant's
testimony is corroborated by testimony from a highly reputable
board certified orthopedic surgeon, Arnold Peterson, showing
that claimant suffered from a thirty-five percent disability.
This evidence, when combined with evidence of claimant's
lack of education and inability to qualify for employment
other than that of a boilermaker, provides substantial
credible evidence for a finding by the Workers' Compensation
Court that this claimant was permanently totally disabled.
It certainly would have been better for the Workers'
Compensation Court to make a specific factual finding supporting
the reason for its determination of permanent total disability.
However, we can imply such a finding. In light of the fact
that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed
in favor of the worker, I would imply such a finding in this
situation because there is certainly evidence in the record
to uphold the determination herein made.
I concur h Justice Morrison's dissent.
I