No. 81-94
I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA
F H F
1982
STATE O M N A A
F O T N ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
vs.
DARRELL ROSS PLOUFFE,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a
Honorable James W h e e l i s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
Hood and Sherwood, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Randi Hood a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
J. Mark Murphy a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
R o b e r t L. Deschamps 111, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Ed McLean a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
Submitted: March 29, 1982
Decided: J u n e 1 5 , 1982
Filed: J N 15 19'2
U
aAim.WB.&*
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
D e f e n d a n t , D a r r e l l R. Plouffe, appeals h i s deliberate
h o m i c i d e c o n v i c t i o n and t h e d e n i a l by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f
t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , M i s s o u l a C o u n t y , of h i s m o t i o n
t o s u p p r e s s s t a t e m e n t s h e made t o p o l i c e .
On J u n e 6, 1980, d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d for parole
violation. On June 9, 1980, defendant was charged with
d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a s provided i n s e c t i o n 45-5-102, MCA.
D e f e n d a n t was a r r a i g n e d b e f o r e a M i s s o u l a County J u s t i c e o f
the Peace on June 10, 1980, and, on that same d a y , the
p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n c h a r g e was d r o p p e d .
On J u l y 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , an i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d c h a r g i n g
defendant with d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Defendant pleaded not
guilty. Defendant's motion t o s u p p r e s s s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n t o
t h e p o l i c e was d e n i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on S e p t e m b e r 8 ,
1980.
A jury trial was held from September 15 t o 19; a
g u i l t y v e r d i c t was r e t u r n e d on S e p t e m b e r 19. D e f e n d a n t made
s e v e r a l motions t o dismiss: the f i r s t a t t h e c l o s e of the
S t a t e ' s case; t h e s e c o n d a t t h e c l o s e o f h i s own c a s e ; and
the third after the guilty verdict was returned, A 11
motions to dismiss were denied by the District Court.
D e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o f o r t y y e a r s i n t h e Flontana S t a t e
P r i s o n , with twenty y e a r s suspended.
In t h e e a r l y a f t e r n o o n of June 5, 1980, Rena Evans
was found dead in her trailer. The cause of death was
manual strangulation, occurring sometime between 9 : 00 p.m.
on J u n e 4 and 6: 47 a.m. on J u n e 5.
The trailer was described generally as "neat as a
pin," w i t h no s i g n o f a s t r u g g l e h a v i n g t a k e n p l a c e . Evans
was clothed in a red housecoat, zipped to the neck. A
w a l l e t was found u n d e r n e a t h t h e c o u c h i n t h e t r a i l e r . The
w a l l e t c o n t a i n e d t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p a p e r s and t h e d r i v e r ' s
l i c e n s e of the defendant, a s well a s t h e b u s i n e s s c a r d of
the defendant's parole officer.
On t h e e v e n i n g o f J u n e 5 , t h e M i s s o u l a County S h e r i f f
contacted the defendant's parole officer. O t h e grounds
n
t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s w a l l e t was found a t the scene of a homi-
c i d e , t h e p a r o l e o f f i c e r a u t h o r i z e d an o r a l p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n
warrant. A w r i t t e n warrant was e x e c u t e d on t h e morning o f
J u n e 6.
On t h e morning of June 6 , d e f e n d a n t was s t a y i n g a t
the r e s i d e n c e of B r e t t Tandy, S t a c y L a v i n and Joe Phelps,
who l i v e d a t No. 9 South Caravan i n a t r a i l e r c o u r t a c r o s s
from d e f e n d a n t ' s listed residence a t No. 3 South Caravan.
khile a t No. 9 South Caravan, on the morning of June 6,
defendant mixed some Drano with milk and drank it.
D e f e n d a n t l e f t b e h i n d a n o t e which r e a d s :
"Brett & Stacy,
"Take c a r e o f Toke [ d e f e n d a n t ' s d o g ] . I'm
n o t g o i n g t o l e t my l i f e be c a g e d a s I would
o n l y have t h a t c h o s e [ s i c ] & I c a n ' t t a l k o r
I ' d end up Ded [ s i c ] . Love ya a l l . Take
c a r e and e n j o y l i f e .
" I d i d n ' t do i t . Three guy o u t of s t a t e . "
The l a s t two s e n t e n c e s o f the note a r e written with seem-
i n g l y l e s s c o n t r o l t h a n t h e main body o f t h e n o t e .
B r e t t Tandy f o u n d d e f e n d a n t a f t e r h e d r a n k t h e Drano
and called an ambulance. Defendant was taken to St.
P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l t h a t a f t e r n o o n o f J u n e 6 , 1980.
Two police officers talked with defendant in the
h o s p i t a l emergency room. The t a p e o f t h i s interview indi-
c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a s k e d , "Can you t e l l me what hap-
pened and what d i d you t a k e ? " The d e f e n d a n t was u n a b l e t o
respond v e r b a l l y . On t h e recording, t h e defendant can be
heard gagging, clearing his throat, and spitting. The
officer then asked defendant if he wished to write his
answers. E v i d e n t l y t h e d e f e n d a n t began t o w r i t e h i s a n s w e r s
since a few m i n u t e s l a t e r the officer said, "So t h e y w i l l
k i l l you, i f you s a y a n y t h i n g . " T h e r e i s more w r i t i n g and
and t h e o f f i c e r a s k s , "Who's t h e y ? ' '
Testimony a t the suppression hearing suggests t h a t
a b o u t t h i s t i m e t h e emergency room d o c t o r e n t e r e d and a s k e d
t h a t t h e t a p e be t u r n e d o f f w h i l e h e examined d e f e n d a n t .
After the tape recorder was turned back on, the
officer informed defendant that he was at St. Patrick's
Hospital and i t was a b o u t 4 : 0 0 in the afternoon. At t h i s
p o i n t , t h e o f f i c e r showed t h e d e f e n d a n t a n a d v i c e o f r i g h t s
form and e x p l a i n e d i t t o him. Upon a s k i n g d e f e n d a n t i f h e
understood t h e form, t h e o f f i c e r s a i d , ". . . y o u ' r e nodding
y e s , t h a t you do u n d e r s t a n d t h o s e [ t h e r i g h t s ] ." The d e f e n -
d a n t t h e n s i g n e d t h e w a i v e r o f r i g h t s and p r o c e e d e d t o w r i t e
h i s responses to police questions.
I n c l u d i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w a t t h e emergency roorn, d e f e n -
dant was interviewed by authorities five times. He was
i n t e r r o g a t e d by p o l i c e i n t h e e v e n i n g o f J u n e 6 , and a g a i n
on J u n e 7 . Defendant's parole o f f i c e r i n t e r v i e w e d him on
June 9. On June 26, d e f e n d a n t was a g a i n interrogated by
police, but defendant had his attorneys present. Guards
were a s s i g n e d t o w a t c h d e f e n d a n t on t h e e v e n i n g o f J u n e 6 .
V i s i t o r s and t e l e p h o n e c a l l s were r e s t r i c t e d .
The S t a t e , throughout its case, h a s emphasized the
d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n by d e f e n d a n t . Def en-
d a n t ' s f i n a l n a r r a t i o n o f what h a p p e n e d on t h e n i g h t o f J u n e
4-5 is summarized a s f o l l o w s :
D e f e n d a n t was o u t d r i n k i n g w i t h f r i e n d s u n t i l
the bars closed. I n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s
o f J u n e 5 , he s t op p e d a t Evans' t r a i l e r . De-
f e n d a n t and Evans engaged i n s e x u a l i n t e r -
course. Soon t h e r e a f t e r , two men e n t e r e d t h e
residence. One man was w e a r i n g a b u r g u n d y
l o n g - s l e e v e down j a c k e t and b l u e j e a n s ; t h e
o n l y c l o t h i n g d e f e n d a n t c o u l d remember a b o u t
t h e s e c o n d man was t h a t h e was a l s o w e a r i n g
blue jeans.
The man i n t h e g o o s e down j a c k e t walked o v e r
t o Evans; t a l k e d w i t h h e r , and s l a p p e d h e r .
A t t h i s t i m e , t h e s e c o n d man p u l l e d d e f e n d a n t
t o t h e f l o o r and k i c k e d him. D e f e n d a n t was
t o l d n o t t o s a y a n y t h i n g o r he and h i s g i r l -
f r i e n d , J a n i c e , would g e t h u r t .
D e f e n d a n t t h e n l e f t Evans' t r a i l e r , went b a c k
t o h i s t r a i l e r and d r a n k some s c h n a p p s ' .
About a h a l f h o u r l a t e r , h e r e t u r n e d t o
E v a n s ' t r a i l e r and found h e r l y i n g f a c e down
on t h e f l o o r . He t u r n e d h e r o v e r , n o t i c e d
t h a t h e r f a c e was d a r k , and t h o u g h t h e h e a r d
her gasping f o r breath. Thinking t h a t she
would be a l l r i g h t , d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e
trailer.
He n o t i c e d t h a t h i s w a l l e t was m i s s i n g and
went w i t h a f r i e n d t o l o o k f o r i t i n a b a r
parking l o t , but they d i d n ' t find it.
The above statement differs f ram defendant's first
three statements in t h a t defendant f i r s t told police that
two men, w i t h p o s s i b l y a t h i r d h e h e a r d i n a back room, w e r e
a l r e a d y a t Evans' h o u s e when he a r r i v e d . No m e n t i o n was made
of h i s h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e v i c t i m . Instead of
jeans, t h e d e f e n d a n t f i r s t t o l d p o l i c e t h e men were w e a r i n g
jumpsuits. I n t h e l a s t two s t a t e m e n t s , d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t
Evans was a l o n e when h e a r r i v e d , t h a t t h e y had s e x u a l i n t e r -
c o u r s e , and t h e n t h e two men a r r i v e d .
Testimony i n d i c a t e d t h a t a f t e r d e f e n d a n t l e f t Evans'
trailer t h e second time, he went t o No. 9 South Caravan,
where he had been s t a y i n g . He s l e p t f o r a w h i l e and i n t h e
e v e n i n g o f J u n e 5 went t o a movie. A l s o , on t h a t e v e n i ng ,
he was t o l d by o n e of h i s roommates t h a t Rena Evans had b e e n
found s t r a n g l e d . The n e x t morning d e f e n d a n t was found a f t e r
he d r a n k t h e Drano.
The d e f e n d a n t h a s r a i s e d two b a s i c i s s u e s :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s
m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e s t a t e m e n t s l ~ emade t o t h e p o l i c e o r
h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r p r i o r t o J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 ; and
2. Whether the District Court erred in denying
d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s .
Four s u b s i d i a r y i s s u e s were raised by d e f e n d a n t to
support his argument that his motion to suppress was
improperly denied:
A. Whether t h e S t a t e p r o v e d a knowing and intelli-
g e n t w a i v e r of t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l and r i g h t a g a i n s t s e l f -
incrimination by the defendant prior to interrogations
c o n d u c t e d on J u n e 6 , 1 9 8 0 ;
l.
3 Whether s u b s e q u e n t s t a t e m e n t s made by d e f e n d a n t
s h o u l d h a v e been s u p p r e s s e d under t h e " c a t o u t o f t h e bag"
theory;
C. Whether t h e s t a t e m e n t s t a k e n from d e f e n d a n t p r i o r
t o J u n e 10 a r e p r o d u c t s o f an a r r e s t l a c k i n g p r o b a b l e c a u s e ;
and
D. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
suppressed because of the State's unnecessary delay in
t a k i n g t h e defendant b e f o r e a judge.
I. Motion t o S u p p r e s s
The d e f e n d a n t f i r s t contends t h a t the s t a t e m e n t s he
made to police in the hospital emergency room on June 6,
1980, s h o u l d have been suppressed because the State failed
t o show t h a t d e f e n d a n t made a knowing w a i v e r o f h i s r i g h t t o
counsel and right against self-incrimination. Defendant
claims t h a t while there is a s h o w i n g t h a t h e was r e a d h i s
rights, t h e r e i s no showing t h a t he u n d e r s t o o d t h e n .
The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e United States has recently
s e t down a two-pronged t e s t t o determine whether a d e f e n d a n t
h a s made a v a l i d w a i v e r o f h i s r i g h t s . I n Edwards v . A r i z o n a
(1981) I - U.S. -, 1 0 1 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, the
Court s a i d :
". . . I t i s r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r under o u r c a s e s
t h a t w a i v e r s of c o u n s e l m u s t n o t o n l y be v o l -
u n t a r y , b u t c o n s t i t u t e a knowing and i n t e l -
l i g e n t r e l i n q u i s h m e n t o f a known r i g h t o r
p r i v i l e g e , a m a t t e r which d e p e n d s i n e a c h
c a s e ' u p o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s and c i r c u m -
stances surrounding t h a t case, including the
b a c k g r o u n d , e x p e r i e n c e , and c o n d u c t o f t h e
accused,' J o h n s o n v . Z e r b s t ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 304 U.S.
458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1 8 1 9 , 1 0 2 3 , 82 L.Ed. 1 4 6 1 .
[Other c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d .] " 1 0 1 S.Ct. at
1883-1884, 68 L.Ed.2d a t 385.
This Court has recently outlined further relevant
factors which must be considered in determining whether
t h e r e h a s been a v a l i d w a i v e r :
". . . Other a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in-
c l u d e t h e a g e , e d u c a t i o n , and i n t e l l i g e n c e o f
t h e a c c u s e d , and h i s c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d
t h e w a r n i n g s g i v e n him, t h e n a t u r e o f his
F i f t h Amendment r i g h t s , and t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
o f waiving t h o s e r i g h t s
omitted.]
. . . [Citations
I n a d d i t i o n , a v a l i d waiver must
i n c l u d e n o t m e r e l y a comprehension of t h e
b e n e f i t s b e i n g a b a n d o n e d , b u t a l s o an a c t u a l
relinquishment of those b e n e f i t s , a s evi-
denced by t h e a c t i o n s o r s t a t e m e n t s of t h e
accused. [Citations omitted.] " S t a t e v.
B l a k n e y ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mont
1 0 4 9 , 39 S t . R e p . 436, 440.-
. , 6 4 1 P.2d 1 8 4 5 ,
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t made a know-
ing waiver of his rights, drawing from t h e r e c o r d and the
testimony a s t o h i s appearance. W will
e not disturb t h i s
f i n d i n g o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i f t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i -
b l e evidence t o support it. S t a t e v. Davison (1980), -
Mont . , 6 1 4 P.2d 489, 493, 37 S t . R e p . 1135, 1139; State
v. Grimestad ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. , 598 P.2d 1 9 8 , 36 S t . R e p .
1245.
Here, t h e defendant signed a waiver of r i g h t s form.
The t a p e o f t h e f i r s t i n t e r v i e w s u g g e s t s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was
a b l e t o understand and respond t o police questioning. The
officer who questioned defendant testified that defendant
seemed c o g n i z a n t o f h i s a c t i o n s . The d o c t o r who s a w d e f e n -
d a n t a f t e r h e l e f t t h e e m e r g e n c y room t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n -
d a n t was c o h e r e n t a n d a b l e t o g i v e a c o g n i z a n t s t a t e m e n t t o
police. A s the S t a t e has pointed o u t , t h e defendant is n o t
a person inexperienced with police procedures; he was
previously convicted of a f e l o n y a n d on p a r o l e a t t h e time
of the offense.
The above e v i d e n c e was sufficient for the District
Court t o c o n c l u d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t made a knowing a n d i n t e l -
l i g e n t waiver of his rights a t the first interview in the
e m e r g e n c y room.
Since we affirm the District Court's finding that
d e f e n d a n t made a knowing a n d i n t e l l i g e n t w a i v e r , d e f e n d a n t ' s
" c a t o u t o f t h e bag" argument need n o t b e a d d r e s s e d .
Defendant next contends t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t s made t o
the police on J u n e 6, June 7, and June 9 should be sup-
pressed because they are the result of an arrest lacking
probable cause.
The D i s t r i c t Court found that the parole violation
warrant was properly issued and the arrest p r o p e r l y made
because defendant's wallet was found at the scene of a
criminal homicide. Even if the warrant was n o t properly
issued, t h e D i s t r i c t Court concluded that no v i o l a t i o n of
d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s would h a v e r e s u l t e d . W e agree.
The test is whether there was probable cause or
reasonable grounds t o believe that t h e d e f e n d a n t had com-
mitted acts that constituted a violatiorl of p a r o l e condi-
tions. M o r r i s s e y v. Brewer ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct,
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. I n P e t i t i o n o f Wing ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Mont.
501, 464 P.2d 302, we upheld the a r r e s t of a parolee for
g i v i n g a f i c t i t i o u s name and " f r e q u e n t i n g t a v e r n s . "
Under condition of parole, Rule 1, t h e parolee is
u n d e r a g e n e r a l d u t y t o o b e y and r e s p e c t t h e l a w and be a
good c i t i z e n . The f a c t t h a t t h e p a r o l e e ' s w a l l e t was f o u n d
a t t h e s c e n e of a c r i m i n a l homicide g a v e t h e p o l i c e reason-
a b l e g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e was a b r e a c h o f c o n d i t i o n
o f p a r o l e o r a v i o l a t i o n of a law,
The defendant next contends that t h e d e l a y between
h i s a r r e s t on F r i d a y , J u n e 6 , f o r p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n and h i s
a r r a i g n m e n t on J u n e 1 0 f o r d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e c o n s t i t u t e d
a n " u n n e c e s s a r y d e l a y " i n b r i n g i n g him b e f o r e a j u d g e and,
therefore, his statements to the police during that time
s h o u l d be s u p p r e s s e d .
As we noted recently in S t a t e v. Rodriguez (1981),
- Mont . -, 628 P.2d 280, 38 S t , R e p . 578F, we w i l l n o t
h e s i t a t e t o f a s h i o n an a p p r o p r i a t e remedy, " [ i ] f t h e defen-
dant can show prejudice or a deliberate attempt by the
prosecution t o circumvent a speedy arraignment." 628 P.2d
a t 284. The b u r d e n is f i r s t on t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show t h a t
t h e d e l a y was u n n e c e s s a r y . S t a t e v. Benbo ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont.
252, 570 P.2d 8 9 4 , 900.
H e r e , t h e d e f e n d a n t o n l y showed t h a t a j u s t i c e o f t h e
peace was available from June 6 to June 9. Defendant's
presence i n the hospital during t h i s t i m e suggests t h a t t h e
d e l a y i n b r i n g i n g him b e f o r e a m a g i s t r a t e was n e i t h e r u n r e a -
sonable nor p r e j u d i c i a l .
More importantly, when statements to police are in
issue, the requirement of a prompt initial appearance is
viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t .
See, S t a t e v. Nelson (1961), 1 3 9 Mont. 180, 362 P.2d 224;
State v. White (1965), 1 4 6 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761; and
Benbo, supra. Here, there is n o t h i n g to suggest t h a t the
delay influenced the voluntariness of defendant's statements
t o p o l i c e w h i l e h e was a t t h e h o s p i t a l .
The s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n t o t h e p o l i c e b y t h e d e f e n d a n t
were therefore properly admitted into evidence, and the
m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e s t a t e m e n t s was p r o p e r l y d e n i e d b y t h e
District Court.
11. Motion t o D i s m i s s
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the Dis-
E r i c t Court s t a t e d :
". . . Montana h a s n o t a d o p t e d t h e s t a n d a r d
argued by t h e Defendant. The S t a t e , i n t h e i r
b r i e f , m i s t a k e n l y s a y s t h a t Montana h a s
a d o p t e d t h e new s t a n d a r d o f s u f f i c i e n c y o f
t h e evidence set f o r t h i n Jackson v. Virginia
i n S t a t e v. Armstrong, 37 St.Rep. 1563
(1980). I n t h a t c a s e t h e Court s a y s , 'The
t e s t for t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence i n a
c r i m i i l a l c a s e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e is r e l e v a n t
e v i d e n c e which p e r s o n s o f r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s
might accept a s adequate t o support a conclu-
sion.' 37 S t . R e p . a t 1 5 6 7 . T h i s is simply a
restatement of t h e 'no evidence1 r u l e : i f
t h e r e is r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d , t h e
Court w i l l not d i s t u r b the v e r d i c t . The
C o u r t w i l l n o t rnake a n i n d e p e n d e n t a n a l y s i s
o f whether t h e S t a t e c a r r i e d its burden of
p r o v i n g its c a s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . "
Defendant contends t h a t t h e District Court erred by
the above analysis and that, at least since State v.
Rodriguez, supra, t h i s Court has adopted the standard set
down i n Jackson v. Virginia ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S e c t .
In Jackson the United States Supreme Court stated
that in determining whether the evidence is s u f f i c i e n t t o
support a criminal conviction, ". . . t h e relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the l i g h t most
favorable to the prosecution, - rational
any trier of fact
could have f o u n d t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e crime b e y o n d
a reasonable doubt." 4 4 3 U.S. a t 319.
In State v. Rodriguez, supra, this Court cited
Jackson, stating, " [ t ] he e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o p e r m i t
any r a t i o n a l t r i e r of f a c t to find t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d
t h e d e a d l y blow o r blows." 6 2 8 P.2d a t 283.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t
a p p l i e s a " n o e v i d e n c e " r u l e on r e v i e w o f s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e
evidence in criminal convictions. This Court has consis-
t e n t l y a p p l i e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s t h e t e s t o f whether t h e r e is
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n , viewed i n a
light most favorable to the State. See, e.g., S t a t e v.
Kirkaldie (1978), 1 7 9 Mont. 283, 587 P.2d 1298; S t a t e v.
Campbell ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. ,
- 6 1 5 P.2d 190, 37 St.Rep.
1337; and S t a t e v. Wilson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont . -, 6 3 1 P.2d
1273, 38 S t . R e p . 1040. " S u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e is s u c h r e l e -
v a n t e v i d e n c e a s a r e a s o n a b l e mind m i g h t a c c e p t a s a d e q u a t e
t o support a conclusion." See, Wilson, 6 3 1 P.2d a t 1278,
and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n .
Moreover, i n Wilson, t h i s Court concluded that the
" s u b s t a n t i a l evidence" s t a n d a r d d o e s n o t f a l l s h o r t of the
J a c k s o n s t a n d a r d , and we n o t e d t h a t t h e J a c k s o n s t a n d a r d was
a p p l i e d i n Rodriguez.
The question here then is simply whether there is
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s conviction.
The e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t the defendant, i n summary, is
t h a t he was w i t h Rena Evans between a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2: 30 a .m.
and 4:30 a.m. on J u n e 5 , 1 9 8 0 . D e f e n d a n t had s e x u a l i n t e r -
course with Evans. Defendant's wallet was found under
E v a n s ' c o u c h . The E v a n s ' home showed no s i g n s o f a s t r u g g l e .
Defendant attempted s u i c i d e by drinking Drano on June 6,
1980. Defendant gave f i v e s t a t e m e n t s t o p o l i c e c o n t a i n i n g
several inconsistencies. In h i s statements, defendant
i m p l a u s i b l y c l a i m e d he h e a r d Evans g a s p i n g f o r b r e a t h when
he r e t u r n e d t o h e r t r a i l e r . He d i d n o t s e e k m e d i c a l a t t e n -
tion for her. Moreover, when defendant discovered his
w a l l e t was m i s s i n g , he d i d n o t r e t u r n t o E v a n s ' t r a i l e r but
r a t h e r went t o t h e parking l o t o f a b a r . W believe these
e
facts constitute substantial evidence and are therefore
s u f f i c i e n t t o support the conviction.
D e f e n d a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e a b o v e f a c t s show o n l y t h a t
h e had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit t h e a c t and n o t h i n g e l s e .
T h e r e is l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s i s a c l o s e c a s e .
The e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s h i g h l y c i r c u m s t a n t i a l .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a s we n o t e d i n S t a t e v . A r m s t r o n g ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont. , 616 P.2d 341, 37 St.Rep. 1563, c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e is n o t a l w a y s i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y . "The d e t e r m i n a t i o n
a s t o t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of circumstantial e v i d e n c e t o make a
c a s e f o r t h e j u r y and t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n i s o n e t o b e
made upon all the facts and circumstances which are to
considered collectively." 616 P.2d a t 346.
Based on t h e a b o v e f a c t s , a n y r a t i o n a l t r i e r o f f a c t
c o u l d f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
As i n o u r p r i o r c a s e s , we a r e r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e t h i s f a c t -
f i n d i n g d u t y away from t h e j u r y .
W concur:
e
34& J . w b&!QQ,
Chief J u s t i c e