In Re the Marriage of Krause

No. 82-20
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
BARBAJPA J. KRAUSE,

Petitioner and Appellant,
and
LARRY KRAUSE,
Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone
Honorable William Speare, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Stephens & Cole, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Gary L. Beiswanger, Billinqs, Montana

Submitted on briefs: June 24, 1982
Decided: September 23, 1982
Filed: 8EP 23 "1382
M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
This is a n a p p e a l f r o m a judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of
the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l District, S t a t e of Montana, i n and for

the County of Yellowstone, dividing t h e marital a s s e t s of the
parties. The w i f e a p p e a l s .
The p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d o n O c t o b e r 1 8 , 1 9 7 4 , at Billings,

Montana. It was t h e second m a r r i a g e f o r both p a r t i e s . There
were no c h i l d r e n b o r n o f t h e m a r r i a g e , h o w e v e r , e a c h of t h e p a r -

t i e s h a s c h i l d r e n from t h e i r p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e . Barbara Krause

was t r a i n e d t o be a r e g i s t e r e d n u r s e b u t h a s n o t worked in that
c a p a c i t y s i n c e 1970. L a r r y K r a u s e p r e s e n t l y works a s a p e t r o l e u m

engineer. I n F e b r u a r y of 1977, Barbara p e t i t i o n e d f o r a d i v o r c e .

A decree of d i s s o l u t i o n was signed by the District Judge on
May 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 . The d e c r e e d i d n o t make a p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n ,

r a t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e x p r e s s l y r e s e r v e d j u r i s d i c t i o n to make
the disposition a t a later date.
D u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s p o o l e d t h e i r a s s e t s and made

investments. Principally, they invested in oil and gas

properties, three kinds of common stock, and real property
l o c a t e d on t h e B o u l d e r R i v e r . Only t h e above-mentioned assets
were d i s p u t e d a t t h e t r i a l ; t h e p a r t i e s h a v i n g p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d

on a division of the balance of the property.
By s t i p u l a t i o n of the p a r t i e s the District Court appointed a

S p e c i a l Master, a certified public accountant, f o r p u r p o s e s of

reporting to the Court on the following issues :
1. A s c e r t a i n i n g t h e n e t w o r t h of t h e r e s p e c -
t i v e p a r t i e s i n c l u d i n g a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a l l
a s s e t s owned o r a c q u i r e d b y t h e r e s p e c t i v e
parties;
D e t e r m i n i n g t h o s e a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s
. a t w e r e a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e
r r i a g e and t r a c i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
p r e m a r i t a l a s s e t s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s
a n d t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of mari-
t a l a s s e t s or p o s t - m a r i t a l a s s e t s ;
3. Providing a w r i t t e n r e p o r t t o the Court
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s o u r c e s or d e r i -
v a t i o n of the assets of the respective
parties.
( 2 ) w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d b y f a i l i n g to v a l u e a s s e t s

a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g ; and ( 3 ) whether t h e r e

was a w a n t o f c a n d o r and d i s c l o s u r e r e g a r d i n g financial infor-
m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s ?
I n r e l a t i o n to t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t :
( 1) her h u s b a n d ' s non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s were w r o n g l y con-

s i d e r e d as m o n e t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and ( 2 ) t h a t h e r n o n - m o n e t a r y

c o n t r i b u t i o n s were n o t c o n s i d e r e d . W e do n o t a g r e e w i t h e i t h e r

assertion.
Regarding h e r f i r s t assertion she points to her husband's

c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . During t h e m a r r i a g e ,
L a r r y K r a u s e was g i v e n t h e o p t i o n to t a k e a d e c r e a s e i n e a r n i n g s

i n r e t u r n f o r t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n w o r k i n g o i l and

gas interests. I n 1975 he took a c u t of $6.25 from h i s h o u r l y
consultants fee. Then i n 1 9 7 7 h e t o o k a n o t h e r c u t of $ 2 . 9 0 p e r
hour. T h e s e f o r e g o n e e a r n i n g s of t h e husband c o u p l e d w i t h a c a s h
c o n t r i b u t i o n of the wife resulted i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of the oil
and gas interests. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e c o s t of

acquiring these interests was $36,847; with $29,088 a t t r i-

butable to t h e husband I s f o r e g o n e e a r n i n g s and $ 7 , 7 5 9 a t t r i b u -
t a b l e t o the wife's cash contribution.
The a p p e l l a n t / w i f e c o n t e n d s it is e r r o r to " g i v e a n y m o n e t a r y

w e i g h t to non-monetary contributions. . ." I n o t h e r words, she
a r g u e s t h a t t h e f o r e g o n e e a r n i n g s were non-monetary contributions

and the District Court improperly assigned to them a dollar

value.
I n a l l of o u r p r e v i o u s c a s e s when w e s p o k e of non-monetary
c o n t r i b u t i o n s we were r e f e r r i n g to t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s which a r e
difficult to quantify in dollars and cents. For example, in
Eschenburg v. Eschenburg ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014,

we noted that a marriage is much more than a business

r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t h e 3 2 - y e a r m a r r i a g e i n c l u d e d
raising f o u r c h i l d r e n , managing the household, entertaining at

social activities, and volunteering services to activities
The S p e c i a l Master c o m p l e t e d h i s r e p o r t o n J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1 9 8 1 . The

r e p o r t s e t o u t t h e o r i g i n a l a c q u i s i t i o n cost of t h e v a r i o u s pro-

perties and the contribution of each party. Also, the fair

market value at or near the time o f divorce is indicated and

d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e amount of their

contribution at the t i m e of a c q u i s i t i o n . The p e r t i n e n t p a r t of

t h e r e p o r t is s e t o u t b e l o w :

Larry Barbara
-- - - - - o t a l
T Krause K r a u s e --
- -- -

2000 S h a r e s E n e r g y
Resources Stock $ 4,109.85 2,339.81 1,770.04
V a l u e 5/17/78 18,000.00 10,247.40 7,752.60

300 S h a r e s C o n t i n e n t a l
Group S t o c k 8,599.68 2,010.89 6,588.79
V a l u e 5/17/78 9,375.00 2,191.88 7,183.12

100 S h a r e s S i m p l i c i t y
Pattern 1,639.50 383.37 1,251.63
V a l u e 5/17/78 1,375.00 321.48 1,053.52

Boulder Property
V a l u e 5/17/78

O i l Properties
V a l u e 1/1/79

T o t a l Cost Values 66,169.66 41,322.56 24,869.60
T o t a l F a i r Market Value
@ 5/31/78 $119,164.00 78,924.37 40,239.63

On March 3, 1981, the property distribution part of their

case was h e a r d b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The c o u r t made f i n d -

i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law on J u n e 22 and e n t e r e d i t s
judgment o n S e p t e m b e r 1 6 .
The c o u r t awarded 6 5 p e r c e n t of the i n t e r e s t i n t h e o i l and

g a s p r o p e r t i e s to L a r r y K r a u s e and t h e b a l a n c e to B a r b a r a K r a u s e ;

e a c h w a s awarded 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e Boulder River property; and

t w o o f t h e common s t o c k s , E n e r g y R e s o u r c e s and C o n t i n e n t a l G r o u p ,
were s p l i t 6 5 p e r c e n t and 35 p e r c e n t t o L a r r y and B a r b a r a respec-

tively. The r e m a i n i n g s t o c k , S i m p l i c i t y P a t t e r n , w a s awarded to

Barbara. The p e t i t i o n e r , Barbara Krause , was u n s a t i s f i e d with

t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n and a p p e a l s t o t h i s C o u r t .

The a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s : (1)whether t h e District

C o u r t e r r e d i n i t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;
related to the husband's career. In the case of B i e g a l k e v.

Biegalke ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 311, 316, 564 P.2d 987, 990, non-
monetary contributions of the wife included "wearing out her
wedding band c h o p p i n g wood, turning bales i n the field, [and]

c h a s i n g c a t t l e on f o o t . . ." Again, i n I n R e M a r r i a g e of K a a s a
(1979), 181 Mont. 1 8 , 23, 591 P.2d 1110, 1113 non-monetary
contributions were described as follows: "she helped move

cattle out to pasture, hauled cattle by trucks, helped with
branding, c o o k e d f o r t h e crews, r a i s e d c h i c k e n s and was r e s p o n -
s i b l e f o r the family garden ."
We believe it is these kinds of contributions that the

l e g i s l a t u r e had i n mind when t h e y e n a c t e d s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA,

w h i c h m a n d a t e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f " c o n t r i b u t i o n [ s ] o f a s p o u s e as a

homemaker o r t o t h e f a m i l y u n i t . " W e do n o t i n t e n d to p r e c i s e l y
define non-monetary contributions . Such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are the
p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e hold t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court

properly considered the respondent's f o r e g o n e e a r n i n g s as mone-
tary contributions toward the acquisition of the oil and gas

interests. Indeed, t h e y are m e a s u r e d a c c u r a t e l y i n d o l l a r s and

cents and it is d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e i v e of them as a n y t h i n g b u t
monetary.
The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t h e r n o n - m o n e t a r y c o n t r i-

butions were not considered. A t the trial the appellant
t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e term of t h e m a r r i a g e s h e m a i n t a i n e d t h e

h o u s e , k e p t it c l e a n , p r o v i d e d meals, d i d t h e s h o p p i n g , c a r e d f o r

t h e c h i l d r e n , d i d i r o n i n g , h e l p e d w i t h lawn c a r e , and w a s a c t i v e
i n s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o t h e husband I s business. Obviously
t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are s u b s t a n t i a l . However, w e f i n d n o e r r o r .
T h i s Court h a s s t a t e d innumerable t i m e s t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court
had broad d i s c r e t i o n i n d i v i d i n g t h e marital estate. "The test

for reviewing the District Court's discretion is : Did the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e of its d i s c r e t i o n act a r b i t r a r i l y

without employment of conscientious j udgement , o r exceed the

bounds of r e a s o n i n view of a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? " C o n v e r s e v.
Converse (1982), -- -.- Mont . -- -- - I
--- . ---
-
, 6 4 5 P.2d 413, 415,

39 S t .Rep, 8 8 7 , 889; Levandowski v. Levandowski (1981),

-- Mont . --. - -.-
-. , 630 P.2d 2 3 9 , 38 S t . R e p . 1002; In Re Marriage

of Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361; Ze11 v . Ze11

( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33. We f i n d no e r r o r w i t h t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n i t s e v a l u a t i o n of the various contributions to

the marriage.

The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s " t h e c o u r t 1s f i n d i n g s d i d n o t

address i t s e l f to t h e e f f e c t or t h e w e i g h t t h a t was t o be g i v e n
B a r b a r a 1s non-mone t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s ." Presumably t h e a p p e l l a n t

c o n s i d e r s s u c h an o m i s s i o n as r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e do n o t a g r e e .

" ' F i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law p r o -
v i d e a f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e c o u r t ' s judgment.
M a r r i a g e o f B a r r o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 1 6 1 , 580
P.2d 9 3 6 . T h i s f o u n d a t i o n need n o t c o n s i s t
o f a m u l t i t u d e of e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s , b u t t h e
f i n d i n g s of f a c t must set f o r t h a r e c o r d a t i o n
o f t h e e s s e n t i a l and d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t s upon
w h i c h t h e c o u r t r e s t e d i t s c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w
a n d w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e j u d g m e n t would l a c k
support. J o n e s v. J o n e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) f Mon t .
---- , 620 P.2d 8 5 0 , 37 S t . R e p . 197T.-i-"-

-n v -e ,
C o- r s
e supra, 645 P.2d at 416, 39 St.Rep. at 890.

As the second issue, the appellant alleges error by the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r t h e o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s

properly. Error is alleged through a two-pronged argument,

first, " f o r f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r t h e income t h a t was d e r i v e d from

t h e marital o i l and g a s p r o p e r t i e s a n d , second; t h a t t h e c o u r t

e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r a n y v a l u e f o r a d d i t i o n a l o i l and g a s

assets acquired as a r e s u l t of income e a r n e d from w h a t was a n

agreed marital asset ." This situation is one of first

impression, consequently a more detailed v i e w of the facts is

necessary.

A s n o t e d a b o v e , when t h e p a r t i e s were d i v o r c e d i n May of 1 9 7 8

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e s e r v e d j u r i s d i c t i o n to a p p o r t i o n t h e m a r i t a l

property. From the divorce to the hearing on property

distribution, thirty-four months elapsed. During this thirty-

f o u r month p e r i o d t h e h u s b a n d had c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o i l and g a s

properties. The p r o p e r t i e s c o n s i s t e d of "working interests" in
twenty-three o i l and g a s w e l l s , t w e n t y of which were p r o d u c i n g .
The p r o p e r t i e s g e n e r a t e d income and more " w o r k i n g i n t e r e s t s " were

purchased. L a r r y K r a u s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e d i v o r c e he had
p u r c h a s e d i n t e r e s t s i n t e n to t w e n t y a d d i t i o n a l w e l l s . The f u n d s

t o p u r c h a s e t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s came from two s o u r c e s ; h i s

income as a c o n s u l t a n t , and from income g e n e r a t e d from t h e o r i g i -
n a l twenty producing w e l l s . I t was t h e w i f e ' s c o n t e n t i o n a t t h e

trial court that s h e be allowed to s h a r e e q u a l l y i n b o t h the
income r e a l i z e d from t h e o r i g i n a l t w e n t y wells and t h e a d d i t i o n a l
interests purchased with the income of the original twenty.

B e f o r e a d d r e s s i n g t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w e f i n d it n e c e s s a r y to e v a l u -

ate the circumstances which generated this issue.
T h i s p r o b l e m a r i s e s b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s a t i m e l a p s e of t h i r t y -

f o u r m o n t h s b e t w e e n t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n and t h e h e a r i n g o n

property distribution. The r e c o r d d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a n y j u s t i f i-
c a t i o n f o r such a lengthy d e l a y . Even i f t h e t i m e d e l a y had n o t

caused complications in the valuation of the property, this
s i t u a t i o n should not occur. Here t h e p a r t i e s were d i v o r c e d f o r
n e a r l y t h r e e y e a r s y e t t h e y s t i l l owned p r o p e r t y as i f t h e y were

h u s b a n d and w i f e .
A District Court may postpone d i s p o s i t i o n of the marital
property. The authority is found in section 40-4-104, MCA,

which r e a d s i n p a r t :
"The D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h a l l e n t e r a d e c r e e of
dissolution if:

". . . the c o u r t has considered, approved, o r
made p r o v i s i o n f o r . . . t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of
prope;ty o r p r o v i d-- - a s e p a r a t e , --- r
ed f o r late
h e a r i n g -c o m p l e t e t h e s e m a t t e r s . "
to (Emphasis
added. )
The comments t o t h i s s e c t i o n s t a t e :
"The p h r a s e , c o n s i d e r e d , a p p r o v e d , or pro-
vided f o r ' i n subsection . . . ( l ) ( d ) is
intended to confer upon the court the
a u t h o r i t y t o r e f u s e to make a n y a w a r d , i f t h e
e v i d e n c e j u s t i f i e s a n o u t r i g h t d e n i a l , as well
a s t h e a u t h o r i t y to make s u c h a l l o t m e n t a s t h e
facts require. To a v o i d a n y d o u b t , t h e c o u r t
is a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s l y to p r o v i d e f o r a
l a t e r h e a r i n g t o c o m p l e t e a c t i o n on t h e s e
m a t t e r s , - -c e s s a r y . "
i f ne (Emphasis added. )
C o m m i s s i o n e r l s N o t e , ~ h n o t a t i o n s to MCA, T i t l e
4 0 , F a m i l y Law, p. 4 9 .
 Once before w e have focused on t h e l a n g u a g e of subsection

(l)(d). I n M i l l e r v. Miller ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -- .- Mont . ----I , 616
P.2d 313, 3 1 8 , 37 S t . R e p . 1523, 1528; t h e a p p e l l a n t claimed t h a t
i t was error t o s e p a r a t e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n a s p e c t o f the marriage
from t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n . T h i s C o u r t d e n i e d t h a t claim and
stated: " t h e i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e and j u d i c i a l economy are b e s t
s e r v e d by g i v i n g D i s t r i c t C o u r t s b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e c o n d u c t

o f t h e i r p r o c e e d i n g s and t h e s e v e r a n c e o f t h e v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of
d i s s o l u t i o n decrees."
Nonetheless we do not view the statute and comments as

a l l o w i n g a n i n d e f i n i t e p o s t p o n e m e n t of the property disposition.

The l a n g u a g e is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The c o u r t c a n p o s t p o n e matters
only if it h a s " p r o v i d e d f o r a separate later hearing." I n our

view, "provide for" means t o make arrangements for. Making

arrangements includes the setting of a date or a time period
which is a g r e e a b l e between t h e p a r t i e s . To d o o t h e r w i s e is to

unnecessarily punish the parties. An indefinite postponement

merely places the parties in limbo and creates appellate
problems.
Furthermore, a p o s t p o n e m e n t s h o u l d n o t be a r o u t i n e m a t t e r .

The comments n o t e t h a t p o s t p o n e m e n t is a u t h o r i z e d " i f n e c e s s a r y . "
C e r t a i n l y t h e r e a r e c a s e s w h e r e p o s t p o n e m e n t of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i -

b u t i o n o r o t h e r matters is i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i e s .
However, it s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t d e l a y i s " n e c e s s a r y . " Present
C o l o r a d o law s u g g e s t s a b a l a n c e d approach. T h e i r s t a t u t e also

allows District Court discretion in postponement of property
d i s t r i b u t i o n , yet t h a t d i s c r e t i o n is l i m i t e d . T h e i r comparable
v e r s i o n of o u r s u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( d ) r e a d s :
"The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h a l l e n t e r a d e c r e e of
d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e when:

lution . . .
" ( b ) I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h e v e r y d e c r e e of d i s s o -
the court shall consider,
a p p r o v e , o r make p r o v i s i o n f o r . . . the
d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y ; b u t t h e e n t r y o f a
- ree with respect t o
dec - ... dispositionoF
p r o p e r t y - -e d e f e r r e d by t h e c o u r t u n t i l a
may b
t i m e s u b s e q u e n t to t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n
o f m a r r i a g e -- -
upon - - n g - -s u c h d e f e r r a l
a findi that
is n e c e s s a r y - - - s t i n t e r e s t s - -
--
in the be - of t h e
 parties." Colo . R e v . S t a t . section 14-10-106
( 1973) .
T h i s r e q u i r e s t h e C o l o r a d o c o u r t s to make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s

of necessity before deferring property distribution. "It is
c l e a r t h a t the reason f o r the requirement f o r a s p e c i f i c finding

o n t h i s i s s u e is t o p r e v e n t u n w a r r a n t e d d e l a y s i n d i v i d i n g p r o -
p e r t y i n d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e c a s e s . " I n R e M a r r i a g e of R o s e

(1977)r 40 Co10.App. 176, 177, 574 P.2d 112, 113.
I n summary, w e e n c o u r a g e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s to c o n c l u d e a l l m a t -

ters upon e n t r y o f a d e c r e e of dissolution. In those unusual
cases where the trial court is not able to provide for the
property disposition at the time of dissolution, the District

C o u r t m u s t make w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s t h a t a p o s t p o n e m e n t of t h e p r o -
perty disposition is in the best interests of the parties.

Furthermore, the District Court must "provide for a separate
later hearing" by either setting a specific hearing date to
c o m p l e t e matters o r by s e t t i n g a t i m e p e r i o d w i t h i n which the
parties must come before the court for final disposition.

W e do n o t i n t e n d to set p r e c i s e t i m e l i m i t s . Such d e c i s i o n s
are w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Furthermore, we

do not hold t h a t an unwarranted delay w i l l result in a faulty

D i s t r i c t C o u r t judgment. However, i n t h i s case, t h e u n w a r r a n t e d
delay coupled with valuation factors resulted i n an abuse of

discretion. Part of the problem results from the District

Court's timing of the property valuation. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
r e l i e d on t h e S p e c i a l Master's r e p o r t which v a l u e d t h e o i l and

g a s i n t e r e s t s e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 7 9 , s e v e n months a f t e r t h e
dissolution. All of the other contested property was valued
e f f e c t i v e May 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 , t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n .
As to the time of v a l u a t i o n we have s a i d , " [tlhe time for
proper valuation cannot be tied to any single event in the

dissolution process. The filing of a petition, trial of the

m a t t e r , o r e v e n t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n d o n o t

c o n t r o l t h e p r o p e r p o i n t of e v a l u a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court."

L i p p e r t v. Lippert (1981), - .- Mont . ---I , 627 P.2d 1 2 0 6 ,
1 2 0 8 , 38 S t . R e p . 625, 628. Furthermore, we indicated t h a t t h e r e

c a n be s e v e r a l v a l u a t i o n p o i n t s r a t h e r t h a n o n e s i n g l e p o i n t f o r

a l l of the property. This is s o b e c a u s e some a s s e t s may f l u c -
tuate in value. Although Lippert
A did not involve a post-

dissolution property distribution the same rule applies and

e x t e n d s beyond t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d a t e . Thus, i n these f a c t s , the

time of the dispositional hearing on March 3, 1981, was a

feasible and allowable point to determine valuation.

Furthermore, i t was the preferable point i n v i e w of the often

s t a t e d r u l e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s g n e t w o r t h m u s t be d e t e r m i n e d a t o r

n e a r t h e t i m e of the divorce. S e e H a m i l t o n v. Hamilton (1980),

Mon t . -- , 607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247; V i v i a n v. V i v i a n
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 341, 5 8 3 P.2d 1072; I n R e M a r r i a g e of Kramer
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439; Downs v . Downs (1976)I 170

Mont. 1 5 0 , 5 5 1 P.2d 1025. The c r u x of the above-cited cases is
that property valuation should occur at the time of property

distribution, or in other words, emphasis is on current

valuations. This reasoning is e v i d e n t i n Herring v. Herring

(19791I Mont . , 6 0 2 P.2d 1 0 0 6 , 1 0 0 7 , 36 S t . R e p .
2052, 2054, where we remanded since " t h e r e was no attempt to

place a present, f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e upon t h e s e i t e m s o r to d e t e r -

m i n e t h e n e t w o r t h of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i r d i v o r c e . "

Additionally, i n E v e r t v. Evert (1982)f Mont .- -- -- -- , 645

P.2d 417, 39 S t . R e p . 8 6 0 , w e remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r

failure to "place current values on the partiesg assets." In

t h a t case t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded a h o u s e and a 2% a c r e p a r c e l

of land based o n l y upon t h e e q u i t y b u i l t by t h e p a r t i e s r a t h e r

t h a n any v a l u a t i o n f i g u r e .

From t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n s e v e r a l p r i n c i p l e s are e v i d e n t ;

( 1 ) p r o p e r v a l u a t i o n is n o t t i e d to a s p e c i f i c e v e n t , (2) there

may be more t h a n o n e v a l u a t i o n p o i n t , d e p e n d i n g upon t h e k i n d of

p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d , and ( 3 ) p r e f e r a b l y , valuation should occur a t

the t i m e of distribution, or, stated a n o t h e r way, present fair

market values s h o u l d be used. In given f a c t s i t u a t i o n s , these
p r i n c i p l e s con£ l i c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r . When o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e many

d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of marital p r o p e r t y and t h e a s s o c i a t e d problems

o f v a l u a t i o n i t is o b v i o u s t h a t a h a r d and f a s t r u l e s h o u l d n o t

be imposed. Thus, we cannot rule that District Courts must

a l w a y s v a l u e p r o p e r t y a t t h e t i m e of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Time and t i m e

again we have said it is the District Court that has broad

d i s c r e t i o n in property d i s t r i b u t i o n . I n S e l l v. S e l l ( 1 9 8 1 ) , --

Mont. 6 3 0 P.2d 222, 224, 38 S t . R e p 9 5 6 , 958, we
stated: " [ t l h i s c o u r t h a s a l i m i t e d s c o p e of a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w
and will not intervene except when the District Court has

d e p a r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h e norms o f e q u i t y . " "The e x e r c i s e

o f d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is n e c e s s a r y when d e t e r m i n i n g

t h e w o r t h o f m a r i t a l a s s e t s which f l u c t u a t e i n v a l u e . " Lippert,

627 P.2d a t 1 2 0 8 , 38 S t . R e p . a t 628. I n t h i s case we f i n d t h a t

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e v a l u a t i o n of the

contested marital property. The record indicates substantial

differences in the value of some of the property from the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n d a t e s to t h e t i m e o f t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l

hearing. For example, t h e E n e r g y R e s o u r c e s s t o c k was v a l u e d a t

$ 1 8 , 0 0 0 o n May 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 , t h e d a t e of dissolution. The D i s t r i c t

Court used t h i s value in its d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Testimony a t t h e

dispositional hearing showed its present value at $31,000.

F a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e s e k i n d s of v a l u e f l u c t u a t i o n s is e r r o r .

On remand t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d a c c e p t e v i d e n c e on c u r r e n t

valuations of all of the contested marital property.

Specifically, the appellant alleges error for the District

Court's f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r b o t h t h e o i l and g a s income and t h e

additional acquisitions. I n a p p e l l a n t ' s view, t h e s e assets are

p a r t of t h e marital estate. W e agree.

The case o f Lippert is c i t e d i n s u p p o r t of t h i s contention.

T h e r e t h e h u s b a n d t o o k $ 9 6 , 0 0 0 o f t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y to i n v e s t

in a business. The business went bad and the i n v e s t m e n t was

lost. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e $ 9 6 , 0 0 0 a s p a r t of the

m a r i t a l e s t a t e e v e n t h o u g h i t was n o t i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f
dissolution. The j u d g m e n t o r d e r e d t h e husband t o p a y t h e w i f e a

sum of $48,000, one-half of the amount that was lost. We

r e v e r s e d s t a t i n g t h a t " t h e award i g n o r e s f u n d a m e n t a l l e g a l p r i n -
c i p l e s o f m a r i t a l s t a t u s ; s p o u s e s p o s s e s s m u t u a l powers, o b l i g a -

tions and interests which endure until lawfully modified or
terminated. One o f t h o s e p o w e r s is t h e power t o f r e e l y c o n t r a c t

w i t h o t h e r s r e g a r d i n g marital p r o p e r t y . " - pert,
Lip
- 627 P.2d at

1209, 38 St.Rep. at 629. That reasoning applies to this
situation. The a p p e l l a n t was n e v e r d i v e s t e d o f h e r i n t e r e s t i n
t h e marital p r o p e r t y . She r e t a i n e d a m u t u a l i n t e r e s t e v e n t h o u g h

the r e s p o n d e n t was in c o n t r o l of the property. It cannot be
disputed ; the appellant held an interest in income-generating
property. T h a t i n c o m e , o f which s h e had a n i n t e r e s t , was r e i n -
v e s t e d t o a c q u i r e more a s s e t s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t she also h a s an

interest in those a d d i t i o n a l assets. In effect, the District
C o u r t f a i l e d to v a l u e a l l of t h e marital assets, c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e

case m u s t be remanded. T e f f t v. T e f f t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. I

628 P.2d 1 0 9 4 , 38 S t . R e p . 8 3 7 ; Hamiton v. H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont . - - - .- , 607 P.2d 1 0 2, 37 St.Rep. 247.
The record indicates that the additional interests were
purchased i n p a r t f r o m t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s own e a r n i n g s . Also, it

may be that the respondent acquired the additional interests

through careful and prudent management. These contri b u tions

deserve careful consideration.
F i n a l l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e was a l a c k o f can-

d o r and d i s c l o s u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n f a i l i n g t o or
intentionally refusing to provide i n £ ormat i o n concerning the
a d d i t i o n a l o i l and g a s i n t e r e s t s . The r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u b s t a n -

t i a t e s u c h a claim. P r e s u m a b l y t h e a p p e l l a n t hoped to g e t t h i s
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e day of t r i a l t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y of Robert
Nance , the respondent's business associate. It was learned the

day before trial that Mr. Nance c o u l d n o t a t t e n d , thus hurried
a r r a n g e m e n t s were made t o t a k e h i s d e p o s i t i o n . D u r i n g t h e depo-

s i t i o n t h e following exchange occurred:
 "Q. Has L a r r y K r a u s e a c q u i r e d o i l and g a s
i n t e r e s t s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e t h a t are s e t
o u t i n t h e s e t h r e e e x h i b i t s t h a t are b e f o r e
y o u s i n c e t h e d a t e of t h e l a s t a c q u i s i t i o n of
the interests listed there? A. Oh, b o y , I
would s a y y e s , b u t I d o n ' t know t h a t f o r a
f a c t because I d o n ' t keep up w i t h L a r r y ' s
e n d e a v o r s as f a r as o u r p a r t i c i p a t i o n is con-
cerned. I would h a v e t o go b a c k and c h e c k o u r
b l o w s h e e t s as t o who g o t w h a t i n w h a t w e l l s .
I d o n ' t k e e p t h a t r i g h t o n t h e t i p of my
tongue.
"Q. Who would h a v e a c c e s s to t h o s e r e c o r d s to
determine the additional i n t e r e s t s t h a t Larry
would h a v e a c q u i r e d , s a y s i n c e May of 1 9 7 8 ?
A. W e l l , my b o o k k e e p e r w o u l d .

"Q. What is h e r name? A. M a r l e n e Conrad ."
Then, t h e morning of the trial, Mr. Nance's bookkeeper w a s

s e r v e d w i t h a s u b p o e n a d u c e s tecum. However, t h e b o o k k e e p e r d i d
not appear with the desired documents because she f e l t s h e d i d

n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o produce t h e r e c o r d s of M r . Nance. The
appellant further sought this information from the respondent

during trial where the following exchange occurred:
"8. Have you a c q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l p r o d u c i n g
i n t e r e s t s from income t h a t was g e n e r a t e d from
t h o s e o r i g i n a l 20 w e l l s ? A. Income f r o m
t h o s e wells and income t h a t I ' v e made on con-
s u l t i n g , yes. I have a c q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l
wells.
"Q. Do you know how many a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s
you have a c q u i r e d ? A. Not j u s t o f f h a n d . I
would be g u e s s i n g w h a t it i s , b e c a u s e I r e a l l y
d o n ' t know f o r s u r e .

"Q. Would it be more t h a n 20? A. No.

"Q. Would it be less t h a n t e n ? A. I would
s a y b e t w e e n 1 0 a n d 20, somewhere in that
range."
These f a c t s taken t o g e t h e r c e r t a i n l y do not substantiate a
l a c k of c a n d o r or d i s c l o s u r e . A r e v i e w of the D i s t r i c t Court's
f i l e c e r t a i n l y shows o t h e r w i s e . Similar information was sought
by the appellant early in the action through the use of
interrogatories. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s a n s w e r s were v e r y c o m p l e t e i n
those early instances and there is n o t h i n g to suggest t h a t at

t r i a l he would n o t h a v e b e e n as c o m p l e t e g i v e n a d e q u a t e t i m e to

p r e p a r e t h e in£o r m a t i o n .
The judgment is v a c a t e d and remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s .
We c o n c u r :